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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
Competing claims for primacy by national and international 
interests traditionally accommodated a sovereign national right to use 
force in international disputes. At the same time binding internationhl 
law was being developed to limit wars and mitigate their excesses. 
The two World Wars emphasized a need to curtail unfettered national 
sovereignty and increase co-operation between States. The creation of 
an international regulatory institution open to all States, designed to 
foster a climate in which peaceful resolution of international disputes 
was the norm would, it was hoped, eliminate a place for war in Society, 
Accordingly, the unsuccessful League of Nations (1919), superseded by the' 
United Nations Organisation (1945), were created. 
Since 1945 the number of independent States in membership of the 
United Nations has multiplied but the organization has been dominated by 
two blocs formed on two nuclear powers with opposed ideologies. The 
effect of developing technology, and lack of consensus in both General 
Assembly and Security Council has been that wars have continued, weapons 
have become more powerful and more readily available, and States continue 
to put their national interests before the interests of the global 
society the organization was designed to protect. Technology continues 
to ensure a danger of nuclear war, and States continue to feel it 
essential to arm for defence and deterrence. 
With these contemporary influences in mind this thesis considers: 
(a) the International Laws of War and their application to 
International Law and Order, 
(b) arguments which sought to just:fy or abolish wars, and 
(c) means extant and J?roposed to define and confine the legal limi ts of 
~r, and conduct ln war, through humanitarian law, arms control and 
dlsarmament, 
with a view to concluding whether international law and international 
institutions have affected the place of war in society in the XXth Century. 
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PART 1 
LAW AND WAR 
In its evolution human society has deployed a continuing history of 
armies, violent acquisition and the use of force as a method of resolving 
disputes. If there is some evidence today that reliance on the use of 
armed force may be in a state of transition violence has not yet been 
universally abandoned. The pervasiveness of opposed interests in society 
accompanied by a violent source of turbulent energy has affixed the 
vocabulary of military operations to everyday speech especially in 
relation to commercial intercourse and litigation. One thinks of 'dawn 
raids' and'defences'. Some similarity of tactics is also employed in 
both military and civil affairs. 
Of war as a legal instrument of politics Clausewitz said 'it must 
be looked upon as a part of another whole' so 'taking on its character' 
from that whole, for if war has a 'grammar of its own its logic is not 
peculiar to itself,.l The same is true of law. Politics, however, is 
not necessarily grounded in ethical rectitude or even good faith: this 
affects both law making and war making. 
In considering law and war there are the similarities of 'righting 
wrongs' and 'recovering property or territory' adduced as easy rationales 
for propagandists of war whilst they remain fundamental to law and order. 
Similarly, to punish offenders against international law is one ready 
argument evinced for offensiv~ war leaving in practice only post-war 
retrospection at the bidding of the victor to effect some element of 
retribution. 
Service in the regular army followed by reading law and strategic 
studies combined in this writer to induce recognition of a failure to 
emphasise a necessary co-existence and contiguity of law and war as 
positive factors in the international system when general arguments 
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common to issues of defence and war and peace are represented to 
electorates. 
It is true that military law may be studied by the soldier as a 
subject for promotion and Staff College examinations. But experience, 
particularly in peacetime, was that acquaintance with aspects of military 
law referred more closely to courts martial procedure and the periodical 
reading of a section of the Army Act as a parade requirement. Public 
international law for first degree law students is a subject of great 
breadth and complexity in which the Laws of War form only one element. 
Legal (as opposed to purely moral) aspects of military planning and 
operations arise in strategic studies but such aspects are more commonly 
concerned with natural law as well as Thomist concepts. The fundamental 
purposes of the International Laws of War - the elimination of war, or, 
failing that, the abatement of unrestrained human conduct and the 
proscription of certain and indiscriminate weapons - may be overlooked in 
the study of the practical difficulties which current situations 
generate. 
Thus personal experience and retrospective thought led to some 
study of the juxtaposition of law and war in international relations, and 
to the related problems and conflicts which have arisen from the demands 
of sovereignty or centralized authority within the international system. 
As a result this thesis addresses such problems and how they have been 
resolved or exacerbated in terms of peace and war by legal influence 
exerted on the place which war traditionally has held in society. 
As both the international system and its constituents are greatly 
affected by history, environment, and human nature all of which have 
combined to promote a nationalistic approach to the practical working of 
international relations, it might prove possible to determine whether the 
consensus which results in international law and its institutions has had 
a bearing on the place of war as recognised by individual States. It was 
necessary to consider the major hurdles which man has erected by his 
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behaviour as individual and as society in his endeavours to avoid or 
prevent conflict or to make its effects less inhumane. We have to 
consider the extremes urging the exercise of untramrnelled sovereignty in 
the interests of nationalism at one end and the collective direction of 
international relations by a system embracing the United Nations (UN), 
its institutions, and the International court of Justice (ICJ), at the 
other. This is a continuing subject and its possibilities remain 
unexhausted at any time. For practical reasons, however, actions and 
situations only up to July 1989 could be taken into account here. 
It followed that the structure of this thesis was to some extent 
dictated by the elements selected for consideration and to their 
relationship with the wider subject matter involved. In what follows, 
Lpart I deals with the interaction of law and war in general terms. It 
briefly considers the International Laws of War and their application to 
international law and order, to the united Nations, and to military 
operations and the use of armed force. Thereafter Part II considers in 
more detail some of the arguments proposed by schools of thought which 
seek to justify or to abolish war. The respective positions are 
illustrated by concepts of Just War on one hand and the Rule of Law on 
the other. Between these two possibilities is a third which is examined 
in terms of the strategic doctrine of deterrence. That doctrine supposes 
the prevention of wars by the display of armed forces in relevant 
circumstances forcing decisions to be made as to costjbenefit 
probabilities. The doctrine's rationale is shown to lie in scepticism 
about the likelihood of abolishing war whilst at the same time disputing 
the fundamental practicability that any modern war can (in Christian 
terms) be just, especially when nuclear weapons form the basis of 
defence, deterrance or retaliation. 
Part III discusses the means extant and proposed to confine and 
define the legal limits of total war and to affect conduct in war so as 
to avoid the worst consequences which experience shows are likely to 
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follow the outbreak and progress of war today. Such means are twofold: 
first, humanitarian law, and second, arms control and disarmament. Both 
are direct applications of legal agreements. In practice the extent of 
such agreements is shown to fall below what is necessary if war is to be 
abolished or its effects really curtailed in the interests of humanity 
and specifically of non-combatants and their property. The uninhibited 
manufacture of arms, and the weakness of legal provisions which 
necessarily depend on observance or non-observance of international law 
by individual nations are shown as promoting possibilities for conflict 
between and within States and in the United Nations. 
This leads to the conclusions of Part IV which suggest that the 
direct effect of international law both as to the abolition of war and 
the prevention of any specific war, and on conduct in war and use of the 
weaponry falls short of the undertakings of the member States of the 
united Nations Organisation (UN) as contained in the UN Charter. It 
appears to be the case, however, that in an atmosphere of argument 
between wars' effects and international law and order an equation of loss 
and gain, rather than of moral evaluation, has been the rule. Experience 
shows that if war is not prevented it is not likely that conduct in it 
will or can be controlled effectively within the scope of the Laws of War 
whatever retrospective action is possible against those who breach the 
Laws. Regretfully, therefore, the conclusion is reached that 
international law and international institutions have not as yet 
displaced war from a leading role in international calculations and 
actions. 
A problem of this thesis, arising from its genesis within my 
experience, and from its drawing from law, politics and international 
relations, is that it may fail to satisfy someone versed only in one of 
these three aspects. Nonetheless, the interaction of the disciplines, 
and the insights which each can contribute to the generality of facts, 
may be found to be useful. The thesis shows that perhaps none of the 
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disciplines have been as successful in diminishing the place of war in 
modern society as the enthusiasts of each discipline sometimes claim. 
Notwithstanding a time scale ending in July 1989, this thesis 
cannot be left without reference to the momentous political movements and 
events which have taken place in Europe since that date. These events 
may well have major influences on the place of war for European states 
generally and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw 
Alliance in particular. Apart from any movement towards the 
re-unification of the two Ger.manies, one effect will be to heighten 
interest in arms control and expenditures on military forces. Extension 
of the range and acceleration of the current negotiations for arms 
control measures between the members of the two European alliances is to 
be expected. Another consequence will be an increase in co-operation 
between East and West in Europe in economic intercomnrunication and trade. 
In such changes, as noted in the conclusions above, it cannot be 
claimed that international law was the essential initiatory influence. 
The reason lies else~lere in the economic realities which have forced 
themselves to the attention of Russian leaders and the peoples of their 
satellite States. These realities stemmed not only from political 
policies but also from an economy organised primarily for military 
production. At the same time Russian attitudes, and public opinion in 
the satellite States, have been influenced by the overt effects which 
flow from the standards of, and administration within, the Western system 
of law and order - including economic order - compared with their own. 
The International Rule of Law. 
The society of nations is governed today by an amalgam of 
individual State's rights and collective international agreements. It is 
only loosely referred to as constituting an international system for it 
falls somewhere between individual State sovereignty and the principle of 
central authority which has yet to be consummated. Technological 
evolution has ensured that inter-communication and inter-dependence 
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between States reduces the political exercise of much practical and 
independent sovereignty except the nominal sovereignty to accede to 
agreements which events and relative propinquity force on States. 
Because the actions of each individual State may have increasingly 
widening effects on other states in any case the scope for inter-nation 
dispute and war on a wide - even global - scale is increased. 
Recognition of these developments has led to movements (a) designed 
to improve the international relations system to ensure international law 
and order, and (b) to eliminate war as an instrument of international 
'litigation'. In these endeavours it is believed by some that (a) cannot 
be effected whilst provision of the means by which war is made possible 
is a matter for national sovereign decision. It is also believed that to 
ensure (b) will entail the introduction of an effective central authority 
with the means to enforce law and order. 
The ideas are not new. The analogy of the impossibility of order 
without law in municipal administration canvassed in the international 
scene was resisted before the first world War. At that time it was still 
considered that peac~ was a state designed by the nation, on the nation's 
terms, and to be fought for on that basis if necessary. Eminent jurists 
increasingly disagreed. Some saw chaos in a rule of law applied 
internationally and considered that it was for each State to secure for 
itself, in conjunction with its allies, or by its balance of power 
policies, its own conception of peace, security and place in the global 
pecking order. Such a conception of international law and order was 
supported by the idea that the Law of Nations was to be applied by States 
not to themselves unless in the national interest and in conformity with 
traditional concepts of national sovereignty otherwise the matter might 
be tested by war. 
Brierly sub-titled his study of the Law of Nations 'An Introduction 
to the International Law of Peace' but, like others, he could not omit 
from his survey reference to the law of war no matter in what light he 
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regarded war in international relations. Oppenheim on the other hand 
devoted more or less equal space to Peace (vol I) and to Disputes, War 
and Neutrality (Vol II) in his treatise on International Law. In the 
index to Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law the words 
'peace' and 'war' have no place and he concentrates on the peaceful 
settlement of disputes albeit with reference to war crimes and 
international criminal responsibility. 
The reality is that there is no neat division but rather much 
interaction between war and peace and the law governing the two 
conditions. If that law is the product of times of peace much of it has 
grown out of experience of war and its aftermath. 
War and peace are concerns of States in the exercise of their 
sovereignty but there is a prior principle to be observed: 
lithe first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissible rule 
to the contrary - it may not exercise its powers in any form in 
the territory of another state."2 
In general invasion by armed forces is a breach of that principle: 
incursions at the invitation or with the agreement of the invaded state 
is another and sometimes disputed matter. The steps leading to such 
action are taken in time of peace and include the creation and 
maintenance of the means to make and conduct war if the situation 
develops to the stage where peaceful solution becomes unlikely in the 
traditional climate of inter-State diplomatic negotiation. 
Over the centuries changes in means of destruction have changed the 
nature of war. Following the 'total world wars' of this Century, and the 
obvious danger of any war taking on a global scale today, the necessity 
for a change in the organization of international relationships and the 
method of settling disputes has become increasingly apparent. Ultimately 
such change must involve the rejection of war as a tool of state practice 
if it is to become effective. 3 Acceptance of change, however, depends on 
attitudes to what is to be exchanged for what. In substituting law for 
war high ideals are not always reflected in statements about the 
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effectiveness of international law and about how it is to be observed. 
As Oppenheim pointed out, 
"It is important to distinguish between the criticism of 
International Law and that of the science of International Law. 
The latter cannot be responsible, to any appreciable degree, for 
the shortcomings of International Law whose growth and authority 
must depend on the willingness of States to accept, through 
progressive limitations of their sovereignty, the normal 
restraints of law". 4 
'Willing acceptance' must be borne in mind when considering change 
already accomplished. The UN, like its predecessor the League of 
Nations, was founded both on the rejection of an unrestricted right of 
individual states to make war and, instead, for an institutional 
authority dedicated to the peaceful settlement of inter-State disputes. 
From its inception the task of the UN, in addition to furthering 
obervance of the already established Laws of War, was to develop 
international law especially in connection with tilese three major 
issues:-
(a) Prevention of war by concentrating effort on changing the 
nature of international relations through an effective forum in 
which individual State actions could be examined. 
(b) Legality of state actions by an understanding that "the 
progressive development of international taw requires effective 
organization of the conununity of states". 
(c) Conduct not only in war itself but through continuing efforts 
to limit weapons both qualitatively and quantitatively pursued 
to eventual elimination and disarmament. To this end to 
restrict the right of States to research, design, develop, 
manufacture, deploy and generally to sell armaments. 
Experience has shown that war is not likely to be eliminated before 
States observe the common individual and collective standards of an 
international Rule of Law such as is ordained by the UN Charter. 
Whatever hopes to the contrary the founders of the UN may have nurtured, 
States still regard themselves primarily as independent, equal and 
subject practically to the dictates of their national interests and their 
conception of comprehensive security even if loosely within a world 
conununity where consensus is an amalgam of interests held in common 
rather than of a corrmunal glcbal interest. 6 Independence and equality, 
however, are draftsrnens' terms not necessarily reflected in reality but 
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expressing the ideals of the UN Charter (Art 2.1). It follows that not 
only are states still judges in their own causes but that they compete 
for leadership or influence within their political level or geographical 
area, and for such resources as they need to foster their interests. The 
majority maintain armed forces, whether for survival as independent 
States or to bolster whatever plans they have for their own futures. 
OVerall, the emergence of super powers with opposed ideologies but great 
reserves for patronage, aid and encouragement, dominate the international 
system. 
The contemporary system has recognized and so far tolerated this 
situation seeing some correlation between a place for war and the use of 
force. Until the system changes from one of individual self-interest 
into some form of international community, military power and self-help 
are likely to remain arbiters in inter-State dispute. 
In spite of pretensions of equality, in practice the system of 
independent States is dominated by the bi-polarity of the Russian and 
Anerican super-powers, with opposed political and economic philosophies 
promoting not only competition in their respective ways of life and 
outlook, but rivalry for the leadership of groups of other States. Such 
competition to attract a political grouping has tended to obscure reasons 
and causes, often of long-standing and indigenous, for inter-State 
conflict. 
To such long-standing causes of friction are added the stresses of 
positive ambition and national interests, although some of the stresses 
may lie in a belief in, or wish for, that equality promised in the UN 
Charter (Art 2.1). Movement towards equality, when interpreted 
domestically, may involve the changing of social systems to 
industrialization and urban living. Increasingly this is to be seen in 
the struggle of the 'have-not' States (more and more encumbered by 
external debt) in their efforts to become 'have' states. Added stresses 
are inherent also in the challenges and disruptions created by 
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intra-state violence and terrorism introduced by factions within the 
State. Such violence and terrorism may be promoted by, or be susceptible 
to, external interference which political and other interests can foment 
and encourage with the aid of arms transfers and commerce in illegal 
drugs. 
Change in the international system, or in domestic party political 
alignments, does not imply change in national ambition and long-term 
politics. In any case, change proceeds at an uneven rate and at 
different velocities for different States. 
In the Hobbsian situation national interests demand as a minimum:-
(a) Capability for internal security and external defence. 
(b) Economic well-being to maintain existing political standards. 
(c) Maintenance of values, material and spiritual, which the 
citizens believe to be essential, and 
(d) a world co~ity within which these values can be universally 
maintained. 
This amounts to a concept of comprehensive security extending to 
the military, political, economic, ideological and psychological in a 
system demanding a degree of inter-dependence between States. In such 
inter-dependence the lawyer may view relationships only as legal 
connections accepting that war is immoral but discussing only its 
legality. The soldier's view may be limited to military situations and 
relations whether in war, or in what passes for peace and internal 
security, conceding the unethical nature of indiscriminate weapons whilst 
wanting to retain (or, perhaps, obtain) nuclear weapons either as a 
war-fighting factor or because he feels safer with the weapon than 
without it. In the long run it is not possible for the political and 
social aspects to be ignored, for to the lawyer and the soldier both are 
essential to inter-societal survival and for the continuing survival of 
the State. Collins defined such a situation as, 
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"Political power over the minds and actions of men at home and 
abroad, geographic strengths and weaknesses; the economy, 
particularly natural resources, industrial capacity, and finances; 
the people, including their numbers, location, temperament, morale 
and education; the scientific and technological base; the military 
establishement, active and reserve; and, as the integrating 
factor, leadership"a, making up the power of the state. 
There is no mention here of law, but the place of law is more 
easily understood it if is accepted that the overriding and rational 
object of a State is the well-being of its peoples. That would be 
impossible without a regime of law and order. There is no general or 
necessary agreement on the means to be employed either within a society 
or between one society and another, to attain such an objective. This is 
not the result only of inadequacies in the international system or of the 
concept of national sovereignty, but rather that national interest is 
easier to understand than global interest and takes priority in national 
political action. 
In projecting from the municipal to the international it follows 
that agreement is not invariably desired for it might be thought likely 
to result in too great a diminution of national sovereignty. This might. 
be the case if it leads to a 
"belief that war has become unprofitable for self-advancement, 
unnecessary in self-defence, and at the same time unprecedented~y 
dangerous" for it would "constitute a powerful case for neglectlng 
military preparations". 9 
This might especially raise fears that a common approach to method, means 
and international processes was likely to lead to international 
government. Such a belief has been frustrated so far, even directly 
between the super powers. Indeed on a global view the situation is more 
accurately described as follows: 
"The legal revolution worked by the United Nations Charter has had, 
in some respects, an unfortunate effect on international legal 
thinking since 1945. Many jurists and official bodies (including 
the united Nations International Law Commission) accepted the 
Charter's prohibition on the use of force at its face value. The 
prevailing attitude seems to be that since international war was 
outlawed it would cease to exist; ergo, there was no necessity for 
rules governing war. Those rules that were in existence, such as 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, were considered historical 
reminders of a bygone and more barbaric era. 
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The facts speak otherwise. Despite the theoretical 
prohibitions of the Charter, war in one form or another continues 
to plague mankind. Indeed, in recent years there has been a 
recrudescence of violence".lo 
Of course, the maintenance of law and order has to be striven for, and no 
student of inter-war history was likely to take the Charter merely at its 
face value. Yet somewhere between the extremes of violence and peaceful 
persuasion the need for international law and order remains vital to the 
continued evolution of world society. This is manifest from the 
increasingly destructive capabilities of weapons and their growing 
potential for surprise attack; the intensification of the interdependence 
of states; and the incidence of continuing violent conflict involving 
both inter-State and civil wars. 
Whenever illegality occurs in inter-State disputes, inaction by the 
UN, absence of sanctions against offenders, and justification or 
mitigation through erosion of time will often give an appearance of 
sanctifying the original breach of order. Indifference or absence of 
response to UN resolutions regarding specific disputes show similar 
attitudes of non-co-operation. Yet if the relationship between 
prevailing attitudes and existing law and custom sometimes seems remote, 
law and custom are constraints in international relations, even if 
changed circumstances may be advanced on occasion to offer escape from 
the duty to honour treaty obligations which is vital to law and order. 
Since 1945 there have been many incidents of hostile acts and the 
use of force, or of coercion short of war such as armed reprisals by one 
State against another. There have been armed interventions which have 
not always been in defence of minority rights. These are generally 
incidental and not basic to the place of war, though they may lead to 
war. Such incidents are not considered in detail here, although areas of 
reprisal and coercion short of war, as well as concepts of neutrality, 
are well documented even if contentious in international law. They are 
provided for in the UN Charter. 
By definition neutrality is a limitation on the use of force 
directly affecting only the neutral State and not the place of war in 
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general. Neutrality is at risk today through the expanding technology of 
weapons and growing parochialism in the international society. Attitudes 
towards the use of force short of war may be changing in favour of 
representation at the UN with perhaps a growing acceptance of the 
proscription of armed interference in another State (although cases still 
occur). Participation by avowedly neutral States in UN Peacekeeping 
Forces indicates that the concept of neutrality is also changing as a 
consequence, and in favour of collective UN action. But the defence of 
neutrality dictates the maintenance of a military capability as Sweden 
and Switzerland show. 
Factors which have been identified as vital to an international 
relations system of law and order include: 
Limitation of the use of force proposed by the UN Charter. 
Abolition of the acquisition of territory by conquest. 
Recognition of governments and States. 
Treaty relationships, ~~e concept of rebus sic stantibus, and the 
UN Charter and its subsidiary instrumencs. 
These factors are all dictated or affected by public international law 
which is now discussed. 
Public Inte~ational Law: Definition. 
For the purposes of ~'is thesis law may be sufficiently accepted 
without elaboration as being, 
"The body of rules, whether formally enacted or customary, which a 
state or community recognizes as binding on its members or 
subjects".ll 
Admittedly that definition leaves unargued any difference of opinion as 
to whether any ~le or body of rules not recognized as binding is indeed 
law. l2 A de:inition of international law is not simple, and ~'ere are 
schools of thought regarding the validity of international law in the 
absence of a central authority and central law-making institutions. 
For at least three reasons it would be now otoise to construct a 
new definition of international law. First; there are sufficiently 
adequate definitions already which fit contempora~ conditions. 13 
Second; some schools of ~~ought about international law are unlikely to 
agree on any new definition whilst they remain undeci~ed as to whether 
28 
international law is law or the mere expression of morality. Third; 
whilst the Purposes and Principles of the UN, if accepted and obse~ed 
without rese~ation, would have involved changes in the traditional 
system of international relations and its concept of unfettered 
sovereignty, there is as yet little obvious and real universal desire for 
a more centralised direction of world affairs. 
Even within the conflicting schools of thought where there is doubt 
as to the source of international law, there is a general acceptance of a 
concept of binding agreements between States the provisions of which are 
to be observed honestly. If there is less general acceptance universally 
of the European inspired concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello they 
are sufficiently respected in the international community to form the 
basis of a law of peace and war. Observance may be another matter. 
Public International Law: Scope and Limitation. 
The circle of those whose lives are concerned with public 
international law; those whose unfortunate circumstances are the direct 
results of its failures and lacunae; and of those others who connect 
philosophical legal concepts and international relations, is 
circumscribed. So too are the numbers who consciously regard publiC 
international law as fundamental bedrock. Certainly international law 
may be considered a conventional system for those engaged in 
international diplomacy or, at least, as a convenient framework for 
disposing of disputes falling short of those disagreements between States 
which might otherwise lead to conflict. The system might apply also in 
relation to activities and relationships between alliances such as NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) for these also should be conducted 
in the light of international legal regulation. 
OUtside that circumscribed circle the connection is likely 
generally to be dismissed, for people do not customarily order their 
affairs and existence with strict legalities in mind. Nor do they regard 
the UN Charter as a manual of State behaviour and deportment. They may 
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have one overall view, however, that law is what is imposed by a 
legislature acting within the general bounds of some form of national 
approbation which includes the real possibility and procedure for 
subsequent amendment and repeal. If so, they miss the essential 
difference that international law results from consensus obtained at one 
time, remains binding at another, and is difficult of amendment or repeal 
having itself - if observed - become customary usage. 
Failures of international law in peacetime, especially when related 
to failures in the UN, are seen as inability to change bath human nature 
and claims for the primacy of national interest. International law, 
therefore, may stand or fall for many on its ability to prevent war, all 
else being regarded as mere administration. It may also be dismissed by 
those who find international and reciprocal concepts of political asylum 
and refusal of extradition where overt terrorist activities are 
judicially interpreted as political, as failure to enforce 
internationally desirable standards. Domestic analogies of sanctuary are 
now largely abandoned but yesterday's terrorist may be today's pontiff or 
prime minister. The effectiveness of international law may be doubted 
also by those who, studying the palsy forced upon the Security Council 
through exercise of veto powers, see only UN failures and so discount its 
peace-keeping successes. 
If they are resolved at all, disputed situations are resolved by 
consensus or by force. Both consensus and force are of legal connotation 
for legislation - as opposed to decree - is by consent in practice 
although administered by force if necessary. In international relations 
questions arise constantly: solutions even when obtained by consensus 
are imposed notwithstanding that the parties may freely accept such 
solution. This is the case where the backing of one side representing a 
majority of numbers or of potential force of arms, has advantage. It 
leads to Starke's 'ordered rather than a just system,14, and remains the 
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case whether the matter is administered under international law applied 
domestically, or by international organizations. 
In practice, like municipal law, international law represents a 
conflict or co-operation between the politician - as politician and 
legislator - and the judiciary or the national representation in 
international fora. Domestically the politician or bureaucracy often 
tries to withold what the Constitution or Basic law bestows. In the 
international situation, because national interest is the substance of 
dispute at the UN and The Hague, conflicting national views often inhibit 
the imposition of the sanctions upon which the law relies. 
Can there be law without sanction? Is any supposed difference 
between law and force really only a philosophical abstraction? The fact 
that legislation whether municipal or international is the fruit of 
compromise does not of itself exclude a necessity for force to ensure its 
administration even though, as Dicey said, 
"The existence and alteration of human institutions must, in a 
sense, always and everywhere depend upon beliefs or feelings, or 
in other words, upon the opinion of the Society in which such 
institutions flourish".15 
Where there is no general agreement - as is often the case in 
international society - although there is free and voluntary subscription 
to it the effectiveness of particular legislation must rest on a general 
agreement for imposition of sanctions where necessary. Where there is no 
sanction law and justice may prove to be insubstantial words. 
Consensus of opinion in international relations is diffi~Jlt to 
obtain but a factional opinion will not sustain international lawmaking. 
This highlights a difference with municipal la~making for in a democracy 
the will of a majority, however expressed, will prevail. In other states 
naked force not votes cast may decide as formerly in Haiti or the 
Philippine Islands. But all law is imposed whether by consensus or 
force, and law is law only so long as it is imposed. But the enforcement 
of international law is a complex matter of state responsibility and of 
international institutional direction or control. 
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Where the universal enforcement of common methods and standards is 
essential to the utility of an international measure the creation of an 
international agency with global powers may be agreed by States. In 
principle such an institution should serve two purposes: first, to ensure 
that the law is applied universally and is observed: second, to enforce 
the binding nature of obligations which might in some cases be 
selectively viewed by States so nullifying the purpose of the law. The 
UN is such an institution. It shows, however, that power to act in 
principle is not the same as approval to act in practice. In another 
field the Atomic Energy Agency, working under the UN and the powers 
afforded by its statute of 1956 and the Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968, 
demonstrates an issue where the enforcement and verification would be 
ineffective if applied only by individual States. 
political consensus in the UN, as elsewhere, is often lacking as to 
ends as well as means despite the over-arching objectives of 
international law. On the other hand, the passing of dictatorial 
national leaders may be largely unlamented at the UN -(though some like 
the late Shah may be subjected to greater opprobrium than others like 
Amdn). Changes of governments by force have been received easily in 
international relations for States must deal with the realities of other 
States. The same may apply to international institutions. The UN has 
conferred respectability on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
even in the absence of an agreed territorial base, and it did not 
withdraw recognition from Iran, in spite of the terrorist activities of 
both. But such instances merely illustrate various approaches to the 
political rather than to the legal aspects of such situations. 
Dethronement of constitutional monarchs and the displacement of 
elected governments are still sanctions imposed by weight of numbers or 
force. Such action may leave statute Books unimpaired, or the existing 
law may be abandoned if only in theory and new law may be enacted. The 
new enactments are then the law however obedience may be motivated, but 
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domestic change will not affect the obligations of states towards 
international law. 
For the purposes of argument, however, Hart's lead may be followed, 
appealing perhaps to Thomas Erskine and reason and to natural law. 16 
Like others Hart dismissed the question: is international law really law, 
as being a trivial question about the meaning of words mistaken for a 
serious question about the nature of things. 17 If he is right, Hart's 
suggestion that it is 'for each person to settle (the matter) for 
himself,,18 is related to doubts which obtain about any definition of law 
itself as well as the conventions which are evidence of it. 
Public International Law: CUstom, Treaty and Acceptance. 
Although in recent years much customary international law has been 
the subject of international conventions the principles derive from: 
(a) The Law of Nations which evolved from a consensus on behalf of 
the common good of all established with the authority of the 
greater part of the whole world. 19 
(b) A societal law developed naturally from international law in 
. t 20 1 S potency. 
(c) The valid development of the Law ?f Nations in accord with and 
binding in virtue of natural law. 1 
If it is accepted that natural law promotes the common good the 
contemporary state of international relations should accord with the 
state of law. The former is dominated by politics, and international law 
must at all times wait upon political consensus for administrative powers 
as well as for expression. But international law is unlike municipal 
constitutional law in that it is not a set of formal rules classifying 
certain fundamental principles of an expressedly permanent nature. Apart 
from the UN Charter, public international law consists mainly of treaties 
to which States parties have subscribed voluntarily, as well as some 
customary principles intet alia' as to sovereignty, territory, freedom of 
the seas, and the conduct of war. The customary principles, whether 
codified or not, are enduring and ReIsen held that the constitution of 
international law was embedded in the principle pacta sunt servanda. 
Others, however, cite rather the clausula rebus sic stantibus for 
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expression of permanence in treaties in practice, as opposed to custom, 
is less usual. 
Public international law accordingly is divided between the 
permanent customary law; universal conventions which are subject to 
amendment and are sometimes codifications of customary law; and treaties 
(which some believe are subject to unilateral abrogation through material 
changes of circumstances). 
The above three definitions of international law all refer to 
principles, rules or actions legally binding upon States. Much has 
reference to treaties freely entered into between States. As Briggs 
says. 
"From the dawn of documentary history, treaties have been made 
between political entities on the assumption that they created 
binding obligations which would be observed". But he adds, 
"perhaps treaties have been violated from as early a date in 
history" .22 
A first point about custom is as regards violation and withdrawal from 
treaties on which Briggs observed, 
"If treaties were made solely to be violated on convenient 
occasions, it would be difficult to explain why hard-headed 
statesmen, serving their national interests, should bother to 
engage in the laborious undertaking of drafting and concluding 
hundreds of new treaties each year". 2 
But treaties are entered into for a diversity of reasons and with a 
variety of motives of which subsequent violation may be one. Even 
so-called permanent treaties often include escape clauses, but these also 
have been violated. Hitler had constantly and publicly identified Russia 
as Germany's enemy and it was not surprising that the Russo-German Pact 
of 1939 was quickly violated by Germany. 
Professional diplomacy has an 'industrial' content for expediency 
is a normal impellent of politics and the will is often mistaken for the 
deed. Some diplomatic discussion turns on interpretation and States will 
seek what favours their interests. The precaution of including reference 
to the interpretative function of the ICJ is not always taken, for the 
gamble of judicial interpretation may be le~s desirable than unilateral 
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appeal to rebus sic stantibus when a State cannot fit its own 
interpretation of the provisions of a treaty to that arrived at by the 
other parties. 
The subject of the clausula is referred to later, but 
interpretation of the texts and of changing circumstances is not a matter 
of drafting for in practice both violation and withdrawal are politically 
inspired issues. 
Neverthless, whatever views are held about international law in 
theory, 
"the great majority of rules of international law are generally 
unaffected by the weakness of its system of enforcement, for 
voluntary compliance prevents the problem of enforcement from 
arising altogether. The problem of enforcement becomes acute, 
however, in that minority of important and generally spectacular 
cases •••. in which compliance with international law and its 
enforcement have a direct bearing upon the relative power of the 
nations concerned".:24 
Debate about such cases was common in the League of Nations but has now 
moved away from any effective or judicial tribunal to the General 
Assembly where sides are taken but which reflect ideology rather than the 
relative power of the parties at issue. Apart from a State's relative 
power it is "will to enforce" which may be lacking. 
Brierly had the view that, 
"the best evidence for the existence of international law is that 
every actual State recognizes that it does exist and that it is 
itself under an obligation to observe it. States may often 
violate international law, just as individuals often violate 
municipal law; but no more than individuals do Stater defend their 
violations by claiming that they are above the law". 5 
There are exceptions: States initiating aggressive war are really 
claiming to be above the law whatever justifications they offer. Wilful 
breach of Art 2 of the UN Charter would also constitute such a claim. 
Perhaps Briggs is right in saying that the, 
"phenomena of international law have ~urvived all the wars and all 
the dictators of recorded history".:2 
but from time to time States seek to by-pass it and justice may take a 
long time to be recognized and applied. 
The concept of an international law in the present international 
system has not gone unchallenged. There is still some sympathy for a 
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view that the Austinian definition should be followed. Others hold that 
there is no international law if effective sanctions are not readily 
available, and that international relations therefore are matters of 
societal arrangrnents. But the reviving interest in jihad and janissarial 
organization within States is in direct opposition to concepts of law and 
human rights. More perceptive observers realistically see what obtains 
in international relations where choice of law in private international 
law in practice is accepted by States just as custom and treaty are 
accepted in public law. Some may claim that this is the fruit of 
agreement and is binding only when the parties so agree and it is not law 
but merely a kind of morality. That view is misconceived: international 
law is binding because it is in the interests of the international 
society in which care for the concerns of the citizens is a fundamental 
of statehood. As Hirst said 
" •••• our modern conception of a state is itself the creation of 
international law, and it is by the canons of international law 
that the rights and duties of the state are defined". 
Definition is one thing, but how are the rights to be upheld? 
Hirst had no difficulty in perceiving a sanction procedure for in 
lithe case of international law the primary sanction is the formal 
protest or presentation of a claim by a state which considers 
itself injured by a violation of law. This method implies precise 
definition of terms and logical consistency among them, assuring 
an identi ty of meaning among all parties". 7 
In the case of intervention in the affairs of another state the primary 
action of the injured State is prescribed by the Charter as peaceful 
negotiation rather than armed action. This Hirst could claim is not only 
a legal system but an effective one in principle. It is those cases 
where the primary sanction is rejected and armed conflict is preferred to 
voluntary arbitration or judicial decision which expose the weakness of 
any final international enforcement in practice. 
The Status of International Law. 
Public international law is binding on States: if it were not so it 
could not be law. It represents a triumph of agreed common purpose over 
individual State sovereignty and, moreover, in a ~~jority of cases 
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requires no enforcement powers beyond reciprocity (which is well as there 
is an absence in major issues of an effective and reliable enforcing 
authority or agency). Observance by one side as a quid pro quo for 
observance by the other is sound enough in bilateral relationships but 
hardly sufficient in matters affecting all, or a number, of States at the 
same time. That is not to criticize the law itself, for that may serve 
international purposes generally. It is failure to observe it in 
individual cases which leads to war. 
Disputes are most likely to arise in matters where sovereignty is 
most determinedly pursued as regards territory, independence and the 
right to make war. The areas most neglected by legal provision as yet 
are those concerned with how and at what level a State should be armed, 
and how the use of force may be regulated: that is, arms control as a 
legally enforcible system. 28 It is here, at the fundamental conflict of 
the national interest of a State in relation to another, in an 
ineffectively co-ordinated international milieu, it is most obvious that 
difficulties will be resolved only by political action and not by legal 
theory. Legal theory points to the binding nature of treaties but does 
not at the same time provide for those States that have not expressed 
consent to be bound by any specific treaty provision beyond the 
possibilities of constraint in already existing relevant custom duly 
recognized as such. 29 At the same time the proper political action will 
be that which conforms to international law. 
International law, however, does not prescribe a universal method 
of adoption and enforcement, or of precedent. In consequence States 
adhere to their customary and differing formal procedures to give effect 
to what they have agreed and ratified as to their relationships with 
other States. Nevertheless, the contemporary nature of international 
political and economic inter-dependence, and the effects of the actions 
of one State on others, make it increasingly difficult to avoid the logic 
of agreements even when they remain unratified. 30 
37 
It is not necessary to spend much time with inquiry as to the 
status of the Law of Nations so far as the United Kingdom is concerned. 
As to customary international law, Abbott, CJ, said of English law that 
the law of nations must be deemed a part of the common law. 31 It has 
also been said that, 
"so far as the Courts (of England and Wales) are concerned, 
international law has no validity save in so far as its principles 
are accepted and adopted by our own domestic law".32 
This infers that the "agreements of nations which constitute 
international law" will be accepted and adopted. Alverstone, LJ. said, 
"whatever has received the common consent of civilised nations must 
have received the assent of our country".33 
and this interpretation is generally followed in the British 
commonwealth, although Canada stresses the primacy of legislation. The 
views of Rand, J. in that connection should be observed as against "the 
virtual repudiation of the concept of inherent adaptability,,34, for 
statute law is paramount in Britain even if contrary to international 
law. 35 Yet there is a presumption that legislation is not intended to 
contravene international law, so that a statute designed to give effect 
to a treaty will be interpreted from the treaty.36 But a treaty is not 
binding on the courts if it changes the law, extends the powers of 
government, or creates direct or financial obligations. Such a situation 
can arise because treaty making is a prerogative power and it is for the 
legislature to remedy it. It is not thus in the US where duly ratified 
treaties are binding on the courts unless a subsequent statute overturns 
the treaty provisions. 
For Scotland, however, 
"there is no such thing as a standard of international law 
extraneous to the domestic law of'a kingdom .... international law 
so far as this (High Court of Justiciary) is concerned, is the 
body of doctrine regarding the internatio~al rights and duties of 
states whic~ has been adopted and made part of the law of 
Scotland".3 
Thus it is apparent that there is a weakness as between one State 
and another for a negotiating representative on behalf of a state in 
international 'law making' may not be the domestic legislating authority 
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and, in effect, the latter may over-rule the former in a manner which 
would not necessarily arise in domestic legislating. 
Procedural differences between States as to adoption and 
implementation of international law are less important than consistent 
observance and enforcement nationally. It is here that a weakness is 
apparent in Hirst's appreciation which whilst dealing with issues between 
States neglects issues affecting only the relationship under 
international law of a State and its citizens. This is relevant to the 
Laws of War as is explained below. 
International law is intended to relate to real situations by way 
of prohibition, restraint, endorsement, interpretation and even 
encouragement. It does not initiate change in international relations 
but rather delineates boundaries within which situations should be 
contained. It must be alive to changes not only in scientific and 
technical development but in aspects of any system of inter-State 
relations that may be affected by such developments. This is true 
particularly of the means of making, waging, and preventing war. 
The absence of legislative processes for the systematic development 
of international law has made necessary a circuitous arrangement for 
attempting modification and development. The innate difficulties 
presented by conflicting interpretations of existing law and custom are 
not lessened when parties concerned refuse the judicial interpretation 
facilities of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and codification 
is not always a solution, for simple collation of any particular issue 
may entail 'new' law for some States. The difficulties were illustrated 
by the 1930 Hague Codification Conference where there was little 
agreement, and what minor agreement was reached remained unratified by 
many states. 
All this was recognized by the founders of the UN for Art 13 of the 
Charter makes provision for both codification and development. This 
resulted in the establishment in 1947 of the International Law Commission 
as part of the machinery of the UN. The Commission has submitted several 
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draft conventions initiating tortuous proceedings intended to effect 
progress towards international agreements on means to secure peaceful 
solutions to inter-State disputes. 
Yet if such legislation is to be effective it must engender respect 
not only for the statutory provisions enacted but also for the 
legislature and legislators, the causes, and the enforcement measures. 
Disregard of international law is often displayed in the General 
Assembly, especially as characterized in the public media, even if not in 
the Official Record. It is not public media reporting which is reflected 
in and reflects the attitude of peoples to cause and organization. 
Attitudes also embrace, 
"certain fears and uncertainties, some inherited from the past, 
some rooted in paranoia, and others based on reality".38 
Such attitudes are especially affected when the law and fact of war is 
debated although war is subject to law and the custom and conventions 
fot~ part of international law. 
International Law of War. 
The principles of law concerning the making of war are now included 
in the UN Charter: those referring to the conduct of war form part of the 
Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946; 
and those addressing some of the effects of war are the subjects of 
Conventions and Protocols. This codification, and the subsequent 
international instruments, followed world wars in this Century the total 
nature of which necessitated consideration of the combatants and their 
actions in modern war but also, and more particularly, the situation of 
civilian populations now inevitably affected directly by modern warfare. 
When war was a more simple art or science implying declaration of 
formal intention, mobilization, concentration and approach marches at a 
foot soldier's pace, civil rather than military law more often obtained 
for the processes were well provided for in municipal legislation. until 
the conscriptions of Frederick the Great and Napoleon and the creation of 
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standing military forces, soldiers other than mercenaries were civilians 
lightly uniformed and contemporary jurists applied themselves to concepts 
of international law accepting the notion that a Prince's right to make 
war was generally unlimited in law. 
As a first task they sought to place formal restrictions on how the 
right should be exercised and in what circumstances. They then 
considered what should constitute moral standards in the actual fighting. 
Thus their early discussions were about: 
(i) Just (lawful) and unjust (unlawful) war, and 
(ii) the conduct, methods and weapons of warfare. 
Whilst they did not solve the question as to who ought to be the rightful 
judge of justness and legality other than a prince who was necessarily 
judge in his own cause, they did evolve a 'highly sophisticated law of 
neutrality' with which to arbitrate between belligerent and 
non-belligerent. But there was still no real effort tc forbid war as an 
instrument of national policy, and efforts to control progress in the 
technology of weaponry were unsuccessful. 
Today war remains subject to the same necessities which seemed 
striking to the earlier jurists, but law has evolved as to formal 
declaration, as to classification of aggressive (and therefore unjust) 
war, and as to how war should be conducted. In addition, through the 
purposes of the UN, the need to abolish war is formally recognized. 
Law and war have similarities. Both are grounded in or by group 
culture. Both pre-suppose discipline and the enforcement of disciplinary 
codes, as well as centrally controlled administration. Both have basic 
philosophical backgrounds of society directed by its strongest element. 
Both necessitate taxation for funds to effect their aims. Both take toll 
of natural resources. 
There are also incompatibilities. Law's purpose to protect life 
and property is the oldest aim of most public law. War's ultimate 
objective may be similar but the essentially destructive nature of war, 
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whatever its ultimate protectionist objective may be, is opposed to law's 
fundamentally peaceful methods. Thus, war should never be regarded as an 
operation of law for law prescribes other methods for the settlement of 
disputes and the administration of international justice. 
Good faith (uberrima fides) is fundamental to legality in human 
relationships: aggressive war usually signals a breach of such morality. 
More than three centuries ago Grotius claimed that, 
"good faith •••. is not only the principal hold by which all 
governments are bound together, but it is the key-stone by which 
the larger society of nations is united".39 
Three centuries later the founders of the UN concluded that, 
"to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained ••• ",4o 
was essential if peace was to be encouraged and wars avoided. 
War and vIolence and the forceful acquisition of territory marked 
the three centuries during which an absence of good faith was a frequent 
precursor of war. Good faith must be evidenced today by actions which 
fall within the consensus reached between nations to which expression is 
given in international agreements and 'other sources of international 
law'. The standards are more demanding and the actions more transparent 
for they can now be more quickly monitored with the aid of modern 
surveillance technology. Such technical apparatus will be available 
whether the international system is one of individual sovereign States 
applying international law within their respective jurisdictions, or 
whether a central authority enforces the law universally with the consent 
and assistance of member States. The alternative, supersession by an 
imposed central and imperial authority ruling by military force is less 
thinkable, or practicable, under modern conditions and nuclear arsenals. 
In his study of the History of Warfare Field Marshal Montgomery 
said that, 
"The true objective of Grand Strategy must be a secure and lasting 
peace" .41 
42 
That same history demonstrates how often this has been frustrated in 
reality for wars have resulted rarely in the permanent solution of 
disputes. But although he noted that "modern war is "total war" 41 
Montgomery found no place for the instruments of abatement in his 
historical study. 
Similarly, when defining war as an act of violence, Clausewitz had 
been able to dismiss international law as 
"self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth 
mentioning, termed the usages of Internation~l Law, accompanying 
it without essentially impairing its power". 2 
Von Moltke the Elder thought little of the Institute of International 
Law's model code of war (1880), 
"The ability of codes of law to control what happens in war is very 
limited: there was no sovereign to enforce it". 3 
Such an atti tude was carried into the xxth Century in the planned 
disregard of legal obligations respecting neutrality by Germany. 
Fuller, ho~ver, in discussing the conduct of war devoted some 
space to a review of the international law of war, the League of Nations 
(L of N) and the UN. 44 
Despite von Moltke and other Clausewitzeans there is now in the UN 
an enforcing authority to supplement any attention which States may 
individually direct to the study and enforcement of the Laws of War. 
Military institutions generally encourage great respect for tradition and 
custom. A possibility that Clausewitz's dismissive attitude to 'the 
usages of International Law' persists should not arbitrarily be 
dismissed. Lawyers and legislators, however, may take a different view 
than military men being more wedded to the spirit of law than to concepts 
of military necessity. 
The effects of differences in the respective hierarchical 
situations of civil and military advice-giving channels have to be 
considered also. In civil affairs a Minister of State and a Law Officer 
are likely to be members of governmental decision-making bodies. The 
Commander in the field has a different relationship with his legal and 
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political advisors for he is himself the decision-maker, and, if subject 
to political control, nevertheless retains some measure of freedom of 
action. There is also a gulf between the effects of political expediency 
and the possible bloody effects of military necessity as seen by armed 
forces. This difference may be seen in attitude to the letter as well as 
to the spirit of international legal restrictions. 
Law in general is not necessarily or invariably prohibitory. In 
civil application laws are often permissive especially in promoting 
co-operation between States. The Laws of War are intended to restrict 
the sovereignty of states and their operations of war as well as the 
conduct of commanders, individuals - and sometimes governments - in and 
with regard to war. Such restrictions are no longer - even if they were 
when Clausewitz wrote - the 'almost imperceptible and hardly worth 
mentioning' restraints he dismissed. Indeed, Clausewitz's observation 
may have been confined to military operations and to any restraints which 
it was customery for Commanders to impose on their forces in both warfare 
and military occupation of enemy territory rather than in wider issues of 
international law and the usages of war. But the difference between the 
generality of international law and the international laws of war may 
have some influence on military attitudes. 
The effect on the place of war of legal restrictions imposed by 
international law may vary between States. A State under military 
government, or one in which the military dominates the political (as in 
pre-1914 Germany), may react differently than will the more politically 
governed State. The planning of acts of state (including war) may really 
reflect the strongest influence on government in its attitude to 
externally imposed restrictions even when they had been nominally 
accepted by the State. Despite the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969 45 national actions may depend on 
interpretations of legal instruments coloured by intention and ambitions 
rather than on good faith. 
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International Law and the Concept of War or Peace. 
Whatever a State's intention had been in exercising its right to 
use armed force in pursuit of its policies it was not always easy to 
determine in legal terms whether a State was at peace or at war. This 
was not a matter solely of the convenience of the belligerents and their 
relationships in law with non-belligerent States but was conditioned by 
the scale of hostilities and where they took place. Later the question 
of whether any form of armed conflict was permissible to the signatory 
Powers to the Kellogg-Briand pact((1928) UKTS 29 (1929) Crnd 3410) was 
determined by their condemnation of "recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies" (Art 1), and to their agreement "that 
settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature 
••• shall never be sought except by pacific means" (Art II). 
Another effort was made to strengthen peace by the General Act on 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1928 UKTS 32 (1931) Cmd 
3930). This provided for conciliation, arbitration or reference to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). There was little 
support for the Act in practice, and a simple definition of 'a State at 
war' still seems elusive. 
Since 1945 the place of war has been affected incidentally by the 
adoption of the concept of 'conflicts' rather than the more traditional 
'wars' in the UN Charter. There has also been a widening of the 
conventional definition of war and the application of humanitarian law to 
it. 46 Traditionally the laws of war applied on a narrow interpretation, 
for example to 
"a state of f~rce between States with suspension of peaceful 
relations. ,,4 
Today a more comprehensive coverage extending to war and civil war has 
resulted from humanitarian considerations recognized as necessary in all 
modern warfare and its effects. Thus, whereas Geneva Protocol I of 1977 
(UK Misc 19 (1977) Cmnd 6927) refers to 'International Armed Conflicts' 
Protocol II relates to 'Non-International Armed Conflicts' 
45 
"which take place .••. between the armed forces and dissident armed 
forces or other organized armed groups •.•. which 
exercise .••• control over part of its territory".48 
Such definitions, embracing both inter State and civil conflict, 
are really in terms of the effects of war especially on individuals 
rather than of war itself as was in point in earlier, narrower 
definitions. 49 The wider definition is not universally accepted for it 
might include internal armed conflict by self-styled 'liberation forces' 
encouraged and supported materially from external sources. 
Is a simple view of international legal concepts of peace and war 
now possible? If the former is regarded simply as the law of peaceful 
settlement of disputes whilst the latter is of imposed settlements, a 
simple division may be apparent which in reality is confused. In 
international law increased acceptance of peaceful settlement as the norm 
reduces the risk of imposed settlements. It is clear that settlements 
may be imposed by law as well as by force although some legal settlements 
such as by the Treaty of Versailles ((1919) 225 CTS 118) are the result 
of force. But settlement by law demands acceptance of a legal system 
whilst imposed settlement is a direct antithesis of consensus. The 
rationale of economic practice may be clear if only in the short term, 
but the rationale of peace and war even in economic terms is less simple 
than first impression suggests, as Russia now realises. 
Brierly believed that the Kellogg-Briand Pact prohibited the use of 
force short of war. so Oppenheim is fairly non-committal on the question 
of the meaning of 'war' and 'resort to war,S1 in the context. There were 
several interpretations: for instance that 'war' did not apply where 
there was no formal declaration, but 
"the findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal make the assumption that 
the phrase in the Pact has no lasting effect".52 
With reprisal and other forceful action short of formal declaration well 
established it is not possible to reject the possibility that at the time 
these acts were to fall outwith the Pact's terms, but that the events of 
1937-1945 made it desirable to include them. 53 
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That is to draw a distinction between 'peaceful means' and 
'forcible means': both require stringent definition. But the Pact 
contained some ambiguity in further referring to the renouncing of war as 
'an instrument of national policy'. Clausewitz would have had some 
difficulty in visualising even a defensive war as not being of national 
policy. Kelsen's view that war waged as a reaction against a violation 
of international law is for the maintenance of law and not war as an 
instrument of national policy would also have surprised him, for such a 
view neglects the contrary view that it is national policy to uphold 
international law and order. 54 
It was formerly the situation that war was only war when it was 50 
recognized by the belligerents. The Soviet Union and China in 1929 did 
not consider themselves at war any more than they have done over border 
incidents since 1945. The Sino-Japanese incidents of 1931 and 1937 were 
not regarded as war either by the belligerents or the League of Nations. 
Is the criterion to be recognition by other States of the situation as 
war? Greene, MR. preferred a 'common sense view' rather than reliance on 
the writings of various authors on international law that 'war' has a 
technical meaning in the principles of international law. Nor could he 
find any definition of 'war' in English law in relation to the matter 
before him which concerned the Sino-Japanese situation of 1937. 55 But 
Briggs points out that, 
"The Charter of the United Nations has gone beyond the League of 
Nations Covenant; instead of providing merely for the regulation 
of resort to war, it makes illegal the threat or ~se of force 
contrary to the purposes of the United Nations".5 
The use of terms such as 'recourse to', 'resort to', 'outbreak of' 
to thinly disguise, particularise, or render technical any threat or use 
of force, is not now regarded as 'peaceful settlement of dispute', and in 
any case now falls outside the limitation of Art 2.3 of the Charter. 
'Self-defence' is also stigmatised, as States can no longer be judges in 
their own cause on this issue, for 
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"whether action taken under the claim of self-defence was in fact 
aggression or defensive must ultimately be subject to 
investigat~~n and adjudication if international law is to be 
enforced" . 
As an expression of a judicial nature this is hopeful for the future, but 
motives for supporting one side or the other in the General Assembly in a 
dispute make it rather less so. It might have been easier earlier when 
it seemed possible to define war as a state of international illegality 
falling within the limitation prescribed by the UN Charter, especially 
Arts 2 and 51. But in the light of contemporary practice that would now 
attract the criticism that illegality invites prescriptive action by the 
relevant lawful authority. Within the limits of existing international 
practice such action cannot usually be expected except, perhaps, in 
retrospect as at Nuremberg. The problem may remain a real one despite 
the UN and until the adage 'prevention is better than cure' is taken to 
heart as regards war, arms transfers and the international arms trade. 
International Law and Milita~ Action. 
In the context of war and peace it has been shown that 
international law is a congeries of concept, custom and consensus, and 
(like other legal systems) of restriction. Parallel to other branches of 
international law the laws of war developed haphazardly and 
adventitiously over a long period of time as circumstances indicated or 
demanded, and without any fundamental or continuous view of the abolition 
of war itself. Neither has the system been the product of legislative 
planning of a comprehensive programme. Now not only does the modern 
concept of the elimination of war have its seat in the UN, but the 
possibility exists there for the formulation of programmes to keep pace 
with technological development in weapons and political change which 
might make feasible control of the place of war in the international 
system. 
Although sometimes infringed or eluded international law expressed 
in treaties, conventions and agreements is generally acknowledged by 
States. Whatever the possibilities for the future the present seems to 
indicate that the idea of continuing necessity for the use of force as a 
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nonn in inter-State relations has not been changed by any contemporary 
concern for ethical standards, or human rights and dignity, 
notwithstanding international declarations. Nevertheless, although some 
conceptual contents of international law are rejected at times by some 
states they are accepted generally even if with reservations. Examples 
are that wars of aggression, the use of indiscriminate weapons, and the 
taking and killing of hostages, are now held to be wrong in principle. 
Enforcement of international law, however, is affected by national 
interest and conscience. Consensual inter-State agreements are 
negotiated within a framework of national interests, and enforcement, 
which remains a matter generally for the State, follows that pattern. 
The obligations contained in universal instruments such as the UN Charter 
in practice also fall to be respected by states individually even where 
the Charter has provided for collective action. Peacekeeping forces have 
been deployed only with the prior acceptance of the States concerned. 
A fundamental recognition of legal standards designed to prevent 
war is inherent in the UN Charter. Similarly restriction on the conduct 
of war is accepted by adherence to conventions and other relevant 
instruments. Whereas the UN Charter is applicable to all States (Art 
2.6) conventions and treaties generally affect immediately only those who 
sign and ratify. Bi-lateral treaty provisions may have some effects also 
on third parties and Art 102 of the Charter is intended to give publicity 
to such situations. The conduct prescribed in such instruments (if 
accepted as nonnal conduct in international relations) could come to be 
regarded as custom with general application in the laws of war. 
Continuing development of international law implies that whilst 
changes of circumstances or alliance may result in changes in a State's 
obligations to other States it will remain bound by the general 
provisions of the universal laws despite vagaries of interpretation. 58 
In the general provisions for the treatment of prisoners of war, for 
example, during the Second World War the Geneva conventions of 1929 
(Treaty Series No 37 (1931) Cmd 3941) applied but neither Germany nor 
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Russia complied with them. Russia had not subscribed to the Conventions 
and Ge~y responded by treating the Conventions as not being applicable 
to Russian prisoners of war. Russian practice and custom differed from 
Ge~ usage which normally would have conformed to the Conventions 
(which were applied to prisoners of war of other nationalities taken by 
Ge~y). Thus, the conduct of both states departed from the 
Conventional standards so that neither could have been either correct or 
obligatory.59 In any case conduct antithetical to established custom, 
even if normal usage of a specific State, cannot become universal custom. 
In the Second world War the Japanese had also failed to adhere to 
the 1929 Conventions in their treatment of prisoners of war and 
civilians. The fact that Japan did not recognize any right of surrender 
by members of their own forces explains the national attitude without 
condoning it. 
International delinquencies of this kind do not have any immediate 
effect on the place of war. They do, however, affect international 
relations, inter-State attitudes and conduct when they fall within 
obvious policies of a state and are not aberrations of individuals. 
It was unlikely that the incidence of war crimes would be less in 
wars since 1945 despite the International War Crimes Tribunals which 
followed the Second World War. A 1952 UN Resolution60 criticized the 
treatment of allied prisoners in Korea. Of the US-Vietnam conflict 
Telford Taylor said that, 
"numerous reports of Ncrth Vietnamese torture and general 
mistrrrtment of prisoners persisted throughout the course of the 
war". 
Public display and humiliation of prisoners in the Iraq-Iran war was a 
constant subject for television exposure. 
Whatever the incidence of war crimes since 1945 the International 
Tribunals have not been repeated. This was due possibly to the 
circumstances that the Chinese, Vietnamese and Koreans were following 
normal customary practices and that there was no clear cut victory and 
defeat as the conclusion of hostilities. The Iraq-Iran situations formed 
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part of psychological warfare planning which took advantage of world 
television opportunity. 
Concern with the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians 
displaced through the operations of war has been continuous since 1945 as 
the 1949 and 1977 Conventions and Protocols, and the 1978 Red Cross 
Fundamental RUles62 show. It seems, however, that concern with principle 
regarding war crimes is not carried into international action by the 
States not engaged in war. If this was not so a standing UN War Crimes 
Commission and Tribunal might have corne into existence with some effect 
in the training of armed forces. 
International Law of War: Prevention, Legality and Conduct. 
In the modern history of war three aspects of international law as 
they developed impinged upon national attitudes regarding the use of 
force in the settlement of inter-State disputes. prevention, legality 
and conduct have been referred to traditionally as jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello. Today, war is no longer accepted unconditionally as a normal 
matter of international relations; its legality is questioned, and 
emphasis has shifted from justification of war to efforts directed 
towards its abolition. But the legality of war is questioned by those 
who consider that one side or the other must be an aggressor and in 
breach of Art 2 (3) of the UN Charter rather than by those who regard war 
as an expensive anachronism. In the reality that war has not yet been 
outlawed, international law seeks to provide for the limitation or 
elimination of some of the more indiscriminate strategies, deployments, 
and tactics, as well as weapons. 
In practice this more general concern with lirnitation of weapons, 
and in Europe with tactics, numerical size of forces and rates of 
financial expenditure on them is responsible for much formal 
documentation. The substance of these arguments which have been made 
regarding such attributes of armed forces whilst intended to regulate 
manning, armament and deployment in peacetime also has peacekeeping - if 
not abolition of war - in mind. 
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1 Prevention. Following the Second world War which the League of 
Nations had failed to prevent, the UN, as noted above, was established 
with purposes which included ~~e prevention of war by collective action, 
and by the development of friendly relations between States (UN Charter 
(Art 1)). Disarmament and the limitation and regulation of a~ents 
were to be considered in the search for war prevention (Arts 11 and 26). 
In addition, the Security Council was to, 
(a) determine the existence of any threat to peace and apply 
peaceful means of resolution, (Arts 34, 40 and 41). 
(b) take military measures if (a) failed (Art 42), and 
(c) set up a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist it (Art 
47) • 
The collective machinery provided has not fully been utilized. Perhaps 
this does not imply that States generally have lost individual appetite 
for peace even if the urgencies of their own immediate situations may 
weaken their resolve for the application of collective action against 
other States. Whether the passing of Res 177 (II), adopted on 21 Nov 
1947, was seen more as supporting the successful Allies in bringing enemy 
leaders before a Tribunal to answer for their actions is debatable, but 
the precedent of the NUremberg and Tokyo Tribunals has not been 
followed. & 1 
The UN Law Commission later submitted draft principles of 
International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgement of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal which included provisions similar to Art 6 (a) on 
Crimes against Peace&4 of the Tribunal Agreement. 
It may be said that the inclination in favour of peaceful 
1 h · th C d th t f'" . 65 d . d sett ements s own ln e ovenant an e Pac a ~ans an carne 
into the Charter was fortified by a criminal code in respect of offences 
. t 6& agalns peace. However, following events since 19~5, and failures to 
implement the provisions of the Charter, the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
«(1968) 7 ILM 809) (Art VI)) seemed to fortify moves to secure peace, but 
practice proved disappointing. The 1985 Review Conference on that Treaty 
reported: 
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"B (1) The Conference concluded that, since no agreement had been 
reached in the period under review on effective measures 
relating to the cessation of an arms race at an early date, 
on nuclear disaDmament and on a Treaty on general and 
complete disaDmament under strict and effective 
international control, the aspirations contained in 
perambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and 
the objectiyes under Article VI had not yet been 
achieved" . 6 
DisaDmament tends to be delayed by prospects of progress in the 
technology of weaponry. Whether the arrival of new weapons has an effect 
on existing strategic and tactical theory, or whether ~~e doctrines 
initiate search for new weapons, the effect on disarmament - and 
abolition of war - seems identical. This sometimes affects international 
agreements, for example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 (11 ILM 
784) where debate on the us Strategic Defence Initiative and on 
Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles will be carried into the Third NPT 
Review Conference on the Treaty which is due to take place in 1990. 
2 (a) Jus ad Bellum - Legality. Theories of just war are 
considered in Part II of this thesis. Of the traditional law only that 
dealing with declaration is pertinent here. 
Declaration of War was regarded as the next logical step when 
peaceful negotiation proved unavailing, for commencement of hostilities 
without 'previous controversy' and without attempted settlement by 
negotiation was a violation of the Law of Nations. 68 By the beginning of 
the present century declaration "as far as circumstances allow" was 
regulated by the 1st and 2nd Hague Conventions (for instance Convention 
III of the Second (1907) conference. 69 ) Since then commencement of 
hostilities without declaration of war has been the rule rather than the 
exception. 
Modern weapons lend themselves to pre-emptive action and to 
strategies of surprise making it probable that formal declaration will be 
unusual in future. Omission of declaration with a view to immediate and 
conclusive success through surprise (some modern weapons are designed for 
such a first use) may not avoid inquiry into the legality of action or 
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any breach of neutrality involved. That might not have been possible 
formerly for the 1907 Convention bound only the contracting parties. Now 
the UN Charter applies to all States. In any case, in the sense that 
States are regulated as to war-making by the UN Charter rather than by 
self-determination, to make war is no longer a 'right', and a guilty 
belligerent may no longer be permitted to attain, retain or expect any 
rights, or to benefit, from his unlawful act. The maxim ex injura jus 
non oritur applies although it must be noted that Israel has not forcibly 
been deprived of conquered territory. 
2 (b) Arms control agreements. International law is also concerned 
with the exclusion and limitation of weapons and, less often in the past 
but increasingly in NATO - WPO negotiations, with tactics and the size of 
defence expenditures and numbers of weapons. Arms control falls within 
both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, for the effect of bi-Iateral 
measures negotiated between States in peacetime also includes 
peacekeeping between those States. Some such agreements will be 
abrogated in war although, as Draper has pointed out, 
"The laws, whether international or municipal, are certainly not 
'silent' in time of war. In fact, there is a great deal of extra 
law applicable only in war. The international law of war7~s far 
from simple, as one would imagine from its long history". 
Thus, general (multilateral) treaties effecting limitation in arms or 
conduct carry on from peace to war. Examples can be found in the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions and Protocols and UN Conventions which are 
referred to later. 
The volume of the whole range of international treaties is 
formidable but omissions are glaring. For instance, the Agreement on the 
Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscrimiate 
Effect (UN Convention of 1981)71 excludes by definition the most 
indiscriminate weapon of all. Again, notwithstanding the Preamble of the 
Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and especially the Declaration of Art 
VII to "undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
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disarmament", the Third Review Conference referred to above remained 
pessimistic. 72 
(iii) Conduct - jus in bello. Like universal provisions concerning 
limitation of arms, formal provisions governing conduct in war are 
contained in the Hague, Geneva and other Conventions. The possible 
devlopment of an international criminal code is referred to below. Prior 
to the first World War it was left to national tribunals to punish 
individuals for the infringement of the customary and the later 
conventional laws of war. Summary punishment might be meted out also on 
belligerents taken in the field in the act of breaching the law. The 
XXth Century growth of the popular press and development of psychological 
warfare with information and disinformation, claim and counter-claim 
regarding the actions of governments and the military in war, increased 
general interest in war crimes. With increasing involvement of civilian 
populations in war the conduct of the belligerents was given a more 
immediate and general notoriety. 
After the first World War the responsibilities of individuals for 
war crimes were referred to in the Treaty of Versailles ((1919) 225 CTS 
188 Arts 227-230). During the second World War the Allied Governments 
issued several individual and jOint declarations relating to the future 
punishment of war criminals,73 stating that the punishment of war crimes 
was a principal war aim. The establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal followed as did trials of ex-enemy personnel by Allied occupying 
forces courts. In effect such procedure introduced a more formal 
criminal code into the jus in bello. 
In addition to jurisdiction as regards crimes against peace, the 
international Military Tribunal Charter afforded jurisdiction also in 
respect of war crimes and crimes against humanity.74 This world forum in 
which leading Gennans, Japanese and others were tried for war crimes 
ideally could have become a precedent for the future. This was 
especially relevant to Vietnam and Cambodia for the Tribunals had a 
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further purpose. In addition to war crimes they had jurisdiction in 
respect of crimes against humanity including such crimes committed before 
11 d · 75 as we as urlng war. That jurisdication was wide and included crimes 
with political objects and whether infringing domestic legislation or 
not. To continue in the vein of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
Charter was a purpose indicated in UN General Assembly Resolution 177 
(II), but there have been no international prosecutions for war crimes or 
crimes against humanity in respect of wars fought since 1945. Similarly 
those States that have acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ((1948) 78 UNTS 277) confirmed that 
"genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is 
a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent 
and to punish". (Art I). 
Pol Pot's present situation of negotiating power in Cambodia is only one 
example of international disinclination to pursue any precedent which 
might have arisen from Nuremberg. 
The precedent was avoided in post war international instruments 
(notably the four Geneva Conventions of 1949) and there has been a 
reversion to national jurisdiction and prosecution. At the same time the 
introduction of international legal interest in civil war by the Geneva 
Protocol II of 1977 did not widen the area defining war crimes which 
could be accountable to international tribunals for the jurisdictional 
limitation of Art 3.1 prescribes national prosecution. 
The position now seems to be that unless the victorious in war want 
to initiate international tribunals, war crime prosecution will be left 
to national procedures, especially in instances of limited war between 
two States as has often been the case since 1945. 76 
Behaviour in war may not be indicative of behaviour to be 
anticipated in peace especially where the normal place for war in a state 
is dictated only by the reasonable necessities of defence. Behaviour in 
war may reflect human psychological inclination carried over from peace. 
However, any licence allowed in war to the fighting services or to 
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civilian services accompanying a~ed forces, whether with or without 
superior orders, may be reflected in attitudes to law and order in a 
State when peace is regained. This is especially likely if known 
breaches go unpunished and if a different standard of conduct to that 
normally obtaining in the a~ed forces of a State is permitted or 
encouraged when in occupation of enemy territory. The post 1919 
experiences of Russia and Ge~y, and the present situations of Lebanon 
and Cambodia demonstrate the danger. 
Strict enforcement of disciplinary rules of combat will be 
necessary in cross-border and other military reprisal operations short of 
war where normal a~ed forces rather than specialist police-type military 
bodies are employed. An atmosphere of punishment may prevail in such 
operations for which normal ar.med forces have little training. Political 
policies of the bombing of villages (even though due warning is given) 
are bound to affect the civilian population. 
International Law and Military Action Short of War. 
Military engagements between the armed forces of states, or the use 
of ar.med force by a State, do not lead inevitably to war. custom in 
international law has cognizance of incidents of violation of 
sovereignty, retorsion and reprisal and other coercive means taken 
towards a settlement of inter-State dispute. The adoption of the UN 
Charter has not eliminated the custom or practice. 
A comment quoting incidents in 1985 was that 
"Whereas in the past breakdowns in international law and order were 
localized in wars, intervention, and traditional border 
incursions, there now emerged a broader willingness on the part of 
major powers to disregard the territorial sovereignty of other 
States, and, as a matter of deliberate policy to place milir~ry or 
police expediency above compliance with international law". 
The incidents were quoted as follows, 
(a) In the aftermath of the seizing by terrorists of the MV 
"Achille Lauro" US forces forced an Egyptian civil air liner 
to fly to and land in Italy with the surrendered terrorists. 
(b) Israeli milita~' aircraft breached Tunisian airspace and 
bombed what was allegedly the Headquarters of the Palestirne 
Liberation Organization. 
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(c) French Military Officers sank the British registered MV 
'Rainbow Warrior' in Auckland Harbour. 
(d) Following invasion of Lebanon and subsequent partial 
withdrawal of her forces Israel made several raids by land and 
air on villages in South Lebanon. 
(e) South Africa made several armed incursions into Angola. 
(f) US military aircraft made bombing strikes on Libya. 
(g) There were many reported instances of Afghan or Russian 
military aircraft breaching Pakistani air space and bombing 
targets in Pakistan. 
(h) Russian submarines deliberately violated Scandinavian 
territorial waters. 
(i) A South Korean civil air liner strayed into Russian airspace 
and was shot down by Russian military aircraft. 
Breaches of sovereignty such as these may be common but the law is not 
invalidated because incidents of the kind (if not warranted as reprisal 
or retorsion) go unpunished. This is a grey area for the UN Charter does 
not directly address the subject of reprisal and retorsion which, if 
lawful in any circumstances, must fall within either Art 2.1 (as an 
attribute of sovereignty and the equality of all member-States) or Art 51 
(the inherent right of self-defence against armed attack). What 
constitutes 'armed attack' may be debatable in the context, but terrorist 
attacks sponsored by or connived at in adjacent states may corne within 
the term. 
Reprisals 
"are such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of 
one State against another as are exceptionally permitted for the 
purpose of compelling the latter to consent to a satisfactory 
settlement of r difference created by its own international 
delinquency. ,, 7 
The term 'exceptionally permitted' seems to assume some international 
standard of reference bringing the action within Art 1.1 of the UN 
Charter (ie, in conformity with the principles of justice as well as 
international law), But Oppenhein also said that 
"reprisals involving armed forces are prohibited with the exception 
of action taken in self-defence or in pursuance of properly 
authorized international action". 7 9 
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He noted that this statement was contained in a resolution adopted by the 
Institute of Intetnational Law at Paris in 1934 within the terms of the 
League Covenant. It might stand today in interpreting the UN Charter 
although it may be argued that the Charter fails to deal with the problem 
of self-defence and how it should be defined in this context. 
Nevertheless national action under Art 51 short of war and actual 
invasion should be preceded by reference to the Security Councilor 
General Assembly under Art 35. It is, perhaps, a measure of the attitude 
of member-States to how the Security Council has been allowed to operate 
that self-help actions have been taken by way of reprisal as well as of 
open war. so 
Reprisals today may have a more general application to terrorist 
activities planned, mounted and provisioned from adjacent States. The 
continued use of antagonistic military force, however disguised as 
'freedom fighters', operating in and from neighbouring States through 
neglect of effective prohibition - or with active support from the host 
State - could lead not only to reprisals but to war. The mere presence 
and non-expulsion of such bodies of nationals of another State, 
especially where extradition agreement does not exist or is stultified on 
political grounds, will at least breach good relations. But reprisal 
. ., th d" 81 even for overt 11legal acts "must be 1n proport1on to e wrong one, 
suggesting some scale of judicial judgement rather than what probably 
will be an act of armed force, or as in the case of Israel and Syria (and 
the PLO), invasion and acts of war. But international disturbance may 
arise from economic difficulties as well as from situations involving the 
use or threat of hostile armed action. 
International debt and failure to meet interest charges and 
repayment dates may be met by methods of retortion such as tariff 
discrimination or blockade although those are less likely today and an 
atmosphere of mutual settlement, write off and rescheduling makes actions 
such as in the Venezuelan pr~ference Case82 outdated. In any case 
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governments do not show enthusiasm for use of retortion in aid of 
non-governmental banking transactions even when effected through their 
encouragement. As Jessup said, 
" •••. even before attacking the major problem of the right to resort 
to war, international law succeeded in surrounding the employment 
of hostile measures short of war with certain legal restraints." S3 
Although much of the discussion was political not legal, argument 
regarding the American action against Libya (1986) confirms Jessup's 
statement. Indeed, any action involving the use of armed force may 
constitute resort to conflict in terms of the UN Charter. 
There is perhaps a relevant question regarding the application of 
the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide ((1948) 78 UNTS 277) in the light of Arts 2.4 and 103 
of the UN Charter. Art VIII of the Convention does not seem to exclude 
individual State action under Art 1, but in that case the soldier's 
position as to 'lawful orders' could be caught between the unilateral 
action of his State with reference to the Convention and the 
international provisions of the Charter. In theory the question might 
have arisen as to Vietnam's interference in Cambodia had that been merely 
for the prevention and suppression of genocide. Telford Taylor said that 
it was in the spirit of 
"a government's treatment of its own nationals can be so contrary 
to civilized standards as to constitute an international crime". 
that President Eisenhower pledged support to South Vietnam in 1954.84 
Law, Order and Defence: Alliances and Treaties. 
In the past international law and order had a regional flavour. 
Regions such as South East Asia and the Middle East are areas where 
breach of international peace is a constant problem. One traditional 
method of promoting a regional state of peaceful relations was by the 
application of balance of po\~r policies by states. The proposals for 
equilibrium were evidenced by treaties of alliance. The composition of 
earlier alliances, in comparison with those of the post-1945 period, 
changed relatively frequently as the history of Europe shows. 
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The legal instruments generically referred to as 'treaties' may be 
drawn to cover any form of transaction in the scheme of international 
relations subject to formal rules as to validity, legality and 
possibility of purpose, proof and ratification. Treaties of alliance 
form one category giving agreement to legal obligations which may affect 
the likelihood of war. The concept of alliance is not a matter of legal 
principle but of reality relevant to international law, the place of war, 
and thus, to international law and order. 
Alliance by treaty seems to have a simple basis that two or more 
States with common purpose join forces to further that purpose. 
Simplicity may be more apparent than real for the common purpose is not 
likely to be all-embracing and may exclude matters of disagreement as 
well as national purposes not disclosed, or relevant, to the other 
parties. As an example, the North Atlantic Treaty ((1949) 34 UNTS 243) 
is considered. It envisaged an alliance of interests and territory, but 
the question has been raised: if the us is willing to provide military 
support to ensure the security of western European Allies should not the 
West European Allies in return support the American interests elsewhere 
in the world? But a complexity of the alliance is that US troops are in 
Europe to support US vital interests whilst NATO is a defensive alliance 
of collective security against external agggression in the North Atlantic 
Area (ie, Europe and North America as stated in Art 5 of the Treaty). 
Strategically, therefore, the question also seeks clarification as to 
whether the terms of the alliance embrace 'out of area' action if only as 
a matter of means for securing the objects of the alliance. 
There are other disagreements between NATO Allies relating to 
political and economic as well as military means. Kissinger has said of 
this, 
" •..• if the Atlantic Alliance is reduced to its legal context, it 
will sooner or later fail even in the area covered by formal 
obligations. The lifeblood of the Alliance is the shared 
conviction that the security, in the widest sense, of each ally is 
a vital interest to the others; in crises they must not have the 
attitude th~t they will check with their lawyers to determine 
their legal duty".85 
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The objectives of treaties do not require legalistic interpretation 
if there is common purpose, although the methods and means adopted by 
individual allies may be subject to dispute. Strict interpretation is 
less important than the political effects for in an alliance in which 
adhering States are of differing political outlook some disagreement on 
means is likely. The western European Allies have governments ranging 
from socialist to conservative, but both the North Atlantic Treaty and 
the Brussels Treaty of 1948 provided for co-operation in the economic as 
well as the defence field. Both rely on political consensus and 
co-operation. Similarly, the Treaties of Rome of 1951 to 1957 have as 
one objective the maintenance of peace as well as economic and political 
integration. These treaties were constructed in the spirit of the 
preamble to the UN Charter and, in consequence, with the objectives of 
the Charter. 86 Detailed examination of performance under the Treaties of 
Rome show it has not entirely lived up to the standard the Pearson 
Committee set for NATO, ie 
"An Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or 
engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of 
each other1 cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence".8 
NATO has heeded the warning and so upheld its main purposes whilst some 
of NATO's member States as members of the EEC have sometimes forgotten 
the ideal. 
One of the difficulties experienced in alliances is that member 
States may be thought to be equal and with equal voice. In fact allies 
are rarely equal one with the others, especially in economy, geography 
and demography. Absolute equality in burden-sharing is impossible and a 
danger of confusing protection in defence with protectionism in economies 
has to be avoided. In NATO this is particularly true of TUrkey. As yet 
it is not a full member of the EEC and lacks the economic advantages 
states that are members of beth alliances enjoy. Of course, it would 
have been tidier had membership of one alliance required membership also 
of the other, but international systems are rarely so comprehensively 
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planned. In any case a concept of collective defence within an EEC 
Treaty had not then been accepted. 
The practical danger of conflicting interests in a plethora of 
treaty engagements entered into by anyone State is underlined in Art 103 
of the UN Charter. Experience seems to show that there may be a 
difference in the attitude of States to either the spirit or letter of a 
treaty negotiated between a limited number of States, in which national 
interests can be accommodated (as in treaties of alliance) and an 
instrument of a universal character such as the UN Charter. a8 This 
distinction is coloured by the matter in point and if, and how, it 
affects a particular State. A subsidiary question is whether there is 
any different attitude toward a treaty to which a State has been a 
negotiating party or toward a treaty which was signed and in force prior 
to a State adopting it. In the latter case a State has to accept the 
existing treaty (including anything which it may not like about it) if 
revision cannot be agreed before entry. 
In NATO this has had the effect of not exactly accommodating a 
newcomer's national outlook. This can be seen in the initial 
non-integration policy of Spain. There is the conflicting aspect that to 
create an effective alliance some irregularities have to be accepted as 
in NATO in the nuclear ban of Norway, Denmark and Spain as well as the 
withdrawal from integration of forces of France. Such an outlook may be 
encouraged by Art 3: 
"the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". 
Neglecting any question as to whether 'individual' and 'collective' in 
Art 3 might be mutually exclusive,89 not only do States differ on 
procedures and attitudes to treaties, but even in alliances it is 
politically difficult to set aside the rivalries which influence the 
commerce and economies of States. Such differences raise burden sharing 
problems in NATO. Apart from the NATO states different reactions to SDI, 
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deployment of cruise missiles, and modernisation of nuclear weapons, 
there is also the repeated reservations of their positions of Greece and 
Spain in the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. 
There are also divided attitudes to both 'out of area' policies and 
appreciation of new Russian attitudes. 
Disagreements in an alliance are not limited to inter-State 
attitudes but include the discordant effects of internal disagreements 
affecting the cohesion and, therefore, the virility of the alliance. SALT 
II provides an example. Signed on 10 June 1979 by the US and USSR, 
Congress refused to ratify the treaty but the administration decided that 
the US would abide by its provisions. In December 1985 the US President 
submitted a report to Congress on soviet Non-Compliance with Treaties. 90 
The USSR denied the accuracy of the instances as reported. In May 1986 
the President said that from some future date the US would no longer 
abide by the provisions of the Treaty, but that was opposed by Congress 
which threatened not to support the President on the issue. 91 The 
European member-States of NATO with their considerable interest in the US 
nuclear guarantee also opposed the President's position. 
Thus, sectional views of national interest can give rise to 
disagreements extending beyond the state. It is also possible that a 
bilateral treaty although freely entered into by a legitimate government 
may be regarded as inimical to their minority interests by a minority 
most immediately affected in a member-State. Any dispute which arises in 
consequence within the state concerned may affect the operation of the 
treaty. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 is an example. The 
geographical position of the Kurds split between three States is another. 
The situation of Greek and TUrk in Cyprus being, or being regarded as, 
minorities of Greece and TUrkey could be affected similarly by any future 
bilateral treaty between Greece and TUrkey. 
Whether by accident or design positions of minorities have been 
provided for incidentally under Art 39 of the UN Charter. In relation to 
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Palestine in 1948 the point was raised that the word 'international' was 
omitted by oversight from the phrase 'any threat to the peace, breach of 
peace ••• '. That view was rejected and the way was opened for UN 
intervention where internal disputes threatening peace externally (or 
internationally) arise. 92 
Attitudes to treaty making are carried into General Assembly 
debates. The UN Year Book discloses the range of the political and 
security subjects discussed in the Assembly and its committees. Many 
show the voluntary nature of obligations envisaged and ease of withdrawal 
from engagements entered into demonstrating different enforcement 
measures between municipal and international law. 
As to ease of withdrawal from undertakings there is the example of 
a draft treaty text submitted to the UN by Sweden93 banning nuclear 
weapon test explosions in all environments. Of eleven articles two (ix 
and x) provided escape avenues one of which was of the continued 
legitimacy of primary national interests. This is normal practice and 
such escape clauses as, 
"Each party in exercising its national sovereignty would have the 
right to withdraw if it decided that extra-ordinary events 
relative to the subject matter of the treaty had jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country" 
may be no more that rebus sic stantibus in political practice. 94 
Leaving aside the point that alliances may be offensive as well as 
defensive, a traditional bedrock of international law and order in 
positive and procedural terms has been fashioned in treaties and 
alliances directly between states. To some extent the multilateral 
embrace of the UN has now overtaken the tradition. Ideally now direct 
military action between States should be obviated. Practically, however, 
the working of the UN may make for indecision, prevarication and delay 
because whilst causes of dispute may be geographically limited, their 
ramifications in the global views presented at the UN may make consensus 
among its member States impracticable. That illustrates one difficulty 
in promoting international law and order, and it may be explained by the 
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difference in approach by states as regards means although all may have 
sights on a common international end. 
In the State (or Empire) the authority equated the elimination of 
violent crime, insurrection and rebellion with control of the means by 
which such breaches of peace could be aided. Legislation such as 
Explosives and Firearms Acts introducing registration and licensing 
became common when effective civil war was made less possible. 
Legislation prescribed punishments and State controlled means were 
created to enforce them. 
Traditionally (and until the Covenant of the League) limitation in 
the use of force in international relations had been sought on a basis of 
avoiding war rather than in means to make it more difficult, impossible, 
or illegal. Forms of restrictions on certain weapons were suggested only 
in regard to the conduct of war. There was from very early times a major 
difference between State and international community in that any 
restrictions on war agreed by international consensus would be 
self-imposed and policed by States, not enforced by central authority. 
Efforts in the League and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to restrict or 
outlaw war were ineffective in controlling the means for making war. 
Such efforts encouraged a notion that enforcement of international law 
and order requires not only the elimination of war by and on behalf of 
States (as opposed to the world community) but also the essential 
supporting factor of verifiatle arms control and disarmament measures. 
Limitation of the ability to use force is not yet implicit in arms 
control measures for these 50 far seek levels and balances in national 
arsenals. However, doubt about the utility of modern military operations 
to attain, and retain, objectives of political ambition which other means 
have failed to secure or retain may be a more potent constraining factor. 
Limitations on the Use of Force. 
International law and order ideally promote the peaceful settlement 
of disputes between States: the alternative is the use of force either by 
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States or international institutions. In such a choice the earlier 
unfettered right of a State to make war has been restrained and 
restricted by two factors introduced in this Century. First, there is a 
series of treaty obligations in instruments such as the League of Nations 
Covenant (225 CTS 195), the Kellogg-Briand Pact ((1928) UKTS 29 (1929) 
Cmd 3410), the Argentine Anti-War Pact ((1933) USTS 881) and the united 
Nations Charter ((1945) 1UNTS xvi). All were designed to prevent 
aggression and aggressive war or intimidation by threat of war. Second, 
the increasing destructive effects and environmental dangers of nuclear 
and other weapons, makes their potential effect a deterrent to use. But 
the use of force by States continues as a consequence of the inability or 
reluctance of States as an international society to prevent it. This 
seems especially true in circumstances in which a State sees no other 
methods by which its just cause may prevail or its security may be 
secured. 
Ideas about the prevention of war are not new. There were 
prohibitions in the Constitutions of France, Venezuela, Equador, San 
Domingo, Brazil, Uruguay, Portugal, the Netherlands, and spain. 95 Some 
modern Constitutions - Japan's for example - seek a war-free future. 
States with such constitutional inhibitions remain in the minority today, 
and more than at any time in the past, these words of Clausewitz need 
reflection: 
"now, the first, the grandest, and most desirable act of judgement 
which the Statesman and General exercises is rightly to understand 
in this respect the War in which he engages, not to take it for 
something, or to wish to make of it something, whjch by the nature 
of its relations it is impossible for it to be ll ,9 
and, referring to political policy. 
"war (is) only the instrument, not the reverse. The subordination 
of the military point of view t~ the political is, therefore, the 
only thing which is possible". 9 
But if war is undertaken it must be realized that, 
"of all branches of human acti vi ty (i tis) the mos t li ke a gambling 
game. 11 98 
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Emphasising the political nature of war, and referring to limited 
war, Kissinger said, 
"The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is to re-introduce 
the political element into our concept of warfare and to discard 
the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war can have 
goals distinct from those of national policy".99 
This has applied to all war in the past, but would exclude all-out 
nuclear war as being without meaningful political object. The 
elimination and abolition of war will be a political act when, and if, 
politicians and circumstances can be brought to contemplate such an end. 
until then, coercion in international relations by armed force is 
circumscribed by two counter-policies, 
(a) Deterrence: the threat of the use of armed force including 
nuclear forces. 
(b) Limited war: ie, limited to conventional weapons, but with 
danger of escalation to total war. 
and by four limitations, 
(c) Legal: Anti-war provlslons of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
and the UN Charter, with the possibility of 
collective action. 
(d) Military: threat of nuclear devastation involving the 
calculation of 'profit and loss' especially as 
impinging on the interests of the superpowers. 
(e) Economic: the cost of maintaining armed forces and their 
equipment and the opportunity costs thereby 
involved. 
(f) Psychological:world public opinion. 
These limitations are discussed below. 
(a) Deterrence. 
This is dealt with more fully in Part II and it is necessary here 
to point to two limiting aspects regarding the use of force in deterrent 
theory. First, so long as deterrent measures succeed the use of force 
remains unnecessary. Second, where deterrence theory is based on the 
threat to use nuclear weapons the threat is supported by planning in 
peacetime which includes the targeting of centres containing civilian 
populations. Possession of, targeting with, and threat to use nuclear 
weapons may not be illegal p~r se, but actual use would contravene 
international humanitarian law as espressed in General Assembly Res 1653 
(XVI) of 24 January 1961. 100 That Resolution stigmatized the use of 
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nuclear weapons as violating the Charter, constituting a crime against 
mankind and civilization. If tilis does not seem to affect the actual 
deterrent threat the law is obfuscated rather in the manner which obtains 
in the British interpretation that, 
"While there is no rule of international law dealing specifically 
with the use of nuclear weapons •.•. their use is governed by 
general principles of international law". 1 0 1 
Of course, the discussion would be unnecessary if circumstances permitted 
unvarying acceptance of Chapter VII of the Charter, and "the general 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance and the 
restoration of peace". 1 0 2 
(b) Lirni ted War. 
'Limited war' is an expression of objectives not specifically of 
means and method, although these may be limited incidentally. For 
example, the 
"philosophy of the Israeli Defence Force is very clear - to win, 
and win decisively - for the State to survive it is insufficient 
not to lose a battle, victory must be absolute. Israel is 
committed to the belief that 'wars cannot be won by remaining on 
the defensive' against an enemy employing mass and momentum and 
having superior material resources, a prolonged defence is seen as 
courting disaster".103 
The limitation there is in the objective of total victory in battle 
not the subjugation of the enemy people and territory even if conquered 
territory incidentally acquired has not been surrendered willingly or 
gracefully. But objectives of Israel's military operations have always 
been limited even when pre-emptive operations have been the means, as in 
Lebanon. Weapons, too, have been limited to the conventional. 
Nevertheless, to describe any war as 'limited' is probably a 
misnomer and a relic of time when the description was a euphemism for 
military action which a State did not wish to describe as giving rise to 
a 'state of war,.104 Any war, for whatever limited objective, and by 
whatever limited means or geographical restriction, is always liable to 
become general, uncontrollable and total today, unless means of ending it 
are foreseen from the start. 
69 
Modern limited war is not a matter merely of a limited use of 
force. The 
"world situation is characterized by the existence of conflicts 
which are limited, not only geographically, but also with res~ect 
to the size of the belligerents and the means used by them".l 5 
But with nuclear and biological weapons especially in mind, 
"consciousness about limited war an an instrument of policy has 
emerged in reaction to the growing caracity and inclination of 
states to wage general, total war".10 
Limited war may be said to be war in which the object is to seek 
the settlement of a dispute rather than to subjugate an enemy, but the 
difficulty of controlling such a war is obvious as can be seen in the 
Iraq-Iran conflict. The Korean and Vietnam wars may have been intended 
to be limited by the UNjUS, but both North Korea and North Vietnam were 
prepared to accept the effects of total war. This was not readily 
understood by their opponents. 
(c) Anti war: legal provisions. 
In the settlement of disputes the legal duty of stales is set out 
in the UN Charter. states are not required to meet military aggression 
merely passively: the use of forceful resistance is permissible, Art 51 
being a necessary bridge between the ideal and the reality. Law and fact 
are often 'a discordance,lo7, so that whilst States subscribe to the 
anti-war provisions they muster their own national precautions either as 
individual States or in alliances. They must do this because if the 
Security Council does not enforce the provisions of the Charter, and if 
it remains possible to use Art 51 to support a chosen course of armed 
action, States have no alternative for even neutrality must rerrain at 
risk. In any case, it is war not preparations for defence to which the 
legal proviSions apply. 
(d) The 'profit and loss' calculation. 
Acceptable loss in relation to possible gain is likely to be a 
military-economic assessment for the relation of national means to 
national ends through war can be determined realistically only by 
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reference to the probable cost of attaining the political objective, its 
worth when attained, and the subsequent maintenance costs. Such 
calculations are usually untrustworthy and they go beyond the loss of 
men, material and, perhaps, territory, but they are unrelated to any 
consideration of law. Fuller put it that, 
"there is always a relationship between force and aim. The first 
must be sufficient to attain the second, but not so excessive that 
it cancels it out. This is the crux in nuclear warfare".108 
The probability of meaningful political gains from nuclear warfare 
depends on the calculation of the escalation level likely to be reached 
in conflict, but 
"from the point of view of any sane political aim, all out nuclear 
war is nonsense".109 
In circumstances which are likely at some stage to involve directly 
larger industrial States, Fuller's words could be applied to all out 
conventional war. 
There is a further point: in the past there have been legalistic 
justifications offered for the use of force, as well as euphemisms 
providing legal characteristics to obscure a 'state of war' 
differentiating it from a 'state of peace,.110 War was earlier primarily 
a matter for belligerent States with some customary practice regarding 
neutrality and neutral rights and duties. The fundamental approach 
today, however, is that the earlier probability of keeping a war limited 
to the original participants and their territories (including maritime 
areas) is more difficult to ensure. lll In such unforeseeable 
circumstances the loss/gain calculation may be even more unreliable as 
experience in this Century indicates. 
(e) The cost of maintaining armed forces and their equipment. 
War is a matter of money, but the economics of defence procurement 
and maintenance generally are not constrained by international law. It 
is not proposed to pursue the topic here but merely to point out that in 
this, as in all matters connected with national defence, States are not 
completely sovereign. 
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The security of a State rests on successful defence policies which, 
in turn, are derived in part from the morale, health and economic 
well-being of the citizens. The maintenance of each of these aspects 
must be taken into account in the competition for national expenditure. 
States which unduly favour defence expenditure at the expense of other, 
social, votes, or through excessively high taxation, are often those with 
serious internal unrest. Further, attention to Human Rights issues not 
only involves consequential and competing financial provision, but also 
promotes attitudes which are inimical to war and the use of force. 
In addition, there is a danger that costs being of first importance 
in defence policies, the will o'the wisp of nuclear weapons and forces 
being cheaper than large conventional forces may be pursued as it has 
been in NATO and with similar problems of conventional/nuclear funding. 
It may not yet be entirely possible to make war solely on external 
credit, though the national debts of many States are evidence of 
war-making on credit. The comparitive ease with which re-supply can be 
obtained on government-to-government basis, as instanced by both Israel 
and Egypt, is a factor affecting the place of war. Cost, however, 
remains a constraint on the use of force for it is the constant in any 
profit and loss calculstion. 
(f) World Public Opinion 
'War in the sitting room' has been made practicable by the instant 
communications systems now available to the public. It is no longer 
possible to divorce war from other news being reported through these 
direct systems although censorship of some kind may still be locally 
possible. International relations tend increasingly to be conducted in 
public although it is often difficult to disintangle fact from 
speculation especially where situations are simulated by information 
media and are not always what they purport to be. Subject to such 
imperfections, the reactions of a better-informed public are quickly made 
known. This is not decisive, for some states more or less effectively 
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continue to limit access by their citizens to unbiased reporting and 
media and, instead, limit the viewers and readers to the government's 
prejudiced views. 
Peoples have been led (particularly by politicians) to believe that 
the principal purpose of governments is to further improve ti!e citizens' 
economic standards and social well-being. It follows that unless 
governments can induce by propaganda a 'siege mentality' or a spirit of 
expansionism and conquest, the notion that expenditure on war is 
necessarily wasteful becomes increasingly dominant even at a time when 
violence also seems to be increasing in many countries. But daily 
presentation by television of incidents from war zones, as in the US 
during the Vietnam war, may promote a revulsion against s state's 
policies or the methods used in war to carry them out. It is important 
for both State and television to maintain a proper perspective so as not 
to submerge the real action and policies by a 'what is seen on 
television' simulation for the actual bettlefield action. There is also 
a danger of "indigenous dynamics at work" (as in the Third World) 
"tending to bring about an environment where the use of force may become 
a way of life" .112 
The international system is bedevilled by changing alignments and 
relationships affecting local balance: these need to be explained to the 
public. The fundamental task from a government's point of view, however, 
is to put forward arguments and perspectives to support what it sees as 
the national interest. The reciprocal is that governments will also want 
to curb views contrary to their own. In States with relatively 'free' 
media there is a difference between what can and will be tolerated in 
peace and what in war. Overall, however, the promotion of freedom of 
speech and a free press by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art 
19), and the American Convention on Human Rights (Art 13) and other such 
Conventions, may also promote movement in favour of limiting the use of 
force. 
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The United Nations and the place of War. 
The major purpose of the association of states in the UN was to 
affect the place of war, or the abolition of any place for war, in the 
international system. After nearly fifty years the question may be asked 
whether the UN has materially influenced the nations towards the end 
desired. If not, have the Purposes and Principles been rejected in 
intention or fact, or is it that the machinery of the UN is deficient and 
incapable of giving effect to them. The answers may be coloured by views 
as to whether it is unreasonable to expect the acceptance of a society 
fully conforming to the ideals within some defined tract of time. Or is 
a continued progress towards the ideal all that ought to be expected, in 
which case, is such progress apparent. 
The UN ideal is based on the practicability of a consensus between 
States which will allow a form of central world control. In any society 
such control raises contentious issues, objections to central control or 
supervision of matters impinging on national sovereignty were not new in 
1945 when the UN was conceived of as the 
"centre for harmonizing the action of nations in the attainment of 
their common ends", r~d was established "for realistic as well as 
spi ritual reasons". 1 
However, like its predecessor, the League, the UN is subject to what M 
Rouvier observed in 1906 of the proposed Conference of Algeciras, namely 
that, 
"It would be inconsistent with the dignity of a Great Power to 
subaUt itself to what might be the decisive1y?ice of some 
secondary State such as Sweden or Denmark". 
He was not alone in such thought: in Spring 1912 Turkey, for good 
reasons, closed the Dardanelles giving rise to the question whether the 
Turks had the right to exclude merchant ships. Then, as later, 
" ••.. the Russians were not in the mood to rest their case on 
international lawalolle". 'Public opinion' their Ambassador 
said ••.• "would not concern itself with the responsibili ty of 
Turkey or Italy, nor with any treaty rights, but would simply and 
unanimously demand that the Straits be opened to Russian trade, 
and the C~vernment would certainly have to yield".115 
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Views reflecting national strength had relevance for the UN which, 
although established to ensure 
"a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in 
peace in safety within their own boundaries", 
could reach that goal only if the actions taken were not against the 
perceived interests of one or all of the five Great Powers. That was the 
justification for the right of veto power in the Security Council, and 
was intended to ensure such a peace and attain the ideal that, 
"all of the nations of the world ••• must come to the abandonment of 
the use of force as the alternative in a world of over population 
and over production which can be corrected by the age old 
scourges of famine and war in a world organized for power and 
ruled by fear".116 
There is a clear dichotomy between (a) the views of Rouvier and the 
Russians on the right of other States (for such rights include 
"self-preservation, independence, equality, respect and international 
commerce ,,11 7 , all of which are enshrined within the UN Charter, and (b) 
the surrender of the right to ensure those rights by a State's own 
efforts rather than in a collectivity with the help of others but being 
subject to a central authority. Within an international relations 
system, however, the interpretation of rights is not a matter solely for 
unilateral decision whatever national interest demands. Nevertheless, a 
veto right exercised is an expression of national interest. 
Stalin had something of this in mind when he demanded in the UN, 
"absolute assertion of the rights of the 'Big Three' against all 
the bleating of the small powers that their rights were at risk" 
even if this "did not preclude participation in a concert of the 
'Big Three' to protect the rights of the smaller but without that 
right to sit in judgement on the great" .118 
At the same time he insisted on "nothing less that unanimity among the 
greater powers" in the Security Council, and Gromyko in stating that 
"such an organization could in no wise exist if a great power were 
to be denied the right to vote in any dispute irrespective of its 
role in that dispute,,119 
thought to preclude the legal possibility of anyone power attaining (or 
exercising) world dominance. 
Accordingly the veto pcwer was established (by Art 27 of the 
Charter) and, all too frequently because of it, limitations on observance 
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of international law are highlighted through the disproportion between 
the evocative instrument and the real achievements accomplished by it. 
The reality, indeed, has been more in line with the Russian view 
expressed by A T Vi shinsky of 
"international tribunals organized on the basis of 'modern 
bourgeois international law' which he said is a law which"serves 
to veil the serfdom of weak nations to the dominant classes of 
powerful nations". 12 0 
But the exercise of sovereignty today is no longer unconstrained, 
although De Visscher wrote that, 
"Between doctrine and fact there is a great and ever widening 
gulf •••• Thus, in the modern perspective of international relations 
and under the pressure of facts more than of theories, the new 
distribution of power developed •••• Born of a claim for equality 
and will for emancipation from common supremacy, modern 
sovereignties rest upon a negative idea ... whilst the State seems 
to attract to itself the whole of public life, sovereignty at the 
same time claims recognition of the supreme force and asserts its 
independence of any law.,,121 
It might then seem that the major stumbling block in the UN is not what 
the organization and the law are or were intended to ensure, but rather 
what the individual founding States intended. Sooner or later States may 
find it necessary to return to first principles as regards intention in 
the UN examining both attitudes and the machinery to see what inhibits 
fulfulment of the Principles and the major means to unhold them 
contemplated in Art VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Some reasons why 
such an examination may be necessary may emerge from what follows herein. 
Law, international or municipal, is a normative concept prescribing 
conduct as it ought to be. The results to be expected from failure to 
conform to norms of behaviour are less clear especially where means for 
enforcing the norms are ineffectual. After 36 years of its operations 
the Secretary-General of the UN, Snr Perez de Cuellier, in presenting his 
Annual Report asked nations to reverse "their exceedingly dangerous 
course" and urged them "to render the UN more capable of carrying out its 
primary function" of preserving international peace and security. He 
said the central purpose of the UN is a "capacity to keep the peace and 
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to serve as a forum of negotiations", but the UN had been set aside or 
rebuffed. Frequently the Security Council could not act decisively to 
remove international conflict, but even its unanimous resolutions were 
"increasingly defied or ignored by those .... strong enought to do 50".122 
The UN Charter from the beginning had presented the desirable - an 
ideal for international relations which it was hoped States would aim for 
- in defining the sole basis on which the lawful use of force might be 
permissible both in upholding the Charter and in self-defence. Had the 
original members of the UN, 
"decided on making the organization a success, no power on earth 
could resist their combined might." But "if they (continue to) 
choose the path of dissention, the UN (is) predestined to 
degenerate into another system of power politics in disguise. ,,123 
Dissention amongst members has been disruptive: the acceptance of any 
place for war entails the armed forces and armaments of disruption. But, 
the place of war as defined by the Charter is not of itself an indicator 
of readiness for war - or appetite for it - whether on national or 
collective behalf as an arbiter in disputes. The Charter also draws 
attention to the resources of a State for dealing with disputes by 
peaceful means (Art 33). War, therefore, remains only one course among 
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many. 
Experience, nevertheless, has shown that maintaining a place of war 
expressed by military and arms expenditures may seriously affe~t other 
resources and especially the national economy. This has been the 
experience not only of the USSR but also in arms races generally and 
particularly for Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt with dangerous 
repercussions for the Lebanon. 
All resources of international politics tend to become increasingly 
sophisticated through improved conununications systems and increasing 
inter-dependence between states accentuated in the extending embrace of 
regional and multi-national organizations. Power politics accordingly 
continues to be an active element in the realities of nationalism and 
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internationalism. This often leads to courses of action dictated by 
opportunity and views of historic mission rather than to courses of 
comternporary justice.125 The UN has been provided with the means of 
containing this but only if the member-states will those means. 
Experience has so far indicated only a grudging and partisan attitude to 
many of the issues which have confronted the UN. In such attitudes 
failures of the League caused by the impotence of lack of support seem 
consistently to have been forgotten in the UN. 
International Law and the united Nations. 
The failures of the League of Nations were still remembered at the 
closing stages of the Second World War when the UN was founded with hopes 
that international support for international law and its administration 
(which the strong Constitution envisaged) would facilitate some central 
control of the proclivities for war which nations had always exhibited 
and the League had failed to curb •• Consideration of the nature of 
international law rather than debate about its validity, viability and 
varied acceptance would be more rewarding for the promoters of peace. 
Hart's prophecy that, 
"the law enforcement provisions of the Charter are likely to be 
paralysed by the veto and must be said to exist only on paper," 
needed less precipience in 1961 than in 1945 and it is still apt. 126 The 
organization of an effective world authority sustaining the global 
society of States is still remote and one reason seems to be clear. 
There is speculation rather than a clear and common view of what the 
universal common good ought now to be or will be in the future. 127 In 
consequence nations seek to be prepared for every contingency: 
contingencies foreseen in human experience have tended to become 
self-fulfilling prophecies eventuating at inconvenient times. 
In the founding of the UN and drafting of its Charter there is 
point to Russell's assertion that, 
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"Ever since men became capable of free speculation, their actions, 
in innumerable important respects, have depended upon their 
theories as to the world and human life, as to what is good and 
what is evil •.. To understand an age or a nation we must understand 
its philosophy ... There is here a reciprocal causation: the 
circumstanes of men's lives do much to determine their philosophy, 
but, conversely! their philosophy does much to determine their 
circumstances". 2 8 
The statement is also true of the evolution and acceptance of 
international law related to the place which war should at any time have 
in society. Quincy Wright for instance thought it the duty of states to 
co-operate for social, cultural and economic welfare. He conceived of 
this as a moral rather than legal duty to be complied with whatever the 
consequences and their effect on the need for a place of war in national 
, 't' 129 pnon les. In fact the Charter is clear and the member-States should 
be assumed to have accepted its provisions and the duties imposed by them 
on the basis that the duties and the membership are voluntary acts of 
sovereignty. This has brought the duty into the legal consequences of 
membership and those consequences are no longer merely moral. 
Despite the voluntary assumption of the obligations and the fact 
that Art 2.6 of the 01arter extends its obligations to states which are 
not members, there has been a continuing ineffectiveness in the operation 
of the Charter. Much of the ineffectiveness may have been due to the 
veto powers of the permanent members of the Security Council, but a lack 
of support for the ideals has also been evident, national interests 
being placed before international good. Of the many examples, the nine 
years of Russian military intervention in Afghanistan can be cited. Only 
when the USSR was ready to withdraw its armed forces in its own interests 
was the UN negotiator given proper support. The emphasis on national 
interest which is usually put before the strict obligations of the 
Charter ensures constant changes of attitude (and even of fashion) and in 
particular cases renders more remote the impartial treatment which 
member-States ought to give to the world community. 
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Is the UN a half-way house between a system of individual States 
and one of world government as regards peace and war? If so it should be 
able to exert influence on every aspect of inter-State relationships. 
International law on the other hand places obligations and duties on 
individual States, and only in the immediate circumstances likely to lead 
to war are any such obligations placed on the world community 
collectively by the UN Charter. There is need, therefore, for simplicity 
as well as authority in the administration in the UN. In practice this 
is not as evident in the deliberations and actions of the UN as it 
appeared in the simple statement in the Charter's Preamble of ideals and 
how they are to be attained through expressed Purposes, Principles and 
methodology of action. 
Proliferation of non-binding resolutions, regulations and sources 
of regulation lead to uncertainty in interpretation and action. An 
attitude of disrespect leading to avoidance can be engendered such as 
happens with revenue and taxation law. 130 There is need for care that 
the bulk of international law intended to assuage contemporary problems 
does not work to law's disadvantage. Problems include regulation of some 
effects of the increasing interdependence of states, the growth of 
institutions operating within various codes of international law, and 
some arise from the desire of smaller states to limit the influence of 
larger or more powerful states. Care is also required to ensure that 
areas in which law and enforcement are particularly necessary (as in 
matters of arms control and arms transfers) have strong institutions of 
global authority rather than having to rely on inter-State agreements in 
the absence of global policies. Sanctions resolved by the UN still fall 
to be policed by national governments. 
The potential for armec conflict still imposes on member States a 
practical choice between ensuring means for self-help or reliance on the 
provisions of the Charter. Traditions of sovereign authority with bias 
toward national interest remain antagonistic toward a central authority. 
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National interest in survival will continue to view the danger of 
surprise attack with modern weapons as being unrelieved in the present 
time lags occasioned by the deliberations and delays of collective 
action. Since 1945 wars of aggression have been fought on almost Second 
World War scales of weaponry and intensity even if limited 
geographically. There are many examples: Korea, Vietnam, the Middle 
East, South East Asia, Argentina, and they include clear cases of 
aggression. Instances of pre-emption which sought justification as 
self-defence were seen in Israel's Six Day War and in its 1982 airstrike 
on an alleged Iraqi nuclear plant. 
A definition of 'aggression' was finally agreed in the UN in 1974 
and interpretations of it have been used to justify attacks such as the 
Israeli airstrike mentioned which was argued to come within Art 3 (b) of 
the definition. 131 The definition, however, has attracted criticism: 
Paskins and Dockrill said that it, 
"lays down neither a workable content nor a workable procedure 
whereby the justice of particular causes can be determined".132 
In some cases the remoteness of cause and immediacy of operations clearly 
indicate the aggressor to the unbiased, but generally neither the 
provisions of the Charter nor the definition of aggression has had any 
prohibitory effect. Belligerents continue to profess the necessity for 
self-help as they do the justice of their cause. Pre-emptors profess 
their situation demanded the necessity for self-defence. But self-help 
actions are mainly dictated by the absence of belief in the preventative 
powers of the UN or lack of confidence in the speed of decision and 
deployment of collective security measures by the UN. A lack of 
confidence that the attacker's case was likely to find sympathy (or 
justice) may also affect a State's action. 
Failures by the UN to inspire confidence in its ability to prevent 
or confine potential war situations have not arisen from any failure of 
international legal provisions. Rather they have arisen from failures to 
honour the Charter. Exercise of veto power in the Security Council has 
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promoted disbelief in its ability either to act quickly or without bias, 
for the involvement or interest of a permanent member in the instant 
dispute has been obvious in many cases. 
Sometimes there has been a lack of interest or an element of 
neutrality on the part of some States. This seemed obvious during 
Vietnamese expansionism and in the Iraq-Iran conflict, evincing that 
inter-World War philosophy, 
"of minding your own business (which) has not yet beep improved 
upon as a way of peace, sanity and tolerable life".l 3 
That philosophy - the negation of ideals of collective action - has been 
UN experience since the Korean war despite the part it played in the 
failure of the League of Nations. 
There are also underlying failures, for war has not been eliminated 
or weapons universally controlled, and weapons show little sign of 
reaching finality in indiscriminating and destructive potential or 
technological creativity so that it has become impossible in many 
military targets to draw a distinction between armed forces and civilian 
populations. 134 It is not surprising, therefore, that whilst power 
politics continued to vie with desire for international order the UN task 
of eliminating armed conflicts would invite failures as the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact has continued to do (if it is still in force as the 
Nuremberg 'rribunal ruled135 and Oppenheim supports). Of the Tribunal's 
ruling Oppenheim said that, 
"Being permanent in its nature •.•• the Pact •... must be regarded as 
continuing in being and is one of the corner-stones of the 
international legal system". 1 3 6 
But today reference to the Pact seems only to broaden the gulf between 
renunciation and elimination emphasising at the same time failures of the 
UN in the face of national interest in approaches to problems of defence 
and foreign poliey. Michael Jobert, when Foreign Minister of France in 
1972 was of the opinion that, 
"Every Government, this like any other, is confronted with the same 
necessities, the same obstacles, and driven to the same solutions 
as i~ defin7s and imp~ements its policies. In my eyes, a specific 
forelgn pOlley for thlS Government does not exist, and no other 
Government has had one. 137 
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The same factor underlies both reservations: they stem from the 
fact that events dictate despite projected national policies and 
precedents which, if confined within a continuing national outlook, must 
increasingly take note of alliance, federation, and international 
institutional outlook. International institutions usually result from 
ideals and are intended to translate ideals into working policies. In 
the case of the UN the design sought the ideal but the reality is 
reflected in the situations debated and in the attitudes taken to the UN 
by national representatives. For example, at the time of the Yom Kippur 
war in 1973 President Nixon referred to the regional interests of the EEC 
and to American global interests. His aim was to stop Israel from 
invading Egypt for fear that Russia might intervene and direct 
confrontation between the two super powers result. But the US attitude 
was not anti-Israel and the us remained its principal aid and arms 
supplier during and after the conflict. 
Because repercussions from one military action by one state will 
extend to other States the recognition of potential effects and the 
safeguarding of neutral States from potential consequences justifies the 
concern and intervention which international law now reserves for the UN. 
This modern prescription reflected a change of attitude from the 
uninhibited use of force which states had assumed as sovereign right -
(subject theoretically to the moral limitations of just war theory) - and 
without much regard for third party states. From this change of attitude 
in 1919 the League was established, to be superseded by the UN in 1945 
with the important difference that whereas the League's writ ran only to 
its voluntary membership, in the case of the UN, 
"The organization shall ensure that states which are not members of 
the united Nations act in accordance with those principles as far 
as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
securi ty" • 1 3 8 
The constitution of the UN in its Charter detailed the machinery by 
which it would operate and by which its essential tasks could be 
performed given a basic standard of co-operation by the member states. 
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Strictures on the operations of the UN often attribute its failures 
to the use of the veto in the Security Council as though that alone was 
the cause of the failures. It is true that the machinery of the UN, as 
provided for by the Charter, is hampered in use by the veto, but as 
stated above the membership generally often compounds the failure of the 
Security Council by remaining on the sidelines during inter-State war 
(except for the supply and re-supply of munitions of war). The Iraq-Iran 
war is only one example. The practical experience of intervention in 
Korea (perhaps regarded by some as civil war) may be remembered, but 
ostensible neutrality in international conflicts may be long-term and 
intentional, even if altogether without reference to either burden 
sharing or some perceived danger of superpower confrontation. This ought 
to be remembered in reviewing the machinery of the UN. 
The Machinery and Institutional Authority of the UN. 
To give effect to the principles and Purposes of the UN which the 
peoples of the United Nations determined to accomplish there was 
instituted, 
(a) A Security Council of fifteen members with the "primary 
responsibiltty for the maintainance of international peace and 
securi ty" • 1 9 I 
(b) A General Assembly of all the members with power to make 
recommendation either to the Security councilor to the 
membership at large as to any matters brought before it, and 
(c) A Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General whose duties 
include bringing to the attention of the Security Council "any 
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security". 14 0 
The sovereign equality of members is dictated by Art 2.1 but 
practical equality may be affected by, 
( i ) concepts of representative democracy (which) require r special 
cohesion ~,attainable in many developing countries".l 1 I and 
(ii) the Statement of the Four Sponsoring Powers on voting 
Procedure in the Security Council which provides an effective 
veto for the permanent members of the Council.142 
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The truth of (i) may be inferred from the groupings of states 
dominated by more powerful States which has been evident in voting 
patterns in the General Assembly. The effect of (ii) has been as 
foreseen by Hart143 , for although the Security Council ex proprio motu or 
by reference of matters to it has procedural authority as the primary 
organ of the UN, cases where the veto has stultified action have 
multiplied. In some instances it has been necessary for the General 
Assembly to exercise its more limited powers in the face of inaction in 
the Security Council. It would be exaggeration, however, to suggest that 
this was the main cause of weakness. A resolution or direction of the 
Security Council initiating action is only a first step; it depends on 
member States and their resources and finances to implement the action so 
initiatied. It is, nevertheless, a major cause which, unfortunately and 
by definition, cannot be rectified by the Secretary-General under Art 99. 
The provision of UN machinery is no index of its use. UN 
resolutions naming specific States are liable to be disregarded. This is 
not new. Referring to the effect of the Security Council Brian Urquhart 
said, 
" ••. there have been occasions when the Security Council was able, 
under the pressure of events, to agree on important matters ...• its 
actions on the Middle East in 1948. There are a number of 
important issues for which the Council has prescribed basic 
guidelines - Kashmir, Lebanon in 1958, the Congo in July 1960, 
Cyprus in 1964, the India-Pakistan War of 1965. Resolution 242 on 
the Middle East problem in 1967, Rhodesia and Sanctions, the 1973 
war in the Middle East and the subsequent arrangements, Namibia, 
South Lebanon in 1978, apartheid, and •••• international 
terrorism .•.. in a majority of cases the Council's decisions were, 
or are being, ignored with impunity by one or other of the 
parties, and the Council can do little or nothing about it. This 
is not to say the decisions were useless. on the contrary they 
are important international guidelines and objectives and install 
conflict control mechanisms. But the teeth are largely 
missing". 144 
The statement makes clear the essence of the UN's enforcement problem: 
lack of international will restricting UN action to what the 
member-States will allow, with some of the difficulty dictated by 
negative action in the Security Council. For example, following Russia's 
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intervention in Afghanistan (1979) the Security Council on 9 January 1980 
resolved that, 
"Taking into account the lack of unanimity of its permanent members 
at the 2190th Meeting has prevented it from exercising its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, decides to call an emergency meeting of the General 
Assembly to examine the question ll • (SC Res 462). 
On 14 January the General Assembly called for 
lithe immediate unconditional and total withdrawal of all foreign 
troops from Afghanistan ll • (GA Res ES 6/2). 
Further General Assembly Resolutions followed, but the Russian withdrawal 
in 1989 was unilateral and under compulsion of events rather than as a 
result of UN action. 
Some other examples are: 
Lebanon: Conflict in 1978 and 1982 - still continuing - between Israel, 
the PLO and Syria led to the setting up of UNIFIL (SC Resolutions 425 and 
426 of 1978). Res 425 called for Israel to respect Lebanon's territorial 
integrity and political independence, to cease military action, and to 
withdraw. UNIFIL after eight years, which included the arrival and 
departure of a multi-national force not under the UN, on occasion 
successfully prevented or inhibited renewed fighting but that would 
revive following any withdrawal of UNIFIL. Israel still occupies 
Unlawfully a part of South Lebanon, and its 
"concerns for UNIFIL, the UN or for relations with countries 
contributing troops are clearly less im~rtant than its national 
interests and objectives in Lebanon".14 
As time goes on will continued occupation eventually be regarded and 
recognized as conquest despite the UN Resolutions? 
I ran/I rag. Security Council Resolution 497 on 28 September 1980 called 
on Iraq and Iran to refrain immediately from any further use of force and 
settle their dispute by peac(~ful means. But the war continued until 
pressure of events made a cease fire possible in 1989. 
South East Asia. The situation here has continued to be dominated by 
Vietnam successively with France, the US, and with neighbouring states 
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including China, Cambodia and Thailand. There has been consistant 
failure to comply with UN Resolutions. For example GA Res 35/6 (1980) 
regarding Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was followed by invasion of 
Thai territory. Only in 1988 were troops withdrawn from Laos. Some 
withdrawal from Kampuchea is reported in 1989 as part of Vietnam's own 
policies leaving open the possibility of civil war by the re-emergence of 
the Khmer Rouge. 
Indian Ocean Area. In 1971 the idea of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace was 
adopted at the UN (Res 2832), but the Resolution has yet to be 
implemented. 
Examples continue to show that the enforcement of international law 
in the present system is likely to be effected more through world opinion 
and action by super and other powers outside the UN than by collective 
action within it in confonmity with or directly inspired by international 
law. If disregard for UN Resolutions is obdurate in certain members, 
success and failure should be considered in perspective for even the 
long-running Namibia problem now seems near to solution. It is to be 
expected that successes will be soon forgotten in continuing disquiet 
engendered by questions and disagreements remaining unresolved. Kashmir 
remains a case in point. 
In the meantime a problem of reality versus legitimacy affecting 
civil war situations and post-war settlements arises regarding the 
customary law of State recognition. Recognition is a matter for each 
State's discretion by whatever standard of "sufficient suitability" it 
may apply. Many States, including the United Kingdom, do not 
differentiate substantially today between the two customary concepts, for 
recognition de facto is reality and sooner or later may acquire the 
status of recognition de jure. This was a workable method of dealing 
with the matter before questions of recognition by, and admission to 
membership of, the UN arose. For different reasons the cases of China 
and Taiwan and Israel and Arab States are relevant. 146 
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The matter of China and Taiwan is not definitively settled as far 
as China is concerned even if many States have recognized Taiwan. The 
continued refusal of recognition of Israel by Arab States, (if no longer 
by the PLO), continues to raise questions of legitimacy as far as the 
Arab States are concerned notwithstanding the obligations of the UN 
Charter and the fact of General Assembly Resolution 242 of 1967. The 
situation may indicate weakness on tne part of the UN standing as it does 
between UN recognition of Israel and customary law. The UN posi tion may 
not indicate a progressive attitude to support for self-proclaimed new 
States, although the question of any possible admission to membership of 
the PLO must constitute recognition of a new State of Palestine. Whilst 
individual states can adjust their relationships with others according to 
how they recognize each other, their material relations within the UN and 
its voting systems will need clarification if State discretion is again 
to be a matter for majority voting in the UN. Guidelines as to 
"sufficient suitability" will also be required. In practice, however, 
and if the Middle East situation is a precedent, differences in attitude 
to the recognition of a State may lead to war, for if passive 
non-recognition is probably peaceable active refusal to recognize may 
provoke active response, for active non-recognition may be the expression 
of such animosity that war may be inevitable as was the case in Vietnam 
and Korea where the division of each country into two separate States was 
not recognized by the North. 
united Nations 'Law'. 
'Law and order' may be a term without material content if 
considered only to infer that order is dependent upon law, or that law 
necessarily ensures order. This is particularly true in the operation of 
international relationships where if law is prescribed but not enforced 
disorder is likely, although in most international inter-relations order 
does not essentially depend on legal definition. What international law 
88 
does is to make clear what is not legitimate in the inter-actions of 
states. 
In relation to the maintenance of peace between States the UN 
Charter amplifies existing international law and formalizes procedures 
having the object of ensuring observance of its provision by means of: 
(i) a surveillance system intended to make all States (and not 
merely the disputants) have concern with potential or actual 
conflict or interventions by one State in the sovereignty of 
another. (Arts 2, 11 and 35). 
(ii) the exercise of an internationally authorized power to 
intevene on behalf of the international community in 
inter-States disputes to uphold international peace and 
security, and, if necessary, to take punitive measures to 
that end. (Arts 25, 37, 41 and 42). 
(iii) the organization and deployment of armed force in 
implementation of its decisions. (Arts 43, 45 and 48). 
(iv) an ability to make recommendation governing disarmament and 
the regulation of armaments; international co-operation in 
all aspect of sccietal relations; and the development of 
international law. (Arts 11 and 13). 
The systenl of law enforcement outlined in the UN Charter has proved 
powerless to maintain the machinery necessary to assure the citizens' and 
States' security, or a general atmosphere of law and order, whenever the 
Charter's provisions have not been followed. The co-operation of the 
member-States is fundamental to the enforcement of international law at 
present, requiring a moral climate not merely a passive acknowledgement 
which ignores or challenges rather than actively observes the Charter. 
Even morality is not enough for an ethical basis is essential in 
the circumstances that the merits of any dispute must be debated at the 
UN before the powers of the Charter can be invoked. In the Security 
Council decisions depend on fifteen members: the membership as a whole 
may bring their views and interests into the decision-making process in 
the General Assembly. Debate in the UN cannot resemble judicial 
proceedings, and it would be unreasonable to believe it could in any case 
approximate to municipal decision-making whether that decision-making is 
through one-party government, inter-party agreement, or by majority vote. 
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But it is not the debate itself which is pertinent here, it is the 
application of lawful procedures to the decisions arrived at. 
Systems of law are accepted generally within moral and ethical 
bounds because it is recognized that societies as conceived today cannot 
exist without them. That a similar basic philosophy is generally 
accepted also in international relations is evident from subscription to 
the UN Charter which created one system by which states can live and do 
business together. It is imposition and enforcement of the 'legislation' 
that gives rise to problems. Even the legislation can be mystifying to 
the people, if understandable to governments. An analogy of remoteness 
and apparently undemocratic governance in the UN and the EEC may be 
observed in the nomination of representatives to the former and 
commissioners to the latter. A similar perception of remoteness and 
authoritarian attitude in international institutions leads to public 
disinteredness in the proceedings of such institutions. It is noteworthy 
that States are rarely pushed by popular demand into the national 
poSitions taken at the UN except sometimes when the State's own interests 
are the instant case. 
'Peaceful co-existence' and 'friendly relations', however, might 
pre-suppose for some people a system of inter-State law to deal at least 
with day-to-day happenings which impinge on the public law. A 
comprehensive system as is envisaged by Cap VII of the UN Charter might 
be regarded as being in place making it difficult to understand the fact 
that in reality States are more often than not left with self-restraint, 
self-defence and balance of power policies. 
Much blame for this might be ascribed to the antecedents of the law 
and the States. universal homogeneity is unlikely and whereas one school 
avers that there is no international law, another holds that three 
different systems exist. The three are classified as western or 
European; Socialist; and a third which does not follow either the first 
or second and may relate to Latin-American, African or other so-called 
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'developing' states. 147 If there are such separate systems, the UN 
Charter - if not entirely Western - falls between all three. 
In interpretation as in debate the USSR has exhibited one 
viewpoint; the developing States have tended to follow - not necessarily 
dogmatically - the views of their 'patrons'; and the West, which more 
than the others influenced the form of the Charter, does not follow it 
slavishly. Politicians of all shades of opinion, however, have accepted 
the Charter but often as a theoretical guide book while adopting contrary 
practices, whether wholly from different views of international law or 
different interpretations of the Charter. A lack of unanimity of 
viewpoint does seem to have been demonstrated by the attempts made to 
clarify (or obfuscate?) some provisions of the Charter when meeting real 
situations and in elaborate Resolutions seeking to expand, explain, and 
provide doctrines inclusive of the three viewpoints but based on the 
already clear provisions of the Charter. 
Despite differing attitudes, together with the humanitarian laws of 
war and the Nuremberg Tribunal statute the Charter remains international 
law and, perhaps, the definitive jurisprudential law of international 
relations affecting war and peace. The Statute and the Charter are 
statements about the legality of war, but the Charter also justifies a 
place for war. A contrary expression that war has been illegal ab initio 
would confound the earlier institutional writers. The terms of the 
Charter nevertheless relegate the place of war to self-defence and as 
ordered by the Security Council. In reality the member States of the UN 
have not been prepared so far to carry this change to its logical 
conclusion following the parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact who also 
failed to carry into practice their renunciation of war an an instrument 
of national policy. 
Events since 1945 show the feeling has not been finally abandoned 
that a State's own national interests ought if necessary to be supported 
by 'might is right' policies. 148 Events have also shown that States are 
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not yet prepared to leave 'just war' as a matter for the UN and treat 
aggressive war as a crime to be dealt with by collective action. Thus, 
UN 'law' and UN practice have on occasion parted company, and a balance 
between declaration, intention and action has become obvious in the 
actings of States and in the consequential failures of the Security 
Council even when faced by defiant, as well as contrary, actions by some 
members. But a continuing place for war in the face of non-enforcement 
of international law remains patent. 
Whatever may be said of pluralist views on law there are aspects of 
international law and relations which have been common to all societies. 
No society has considered that its vital interests should be left 
undefended or unprotected, and if defence entailed the use of force or of 
pre-emptive operations these were considered to be within legal bounds. 
There were refinements it is true: declaration of war, ransom of 
prisoners, safety of non-belligerents, and so on. But all subscribed to 
an international law of war as far as it went among the civilised states. 
That was a first element of sovereignty and is what is disputed in the 
essence of 'UN law'. The continuance of that subscription may be at the 
root of indecision in the Security Council and rhetoric-without-action 
from the General Assembly. 
It has become customary to blame the permanent members of the 
Security Council for its paralysis, alleging that the use of the veto 
makes effective working of the Council impossible in a continuing 
bi-polarity, but it is not impossible to abandon last ditch defences even 
. 11 t' . t 149 ln a co ec lVl y. A power of veto (not enshrined in the Treaty of 
Rome) was normally accepted in the EEC but steps toward majority voting 
have now prevailed. 
It may not be possible in the Security Council to abolish the veto 
150 for it would necessitate agreement to amend Art 27 of the UN Charter. 
There is a procedure under Cap XVIII but difficulty can be anticipated 
for, if the us and USSR could agree, China might not, and France and 
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Britain would not lightly surrender the Great Power label which veto 
power gives. There is a difference, however, between deliberate dissent 
and the normal working of the international system. 
Because treaties of wide general consequence, embellished with 
normative principles with which all can agree often avoid their logical 
conclusions, precept and practice in international relations are 
sometimes at arms length. Those who formulate the wording of such 
agreements hope to translate the political ideals in a way which will 
effect the desired consequences by means of principles canalised within 
unbreakable procedural programmes. The politician as idealist is rarely 
the same as the politician as political actor. It is relatively easy, 
therefore, for politicians to complain that principles are sacrificed for 
procedures by international bureaucrats, and for international 
bureaucrats to complain tilat workable procedures are subordinated to 
political ends. In fact, the difference is likely to be that whilst the 
international bureaucrats may be working - in spite of their respective 
and varied nationalities - for the international institution and toward 
the consequences of the treaty provision, the representatives of the 
member states, in their role, may not easily depart from the brief they 
bring to the UN and which exploits or defends their national interests. 
In the ICJ and the EEC jurists and commissioners cannot entirely 
shed their national background and prejudices, but they are more 
concerned with making international co-operation work than with 
principles of international co-operation. In that concern they may 
comprehend a simplification of three systems on logical grounds: 
1. Euro-American expressing capitalist ideas and the right to defend 
them; 
2. Russian embracing communism and the right to defend it; 
3. Third World and right to aid from 'wealthier' states not only as ~ 
pro guo for supporting a patron in the UN but as a genuine need for 
development. Whilst common contents are to be seen in the rules a 
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right to defend could not be condoned at the same time as a right to 
supplant or propagate worldwide under a cloak of international 
co-operation. 
A system of international law will be administered within the 
conflicting ideologies of the administrators reflecting traditional and 
continuing causes of war, and the political circumstances and 
organization under which the administrators have been influenced. Also 
reflected are attitudes towards the acceptability in national life of 
party politics as opposed to party government whether military or civil. 
These differing attitudes are carried by national representatives and 
delegates (as well as by the administrators) into the international 
institutions they serve. 
conflicts within the administration, however, often stem from 
political rather than legal differences, but such conflicts themselves 
may be, or become, breaches of international law. The dogmatic 
internationalist must be scrutinized lest he consider the international 
institution only for itself, thus neglecting concern for its 
consequences. 
From their own interests States may be right to resist binding 
agreements on a wide scale. Increasing sources of regulation, inevitably 
proliferating through the interdependence of modern economics and 
communications, impose stresses on domestic government which are not 
1 f abl t d 't' h 151 a ways avour e 0 Slate an Cl lzen everyw ere. Duplication and 
re-duplication of layers of government and administration impose 
financial burdens even where they do not obfuscate the boundary between 
law and administration. Arangio-Ruiz pointed to, 
(i) "confusion between international relations and international 
law" , 
(ii) an "error brought about by the theory of international law 
as a 'primitive' stage of the law of mankind (in lieu of a 
very sophisticated stage of private law of co-existence 
among sovereign States)", and 
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(iii) an "arbitary conception of international law as a kind of 
constitutional or public law of mankind" which leads to 
transposition "into international law (of) normative 
elements which belong to the national rubliC law of given 
States or groups of States and only af ect international 
law .•• through the internationally relevant conduct of the 
State or States concerned".152 
This argument seems to deal with a comprehensive body of law as 
though directed toward a complete system as provided by municipal law, or 
by the aggregation between federal law and state laws of the respective 
federated states. That, however, is not what international law amounts 
to. 
UN Resolutions, Declarations and Treaties. 
In municipal systems of law statute law is elaborated and clarified 
through judicial interpretation and statutory or other subsidiary 
instruments all of which are of binding nature. The UN Charter is 
similarly elaborated and clarified but by Declarations and Resolutions of 
a general nature which, however, have no similar binding qualities. 
Opinions of the ICJ given at the request of the Security Councilor 
General Assembly on any legal question are advisory (Art 96)153. Binding 
agreements emanating from the UN take the form of treaties and 
conventions. 
proliferation in federal and municipal law-making is an index of 
governmental concern with a wide and increasing number of aspects of the 
people's lives. In everyday terms the citizen as an individual is not in 
a position to resist this proliferation for all modern political parties 
have the same instinct for legislating. 
There is not the same degree of proliferation of the basic laws of 
war. This may reflect a reluctance by States to accept interferences 
with their sovereignty, and may extend to States' attitudes to accession 
to treaties which if not overtly opposed may still be treated with some 
measure of passivity. 
Within the UN there is need to avoid confusion between 
international law and international relations and this may be effected by 
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differentiating between treaties on one hand and resolutions and 
declarations on the other. If this is accepted there will be no great 
necessity to examine here the legal effectiveness of the General Assembly 
Resolutions. In any case, this has been done by others including 
Arangio-Ruiz, Gross, McWhinney, Parry, Friedman and Sorensen. 154 
Lauterpacht described the original concept of the functions of the 
General Assembly as, 
"essentially those of initiative, of discussion, of study, and of 
recommendation" but "it is ~lear that the Assembly is not invested 
with legislative powers".15 
That remains the case but Lauterpacht did not foresee that the Assembly 
would be required to give decisions on such issues as Kashmir, Cyprus or 
Lebanon. it is unlikely too that he visualized the incidence of 
resolution-making which would engage the Assembly. For example, 
"most of the 45 resolutions on arms control by the General 
Assembly" (from 1946 to 1~82) "have made little impact on the 
course of negotiations".l 6 
This alone makes it necessary here to limit discussion to only the last 
of three kinds of resolutions, namely those of universal and general 
interest. Those of administrative effect within the UN and those related 
to specific and individual issues, including issues of disputes between 
states are considered elsewhere herein. In the context of the binding 
nature of resolutions the administrative is taken as a direction to the 
Secretariat. The individual issue involves a complex procedural cycle of 
events to acquire any effective quality. 
From the detailed arguments of the authors cited above it seems 
that general and universal resolutions must be regarded as declarations 
of principles which, by being generally adhered to, could form a bsis of 
international customary law. There is no unanimity of view for, 
"Whether a resolution by a particular organ of the united Nations 
is to be regarded as law is •... today widely regarded as a function 
of many variables, including the policy content of the resolution, 
the compatibility of that content with existing customary 
international law, the numbers and characteristics of the 
supporters and opposers of the resolution, the expectations stated 
about tp~7legal character of the resolution by its supporters, and 
so on". 
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To subject a resolution to such an inquiry would seem to render its 
wording almost irrelevant. parry made the point differently, 
"when it comes to assessing proceedings as a source of 
international law there is no need to attempt to force the whole 
operation into the shape of a function of a treaty, or even to 
ponder particularly upon the 'binding force' of resolutions of the 
General Assembly or of any other international body. It falls 
very adequately into place as part of the practice of the States. 
Sometimes that practice results in .... treaties .... Sometimes, more 
often indeed, it does not, but produces political agreements, 
still intended to be binding but lacking that strict legal 
content, or simply expressions of view".lS8 
It is in the nature of Resolutions and Declarations that supporters 
may feel some binding quality should be inherent in them whilst opposers 
reject any legal content. Such agreements do seek to provide for what 
ought to be done, but as Dr Kissinger observed, opponents tend to show 
"the weakness of any position by comparing it with some ideal 
world, but who (feel) no similar compulsion to analyse what would 
happen in the absence of an agreement".159 
Similar experience can be garnered from UN debates but there is equally 
opportunity to correct utopian views. 
A tendency for general and universal treaties to emerge from 
initiative in the UN does not foreclose the promotion of treaty 
negotiation outside the UN as happened with the Treaty of Antarctica 
initiated by General Eisenhower. 160 But Art 13 of the UN Charter should 
not be overlooked in the context of lawmaking, for that is a process only 
concluded by the formal passing of the statute or signature and accession 
to the convention. Continued and detennined pressure applied in the UN 
may be rewarded as in the development of the OUter Space Treaty which was 
preceded by General Assembly Resolutions 1721(XVI), 1884(XVII), 
1962(XVIII) and 2222(XXI).161 Speed in the development of a treaty 
however, may be crucial to the legality of a weapon at any time and may 
affect military operations just as the use of cyanide and mustard agents 
by Iraq to contain Iranian 'human wave' attac!~s, and the threat to use 
chemical missiles against Iranian cities, affected the war between Iraq 
and Iran. 
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Speed in the formulation and completion of general declarations and 
treaties depends on the immediate applicability of the provisions. The 
Outer Space Treaty could immediately directly affect only a few 
technologically advanced States. Where all States are likely to be 
affected from the time the instrument comes into force - as with the 
40-Nation Committee on Disar.mament's proposals for disarmament, arms 
control and chemical weapons - progress is likely to be slower. 
Disarmament is a contentious and often emotional subject and speed of 
progress is not the most important aspect. Speed, however, should not be 
allowed to obscure the scope of agreements which have been reached on 
major general issues by way of 'formal and solemn' Declarations. 162 
That member-States of the UN are concerned to amplify the 
provisions of the Charter is implicit in the varied subjects on which 
Declarations have been agreed. From the Charter in association with the 
Declarations can be seen what the States intend, and sometimes disregard, 
as to the legal place of war. The re-statement of legal positions in 
Declarations is important in reminding member States that they are 
expected to abide by the terms which usually express what they undertook 
on membership for they are not the voluntary codes of conduct familiar in 
municipal law but steps leading to customary law. The variety of 
subjects may be seen from the random selection of General Assembly 
Declarations which follows: 
375 (IV). 
1614 (XV). 
1653 (XVI). 
1962 (XVIII). 
1904 (XVIII). 
1963 (XVIII). 
2131 (XX). 
on the Rights and Duties of States. 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples. 
on the Prohibition of the use of Nuclear and 
Thermo-Nuclear Weapons. 
On Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. 
On the Elimination of all forms of Racial Distinction. 
On International Co-operation in the Peaceful Use of 
Outer Space. 
On Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty. 
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2625 (XXV). On Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of 
International Law. 
2750 (XXV). On Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of 
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
thereof, underlying the High Seas, beyond the limit of 
present National Jurisdiction and the Use of their 
Resources in the Interests of Mankind, and convening a 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
3201 (S-VI). On the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order. 
3281 (XXIX). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
31/91 (14.12.76). On Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States. 
Apart from such General Declarations the Assembly has approved 
Declarations and Resolutions relating to specific disputes, to matters of 
peacekeeping, and to the restitution of territory. (For example, there 
were some twenty Resolutions on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) between 1962 and 
1979). Some Declarations, 2750 (XXV) for instance, have been the basis 
of subsequent conventions. 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations (2625 (XXV)) clarifies and 
expands the Charter provisions intended to promote a system of 
international relations in which the elimination of disputes is a major 
aim and the peaceful settlement of disputes, (should any arise under such 
a system) the norm. The Declaration merits more than a glance at the 
title. The principles enumerated are: 
(a) refraining from threat or use of force. 
(b) peaceful settlement of disputes and safeguarding international 
peace and security. 
(c) non-interference with other States' domestic affairs. 
(d) co-operation in accordance with the Charter. 
(e) equal rights and self-determination. 
(f) sovereign equality. 
(g) fulfilment in good faith of the obligations of the Charter. 
These principles are contained in the Charter, but the Declaration 
avers that "The principles of the Charter which are embodied ••.. 
constitute basic principles of international law".163 That alone should 
be sufficient, but the final exhortation, 
"consequently appeals to all States to be guided by these 
principles in their international conduct and to develop their 
mutual relations on the basis of strict observance of these 
principles" , 
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is expressive of a voluntary organization and a reluctance to express law 
as law. In consequence some commentators think that consensus not 
consent is the binding factor, so that unanimity would have greater 
legislative effect than a mere majority, and that those who voted in 
favour would be more closely bound. Such a reaction is tantamount to 
saying that law is what one voted for and what one voted against is not 
law. Alternatively, does it reflect an obfuscation between the mandatory 
provisions of the Charter and their detailed application - or that it has 
less relevance to legislation than to potential customary law? 
There are problems about strict obseLVance and enforcement of both 
the principles and the Declaration. Principles of general application 
must necessarily be adapted to circumstances where there is neither a 
universal governing authority nor a guarantee of universal obseLVance. 
Adaptation to circumstances may prove to be uneven in practice. If so, 
actions by States may not automatically follow what is 'right' according 
to principles but rather what is 'right' (best) in the circumstances. 
For example it was alleged that the African National Congress had bases 
and received encouragement in states adjoining South African territory. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization had similar extra-territorial 
enclaves. Unfriendly incursions by armed forces into South African and 
Israeli territory were mounted from such bases. Where pre-emptive, 
inhibitory or retaliatory actions were carried out by South African or 
Israeli forces it was claimed that they were counter-actions within Art 
51 of the UN Charter against acts which had infringed Art 2.4. States 
that harbour foreign forces or terrorist groups relying on lack of 
mandatory action on the part of the UN following condemnatory Resolutions 
must be prepared for unilateral opposition. 
Some States have shown disinclination to submit to the attentions 
of an international institution or force set up by the UN to observe or 
enforce action resolved by the UN. Equally action in the UN regarding 
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such a point of conflict as external intervention may be weak. For 
example, 
" •.• the Security Council has not been concerned with UNIFIL 
problems in any consistent way but only intermittently in 
connection with renewals of the mandate. No attempts have been 
made to re-consider the mandate in the light of changed 
circumstances. The permanent members of the Security Council have 
from the point of view of UNIFIL failed to follow up the original 
decision to establish the Force with political pressure on the 
parties concerned to comply with the mandate, particularly Israel 
wi th regard to miE tary withdrawal" . 1 6 4 
Failure to enforce a Resolution in the face of refusal or neglect by a 
named State to implement it would, on case by case examination, weaken 
the hope that Declarations may develop to form a basis of customary law. 
It would follow, as Arangio-Ruiz suggests, that 
"Except perhaps in the presence of very special circumstances, and 
notably when it is a matter of asserting a law-making role of the 
Assembly as presently constituted, the member States are actually 
OPlised ••. to any further step in the organization of their 
re~tions, let alone the organiz~tion of the world or even of the 
so-called 'society of States,,,.l S 
As proof he points to the record of the UN and particularly "the purely 
normative content" of the Friendly Relations Declaration. He compares 
the language of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (375 
(TV» with experience and concludes that, 
"Nationalism and preservation of sovereignty are the main concern, 
except when vague statements about 'common heritage' ~re made with 
regard to OUter Space or the Seafloor and Subsoil".16 
Ruiz's conclusions may characterise attitudes adverse to 
authoritarian interpretations of the Charter and of Declarations intended 
to clarify certain of its provisions. The rejection of the idea that the 
International Court of Justice should have interpretative power regarding 
the Charter supports such a notion. 167 If members believe they 
individually retain a right to interpret the Charter in their own way, 
experience has shown that they may have to have regard for the view of 
one or other of the major powers, but outside the UN. In any case a 
State's UN voting record does not of itself reflect its attitude to a 
war, or to a dispute. Simil3rly, voting attitude especially on general 
issues does not necessarily reflect a State's actions, particularly where 
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these are immediately and directly affected by a general Resolution. 
There is - or may be - a difference between attitude to what it is 
understood should be, and what will be in the state's own interest. It 
is the practice of states not their voting record which forms the basis 
of any customary law. 
Voting and acting inconsistently are not the prerogative of the 
smaller States. Both the US and the USSR have acted outside the spirit 
of the Charter and sometimes not in accord with the letter of 
Resolutions. Consider the USSR's actions in Eastern Europe, Berlin and 
Afghanistan; the us in Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Central America 
and Lebanon; and their support for others in like case such as by the us 
for Israel and the USSR for Vietnam. Further, whereas the USSR had an 
illiberal attitude to the ICJ, the us has tended recently in that 
direction. The two cases of Nicaragua v us (Jurisdiction) ((1984) 24 ILM 
59) and Nicaragua V US (Merits) ((1986) 25 ILM 1023) resulted in American 
termination of its Declaration on Compulsory Jurisdiction under Art 36 
(2) of the Statute of the ICJ. 168 
As between the us and the USSR (and thei r allies in NATO and the 
WPO) a combination of nuclear threat, an instinct for the long-term 
necessity for the UN and the Charter, and economic realities, has 
developed from the times of confrontations of Berlin, Korea and Cuba to 
containment, detente, and now to glasnost and perestroika. In the 
process some regional pacts such as CENTO, SEATO, Baghdad, and now -
possibly - ANZUS, have not survived. No doubt covert and opposed 
policies continue, but it might seem that attitudes to, rather than 
appeals to, international law may have a more important influence on the 
place of war. But the incidence of war makes it apparent that the effect 
of the Charter on the place for war has been very mixed. Art 51 has 
provided a justification for both offensive and defensive operations 
showing that universal ideals continue to be relegated in favour of 
national interests as Ruiz suggested. 
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voting attitudes in the UN are affected by a State's foreign policy 
interests, but the use of force is exceptional for most states. Most 
disputes which have led to conflict have related to political and 
geographical areas in which most States had no immediate and direct 
interest. Their co-operation otherwise in the UN might have been 
different. British Defence Statements have often been marked by 
correlation between national interest and commitments with scanty 
emphasis on what might be required for the UN. Declining interest in the 
'East of Suez' debate of 1966 was influenced by a corning to terms with 
weakening imperium. 169 
The deployment or use of armed force following UN Resolutions is 
designed to deal with specific political and military situations. In 
NATO some allies have difficulties regarding 'out of area' policies 
particularly expressed by the US but not the UN. Most States, including 
the majority of NATO members, maintain standing forces for defensive 
purposes including, perhaps, an element allocated for internal duties in 
aid of their civil power. They might find some difficulty in providing a 
per.manent increment for other purposes. States such as the US, the USSR 
and China, on the other hand, apart from their homeland defensive forces 
also maintain 'power projection' forces. The US has currently some 
174,000 military personnel in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and in naval ships 
in the Pacific and Mediterranean, as well as the force it allots to NATO. 
Russian military formations including those in East Europe are also 
deployed in or available for 'power projection' roles and, like the US, 
naval deployment (and its air component) is especially important in the 
'power projection' strategy. 
These forces are not related or assigned to UN roles or held 
necessarily or primarily to satisfy any requirement of Art 24 of the UN 
Charter. No doubt they could be so allocated, but they represent the 
possibility for action independent of, or at the worst contrary to, UN 
global policy. At the same time Resolutions dealing with specific 
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disputes have been disregarded by offending States usually without 
sanctions. Kashmir, Israel and the Arab states, Cyprus, Cambodia and 
Lebanon are continuing areas of dispute. 
What seems clear is that if the provisions of the Charter cannot 
be, or are not, enforced, or if enforcement measures cannot be made 
possible except after a lengthy lapse of time, the war prevention basis 
of the UN loses respect. Such a view may be too facile: experience shows 
that offensive action in breach of the Charter, or against the spirit or 
text of UN Resolutions, usually spawns much justificatory rhetoric as 
though acknowledging fault. But in some cases to wait for action by the 
UN procedures would be to leave a situation too late for rescue. 
Thus there is point in complaints about timing occasioned by the 
operation of veto power as well as by ideological and partisan voting 
patterns and overt promotion of national interests in the Assembly. On 
occasion issues have been pre-empted by the time they can be raised in 
the UN as in the cases of Afghanistan and Grenada, and it has been said 
that if the Security Council 
"were to start functioning regularly and effectively, ie, if it 
were to take action in cases of threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace and acts of aggression, and if the bulk of the nations 
were habitually to co-operate and obey, thus acknowledging its 
authority, the proscription of the international use of force 
would be effectively sanctioned and so become a rule of law".170 
That statement of the ideal is not remarkable but law is not 
immovably fixed in time and a problem lies between law and usage. The 
Charter prescribes action by the Security Council (especially by Art 24), 
and also for States under Art 51. Ignoring or failing to comply with 
Resolutions is in breach of the law prescribed by the Charter. 
Ineffectiveness on the part of the collectivity in the face of State 
sovereignty is also in breach of that law, but how is either to be 
punished? The founders of the UN in effect reserved to the five 
permanent members of the Security Council the authority to police the 
means by which the responsibilities conferred by the Members under Art 
24.1 should be used. In this way power to decide if, when and how 
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aggression under Art 51 should be dealt with was also in effect taken by 
the five per.manent members. The intention was that these powers should 
be exercised throught the UN but they have often been exercised 
independently and, in practice, often from self-interest. But the 
authority given was also intended to be a limitation on the use of force 
by member States and difficulties have arisen because it has not been 
exerted systematically or invariably. Nevertheless some limitation on 
the use of force has been discernable though how far any such limitation 
is dictated by pressure of international law, public opinion or an 
increasing inability of military action to achieve desired political ends 
remains debatable. 
One element in the debate refers to that aspect of international 
relations by which right to territory could be attained by forceful 
occupation, and this is now considered. 
Conquest, ReCOgnition and Rebus sic stantibus. 
The place of war for a State is a matter of priorities in foreign 
policy and fiscal allocation so that it will be governed by the constant 
factors of probability and finance. When offensive or coercive action is 
required or considered there is neces~ary a calculation of the 
costjbenefit equation. That calculation includes not merely the cost of 
attaining political objectives but also whether the international society 
will countenance retention of the gains effected. This leads to 
examination of three further areas of international law all of which are 
the progeny of customary views of State sovereignty, and have a history 
antithetical to the elimination of war. Some have given rise to 
long-standing disputes and the acceptance or rejection in specific cases 
of either concept has caused war in the past and continuing debate since 
1945. 
These concepts may be summarized as: 
(a) Acquisition of territory by conquest. 
(b) Recognition of States and governments. 
(c) Treaty determination and rebus sic stantibus. 
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Today these concepts are more closely circumscribed by international law 
and, in consequence, may affect calculations about the possible effects 
of a war. 
and 
What is debated about these three concepts are the legality of: 
(i) war. 
(ii) gain by conquest. 
(iii) continued occupation and governance of conquered territory, 
( iv) if (a) has been accomplished through the agreed provisions 
of a peace treaty however imposed, the sanctity of treaties. 
The realities are whether: 
(1) legal rights can be acquired by use of force and, if so, is 
initial force purged by a prescriptive or other period of 
time. 
(2) the territory can be held in the face of non-recognition by 
individual States or in defiance of Resolutions and absence of 
force by the UN as global authority. 
(3) the terms of a peace treaty can be abrogated unilaterally in 
changing circumstances or because peace treaty terms including 
cession of territory are illegal ab initio today. 
Opinions have changed in the light of legal obligations accepted in 
multilateral treaties especially the UN Charter. But different treatment 
seems to be applied as to whether the territory was acquired before or 
after 1939. 
Conquest. 
Acquisition of title to territory by conquest was a relic of the 
Roman Law of Property as is implicit in Hall's definition: 
"Conquest consists in the appropriation of the property in, and of 
the sovereignty over, a part or the whole of the territory of a 
state, and when definitely accomplished vests the whole rights of 
propert¥ pnd sovereignty over such territory in the conquering 
state". 7 
That definition may not have been a statement of what the law was at the 
time, but it was a statement of the reality. Territorial expansion and 
to regain territory previously lost were principal war aims in the rise 
and fall of empires, in revolutionary wars, and in the trade wars which 
colonial conquest initially supported. Provided that the reality of the 
conquest was recognized by other states Hall's definition stood, but the 
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uninhibited exercise of sovereignty was and is curtailed by 
non-recognition. 
Conquest and subsequent recognition still have their place in the 
international system. The concept of acquisition by conquest is 
reprobated today however, but recognition as an international legal 
concept remains in law and practice. 
Various territories of Europe and Africa as delineated today result 
from conquest in the past whether there was then or later the 
acquiescence of the conquered peoples. Most States that were sovereign 
before 1939 have been indebted to, or have suffered from, a rule of 
international law that one of the 
"five modes by which a State may acquire a legal title to territory 
(was) the incorpor~tion of foreign territory ••• after subjugation 
by armed forces".l 2 
Conquest and acquisition, therefore, gave rise to cycles of war, 
reconquest and restitution of territory. In any case, conquest was not 
always universally accepted as a valid way of acquiring territory. 
Hershey, Moore and Briggs among the North Americans, and Oppenheim, 
Phillimore, Westlake and Hall among the British supported the idea but 
Bonfils and Fiore among the Europeans had earlier rejected it. 173 
Fiore at the end of the last Century described the reality, 
"Although conquest per se cannot constitute a legitimate mode of 
aquisition, nevertheless, when it is accomplished, when the new 
conditions have by degrees been gradually accepted by the 
population, and when the fact, illegal in its origin, has been 
gradually legalized, conquest may result in the acquisition of 
conquered territory, by reason of the necessity of accepting an 
established condition strengthened by time and of respecting 
accomplished facts".l 7 4 
Hall's definition "when definitely accomplished vests the rights" amounts 
to no more than Fiore's "gradually legalized". 
Phillipson questioned the ethics of conquest but accepted the 
reali ty saying, 
"title by conquest is now generfllY considered the least desirable" 
•• but is "juridically valid". 1 5 
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The validity of the title might even then have been challenged but to 
change the fact would entail further conflict which for the defeated was 
not immediately possible but might later become so and lead to 
re-acquisition. The period of time between conquest and re-acquisition 
did not affect Phillipson's hypothesis. 
Between the two World Wars and with the corning into force of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the 
Saavedra-Lomass Treaty of 1933176 , Moller considered the illegality of a 
war but the possible legality of its fruits, 
n ••• positive international law by virtue of an inner contradiction, 
recognizes the right of conquest, as a means not only of 
maintaining justice or of protecting suppressed nationalities but 
also of increasing power (wars of conquest)", 
but he also pointed out that 
" ..• an important limitation has been set to this right of conquest 
by the C9yenant of the League of Nations ••• particularly Article 
10 ••• " .1 
But Hershey referring to Art 10 said it 
"does not formally abolish title by terri tory based on future 
conquest, its observance would make aggression and conquest 
practically irnpossible".178 
Brierly agreed, saying in 1936, of conquest and cession, 
" •.• both these titles will disappear from the law if the future 
practice of states is in accofdance with their solemn undertakings 
in the Pact of Paris, 1928".1 9 
But in 1963 he added, 
"What in that event is to be the attitude of the law towards 
conquest or enforced cession will become important".180 
At that stage little inhibition had resulted from the change in legal 
position. 
The position before 1914 was clearly that if a war was terminated 
by a treaty of peace which concluded for cession of territory that 
transfer of title was acceptable. Colonial conquest had similar results. 
Between the two World Wars armed might was forbidden and to be foregone 
through accession to international agreements to that effect. In 
practice Japan invaded China in 1931 and 1932 and again in 1937. Italy 
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invaded Abyssinia in 1935 and 1936. Both were dispossessed of their 
territorial gains only as the result of war. 
The situation between 1945 and 1989 as illustrated by the USSR 
appeared to be similar to that obtaining before 1945. Except for Russian 
withdrawal from Azerbaijan the USSR retained what it had occupied during 
the second world War in the Pacific and in Europe. But during this 
period territorial gains by Israel, and military occupation of 
Afghanistan by the USSR, were reprobated in Resolutions of the UN. It 
had seemed that there would be a dividing line between what resulted from 
the Second World War and what transpired thereafter but there were 
exceptions. India's occupation of Junagahd, Hyderabad and Goa entailed 
show of armed force but without serious objection in the UN. 
Russia's occupation of European States is being questioned today 
although more by the indigenous populations than by other member-states 
in the UN. Japan has continued to seek the return of Sakkalin and the 
Kuriles. What will result has yet to emerge, but the results will not 
have been prompted only by argument as to the legality of the Russian 
position. 
Brierly's 1963 point is still valid. Israeli withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and the Jordan west Bank (following the examples of Vietnam 
from Kamputchea, Russia from Aghanistan and South Africa from Namibia), 
and a Russian withdrawal from the Baltic States would offer some evidence 
towards the acceptance of a general policy in the UN, and for peaceful 
settlement. Alternatively the provisions of Art 4 and Cap VII of the 
Charter afford clear sanctions and non-recognition. How such remedies 
are in practice applied will have a direct bearing on the costjbenefit 
equation which States will need to calculate when contemplating 
aggression with a view to territorial gain. It is the fact, however, 
that in this Century only the adventitious circumstance of world war (but 
not of initial war aims) has influenced the restitution of territory 
acquired and occupied by force of arms. This was true of Japan and 
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Italy; remains in dispute in Kashmir and Cyprus; but has not been 
necessary in cases of temporary occupation since 1945 in the cases of 
'voluntary' withdrawal already mentioned. 
The principle may fall to be considered in relation to older cases 
such as Gibraltar, but, in general, in Europe and the Near East cycles of 
conquest and restitution have been such that in most cases it would be 
difficult to adjudicate fairly on the merits of one possessor against 
another without some kind of prescriptive title, or by referendum to 
provide the basis for 'self-determination'. What seems clear is that if 
the member-States are not prepared to support the simple principle 
Brierly's "discordance between law and the facts which in the long run 
would merely advertise the impotence of the law"lSl could encourage 
Iraq-Iran type of conflicts. 
Recognition. 
Recognition is a procedural method of formal acceptance by one 
State of (a) a new State, and (b) a new government in an existing state. 
Acceptance is not automatic and in the UN a diversity of views can be 
expressed in anyone case about the merits of recognition. Such 
expressions may frustrate uniformity in the UN and may inhibit individual 
States from recognizing a new State or government as in the case of 
Israel and some Middle Eastern States. 
Recognition is a matter of fact rather than of law although a State 
may withold recognition of another in obedience to treaty obligations 
which may stem, for example, from the UN Charter. 
Non-recognition inhibits normal relations between States and 
governments with detrimental effects on the activities of individuals. 
The effects on individual citizens, however, may be tempered by that 
'respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' which is enjoined by 
the UN Charter. But only the effect of recognition on the place of war 
is in question here for knowledge of the disabilities likely to result 
from non-recognition, and the likelihood of adverse UN Resolutions and 
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consequential adverse world opinion, affect calculations of the benefits 
of conquest today. 
Basic to the concept of recognition now is the respect for the 
'self-determination of peoples' which is a Purpose of the UN (Art 1.2). 
In respect of the acquisition of territory the method of acquisition may 
be cruCial, but it is doubtful now whether recognition can give "legal 
validity to what has become an accomplished fact".182 if the fact arose 
from conquest or coercion. 
The general tenor of post war opinion can be described as 
conforming to the 1932 Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition183 ; to the 
Saavedra-Lornass Treaty's definition of reason for non-recognition, (that 
is, an acquisition 'not obtained by pacific means' (Art 1)); and the 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of states ((1933) USTS 881) which 
included the expression 'which have been obtained by force whether this 
consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic 
representations, or in any other effective coercive measures" (Art 11). 
The Saavadra-Lornass Treaty and the Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States were American measures and the former was adhered to by eleven 
European States including Italy. The provisions of the Convention were 
enforced as to the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the American 
States by Declaration of 3 August 1932 warning the belligerents that they 
would not recognize territory 'obtained through occupation or conquest by 
force of arms'. On the other hand, the League of Nations Resolution of 
11 March 1932 in terms of non-recognition of territory occupied or 
conquered by force of arms was disregarded by Italy and Japan before 1939 
and by Germany from 1938. Further, the factual result of the Potsdam -
Yalta 'sphere of influence' understandings between the Allies of the 
Second World War implicitly denied the League principle. 
The Bogota Treaty ((1948) 46 AJIL Supp 43) replaced the 
Saavedra-Lornass Treaty and included the term 'either by force or by other 
means of coercion' (Art 17) which introduced economic coercion into the 
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principle of non-recognition. But the fundamental of the 
'self-determination of peoples' has been tested constantly since 1945 
especially in decolonization issues. The Brezhnev Doctrine184 clearly 
opposed such a principle but now the Baltic States again raise the issue 
of self-determination calling in aid, 
(a) A declaration to the Secretary-General of the League in 1933 by the 
USSR stating an 
" ••• essential principle of its policy ... the right of all peoples to 
self-determination in conditions of freedom to manifest their 
desires",185 and 
(b) A statement of Molodtsov that 
"Soviet opinion regards the incorporation of the Baltic States as 
an example of self-determination based upon the consent of the 
populations concerned". 186 
In 1939, States including the US refused to recognize the Russian 
incorporation, but followed the 'spheres of influence' decisions referred 
to. Now there will be a problem for the UN not only as to recognition 
itself but also as to whether non-recognition on grounds of coercion or 
armed force can be required of member-States despite the customary law, 
if UN General Assembly Res 2625 (XXV) is to be followed. 
Leaving aside Wright's view of the League of Nations P~lestine 
Mandate ('the Mandate and all that flowed from it was illegal,)187 Israel 
was established as a State by the UN in GA Resolution 181 (II). This did 
not force recognition of the State on member-States, or establish that 
non-recognition by some members would necessarily bar an applicant-State 
from membership of (or as in the case of the PLO from some form of 
association with) the UN. The situation of non-recognition, however, is 
not to be confused with a state of armed hostility, although that is the 
case with Israel and some non-recognizing member-States. But the reason 
for non-recognition is the crux of the argument and, as Wright suggested, 
the Arab states' objection was that Israel's territory was acquired by 
force. l8S Recognition is a positive act: non-recognition is negative but 
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may indicate a casus belli, as might the withdrawal of recognition or 
movements to that end. 
The severing of diplomatic relations is not the equivalent of 
withdrawal of recognition but may be as far as a state can go whilst the 
other State continues in existence. In any case although peaceful 
solutions may be found the place of war may be affected in a 
precautionary way. 
Rebus sic stantibus. 
The sanctity of treaties in international relations is an extension 
of the Prince's 'word and bond'. It was often breached in Machiavellian 
terms before as well as after the 16th Century. Nevertheless the strict 
observance of treaty obligations makes for predictability and stability 
in international relations. Orderly withdrawal in agreement with all the 
parties to a treaty maintains the concept of the sanctity of treaties. 
Conduct contrary to these customary usages may affect the place of war. 
In the development of a law of treaties it was inevitable that a 
parallel development of a law of contract would affect the concept of 
international agreements. For instance it has been argued, 
"the rules governing the conduct of individuals cannot be extended 
to treaties •.• Why should a state be bound indefinitely by a 
treaty when it is not so bound by a statute or administrative 
decree?,,189 
But that confuses the sovereignty of parliament over its own laws and the 
substance of international law. 
There have been two schools of thought as regards the duration of 
treaties. One supporting the principle of pacta sunt servanda: the other 
relying on the clausula rebus sic stantibus. The first school has the 
backing of customary law, but a general theory that treaties contain an 
"implied term or clause - to the effect that treaty obligations 
subsist onlr so long as the essential circumstances remain 90 
unchanged" • 
also persists. 
A direct confrontation between sanctity and the clausula concept 
would seem to leave unilateral withdrawal vlithout notice as offering a 
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ground for action, especially in cases where one party was markedly 
disadvantaged. To uphold the clausula would not in any way further 
efforts to eliminate causes of war. 
Although the "practice is inconsistent" and "the exact scope and 
application" of the clausula "are uncetain,,191 the most powerful 
objection lies in the combination of national rather than international 
interest and the practical possibility of withdrawal without notice. 
which 
Following Chesney Hill, Briggs cited customary international law 
"lays down the rule that a party who seeks release from a treaty on 
the ground of a change of circumstances has no right to terminate 
the treaty unilaterally". 192 
It might have been thought that the clausula - in Hyde's term 'an 
unhelpful guide' - might have been extinguished by the UN Charter both as 
to the Declaration on 'respect for the obligations ariSing from 
treaties', and Art 2.2 ('shall fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them •.• ",) but neither Art 62 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties ((1969) 8ILM 679) nor the Fisheries Jurisdication Case 
(Merits) ((1974) ICJ Reps 3)193 has wholly resolved the argument. The 
judgement of the ICJ indicated only that Art 62 is in many respects a 
codification of customary law on the question. Equally, Art 62 deals 
only in a resticted way with it. 
ott points out that Art 62 
"gives a limited right to a state to terminate or withdraw ..• 
because the circumstances under which it became a party no longer 
exists".194 
Whilst the Article sets out the contingent conditions, it js really 
making the point that prudent drafting of treaties ensures the inclusion 
of a procedure for review and termination in an orderly fashion in order 
to avoid dispute and its effect on a state's place of \<1ar. 
Both recognition and the clausula in practice show examples of how 
confused and changing international relations may be perceived when 
looked at through the eyes of those who must be prepared for war and who 
must in consequence rely on facts rather than law. 
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PART II 
WAR: JUSTIFICATION OR ABOLITION 
Attitudes to War. 
NATO's objectives of ccllective defence and the preservation of 
peace and security demand that, 
"Military forces should exist to prevent war and to ensure self 
defence, not for the purpose of initiating aggression and not for 
purposes of political or military intimidation".l 
This philosophy has little historical support where national 
military forces are concerned. What it may more nearly represent is a 
philosophy for a UN force, or the military force supporting an 
international authority's powers of sanction. The main reason for 
making such a distinction between national and international military 
force is that investment in a national force is designed to afford at 
least the possibility that advantage can be taken of circumstances, as 
for example by the USSR in Afghanistan and India in Goa and East Bengal 
(East Pakistan), and as an inhibiting factor against possible aggression 
against the State. Deterrent policies demand more than weak military 
capability vis-a-vis a potential enemy. On the other hand collective 
strength, both physical and moral, which military forces in support of an 
international legal authority would deploy, is more likely to be 
effective because of its political and military aggregation. 
In international relations military forces still dictate the place 
of war on either a specific or a continuing basis, just as the place of 
war dictates a need still for national military forces. 
may be viewed from the standpoints that: 
The proposition 
(i) wealth is needed to underpin military power, and military power 
is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. 
(ii) In the early 1980s the nations of the world were spending 
$1 million each minute on armaments "equal to the total amount 
spent by all nations ••• on essential foodstuffs •.• equal to 
the total GNP of the poorer nations ..• it is escalating at 
such a rate that if it is not halted, by the end of the Century 
it will equal the present total wealth of the world".2 
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These statistics would seem to indicate that some States perceive 
or fear a continuing place for war despite such assertions as General 
Eisenhower's that, 
"War in our time has become an anachronism. Whatever the case in 
the past, war in the future can serve no useful purpose ... any 
risks there might be in advancing to disarmament are as nothing 
compared to the risks for not disarming". 3 
This continuing place for war exists alongside desires for 
disarmament and ideas of collective security. It indicates chat, like 
other instruments of national policy, force, or its threat, is promoted 
by conceptions of national sovereignty and survival. In an ideal world 
the use of other, peaceful, instruments might preclude resort to war, but 
that is not prescriptive in a world which deals with opposed, rather than 
allied, forces, spheres of influence, ideologies and objectives. Yet, 
within the antagonism some common factors dictate agreement in some 
immediately important areas of international relations whilst not 
dismissing basic ideology or the concept of the supremacy of national 
sovereignty. International law is established within these areas of 
agreement but, unlike the ability of states in their domestic policies to 
initiate, amend and repeal their own legislation as their political 
persuasions dictate, international law can only be effected and effective 
by agreement between States. 
The place for the concept of the over-riding nature of nationaf 
sovereignty within the opposed forces and objectives of States is not 
quite secured today any more than it was in hey-deys of Victorian small 
wars and European colonialism. Depreciation of the sovereignty of 
individual nations and States in reality - if not in concept -
necessarily follows (as it has always done) from the effect on inter-
national relationships of opposed and antagonistic 'super' (or Great) 
powers. NOW, the US and the USSR with other states attracted within 
their respective leaderships, dominate the international system. This 
leadership, if not colonial in the earlier sense, is today the centre of 
power and technological imperialism in the combinations of States in 
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which the us and the USSR have ascendency. It is important within the 
context of both war and law, therefore, to consider the aims of thesp two 
super powers. 
A US Chief of Staff Conmdttee Chairman explained his country's aims 
as having the objective, 
"To preserve the independence, freedom of action, and territorial 
integrity of the united States and of (its) allies. To support 
US and Allied vital interests abroad. To encourage an inter-
national order in which freedom, democratic institutions and free 
enterprise can prosper". 
To this end he pointed to the "array of instruments, unilatE:lral, 
bilateral and multilateral, (which) were developed to serve these goals". 
The promotion of the aims he explained in terms of military power, 
" ••• an American presence, strong and forward deployed was 
essential to protect them (i.e. the US Government leaders) from 
interference and coercion as they work to build free and 
functioning societies. American strength has undergirded the full 
range of Washington's foreign and security policies". 4 
Stalin expressed the view that, 
" ••• besides the right of nations to self-determination there is 
also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and 
to this latter right the right of self-determination is 
subordinate. There are occasions when the right of self-
determination conflicts with the other, higher right - the right of 
the working class that has assumed power to consolidate its power. 
In such cases ••• the right of self-determination cannot and must 
not serve as an obstacle to the exercise of the right of the 
working ~lass to dictatorship. The former must give way to the 
latter". 
This was not contradicted by the Brezhnev Doctrine (perhaps now somewhat 
muted), and the method of attaining the socialist goal is in these terms, 
"The CPSU is invariably true to the Leninist principle of 
solidarity with the people fighting for national liberation and 
social emancipation. As in the past, the fighters against the 
remaining colonial regimes can count on our full support. The 
Congress attaches special importance to extending co-operation 
with countries taking the Socialist orientation". 6 
The means involved were explained by General Yepishev, 
"By its social nature and historical design, the army of the Soviet 
Socialist State represents part of the international revolutionary 
liberation force •.• Today the Defence of the socialist fatherland 
is closely tied to giving comprehensive assistance to national 
liberation movements, progressive regimes and new states who are 
fighting against imperialist domination ... In our day Soviet 
Again, 
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anned forces serve as a mighty support for revolutionary peoples 
in their struggle with intervention by world imperialism in the 
internal affairs of the countries which have risen in wars of 
liberation againft foreign dominion, colonialism and social 
oppression " 
"The men of the Soviet army and navy are indoctrinated in ... their 
international duty to the working class and to all who struggle 
against the capitalist yoke for their social and national 
liberation. The invincible might of the Soviet army and navy has 
emerged today as one of the most important factors in determining 
the role and influence of the Soviet state in the world arena". 8 
From such different objectives it follows that conceptions of 
justification for war would also differ as between two States. The US 
acknowledge the concept of just war evolved by European Christian 
humanitarian ideas: the Russian concept (as expressed by Gen. Yepishev) 
is rather that, 
"The nature of a given war .•• that is, whether it is just, 
liberation, aggresslve, or reactionary war - depends on what 
political aim is pursued in it. A war is just if it is the 
continuation of a policy of the defence of the people's 
revolutionary achievements, freedom and independence, and of the 
cause of Socialism and Communism. A war is unjust and reactionary 
if it is a continuation of a policy aimed at suppressing the 
revolutionary struggle, freedom and independence of any people and 
the working people's Socialist achievements, and at subjugating any 
country".9 
If the words do not mean exactly what they say, and if the aims are 
by no means open ended, an area exists within which there is at least 
implicit agreement between the super powers. Threats to their domestic 
security are met more by urgent consideration of military modernisation 
programmes than by modernising programmes to render international law 
more effective. 
Thus whilst war and law can be considered together there is little 
coherent advancement of the latter in parallel with the modernisation of 
military forces and armaments. Argument about the Strategic Defence 
Initiative and the ABM Treaty ((1972)11ILM 784) is in point. 
War and International Law. 
In historical and contemporary terms war is both a subject of, and 
is subject to, international law and custom, but it has always been the 
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instrument of political action and decision. 
International law legitimates political decisions and 
institutionalizes customs by reducing them to written and authenticated 
form whether as international 'statutes' - (if multilateral agreements 
like the Charter of the UN can be so called) - or as conventions10 , 
general treaties11 or bi-lateral treaties12 • International law also 
recognizes Opinions and Judgments of the ICJ13 , and in general terms, 
treaties , conventions, international custom and general principles of 
law recognized by civilized countries. That the Soviet bloc apparently 
prefers bi-lateral to general treaties, and has been loath to use the 
offices of the ICJ, has an effect on the realities of the system but not 
on its legality.14 
War also has its formalities and legalities grounded likewise in 
custom and in written instruments. 
A simple comparison between war as an expression of disagreement, 
and international law as an expression of agreement between States 
disguises many steps on the way to either situation. 15 It is in these 
steps that some effects of international law on war will be found. In 
war's causes there are narrow areas of conflict of fact, failure or 
absence of communication, conceptions of local advantage16 , and 
apparently intractably opposed points of view. In the case of law there 
is political solution institutionalized by law and custom but, equally, 
the result of resolution of those same areas of conflict. For law 
offers not only a modus vivendi for peaceful solution of disputes, but is 
also intended to provide for enforcement. 
It is the ultimate ends which should differentiate law and war that 
have to be resolved and this entails accommodation to the other's view by 
both sides. The difficulty is whether the ultimate necessa~ accommo-
dation seems too great to be absorbed by peaceful resolution of the 
differences. There is a build-up to the conclusion which may take a 
long time as in the case of the Law of the Sea, or may be long awaited as 
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in the Soviet revenge on Poland for the invasion of 1919-20 and on Japan 
for 1904-05. 
As one purpose of international law is to express political 
agreements it is States that negotiate17 , and States are sovereign with 
'territorial integrity and political independence,18 . It is in the 
concept of sovereignty that the difference between states and individuals 
makes direct comparison of municipal and international law sterile. 
state sovereignty has been regarded as unlimited and the various 
Declarations of Human Rights as well as national Constitutions however 
liberally expressed necessarily gave paramountcy within the state to the 
state under a concept of common good to which the individual is 
subordinated. Nevertheless, sovereignty can be limited both as to 
itself and to its administration. Thus it can be affected by voluntary 
relinquishment, as in bi-lateral treaties, or by compulsion such as 
arises from conquest (as in the 1919 Versailles Treaty), or it may 
necessarily arise as an adjunct of imposed or voluntary treaties (such as 
the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1954 or the European Communities 
(Amendment) Act 1986). The State may also voluntarily limit its 
administrative sovereignty by allowing itself (or the Crown) to be sued 
for example; but also by upholding the independent judiciary in its 
interpretation of what sovereignty consists. 19 
In the context of peace and war even if a state declines to join 
the UN it may still be required to "act in accordance with (the) 
principles" if circumstances arise necessitating enforcement of that 
•• 20 provlslon. That would involve a curtailment of sovereignty just as 
membership of the UN involves a voluntary limitation of the right of a 
State to go to war except in the circumstances prescribed by Art 51 of 
the Charter. 
The Analogy of the State and the Individual. 
It would be misleading to consider state sovereignty without 
considering also the liberty of the individual in the state for there is 
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a direct comparison to be made of State and individual as regards 
breaches of laws. For the State the UN Charter envisages the imposition 
of sanctions (Art 41), or other action (Art 43), as well as suspension or 
expulsion from membership (Arts 5 or 6), but the major threat to 
delinquency is collective action by the other members under Arts 48 to 
50. But a State may hope to escape punishment through the support of 
others in the General Assembly, or through exercise of veto powers in the 
Security Council. 
The individual lawbreaker may hope - or expect - to escape his just 
deserts with the aid of influence in the State hierarchy, or he may hope 
for exculpation through other means. The individual with grievance 
against the State, nevertheless, may lack the persistence, or the 
material means, to fight the State. One State may be in a similar 
position vis-a-vis another, but whilst Art 11(2) of the UN Charter may be 
invoked the aggrieved State must organize its own support in the General 
Assembly. 
States usually have civil and criminal, and may also have canon 
law, courts all with due process and powers to enforce the law. The 
findings of such courts are mandatory on those within the jurisdiction. 
It is not thus for States, for in international law the instruments may 
prescribe a system of arbitration (as, indeed, in civil municipal law), 
but in general for States the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) is voluntary. On the other hand, just as actions of 
interdict to restrain action on the part of individuals, as well as other 
actions ad facta praestanda, may be raised in municipal courts, they are 
paralleled in some degree by Art 36 of the Statute of the ICJ ((1945) 
1 UNTS xvi) but whereas procedure under municipal law is judicial, under 
Art 36 it is administrative. 
Two comparisons are relevant here. Jurisdiction may be disputed 
in municipal courts under a regulated procedure but the court will decide 
if it can lawfully proceed. Further, despite anomalies arising from 
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social practice in some States, normally citizens generally are not above 
the law. Permanent members of the Security Council by exercising their 
power of veto under Art 27 of the UN Charter legally put their actions 
outwith any effects that might arise from their examination, and they can 
exercise the veto power on behalf of their friends and client States. 
Again, whilst justification in municipal law is often a mitigato~ plea, 
for the individual is responsible for what he does, justification in 
inter-State relationships is an Act of State and a matter of sovereignty. 
It is individuals who will be brought to account, however, for the actions 
of the State if proceedings ensue as at Nuremberg and Tokyo. In any 
case, the individual on his own account exercises his standard of 
morality: in acting for the State the individual may exercise in public 
life a different standard. 
Perhaps it would be fruitless to pursue any common impulses there 
may be between restrictions :mposed by municipal law and governmental 
regulation on the liberty of action of individuals21 with a desire for 
regulating the actions of States. The former is dictated by 
restrictionist philosophy in the belief that this is for the common good, 
whereas in the case of the State in the context of peace and war it may 
reflect a desire to free individuals from the dangers and costs of war. 
The duties and rights of the individual are regulated by custom and 
legislation imposed by government and expounded by the courts. The 
individual and his influence on the process through electoral franchise 
is remote. States, on the other hand, have a direct role in treaty-
making. 
Treaties are not in themselves law, but are expressions of it when 
accepted into municipal law by 'Nhatever process is constitutionally 
proper to a State. Treaties are sources of international law and may 
give rise to custom in due course. 22 It is facile to believe, however, 
that treaties are effective - as opposed to binding - only between the 
parties to them for they may affect third parties whether that is 
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intended or not. What is more, third party apprehensions of intentions 
or capabilities arising from treaty provisions may give rise to some form 
of reciprocity. For example, action by other 'frontline' states in 
Southern Africa as a result of the Landa and Nkomati Accords of 1984 
between South Africa and respectively, Angola and Mozambique. Such 
apprehensions are more easily aroused when conflicting ideology is 
concerned, as was the case in Southern Africa as well as when the US 
considered the Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and Cuba. Even if 
treaties by and with member States must be deposited with the UN under 
Art 102 of the UN Charter, there is no restriction on the general terms 
of inter-State treaties, subject to consistency with the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN. Even so, fundamental intentions do not always 
become apparent merely from the text of an agreement. 
In sum, the scope for international law extends in reality to, and 
depends on, political decisions reached between States. But the areas 
in which effects might beneficially be felt seem to be based upon the 
concepts of municipal law in terms of authority, enforcement of it, and 
providing the social and economic conditions under which such authority 
and enforcement become acceptable and effective. 
It seems important to make comparisons between law for the citizen 
and law for the State in its international relations, for it is develop-
ment and change in the State which give rise to ideas for development and 
change internationally. In the histories of States internal change 
was generally brought about violently because one section of the society 
desired to take control of the society both as to power and possessions: 
that is to say, the development, wresting power and possession from the 
paterfamilias, often with violence, on the part of family or individual. 
When, eventually, ideas of common good prevailed, change became less 
violent, but it required active control, and equal control, of all by 
representatives of all. 23 That situation has yet to be reached in some 
societies, for States and nations were not at, or have not remained at, 
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the same stage of development, so that violent overthrow has continued in 
some States whilst peaceful development is normal in others. It did not 
follow that such development became fixed in history for any State. 
Some have alternated between peaceful and violent practice24 and the role 
of authority and police has to be considered in relation to peaceful as 
well as violent policies. It may not follow that the desire of the many 
is accommodated where peace, law and order, apparently prevail. Could 
it be said of Pakistan, Syria, Nicaragua or China? 
Peace: A State Policy? 
If war is really an instrument of last resort peace should be the 
normal policy of States. War can be forced upon a state (as, no doubt, 
both Iraq and Iran aver), but it is generally entered as a conscious act 
of aggression or of defence from aggression. Peace for an individual 
State is not an absolute matter for if nominally at peace it can be 
affected by conflicts between other States at any time, as the Gulf 
States feared during the Iraq-Iran conflict. 
Peace at any price cannot be a condition of absolute peace for such 
a policy will be opposed by some as was evident regarding the Boer War, 
the Suez conflict, and the war in Vietnam. 
The study of peace, however, may be intensifying especially in the 
fonn of 'peace research' as an academic subject, perhaps through causes 
such as Marwick describes, 
"Two world wars and the other conflicts since 1945, have taught men 
to be less optimisti! about human behaviour and more rational in 
their study of it". 2 
But a change of attitude might also reflect fear of advancing technology 
and its threat of ultimate danger to environment and species, whilst not 
affecting any change towards nationalism. Britain today would not be 
without support for a policy which Clarendon described in relation to the 
Austro-Prussian War of 1866, 
"We are willing to do anything for the maintenance of peace except 
committing ourselves to a policy of action".26 
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A policy of action now should be dictated by international law provided 
for in the UN Charter, but distancing oneself from military involvement 
whilst engaging in trade and arms supply with belligerents is not a 
policy of peace. 
A state's place of war can be ascertained by reference to its 
foreign policy, defence budget and military planning. The absence of 
military budgets and planning might be thought to indicate a policy of 
peace. In reality, however, the place of war is the real indicator of 
the place of peace for if one is planned it is likely that the other is 
merely reaction to it. 
Subscription to a policy - following Vegetius - of "Let him who 
desires peace prepare for war" has ensured a continuation of armaments, 
arms races, and capability for war rather than the assurance of lasting 
peace. Even the peace of neutrality may owe more to forbearance by 
belligerents than to the neutral State's defensive possibilities. 
Marwick's statement above may raise questions as to (1) whether 
wars can be just for the people in whose names they are initiated and by 
whom they are fought; (2) whether nuclear war can in any case be just 
war; and (3) whether a policy of being prepared for peace by being armed 
for war has failed and should be replaced by disarmament. 
of the historical policy seems only to institutionalize 
Mr Chadband's question: What is peace? Is it war? 
Continuance 
A balance sheet of a kind could be drawn up purporting to show how 
many inter-state disputes have been resolved without violence by inter-
national legal institutions such as mediation in the League of Nations 
and the UN, arbitration, judicial process, and other peaceful media. 
Similarly in disputes which were not resolved by peaceful means, the 
incidence of breaches of international law as reported could be listed in 
a fairly general manner. The difficulty with this methodology is that 
it fails to disclose real attitudes towards international law and the 
fundamental causes of failure to ensure permanent and universal peace. 
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This is a problem in the UN for States approach disputes as to whether 
they are likely to be involved or not and their attitude to one differs 
from the other. They may reprobate military action where they are not 
involved, but where their own interests are at risk they are more likely 
to seek a military solution if compromise 'on their own terms' is not 
forthcoming. Such may be the case even when a proportion of the 
citizens are opposed to military action, or to the kind proposed. Of 
course, when national opposition assumes such a proportion that political 
party loyalty is threatened (as the weight of opinion in the US during 
the Vietnam war changed) the opposition attitude may come to prevail. 
Such a position has a parallel in the UN. In the Korean dispute 
it acted impressively to prevent an aggression and violation of inter-
national law. The Security Council's Resolution of June 1950 condemning 
the invasion of South Korea (and calling for the North Koreans to 
withdraw and for member States to send ar.med forces to Korea) was 
subsequently condemned "with considerable legal justification" that the 
Resolution was invalid as it did not have Soviet support. 27 
The position may be that a State may have a policy for peace 
through collective security. Such a policy will continue to demand the 
provision of armed forces, if only to comply with Art 43 of the UN 
Charter. 
War and Law: Practicalities. 
"In any highly sophisticated society the interaction of mutually 
supporting elements - however diverse and even contradictory they 
may be in their origin - is an essential feature of the working of 
that society". 2 8 
In States as in Churches the supporting elements include leadership and 
discipline. Leadership without which the mutually supporting elements 
cannot be brought together; discipline to help to keep them together. 
Neither element is solely related to personal qualities: both are 
affected by the quality of the fundamental objectives and the means to be 
used to attain them. Clemenceau is said to have believed that leader-
ship consisted of two things that matter: to love and to be loved, and 
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to be intellectually honest. 29 Accepting respect for sentimentality and 
honesty is the disciplined response to leadership. The international 
system consists of many societies and whilst leadership among inter-
national statesmen may be possible discipline among them is more 
difficult of attainment. If leadership requires both of Clemenceau's 
attributes as well as inspiration, audacity and the art of communication, 
international discipline involves compromise, trust and faith in 
others. 30 
This may sound remote from the substance of international law, but 
that substance comes into being only as a result of the exercise of those 
leadership qualities because it is by the leadership of statesmen that 
negotiations and actings emerge which lead to the development of custom 
and law. The evolution of society and the evolution of law of necessity 
have been parallel in time, but it is uncertain whether human society has 
arrived at its present mutation by some conscious scheme of things or by 
unconscious co-operation Witll planned or unplanned forces of nature. 
Similarly undetermined is whether the conduct that gave rise to what is 
now established custom and customary law was designed from the start to 
reach the present conclusion. If not designed, what hypothesis should 
be advanced for permanence in what was adventitious? 
Leadership is relevent also in the context of this thesis, for if 
the human race is to advance in co-operation and harmony on a planned 
basis some modus vivendi not yet apparent will have to be proposed and 
agreed, as will the ends to which both the human race and its politics 
are to be directed (or pointed).31 This is necessary because, in one 
sense, international law is an expression of compromise between political 
ideologies and the hopes and desires which arise from them. To that 
extent, international law has to act as a modifying element in the 
opposed political beliefs deployed at any time within the international 
relations system. In another sense, it is an attempt to soften emphasis 
on welfare-state policies as an alternative to military expenditure, for 
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states now generally follow one or other spending pattern. In a third 
sense, it is an effort to eradicate the modern tendency towards a 
philosophy of 'human rights' without obligations, and without immediate 
possibility of complete satisfaction, and with that associated basis of 
violent usage to obtain such 'rights' which is as obvious in the inter-
national as the municipal scene. Further, it represents some, as yet 
rudimentary, steps towards harnessing technological 'advance' to 
beneficial purposes by diverting scientific effort to that end and away 
from the malign purposes to which it may be put in armament 
proliferation. 
Intellectual honesty must be brought to bear on this, for modern 
war affects all mankind. Yet war as an instrument of politics, and law 
as expressing decisions of politics, represent a limited interest for the 
generality of mankind, and interest in one is not necessarily reflected 
by an interest in the other by the same person, although an 
inter-relationship seems clear enough. Patience is required to render 
the intricacies of modern technology - especially that which is only as 
yet envisaged and not yet substantial - into water-tight legal agreements 
between States. People, on the whole, are not imbued with patience in 
this context, and if some lose interest through impatience, others 
condemn law as being too slow in comparison with technology in any race 
to reduce the risk of war. It is necessary always, therefore, to 
recognize a conflict of timescale between arms-making and law-making. 
In any consideration of leadership toward planned aims for society, 
and in the progress of technological weapons and machines, legal measures 
must play a part if only in relation to the biological aims of the 
proponents of a 'brave new world' .32 This is not because of the 
increasing pace of military technology although that plays a part due to 
the growth of computerisation and robotics. That growth also 
accompanies research into genetics and experimentation with the 
manipulation of animal cells to be followed by systematic cross-breeding 
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of different animal species. Scientists will not stop short of human 
experimentation - as Hitler's 'scientists' proved - and the urge to 
improve artificial intelligence machines is paralleled by ideas for 
'improving' the human species (with military possibilities as yet 
unthought of?). Improving techniques of embryo implanting has made 
commercial human breeding practicable and profitable, even in States 
which have eliminated the sale of infants and young girls. Perhaps 
there is danger of a race between human and artificial intelligence 
development with a view to the elimination of human mistakes which are as 
much a factor of military practice as of industry. 
In spite of this largely individual and not centrally planned 
outlook, societal attitudes toward war continue to be dominated by 
domestic and nationalistic factors. These factors and their associated 
tactics are slow to change, for changes in rules need not only political 
leadership but also force of circumstances. Even where acceptance of 
change is taken to the point of written agreement, and despite the fact 
that 
"Ethical codes have always preceded ethical conduct .•. A certain 
time is needed for education ar~ adaptation. Even afterwards 
perfection is never attained", 
and acceptance is not always turned into performance or even observance. 
The League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the united Nations 
have all demonstrated that. At the time it was possible to say of the 
Nuremberg Charter and Tribunal that the only innovation which that 
Charter had introduced was to provide machinery to carry out existing 
law. But it has had little relevance since other than in the 
discussions of the General Assembly, especially in relation to the tasks 
set for the International Law Commission. . The argument today, all too 
often, is not as to the relevance of the charges, or of the findings of 
the Tribunal but as to the legality of the process, the selection of the 
accused, and the selectivity of the subjects of the charges, in spite of 
the retrospective adoption of Charter and Judgments by the General 
Assembly (Res. 95(1)). 
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If there was popular clamour for war crimes trials it hardly arose 
from considerations of the laws of war despite hopes that open judicial 
investigation could induce revulsion against war and lead to the punish-
ment of those convicted. Questions of leadership and discipline were 
prominent even if the Tribunal itself was a rationalizing device for 
reasons of alliance and popular appeal, as well as a warning for the 
future. Like positive law, however, in the longer term the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals have not achieved the aims, for in the context of war 
crimes the conflict between jus necessarium and jus voluntarium remains, 
and the precedents of the Tribunals have not been followed in wars since 
1945. 34 Indeed, contemporary demand for the prosecution of alleged war 
criminals resident in Britain refers only to crimes of the second World 
war. 35 
Most national systems make it difficult for the citizens to ensure 
the worthiness of those they elect to lead them whether in pluralistic or 
one-party electorates. one political safeguard lies in any provisions 
made for ejecting an unworthy party and a no-longer wanted 
administration. Leaders whc wish to retain office are adept at legis-
lating accommodation for continuance sometimes by nominations, sometimes 
by introducing martial law. Some States, however, are prepared to deal 
with such leaders even if initially bad judges of them. Early 
favourable impressions of Nasser by Dulles were later retracted - too 
late. 36 As history discloses, contemporary assessment of Pol pot, Arnin, 
Marcos and Khomeini has undergone change, and this will be the case with 
Mengistu according to vallely.37 
It may often be difficult to assess the honesty of views of 
national interest against desire for personal power: that is, 
intellectual honesty in practice. In the present state of international 
law and relations power, perr:onal or national, is relevent to the 
policies adopted by the state. The lack of congruity between principle 
and practice is carried from municipal into international affairs and to 
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debates on international law and its development. This is no isolated 
problem for it is reflected in lawmaking which, even if for party 
advantage, will be promoted as being in the national or the global 
interest. If politicians are sometimes held in contempt as being merely 
obedient servants of party they do not help their cause by being 
contemptuous of the legislation they promote. The inclusion of 
'entrenchment' in the European Communities Act 1972 enacting what was 
known to be without substance or regard for reality is an example. But 
the Scottish members of the Commons did-not seek justification in any 
claim to have been influenced by memory of Lord Cooper's statement that, 
"the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctly English 
principle, which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional 
law" .3 
Different points of view are expressed in problems of inter-
pretation after legislation has been enacted, as for instance with the 
Constitutions of the US and of France and in contemporary controversy 
regarding taxation by community charge and the relevance of the Act and 
Treaty of Union of 1706-7. It is natural that nationalism and party 
politics should be applied in discussion of international law following 
cynicism expressed in retrospective legislation and Acts of State in 
domestic situations. Such attitudes appear in international relations 
as claims that 'what we have done is justified'. Patterns of action 
form a basis of custom; they need not be universal practices but only 
sufficient for the law to be drawn from them. But majority political 
systems have tempted powerful groups, 
"to disobey Acts of Parliament, knowing their political friends 
would ensure their repeal when next returned to power".39 
Recent practice in Pakistan has afforded examples. 40 
The Suez conflict may present a picture to illustrate how easily a 
parliament may be led, how circumstances may be dictated by party 
advantage, and actions be made to conform to sectional interests. An 
Israeli view is, 
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"What we have in Israel is political liberty and freedom of 
expression. But of democracy - in the sense that people have an 
influence on the legislation - we have very little".41 
It would seem unlikely that in discussing and promoting inter-
national relations national leaders would adopt a different philosophy. 
In that case, how can one be sure that all steps have been taken to 
resolve differences by peaceful methods before a war is initiated? Or 
whether, in an atmosphere of secrecy, the war is just for either side? 
The Just War Tradition. 
In no area is lack of influence by the ordinary citizen more 
obvious than in the decision to initiate war. Even such an example of 
so-called popular demand as the myth of the 'War of Jenkins' Ear' 
(referring to the War of the Austrian Succession), shows that a period of 
seven years (1731-1738) elapsed between the loss of the ear and the 
outbreak of the war, and the causes of that war were many but not mainly 
popular demand. 
Whatever the motive power, the interplay of law and war, including 
the right to make war, has a long history. If in this Century, and m~re 
paLticularly since 1919, emphasis has been on international institutions 
and written agreements, in earlier time custom had evolved a humanitarian 
approach to the conduct of war, and some general concepts by which the 
condition of a state of war could be initiated and recognised. 
These approaches have become known as the Just War Tradition, and 
its essential characteristics are: 
1. LAST RESORT. "All other means to the morally just solution of 
a conflict must be exhausted bef.ore resort to war can be 
regarded as legitimate". 
2. JUST CAUSE. "War can be just only if employed to defend a 
stable order or morally preferable cause against threats of 
destruction" . 
3 • RIGHT ATTITUDE. 
attitude" . 
"War must be carried out with the right 
4. PRIOR DECLARATION. "War must be explicitly declared by a 
legitimate authority". 
5. There must be a REASONABLE HOPE OF SUCCESS. 
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6. NON COMBATANTS must have IMMUNITY. 
7. PROPORTIONALITY. There must be a reasonable expectation that 
good results will outweigh the horrors of conflict. 42 
Concepts of 'Just War' - that in some circumstances war could be 
morally just - are of great antiquity,43 and may be said to provide the 
origin of modern law of war. The concepts, however, grew from 
moralizing about war itself and not through discussion about prohibiting 
it as a political instrument. The debate was limited for it was about 
what was considered best for the 'common good' of a society or alliance 
and not the common good of international society. Yet the obvious 
parallel is with formulae such as that of Hobbes who justified the state 
as saving people from the condition of continual danger from other 
individuals. Whilst contemporary moralists can ponder the 
practicalities of just war today the concepts are products of a period of 
human history in which war itself was considered licit as well as normal. 
That is, during a time when property was more important than the moral 
issues involved in inter-state dispute. Just war concepts sought, (a) 
to reverse the distinction and to differentiate between circumstances in 
which war was legitimate and when illegitimate, and (b) having accepted 
that war could be legitimate only in some circumstances, to emphasise 
humanity in the conduct of it. 
(a) Thomas Aquinas, for example, prescribed conditions for just 
offensive war as being lawful authority, just cause and right intention. 
This line of thought followed a parallel right of those properly in 
authority to punish criminals and to make war against external enemies 
who had injured the State. 
(b) Advocates of just war theories hoped to mitigate its rigours by 
introducing measures of arms control and proportionality, as well as 
pointing to the sanctity of certain property and the persons of non 
combatants. 44 
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Just war was limited, therefore, to war for the 'common good', and 
in its conduct the limitations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello were to 
be observed. 
Initially, no doubt, jus ad bellum grew out of philosophical 
reasoning, but it is too easy to regard the subject as encompassing a 
universal acknowledgement. The philosophy is basically European, 
Christian, and from states that were - at least nominally - part of the 
Holy Roman Empire, for by far the most sustained efforts in practice to 
advance the concepts came during the Middle Ages when Church and Empire 
were strongest. But elsewhere custom differed from the European 
Christian generality - in Russia for example - especially where the out-
look was towards the east, or the state was in conflict with Muslim or 
Moghali or was in course of effecting colonial conquest. 
It was convenient for most European states to accept just cause and 
declaration of intent for the Prince was judge of the justness of his own 
cause and commander of his forces. Similarly, when the interests of the 
Church and the State coincided a similar convenience arose, for the 
Church's cause was assumed to be just. At the same time, declaration 
gave an interval in which mobilization and concentration could be 
effected for surprise was considered unjust. 
intention was another matter. 
But, of course, right 
Jus in bello must be regarded as primarily humanitarian, but other 
motives are possible as may be seen today in arms control negotiation. 
The position of the State, as opposed to that of the individuals who do 
the fighting, is a powerful element of such negotiations. The 
prohibition of making war against civilians takes no account of how armed 
forces were, and are, recruited: conscripts and pressed men obviously 
were not regarded as meriting exceptional treatment. 45 Not unnaturally, 
their resentment showed in practices of looting, rape and arson. The 
servilities of the feudal system and what was due to the superior in the 
chain persisted in a recruiting system based on what was said to be due 
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to the State. Early arms control concepts were not signally successful, 
and efforts to enforce them generally failed. 
A cynical view might be that jus ad bellum offered justification 
for war rather than its prevention, and the timing of declarations of war 
was such that the aggressor had concentrated his forces before his enemy 
had started his mobilization. Jus in bello, on the other hand, could be 
regarded as making war palatable (even if not desirable) by considering 
that excesses could, in practice, be curbed. In fact, it is more likely 
that experience and intention fell somewhere between two extremes of 
excess and chivalry. This is reflected in the scepticism which the 
concepts have aroused, and still arouse, due at least in part to the 
attitudes of statesmen in justifying their wars. In part also from the 
spectacle of the Church promoting just war theories whilst using the 
State to persecute civilians in the name of religion they nominally 
supported. 
It is necessary also to consider whether definition of war for the 
purpose of qualification as just war includes only declared war between 
states, or at least between settled communities, or whether armed 
conflict falling short of such inter-State war is included. Thus, for 
example, the Korean War and the Falkland Islands conflict were not wars 
at all by some standards. It is a matter for consideration whether the 
methodology of strategis~s, whether consciously or otherwise, is 
designed, or has the effect of, defeating a general prohibition by a 
classification under which justification could be perpetuated. For 
instance, not only is a difference indicated between just and unjust 
wars, but between limited and total,46 colonial and liberating,47 inter-
State and civil, insurrection and rebellion,48 direct and surrogate, and, 
most ominous of all, between nuclear and conventional. 
Definition and classification of war having been propounded it 
remained necessary to decide on its justness, justice and sanctions49 • 
An authority able to so rule should be able to enforce by coercion, 
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threatened or actual, complete prohibition of war as by logical 
development the UN was ideally intended to do. 
This was not the classical intention, however, for the theories 
were to limit war's scope and moderate its harshness not to remove any 
right to initiate just war. In practice the developments led towards 
total war, for all the jurisprudents as well as politicians and princes 
envisaged a continuing right to make war whilst more effective killing 
processes were following scientific advancement. The technology of 
weapons and communications completed the development, making clear the 
truth of Ayala's view that it is a matter of politics and equity to 
decide on justness of cause, and not merely the means used. 
Early classical just war theories, like later law, products of 
feudal and theological philosophising were founded in hope, no doubt, but 
without effective enforcement were hit or miss in reality as the text 
writers' differences show. Vittoria concentrated on right authority and 
whose decision was necessary, but still within the boundaries of 
intention, proportionality, and subject to the belief that other methods 
of negotiation had been exhausted. But the authority's right to make 
war was an essential expression of sovereignty. War should then have 
the purpose of achieving peace: but Carthage, too, was peace - like 
stalingrad or Berlin at a later time. There was always an element of 
reciprocity as well as of religion in the justification. Today, if that 
includes avoidance of enslavement to political extremes, or a 'live and 
let live' basis of armed detente, it does not prevent wars between 
co-religionists whetller Christian or Muslim. 
Grotius introduced an idea of sanctions by not aiding the unjust 
side or hindering the just, an idea that is followed on more predictable 
lines in the UN. Neutrals were to police justice: an earlier hope of 
collective security. 
Pufendorf believed neutrality should be neutral in respect of both 
sides as against being neutral only against whichever side was considered 
unjust. 
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Such theorising was swept away by balance of power alliances which 
made just war theory incompatible with collective security. 
one and a half centuries up to the 19205, 
For about 
"war was not a question of law but of fact; the issue of its justice, or legality, was non-justiciable in the broadest sense".50 
The situation changed for those States which ratified the League of 
Nations Covenant for its provisions added a legal aspect in terms of when 
war was legitimate, in which circumstance justness would be taken for 
granted. But justness of war can be equated to justness of law for, as 
Finnis has pointed out, to say a law is unjust is merely, 
"a critical ~udgment of practical reasonableness whether correct or 
incorrect".5 
Advocates of this proposition might say the same of war, for the side 
supported by law, like the side victorious in war, applauds the 
'practical reasonableness' whilst remaining blind to correctness. But, 
does it follow that if a law satisfies other legal and constitutional 
rules it is law and must be obeyed? There is a contrary view which 
denies the collateral obligation to uphold all laws which, if followed 
generally, would spell doom for legal systems. On the othe r hand, 
literal following and obedience to all laws would spell doom to civil war 
and uprising. This argument is carried further as to international law, 
where there is a school of thought that it is not law at all. In any 
case, 
" any group ••. is motivated toward civil disobedience when it 
becomes persuaded that in some significant area of social life, 
what is legall¥ valid is in violation of the authority 
relationship". 2 
Such frustration can be alleviated by legal methods where such are 
available to the citizens of a State. Not all States' governmental 
systems tolerate political opposition or any form of civil disobedience, 
non-violent or otherwise. In war, however, even war undertaken by 
volunteer forces, frustration caused by the leadership can also arise. 
In a conscript force in the particular circumstances of conflict where 
each man is fighting his individual battle for survival rather than for 
moral or political principles, and whatever his wider beliefs may be, the 
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frustration, personal and imrr~diate, is unlikely to have urgent regard 
for niceties of just war or other humanitarian tradition. 53 It is in 
the echelons separated from the actual fighting, as well as in civilian 
circles, that such arguments have been debated. In each generation, and 
despite Articles of War and Manuals of Law for Active Operations, in 
practice each fighting man has to make his own tradition of battle 
actions within the background of nation, regiment, and so forth. 
This is not to say that, if custom has the force of law in the 
sense that tradition enters into the legislative process, and if custom 
or law is disregarded, punishment should not follow. It may have been 
thought that this was settled at Nuremberg, even if in a rather one-sided 
and selective manner. But it still remains likely that if victory 
cannot be achieved in a traditional way, (that is, an essentially legal 
way) other means will be sought. In addition there are the impulses 
which the crudites of military action that battle imposes upon, or brings 
out from, men under great stress and fear. This, in a way, is a 
reversion to knightly conduct which was more lauded in retrospect than 
recognised by the mass of people at the time of 'chivalry' and of 
hand-to-hand, and face-to-face, conflict. Slave-taking and ransom were 
important elements of that time; now distance and weapon-power have 
added a miasma of indirect killing leading to irresponsibility, and 
leaving only a distant prospect of advancing infantry occupying 
wastelands. 
Knightly conduct in action can be seen from the non-observance of 
the Papal interdiction of crossbow and bow and arrow from general use in 
wars between Christians by the 2nd Lateran council of 1139. Siege 
machines were similarly subject without avail to such interdiction. 
Then, as now, availability of weapons make obedience to such ideals 
selective in conflict, especially when interdictions did not extend 
Q~iversally but were limited to some circumstances not extending to 
'battle against the heathen' . Even so, the Council was an early 
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promoter of arms control, lack of success in which - apart from setting 
some quantitative or qualitative standards - has been a pattern since. 
Johnson comments that, 
"The consensus reached by the end of the Middle Ages in the 
protection due to non-combatants still forms the basis of legal and 
moral ~ttempts to protect civilian society from the destruction of 
war".5 
But it is not the basis which is in doubt, it is the sincerity as 
well as the effectiveness of the attempts. Technological and 
engineering developments in weapon potential are not impeded as SDI and 
its repercussion on the ABM Treaty seem likely to show. Further, whilst 
efforts are made to limit the use of chemical and bacteriological 
weapons, radioactivity from nuclear fallout is a poison, chemically 
produced, and cannot be seen, smelled, or touched, but it is not referred 
to in connection with chemical weapons control. 
Just as the 2nd Lateran Council's consensus on arms control was 
clerical rather than military - (though the Church had a military place 
in the feudal system holding not only by frankalmoignage but also by 
knight service in some cases) - so the protection of civilians had 
reference to civilians of Christian states. It did not extend to any 
prohibition of despoiling the Egyptians or smiting the Amalekites. 
Johnson omits the basis of military service then involved which, in 
effect, was a rape of civilians, for the vassals and serfs paid either in 
blood or tax or both. 
The development of bellum from duellum was a necessary attribute of 
the authority of princes, and of princely quarrels, but underlying 
causes, often personal, were generally in respect of property and 
territory. The knightly code of chivalry was not necessarily universal 
or universally observed even among Christians, nor was it necessarily the 
basis of the laws of war for the code did not embrace more than a 
minority. That may well be the fact today: the leaders not having the 
power in battle which they enjoy out of it. There is too idealistic an 
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air about the theory of just war, for wars were being fought a la 
outrance whilst tournaments occupied the ostentatious display of the 
elite, as well as being their training ground. Burghers, however, were 
still mulcted even if not worthy of knightly sword thrust, and manorial 
courts permitted no 'non-combatant immunity' without penalty in that way 
of life. The different approaches can be seen in considering war 
and rebellion, and the application or non-application of general rules of 
war to the latter, for humanitarian rules in civil conflict are of modern 
conception. Yet, in both, the main question of authority and possession 
remains the same. In any case, practice of the laws in earlier days 
suggests that jus in bello was rather a matter of individual resort than 
a universally accepted canon: lex lata 'laid down', but in practice 
lex ferenda - the desirable - prevailed rarely. 
The horrors of siege and sack should not be obscured by traditions 
of honourable surrender, for, if defeated armies may have marched out 
with colours and drumbeat, the burghers still had a bill to pay. 
If there was justness in war it was rather in limited objectives 
related to limited resources, confining the actual battle as far as 
possible to human visual observation and control by one commander on each 
side. The advent of modern means of transportation, conununications, and 
long-range weapons, and the haphazard development of concepts of total 
war raised stakes, objectives and casualties. Yet total, and therefore 
unjust, war was not curbed by the League of Nations although that 
organization theoretically had the capability of preventing war, for 
there could be no question of last resort if the Covenant was observed. 
Only collective security measures could ensure that last resort was not a 
solution for inter-State dispute. That situation has not changed yet, 
even in the face of the general acceptance of the UN Charter, which would 
make all war unjust. 
A final factor in just war theory, as in all matters of war and 
law, is the advance of technology and its apparently necessary effect on 
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contemporary morality. The progress of the technology is so rapid that 
moral considerations and, hence, legal restraints, can be decided upon 
only after each forward step has been taken in technology and 
engineering, and when the consequences arising from it become obvious. 
The results are to be seen in pollution, embryology, and exhaustion of 
natural resources, as well as in nuclear technology itself, where, 
apparently, effective ground rules cannot be laid down in advance. This 
is shown by the failure to deal with the international development of 
atomic energy. Notwithstanding the Non-Proliferation Treaty, States 
individually can still acquire knowledge of nuclear bomb-making in spite 
of international efforts to limit the utilisation of atomic energy to 
'peaceful' purposes and humanitarian ends. The convenient excuse of 
'breeder-reactor experiment' no longer offers justification for nuclear 
materials transfers, but it is the availability of reserves of uranium, 
as well as control of the development of nuclear weapons, which is a 
reason for the non-proliferation provisions. 
Elimination of the possibility of disasters such as Chernobyl 
cannot be guaranteed and the consequences of them cannot arbitrarily be 
confined. A conflict between 'atoms for peace' and 'atoms for war' is 
now an abiding problem transcending 'normal' international relationships. 
This is a political matter affecting the possibility of just war, and one 
which may be impossible to solve by collective action, for nuclear 
warfare and logic may not be easy bedfellows. Israel, South Africa and 
Brazil may be nuclear-knowledgeable; both Israel and south Africa have 
well-advertised will to survival55 as well. 
President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' policy was the first step 
to nuclear proliferation, and is an example of a good intention masking 
its likely consequences. Just war theory illustrates a similarity, and 
it ought not to be necessary to look beyond the excesses of the One 
Hundred and the Thirty Years' Wars, and the 2nd and 3rd Crusades, to 
perceive the selectiveness - and, all too often, the adventitiousness -
of practice. 
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A Modern View of Just War. 
Is there a modern view of just war beyond the now disputed Art. 51 
of the Charter? Whilst European, including Turkish and Russian, 
colonial empires were in being, the discussion could have been related 
mainly to civil strife or to wars between colonial powers. Recurrent 
wars in South East Asia were hardly noticed outside French interests, or 
in Central and South America outside the American geographical area sub-
sequent to the tacit acceptance elsewhere of the Monroe Doctrine. 
It is at least doubtful if deeply-seated concepts of justness, in 
spite of Burke's warning56 , impelled the British to accept the result of 
the American rebellion of 1775-7. Britain and other colonial powers 
only gradually acknowledged the logic of anti-colonialism. Even then 
they did so from fact rather than from difficulties in conforming to just 
war theories in dealing with insurrection and rebellion by colonial 
peoples. Time will tell whether ex-colonial states of Asia and Africa 
will themselves seek expansion by colonization even if it is restricted 
by immigration barriers. 
There may be justifiable doubt as to whether there is a logical 
place for discussion about just war in the debate about war and peace 
today, but for a different reason than colonial ambition. Just war 
theories were products of their time, influenced by contemporary ethics, 
dominated by the configuration of national leadership and international 
relations as they were, and disputed, disregarded, vilified or supported 
by philosophers, soldiers and jurists, from time to time. The Church's 
relationships to political power as well as to the people was then 
stronger. Clerical theories had their part in political practice. 
This is rarely the case today outside emerging orthodoxy in Islamic 
states whatever sectional interests in Central and South America seem to 
demonstrate in relation to the Catholic hierarchy. During this century 
less regard has been paid to the theories: the result, total war, may 
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have stemmed in part from that neglect. Total war, however, is not a 
negative or accidental happening arising from fashions in philosophical 
thought. Rather, it follows industrial development, scientific know-
ledge as it unfolds, engineering persistence, and technological supremacy 
over moral values, all as political instruments in international 
relations. This industrial development and scientific advance has 
re-introduced some contemporary interest in just war theory and into 
scientific thought as means of countering the total threat arising from 
it. 
War can only be a practical (or even practicable) instrument if it 
is possible by its means to secure and hold the objects for which it is 
used. The technologists, perhaps against their original judgment but 
constrained by fears of pre-emption by Germany, have, quite fortuitously, 
produced in the nuclear weapon and its various means of delivery, the 
weapon of deterrence. Initial nuclear use and the consequences of 
retaliation and escalation would negate possibility of attaining and 
holding the objectives fought for. That is not to say that there is 
today any certainty about possible future use of nuclear weapons. 57 
This position of superior strength raises the possibility of 
nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear states. Such strategems of threat 
were not unknown in earlier days when superior resources and forces 
offered opportunities for intimidation as, for example, by the Western 
powers against China in the Nineteenth Century, and by both France and 
Britain in Egypt also at that time. But if policies of threat did not, 
and do not, fall within a definition of war the vacuum in the theories 
evident in colonial policy continues today. Of course, international 
law in the shape of the UN Cllarter, as opposed to just war theory, has 
relevance to the aspect of war without war - cold war uS it is sometimes 
termed. 
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Although concepts of ownership vary from time to time and State to 
State, war has always had some relationship to such concepts for property 
and territory were objectives of war. Modern war, whether conventional 
or nuclear, does not respect principles of ownership, and if there can be 
no guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used, whether in conflict 
with theories of just war or not, it is certain that conventional weapons 
will (with their great and increasing destructive power and indiscrimin-
ation). There is the view that nuclear weapons, unjust or not, for 
other reasons should not remain in the arsenals of States. Some 
politicians take a view from practical rather than ethical standards, 
that if nuclear weapons are abandoned by a State there will be no nuclear 
threat made to it. That view may be straying from reality: it also 
takes little account of the totality of modern conventional war. 
All experience of the continuing duration of concepts and conduct 
of war in the face of relevant international law, accepted or presumed, 
must lead to a belief that today's practices are not dissimilar to those 
demonstrated in the actings of warring forces and States under earlier 
jus in bellum and jus in bello. Attitudes to, and human nature 
concerned with, aggression, oppression, fear for survival, and lust for 
conquest, are unlikely to have changed through the centuries even if 
accepted standards of morality have fluctuated to accord with 
contemporary practices. s8 It is necessary to consider only civilian 
immunity, for of 
" ••• those who died as a result of war events •.• civilians formed 
around 5% in the first World War; 50% in the second World War; 59 
perhaps 60% in the Korean War and even more in the Vietnam War", 
to show that even if the armed combatants were not directly responsible 
for all the civilian casualties the effects of war on civil populations 
are such that proportionality in war is minimal. 
There are reasons for the lack of certainty about justness in war 
in contemporary circumstances three of which are noted here. The view 
of the scientist Oppenheimer was that 
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"When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and 
do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have 
had your technical success ... that is the way it was with the 
atomic bomb". 6 0 
A political view was stated by Senator McMahon but without any 
reference to just war theory. Strategic bombing, 
"with nuclear weapons was the keystone of our military policy and 
foundation pillar of our foreign policy as well". 6 1 
There was the cri de cour from President Truman, 
"It is a terrible thing to order the use of something ••• that is 
so terribly destructive ••. you have got to understand that this 
isn't a military weapon ••• It is used to wipe out women an~ 
children and unarmed peoople and not for miE tary uses ... " 2 
But, as Lilienthal said, 
" ••• the choice to use ~cience for good or evil was being blurred 
by political ideology". 3 
This political, rather than military, ability to differentiate in 
scale between conventional high explosive delivered from the air, and 
nuclear explosive similarly delivered, neglects jus in bello as to 
indiscriminate weapons used against civilian populations. It is not 
new, for blockade as a weapon had similar attributes as a political 
weapon. The acceptability of a weapon to the military might be regarded 
as falling within a duty to provide the most effective defence of the 
state. At that stage of provision questions of whether use falls within 
just war theories are not raised. The question of when and how the 
weapon is to be used is generally political after considering the 
military arguments, as was the case in 'area bombing' in the second World 
War. 'Living off the country' was a policy of Napoleon as Emperor not 
as General and as a weapon against the civilian population. Denying the 
enemy subsistence by a 'scorched earth' policy was a political decision 
64 (about which the Burmah Oils saga explains such Acts of state). The 
Nacht und Nebel orders of Hitler however notorious followed Napoleonic 
precedents. 
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Just War and the Churches. 
A weakness of the hypothesis that some wars are just is that 
however hedged around by limiting factors 'the Prince' might be, he had 
the right to declare war especially when backed by the Church. His 
followers (and these, as some are still, may have been under compulsion) 
might have little information as to the Prince's intentions and motives. 
They could fight in what they believed to be a just war as they saw it 
even if the Prince's intentions were not wholly just. The Iraq-Iran 
war, its causes, and its protagonists demonstrate that such a situation 
is not unknown today. 
Churches even if divided on the morality of a claimed right to make 
war, and equally on whether, even if war can be just, clerics should 
actively participate in it,65 in the event give wars support, and give 
States support in war-making. In this divided opinion some would argue 
the merits of each specific war. Others would argue that a Church must 
make the best of the bad or irrational job politicians and diplomatists 
have done in declaring or initiating a war. Some, however, will regard 
it as a patriotic duty to support it, and those who fight - under 
compulsion or voluntarily - ~ill be fortified by the Church's apparent 
approbation of the war and the implied, if tacit, approval of its 
justness. 
From the opening tendencies of the evolution of the hypothesis 
there were difficulties - and evolution is blind to the future. There 
was an early belief that it was permissible for Christians to serve as 
soldiers in peacetime but this did not extend to violent fighting in time 
of war. Secretan noted the difference between militare (to be a soldier 
in peacetime) and bellare (to fight). Again, according to Cadoux, God's 
appointment of a particular person or institution for a particular work 
does not necessarily guarantee the goodness of that person, institution, 
or work. The just ruler thcught of by Paul is always a pagan ruler and 
so justified in a way it w0ul3 be impossible if he were Christian. 66 
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The fact is that when Christianity became the official religion of 
the State, the Church paid for her position by compromising the purity of 
some of her ideals, particularly her pacifism. 67 But the legality of 
war was accepted and, like Cicero, the Church could make "an explicit 
relation between the doctrine of natural law and that of a just war".68 
Albert the Great, teacher of Aquinas, 
"held that it is obviously more natural for man to be rational than 
irrational" . 6 9 
Why should this be so? Rationality is a quality, but a quality 
possessed in different degrees and differently exercised on different 
occasions by different persons. War is the province of politicians, but 
rationality in politics is to hold office. If the rational is natural, 
disputes not only about means - for which there may be alternatives - but 
also about rational ends would be otiose. In politics decisions are as 
liable to be irrational as rational, whether more natural or not. The 
difficulty is compounded by contemporary circumstances and knowledge, 
making today's rationality irrational in retrospect. Further, if the 
rational end is the common good the means must necessarily be a matter of 
dispute for the common good in international relations appears different 
according to the varied national interests involved. There remains, of 
course, the dichotomy of the moral sense versus the animal nature. We 
may believe that war is natural to man, as it may be said that self-
interest is natural to man. selfishness and survival are common bed-
fellows and national interests and survival are also. Ra tionali ty and 
morality as applied to law only commence when the purpose of the law, and 
the purpose to which the law is to be put, is clear. This would always 
have mitigated against just war theory for it can never have been lawful 
and moral at the same time to kill others except in self-defence and when 
no alternative presented itself. How could 'the Prince' make that 
decision for all his subjects unless also providing an outlet for 
conscientious objection? 
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The place of war is still affected strongly by the attitudes of the 
Churches and as, in the ordinary way, Churches are respecters of the law, 
it is difficult to see how they can support war in defiance of existing 
international law when war becomes fact. This is altogether apart from 
a general conscientious objection to war itself. Yet the Christian 
Churches, divided as they may be on the subject of war, generally have 
inclination towards avoiding it, rather than promoting it. There is, 
however, a general tendency on the part of the protagonists to assume 
that global allegience to (a) peace parties, and (b) socialist ideology 
and practice, is inevitable. There may be little evidence to support 
such hypotheses, but the hypotheses may, nevertheless, be self-fulfilling 
especially if not debated rationally whether as a law-abiding or a moral 
(or theological) rationality. 
The emphasis has shifted, however, from interpretation of the vague 
'just war theory' to the difference between aggressive and defensive war. 
This has not resolved doubt or clarified issues, for in considering the 
causes of any war the aggressor is not always easy to identify. This 
is, in any case, rather a reversion to the situation of St Augustine who, 
according to Tooke, seems to have given 
"scant consideration to a war of defence, presumably because he 
took it for granted that such a war is immediately and obviously 
justifiable, and even obligatory". 
on the other hand, "He neither seriously doubted the permissibility of 
war itself, nor was he shocked by its intrinsic evil. A just war 
of aggression, however, must be carried out by the autllority of the 
prince, and must have both a just cause and a right intention".7o 
All these aspects require interpretation and are conditioned by 
points of view, but the political evaluation made in international 
relations cannot be avoided. 71 
It seems fairly clear that there is danger of misunderstanding the 
principles of the just war concept if they are looked for in the 
historical incidents rather than directly from their logic and morality. 
The principles, with all their limitations of Christian exclusivity, were 
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rarely exercised comprehensively and entire in the wars of the tradition-
building period, or, indeed, since. Today the provision of arms by one 
state to facilitate another to wage an unjust (or an illegitimate) war 
against a third is a breach of the principles even if an almost 
incidental transaction in a pattern of contemporary trading. The just 
war concept is universal and permanent; it is the practice which is 
local and transient. 
Law and War: Control or elimination? 
Like law the preparation and waging of war are part of the 
political operations of all-embracing government. In considering how 
war can be affected by the non-military aspects of society law may appear 
to have only a subsidiary role and economics an ever-increasing 
importance. Modern war is more and more a matter of industrialisation 
and technology, and in both the containing factors are economic up to the 
point at which taxpayers may revolt, and potential conscripts refuse to 
bear the costs of governmental policies. But the containing factors 
include many other demands upon the SOCiety the priorities for which are 
decided by governments in their efforts to avoid human resistance points. 
Long-term policies are as important, therefore, as short. 
Thus war and peace are dependent on a manipulation of economic 
factors, and this has had two conflicting effects in the past. First, 
affluent States, with less difficulty, could afford to prepare for war on 
a larger scale than the less wealthy. Second, on the contrary, the less 
wealthy could adjudge a situation in a manner which seemed to present war 
as being a possible way in the circumstances to ensure the economic 
position which was thought desirable. The expenses of war are daunting, 
but sometimes overriding economic factors may be disregarded in the hope 
or expectation of aid from interested States, and of rehabilitation at 
the expense of others if defeat eventuates as a result of the economic 
and military gamble. For States generally the economic prospects, 
however, must appear to preclude war in any case but especially on a view 
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of possible intervention by a super power. 72 Debtor States must also 
consider International Monetary Fund and World Bank conditions and inte-
national bankers' attitudes. Economic considerations alone, however, 
are not the constant factor in the decision making for that remains 
political. 
Other factors include the effect on the industrial wellbeing of the 
State by the distribution and size of its armaments industry, and the 
demands of the armed forces and armaments producers especially for 
skilled labour. ' Such demands may be conflicting in war and may affect 
export trade and arms transfers in peace. 
The manipulation of the people by means of the comrr.unications 
industry is a factor connected with the fact of war as a contemporary 
instrument of national politics. This manipulation in closed societies 
is all-embracing, continuous, planned toward definite ends, and without 
any mitigation by organs of the state. In other States it may be 
diffuse, of many interests, and directed towards many commercial and 
societal ends. It is not always easy in the latter case to recognize 
the source or ultimate purpose of the manifold messages. Churches as 
well as other sectarian and secular institutions may be involved with 
secular and religious themes and objectives interspersed with 
governmental and commetcial communications. Disentangling the political 
from the commercial may be difficult as North Americans have come to 
realise in connection with the subject of war and preparation for it, for 
communications can be pointed in either a pro- or an anti-war direction. 
The domestic media of the US during the Vietnam War is an example. 
Beyond economic and communications factors, with the latter 
including educational, historical, traditional and cultural overtones, 
law constitutes an important factor. It is affected by, and affects, 
both the economic and information factors, but it is especially affected 
by the latter in resisting or promoting movements for change and 
development. 
-
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How the three elements (law, economics, and communications) -
basic to the political approach to war as a continuing concept in inter-
national relations - work seems reasonably clear. They either support 
continuance or abandonment. The difficulty is that, in certain vital 
circumstances, what is promoted in theoretical terms may be denied in a 
practical situation. So that, if (a), support is for continuing the 
concept of war as a political instrument of international relations, the 
economic and communications elements will dominate argument: law will be 
justificatory and Circumscribing. If (b), support is for abandoning the 
concept, law will be prohibitory. That is, law can legalize and 
legitimize whatever political decision is made. But if a State in 
practice by its actions opposes the abandonment of war, domestic 
legislation cannot expunge international law on the subject whatever the 
procedure for receiving international law into the domestic situation may 
~. 
(a) 
Effects following the choice include: 
Continuance. Jus ad bellum will be limited to the 'Prince's' 
will. The principle of declaration of war is already abandoned, 
for although in the first World War there were 56 declarations and 
only 3 omissions, in the second World War Germany invaded Poland 
in 1939 and Russia in 1941: Japan 'invaded' US in 1941 as it had 
Russia in 1904: all without declaration. The advent of modern 
ballistic weapons has rendered superfluous long warning time 
tilrough mobilization and deployment thus promoting state necessity 
as a guide line. 
Jus in bello and humanitarian practices will assume influence 
proportional to the distance from which the protagonists bombard 
each other. The greater the geographical separation the less will 
regard ~ had to the 'courtesies' of the battlefield, and the 
safeguarding of civilians, which successive Conventions have 
prescribed. The matter of the weaponry to be used will continue 
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to engage political argument, but advocacy for war will entail 
continuing pressure for improved and ever-more destructive weapons, 
and an enlargement of the concept of justifications for military 
necessity in the indiscriminatory purposes and uses of such 
weapons. Mitigating factors, such as arms control and 
prohibition, with other humanitarian initiatives such as the Inter-
national Red Cross, eliminating weapons or devices producing 
unnecessary suffering, regulating the treatment of a broader 
definition of prisoners of'war, and, possibly, relief for the 
victims of nuclear fallout - even in neutral states - more than 
ever will require expansion. 
(b) Abolition. on the other hand, the abolition of war as a factor in 
international relations involves dominance by an authority capable 
of ensuring both abolition and prohibition whether such an 
authority is consensual as the UN might be, or as the result of 
global military domination by one State or a combination of like-
minded States. 
The Role of Law in either Case. 
The role of law in either possibility is to give effect to the 
political decisions, but this demands also the power to enforce. It is 
on the note of power to enforce that there is not so much active dis-
agreement as disregard and disenchantment permeating the existing system 
of international relations. It exposes law as a political instrument 
with teeth only so far as governments are prepared to uphold it and 
furnish the means to that end. 
What, then, is wanted from political decision? Abolition of war 
possible only by collective security measures in the first place, and a 
continuing threat of security measures, by collective action, thereafter 
- that is, the ultimate universal theory of deterrence. But this 
obtains theoretically under the UN Charter, and if a written instrument 
152 
giving effect to a political solution is required it is already 
available. 
Whatever is sought of international law in regard to peace and war, 
therefore, cannot provide the will which is lacking to enforce the 
existing law. Unenforced law will not command the will either. Some 
have sought an answer in approbation of just war and condemnation of 
unjust war, but condemnation is not sufficient - many UN Resolutions 
demonstrate that - and judgments about the justness of a war are 
difficult. 
strategists, militarists, politicians and moralists may have 
different standards in relation to national defence, national objectives 
and global security and not all will be directed toward abolition of war 
or toward some tribunal that might lead in that direction. Lawyers on 
the other hand if pointed toward the abolition of war lack means whereby 
to advance the concept in any practical way. 
Whether consciously or otherwise the methodology of strategists 
often has the effect of directing attention away from efforts to outlaw 
war. They do this by appearing to perpetuate justification for war in 
either political terms or by arms control proposals which may obscure the 
miniscule effect on contemporary war-fighting capabilities which have 
emerged so far. Thus, just or unjust, small or large, colonial or 
liberating, wars, or the use of force short of war, remain largely 
uninhibited. 
First approaches to just war theory had morality in their fore-
front. Today war and property are increasingly subject to legal 
provisions which are not necessarily based on moral standards. There is 
inescapable antagonism, however, between law as dealing with existing 
situations and prospective law proposed to deal with developing but, as 
yet, future situations. Difficulties inherent in developing common law 
interpretation in the evolution from a feudal system where superiors had 
rights and inferiors duties, to today's asseverations of inherent rights 
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for all and comparative silence as to duties, are increasingly seen in 
'human rights' litigation. Again, in the Common Law States commissions 
of one sort or another are set up to review existing legislation and 
prognosticate about future requirements and, sometimes, to propose laws 
to deal with foreseen happenings and consequences. The Wolfenden 
Committee (Cmnd 247) was one such, and it achieved above average success 
for such exercises for its recommendaticns under para 355 (a) were 
largely instrumental in guiding early legislation. Similarly, early 
thought about nuclear usage and possibilities, e.g. 'Atoms for Peace' and 
'electricity too cheap to meter', have proved either deleterious to 
mankind or revealed themselves as exaggeration. 73 
The weakness, therefore, is not in the idea of legislating in 
advance of technological development, or even in attempting to change 
moral standards, but in the practical ability of individuals correctly to 
forecast the future. This is no less a problem in international 
relations than in domestic or personal affairs. Indeed, in the field of 
international relations the International Law Commission lies under the 
further disability of serving a variety of masters who may obfuscate 
situations by design or accident, and are concerned more with immediate 
affairs than what the future may bring. 74 In this emphasis on immediate 
problems, or in the blind progressions of scientists as to the ultimate 
consequences of their work, a natural truth is apparent: as evolution is 
blind to the future so are the consequences of national public policies 
including their approaches to the conduct of war. 
Public Policy and Just War. 
States have been guided in their policies by a desire to maintain 
their individual sovereignty and, when it seemed feasible, to extend its 
scope and range. Because States formed part of a collection of states, 
restraints on conduct as well as threats against national interests, were 
always present. Sovereignty embraces many diverse political concepts, 
so that whilst there could be general agreement about the ends which are 
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desirable for mankind, there will be great differences in the means 
proposed by politicians for the political attainment of such ends. This 
means that while a State follows one political path or another it does 
not necessarily dwell happily with its neighbours. This follows not 
only because of differences in political or economic methods pursued, but 
also because of different views held as to what constitutes national 
interests at any time. 
Historically some conflicts of interest were resolved by diplomacy, 
failing which by war, so that "war as a continuation of policy by other 
means" has been a commonplace, commonly accepted as the normal and 
continuing process of international relations. In political terms, 
therefore, the role of war in a society can be deduced from factors of 
historical continuity of intention allied to current actings. 
in war is liable to follow a similar pattern. 
Conduct 
Defence is a matter of public policy for each State, but is subject 
to constraints under international law whether through collective 
decisions of the UN, treaties of many kinds, and the availability of 
resources such as are envisaged under the Law of the Sea. Defence may 
be the concept in mind, but it is war that is being considered, for 
defence is only a euphemism for war in the context of public policy. In 
that context it is not morality which dictates the nomenclature, although 
social desires of communities may explain a wish to avoid the word war. 
At the same time, there seems to be no universal definition of public 
policy, or even a systematic method of arriving at it. It seems, 
rather, to be an especially nationalistic concept founded on each State's 
ambitions, desires and morality, not with an independent worldwide policy 
in mind, and so supporting the view that there is not a big world, merely 
a collection of small worlds" 
The British have offered an approach: 
" ••. in the course of ascertaining the legal position, the Court may 
resort to established public policy which itself ~y be based on 
some social, moral and other non-legal judgment".? 
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This is a very wide definition leaving scope for all shades of moral 
interpretation and political leanings. But in practice in municipal 
affairs, public policy is subject to law and the constitution of the 
State. That may be especially true in those States which enjoy an 
effective administrative law, for it is particularly on the point of law 
enforcement that the relationship of public policy and international 
relations and international law in respect of peace and war is important. 
In the context of peace and war the policy can be compared with the 
ends desired in international relations by the poliCies applied by States 
to such relations. But all States do not necessarily approach inter-
national relations problems in the same spirit of what is desirable for 
the common good, for law and order, or for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, as they approach disputes within their sovereignty. Attitudes 
to judicial settlement of disputes where the State exercises control of 
the judiciary in appointments to the Bench, and by 'correcting' 
legislation, can be compared with voluntary and reluctant acceptance of 
the jurisdiction of international tribunals. 
The expression of the source criteria of public policy cited above 
is really no more than similar expressions regarding international law. 
By adding sub-sec 2 to Art 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, namely the power of the Court (if the parties should ever 
agree to it) to decide a case ex aequo et bono, there is implicit the 
'social, moral or other non-legal' ingredients for judgments in inter-
national, as in municipal, policy. Similar expressions have been 
included in international legal instruments in relation to the law of 
war. Further, where the law or instrument is silent the criteria will 
speak for itself and this is as true of international as of municipal 
poljcy. 
There is the problem that jurists may have a common interpretation 
of what is meant by morals, but it does not follow that this would be 
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recognized universally by politicians when considering public policy 
matters, including the concepts of just war to be followed by them. 
Whose morality sets the standard and the precedent to be followed? The 
question is complicated by differences between ideas of political and 
theological morality. In matters of divorce, abortion and certain 
sexual practices, secular and canon law are not always congruent even in 
one state, and they differ between one State and others. This may imply 
that a strict moral interpretation may dominate one kind of law, but a 
different - albeit moral by some standard - morality may guide another. 
The promulgation of canon law stems from very differing practices as, for 
example, between the Synod of The Church of England and the Code of Canon 
Law of the Roman Catholic Church which has the force of law for members 
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of that Church because the Pope so orders, whereas the Koran determines 
the law of fundamental Islamic states without question or representation 
but not necessarily its interpretation. Secular law, generally 
speaking, however, is whatever can be pushed or pulled through a secular 
legislature. Even in the theological States dissension between strict 
observance of the religious law and the desire for a secular Code has led 
Muslim States towards Codes of Civil and Criminal Law, although such a 
movement is in course of reversal in some of the Islamic states. It 
would be strange in these circumstances of manifold methods of arriving 
at law and public policy if there was general legal agreement as to the 
conduct of war. 
The earlier theories of just war, as of the law of peace and war, 
emanated from scholars and diplomatists who were trained in the embracing 
civil/canon law regime, whereas contemporary dissidents to proposed 
measures at peace conferences and similar gatherings have tended to be 
secularists and often atheists. This poses a question as to whether 
there is any necessary connection between the earlier concepts embracing 
the right to war but subject to certain restraints and duties, and the 
current concepts which embrace defence and deterrence. If so, the 
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further question arises: is current attitude the result of belief that 
just war is impossible today with today's weapons, and avoidance (even if 
not yet abolition) sought because those weapons cannot be limited in use 
to defence. That is, has armament technology embracing a multitude of 
possible irrationalities inspired some rationality as well as fear? The 
juxtaposition of satellite development in association with ballistic 
missile defence and what is called Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 
the US is, plainly, defence. Satellite development itself has, and is 
intended to have, offensive capabilities, whilst ballistic missiles speak 
f th I th · 77 or emse ves on e lssue. But SOl allied with a nuclear arsenal 
has a potential offensive connotation whatever the developers may say. 
The nub of the argument may lie in the fact that all armed forces are as 
concerned with the offensive as with the defensive use of their weapons 
systems and military policy. Indeed, without knowledge of the offensive 
use and power of such systems how could they deploy defence against them? 
Thus, it is reasonable and rational, in terms of means, to allude 
to 'war' rather than defence in considering those means related to the 
public policy concerned with defence. In that case jus in bello cannot 
be neglected (and may inspire renewed consideration of the morality of 
modern weapons). The attitude that defence itself is necessary, or even 
desirable, against encroachments is philosophical as well as physical, 
and some schools of thought would consider the policies and ideologies of 
the encroacher before deciding on military defence. Means as well as 
ends affect the decision. In the light of Art. 51 of the Charter which 
governs the legal place of war, and constitutes modern jus ad bellum, 
armed defence by a State is only an alternative to collective security, 
so that any war might be unjust because it would have been unnecessary if 
the Charter provisions were observed. 
Weapons and modes of warfare which have been the subject of contro-
versy:, dum-dum bullets, aerial and naval bombardment, and submarine 
warfare have always had a probability of infringing strict concepts of 
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jus in bello even before any relevant and specific international rules 
were adopted. The futility of arguing whether a weapon system is solely 
or primarily defensive can be seen from debate about the submarine. At 
the Washington Treaty negotiations in 1920, 
"there was a strong trend of op~n~on •.. favouring the complete 
abolition of submarines considered as a means of warfare 
inconsistent with the laws of war". Opponents, "mainly France, 
considered the submarine a legitimate defensive weapon".'78 
Apart from the merits of the argument, and whether inconsistency is 
illegality, the issue has been clarified in wars since 1920, and history 
has shown that weapons are tools of war and not merely of defence. 
If weapons by their nature are incompatible with just war canons, 
and if they cannot be totally abolished or their technology lost, 
contemplation of their use in war must outrage just war concepts. But 
the submarine situation was left unresolved and remains as an example of 
international inability to adopt restrictive solutions in the face of 
reality and technical 'progress' in weapons design and lethal propensity. 
The argument itself, and the antagonistic positions taken, whether 
logical or illogical even as far as national interests are concerned, 
seem to deny immediate possibility that evolution 'irom national 
development to global community' which some scholars, (not least Karl 
Deutsch), advocate and foresee, or others fear, remains for the distant 
future. 
Jus in Bello: Realities. 
Despite past unfulfilled hopes, in 1981 the UN agreed on 
humanitarian principles which were to be embodied in a Convention79 
acknowledging humanitarian problems and expressing a desire for 
amelioration as well as the, 
"need to continue the codification and progressive development of 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict".8o 
The Preamble to the Convention included the following: 
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"Basing themselves on the principle of international law that the 
right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or 
means of warfare is not unlimited, and on the principle that 
prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles 
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering ..• 
Confirming their determination that in cases not covered by this 
Convention and its annexed Protocols or by any other international 
agreements, the civilian population and the combatants shall at all 
times remain under the rrotection and authority of the principles 
of international law". 8 
The Convention was signed on 10 April 1981: has yet to become effective, 
and should be read in conjunction with reports of the continuing 
realities of modern war. For example, 
"OVer the past five years, the number of armed conflicts - inter-
national, internal and a combination of both - has risen sharply •.. 
The conflicts .•. have not only grown in number but have also tended 
to last longer •.• Not only are conflicts increasing in number and 
length, but practices prohibited by international humanitarian law 
are becoming more and more common: the taking of hostages and 
sometimes their subsequent murder, acts of terrorism, torture and 
other ill-treatment of detained persons, and people reported 
unaccountably missing; it has even reached the point where whole 
civilian populations are subjected to starvation for the purposes 
of war ••• But it is not enough to speak of these problems without 
considering why there are so many conflicts in the first place, 
without considering the general state of international relations; 
for there too the situation is alarming". 8 1 
Acquisition of weapons and training of armed forces are basic to 
theories of deterrence and aggression both of which envisage their use in 
war. The list of internaticnal agreements prohibiting or limiting such 
use may seem somewhat pointless if only contemporary practice is 
considered, but development and procurement, if relatively unfettered, 
can breed only further development and acquisition. Nevertheless, much 
effort has been expended in the UN, and elsewhere in bilateral 
negotiation, seeking to reduce or eliminate weapons of mass destruction 
(nuclear, chemical and biological), and certain weapons which inflict 
'unnecessary' injury (including mines, booby-traps, and other similar 
weapons which if not the cause of mass casualties are particularly likely 
to cause indiscriminate civilian casualties). 
Efforts to reduce or eliminate weapons are not made today with any 
view of just war, nor are they part of a planned abolition of war. They 
reflect growing concern about environment as well as of the 
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inhumanitarian consequences to be expected of modern war. They, 
however, leave untouched the question of whether modern war could be 
"just war" even in the absence of the weapons referred to. 
In discussing war avoidance theories and non-provocation, defence 
policies are sometimes categorized as active or passive. Active as of 
continuing improvement of forces, equipment and strategy; passive as 
incapable of aggression. The annarnents in both cases are nevertheless 
similar, and both envisage the possibility of war. In either case 
preparations are not made because in the event one war might be just 
whilst another might be unjust, although there might be a tacit 
assumption involved either as to the justness of war or as to the 
justness of a state's contemporary position. In the latter case 
conflicting party political views might be debated as occurred in Britain 
in regard to Gibraltar, Ireland and the Falkland Islands. 
Deterrent policies have been evolved which differ substantially 
from the traditional threats of meeting force with force. Retaliation 
direct on the heartland of the enemy overleaping his ground forces has 
now to be feared. The essence of such policies must be evident in their 
obvious capabilities to perform what is threatened and in the sustained 
expenditure needed to maintain the capabilities. No doubt the implicit 
threat is defensive of the status guo ante, (although that might itself 
be unjust), but consideration of the justness of deterrence policies is 
avoided for as long as the policies succeed in preventing war. The 
contemporary issue is whether the means involved are themselves just 
especially where the policy is based on nuclear weapons. 
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DETERRENCE 
Deterrence Theory and Legal Systems. 
A policy designed to avoid war by deterring a potential antagonist 
is as ancient as warfare itself, for if military theory held that a 
society initiating war had the advantage of time, place and conditions of 
its choosing, one object of deterrence was to deny those advantages. In 
consequence deterrent measures include not only perceived defensive 
potentialities but also the possibility of pre-emption, or of delaying 
tactics with a view to obtaining a more favourable time-scale. 
In those circumstances deterrence was comprehended merely as a 
strategem within measures adopted for the defence of the society there 
being no specific technology adapted by politicians or defence forces 
beyond the generally accepted principles of war. Now deterrence is 
studied as a subject with its own concepts, literature and methodology, 
and embraces a wide variety of tactics which to some extent are 
independent of fundamental defence policies. Defence policies 
nevertheless still seek to deter if possible and to defend if necessary. 
Prior to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the USSR, interest 
in theories of military deterrence was limited mainly to military 
students and historians. Since 1945, however, 'war studies' have 
attracted a considerable body of academic and military analysts, not 
excluding theologians. Deterrence and defence - not necessarily 
distinguishable from one another - now play an increasing part in 
national political debate. The interest is mainly concerned with aspects 
of nuclear deterrence rather than with the abolition of war as a primary 
objective. The interest is partisan and sharply divided between 
supporting politicians, academics and military strategists with a 
sprinkling of theologians and moralists on one side. 82 A firm body of 
theological and moral opposition, supported by a sprinkling of academic 
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and military strategists, as well as a growing public awareness, on the 
other side tends to focus on the nuclear weapon rather than on the 
strategy. There is also a legal aspect. 
Deterrence strategy is usually thought of as military although its 
economic content should not be neglected. It is an element of defence 
policy and fundamental to the national place of war. Unless a treaty of 
alliance is involved international law has no formal part in deterrence 
theory except that deterrence today is clearly related to a capability 
for missile warfare to effect by surprise devastation on a scale which 
might foreclose the ability or will to respond militarily. Surprise 
missile attack with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads would 
chiefly have consequences for the civil population and would violate 
international law both as to aggression and as to the weapons used. 
Thus, the theory is one of worse case possibilities, although a 
scale of strike and response is provided for in both massive assured 
destruction and flexible response doctrines. 
Deterrence strategy need not be limited to threat - which is the 
usual basis of nuclear deterrence theory. capacity for defence and 
subsequent counter-offensive forms part of the substance of the deterr~nt 
threat, and this has led to conventional weapon build-up by nuclear as 
well as non-nuclear weapon states. 
What is implied for nuclear States by the adoption of deterrence 
policy is that the States accept that war remains possible, that it may 
be nuclear, and defence measures must include the threat of nuclear or 
chemical response in present circumstances. 
Deterrence is a costly element of defence policies for two aspects 
have to be funded: 
(a) Denial - to make it appear in any case that the enemy could not 
win. 
(b) Retaliation - to indicate what the cost of attempting would be. 
Deterrence and defence are two sides of the same c0in: one presupposing 
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peace - armed, it is true - and the other resolution of disagreement by 
the use of force. 
Deterrence Theosy and Just War. 
Measures of deterrence were earlier incidentals of the diplomatic 
planning of alliances and balance of power evaluations supported by some 
system of raising military forces as necessity or ambition dictated: for 
example, the feudal system, the militia system, and the press gang. 
Because of opposition engendered by fear of the nuclear weapon and its as 
yet unknown consequences, it has become necessary to consider nuclear 
deterrence in the light of the just war tradition, and as if it is a 
finite factor compared with deterrent measures based on conventional 
weapons. It is the nature of the nuclear weapon and its probable 
long-term consequences that are important in this connection. 
Interest in non-nuclear deterrence is concerned with a range of 
conventional weapons especially in increasing interest in chemical and 
biological as well as high explosive weapons. These have their place in 
debate not only regarding deterrence between NATO and the WPO but as to 
proliferation of chemical weapon capability worldwide. Non-nuclear 
states can found their defence and deterrent meassures on and in relation 
tQ conventional and chemical weapons even if with the proviso in cases 
such as Israel and South Africa that nuclear weapons may be possessed 
although unacknowledged. Deterrent strategies, therefore, separate 
concern with nuclear or with non-nuclear opposition. From Edward Long's 
seven criteria**, even if it is possible to remain within just war 
principles with response limited to conventional weapons, it will not be 
if nuclear weapons are used. 
The arguments made as regards nuclear weapons, are first, that they 
are immoral per se: second, that threat to use them in retaliation is 
also immoral. In terms of the UN Charter war is generally likely to be 
illegitimate today, and nuclear war would make both the hope of a 
** See pages 131 and 132 
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successful outcome unlikely and immunity of non-combatants impossible. 
There is a continuing gulf between the Just War Tradition and the conduct 
of war. 
Deterrent measures in any case, especially nuclear deterrence, 
depend on an assured second strike capability and the firm intention to 
use that capability if necessary. It also requires recognition of the 
difference between pre-emptive and preventative war: that is between 
aggression and war to dissuade perceived active aggressive intentions. 
It is not a unilateral measure. For example, if Russia could feel 
absolutely secure only if the west disanned unilaterally the West could 
by no means safely accommodate that feeling. Further, nuclear deterrent 
means are susceptible to subversion from external sources so that 
deterrence must be safeguarded by internal security and countermeasures 
including psychological measures. 
Effective deterrent measures are intended to ensure that planned 
defence strategies, and any consequential counter-attack, do not have to 
be put into active effect, and weapons, legal or otherwise, do not have 
to be used. For some this resolves argument regarding moral issues, 
except for the major premise that a hypothetical decision to unleash 
massive retaliatory measures against non-combatants is not compatible 
with just war tradition. 
It would be trite and misleading to say that deterrent measures are 
taken only because a state fears aggression from a potential enemy. 
Deterrence can be a cloak behind which aggressive capabilities may be 
built up. Intentions may be either offensive or defensive but may 
alternate with circumstances. In one case it remains a moral issue as to 
the means which it is planned to use in deterrence. In another intention 
offends just war tradition and defies the objects of the UN Charter. One 
may applaud Walzer's categorical statement that, 
"Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war".83, but, "We 
threaten evil in order not to do it, and the doing of it would be 
so terrible that the threat seems in comparison to be morally 
defensible" , 8 4 
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as true only if deterrence is a defensive posture with sufficient 
capability to deter. If the intention is to build up to war fighting 
posture with inherent danger of precipitating accidental war the 
comparison lapses for, 
" ••• as a theory, deterrence is fraught with difficulty. Since 
deterrence is a psychological phenomenon, its effectiveness 
depends upon thea rationality and the value system of the opponent 
to be deterred". 5 
On the o the r hand, 
"War-fighting presents precisely the opposite problem. In theory, 
winning a nuclear war is straightforward. Victory can be attained 
either by pre-emptively destroying the other side's nuclear 
weapons or by surviving a nuclear strike or by a combination of 
these. The practicrt implementation of this theory, however, 
presents problems". 
It is easy to see, therefore, that even before the possibilities 
and means of deterrence are considered, moral issues within a State are 
liable to engender bi-partisan approaches to defence policies in a way 
straightforward defensive measures in the past have not. This is partly 
a question of time factors and the impingement upon them of actions by 
other States. Because of external threats the conduct of both war and 
peace are now determined by national strategy. This is evident in 
long-tenn education and indoctrination in times of peace to ensure 
national will and fighting capability if war eventuates and decisions are 
to be effected by force rather than by negotiation. But the national 
strategy is a political conspectus of wants and resources, and if, as 
Clausewitz said, war is a chameleon-like character, so is national 
strategy especially in a multi-party State. The blurring of distinction 
between absolute peace and cold war, as well as the strategies to be 
adopted on a continuous basis, make readiness essential, but the 
urgencies and consequences are such that differences of opinion on the 
means to be adopted are, perhaps, inevitable. 
For the nuclear States the consequences to be expected from nuclear 
war indicate that the utility of military force has changed from fighting 
to win a war to a capability to deter war. It may not be true of 
-
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non-nuclear powers where the emphasis is still on occupation of territory 
or annihilation - as in the Iran/Iraq war - in a total war. 87 
In military terms deterrence normally is a passive concept 
requiring the provision of the means by which the deterrent policies can 
be effected, including the build-up of the means and the training of 
forces. But there are also more active aspects of pre-emption and 
intimidation. The passive role is not affected specifically by 
international law except as regards arms restriction of any kind that may 
have been agreed. In the active role the provisions of the UN Charter 
apply. 
The means of defence and deterrence are not identical in all 
particulars. Related arms control initiatives and negotiations may have 
relevance to one more than to the other, and might stifle the escalation 
dominance which techological advantage may bring. Escalation in scale 
and weaponry must be planned, for if deterrence is largely a matter of 
arms control not war aims, the material demands for a conflict escalation 
policy if deterrence fails must be provided for. In any case, deterrence 
is not only a defensive strategy: to attain credibility it must contain 
the seeds of a counter-offensive policy. 
The concept of offensive capability combined with a defensive 
posture has encouraged the study of deterrence as an independent subject 
since 1945 for four major reasons. First: a general inclination not to 
let post World War II 'cold war' situations of opposed political systems 
deteriorate into active global military conflict in which the opposed 
systems necessarily confronted each other directly. Second: the advent 
of thenmonuclear weapons and a growing realisation of what their use in 
war would involve. Third: the conscious, or sometimes unconscious, hope 
that the experience of the League of Nations will not be repeated ir. the 
UN. Fourth: economic interdependence as an increasingly important factor 
in and affecting national policies. Of course, the four are 
inter-related and some points are more important to some States than to 
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others. If there was ever incentive to avoid war, hopes of long term 
international co-operation have fluctuated being influenced especially by 
the attitudes of the us and the USSR. 
Deterrence is merely a means to an end and is not an end in itself. 
It must be supported by the means with which to obtain and ensure its 
credibility. These are arms, standing military forces, and the will to 
use them alone or in alliance with other States. Here too the ever 
present problem of government arises for the cost of deterrence must not 
jeopardize other national interests if deterrence is to be effective in 
an overall survival policy. Equally, expenditure should not be so 
extravagant that instead of deterrent policies being perceived offensive 
build-up is more likely to be inferred. 
That just war theory played a part in preventing direct war between 
the super powers is doubtful. It is more likely to have been the result 
of direct deterrent measures and the cost calculations of indirect 
confrontation which surrogate conflicts provided. 
As the object of deterrence is to avoid war - at least for the time 
being - if the Just War Tradition is to be invoked in respect of 
deterrent measures it can only be because if deterrence fails some 
element of means or method would offend against the Tradition. It seems 
likely that the debate would be limited to the threat, and the potential 
use, of indiscriminate weapons, rather than the rules enjoining right 
attitude and intention, non combatant immunity and proportionality. 
However, if nuclear weapons are the means by which direct confrontation 
is avoided are they illegitimate at that stage? Or should the debate 
consider methods of pre-targeting, surveillance, laying of minefields and 
possible pre-emption, for all are included within the means and methods 
of deterrence? How is the public policy of deterrence to be investigated 
to see whether it is the real intention, or whether that is not to avoid 
war but merely to postpone it? Some people would feel that it is more 
profitable to concentrate on the restraints imposed by international law 
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on deterrence theories and practice and leave the less debatable area of 
just war to conflict situations. This would allow the debate to 
concentrate also on the terms of the UN Charter, arms control measures 
supporting deterrence, and especially on collective action. 
Although the debate is about security, deterrence and defence are 
necessarily matters of a~ent, force and arms control, and are intended 
as limiting factors as well as war preventing elements. Halperin 
explained that disarmament in practice was a different concept 
"carried out separately from the search for security through 
armaments ••. Those who worked for disa~ent did not study 
questions of military strategy and tended to assume that the 
problem was simply to get rid of the weapons ... those who were 
responsible for seeking security through arrnrrents tended to view 
disarmament as a threat to their interests". 8 
The subsequent establishing of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(1961) - later followed in other countries - was an effort to maintain an 
overall view of national security whilst pursuing arms control agreements 
as a measure of deterrence. 
Arms control measures - significantly lowering the level of arms 
remain a major element in deterrent strategy. Arms control designed to 
reduce risk of accidental or inadvertent war or war through 
miscalculation may incidentally include reduction of arms levels for 
which arms limitation measures are specifically negotiated. They are 
also necessary elements in the calculation of the requirements of 
security. 
KiSSinger talked of 'containment' and of balance of power 
policies89 but did not contemplate indefinite nuclear deterrence. He 
thought it wrong to believe "that nuclear weapons had made the balance of 
power irrelevant", or that "it was possible to stake the nation's 
security entirely on a policy of nuclear confrontation". 
Michael Howard on the other hand thought that, 
"The long term implications of depending on weapons of mass 
destruction for national security worried only a politically 
insignificant minod ty" . 9 0 
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Such a view may have reflected a lang term triumph af cast aver maral 
cansideratians. Increasingly the inSignificant minarity view has grawn 
it being recagnized that nuclear weapans, if used as threatened, wauld 
destray all that they were intended to. safeguard. The cast cansideratian 
then was affected by realisatian that canventianal farces were also. 
required. At the same time sacial stability as well as defence remains 
an essential element in the cost calculatians. To. cantemplate ane 
withaut the other is seen to be absurd. 
Kissinger presumably was thinking af deterrence by balance af 
terror being credible anly when supparted by a canventianal build-up, but 
rejecting the idea af limiting deterrence to. armed farce, he also. said 
that "some graund rules far co.-existence are essential".91 Such rules, 
however, cauld be moral, financial, palitical ar legal. Nuclear 
deterrence has less to. do. with either maraIs ar law, than with ecanamics: 
in the shart term it casts less than canventianal defence. Relatienships 
between States are palitical and ecanamic nat legal except in a 
pracedural sense. They are canducted an a diplamatic plane and the 
diplamat is the servant af the gavernment arguing usually, but nat 
invariable, within a legal framework. In the tatal practice af 
internatienal relatians precedural agreements have to. be farmalized, and 
this is what Kissenger intended. As such agreements include arms centrel 
treaties and humanitarian measures as in the Helsinki Final Acts, they go. 
same way taward rules far co-existance. But are they deterrents? 
What if bi-Iateral agreements are abandaned ar disregarded? They 
are aften shart-term and aften include escape clauses. They are also. 
subject to. the dactrine rebus sic stantibus. 92 It is because af these 
limitatians setting up indeterminate time scales, as well as the 
situatians in which agreement praves to. be impassible, that nuclear 
deterrence may cantinue indefinitely. What is to. take its place is a 
questian which, related to. the earlier failures of conventional 
deterrence, offers little comfort if disarmament and collective security 
• 
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are impossible. The attitudes of some Allies of the US, notably New 
Zealand, and the practical threat to remove nuclear weapons from Britain, 
have to be viewed with the American strategic deterrent still in mind. 
What is implied, however, is that preparedness for war, which is the 
basis of deterrence theory, will continue indefinitely with the resultant 
financial burdens for both sides which such preparation necessarily 
involves. Arms control measures projected to eliminate only some nuclear 
weapons from Europe do not invalidate such an implication. At the same 
time, 
"Opponents of deterrence .•. have traditionally been in favour of 
lower defence spending overall. But they now find themselves 
advocating alternatives such as an improvement in conventional 
defences .•. which would require higher spending in total - or would 
do so if it was to provide conventional forces with ~~ything like 
the same power to deter as nuclear weapons possess". 
Because both NA'ro and the WPO have invested in nuclear and 
conventional weapons and forces, with NA'ro's doctrine of flexible 
response implying nuclear use, and the WPO's concept of the nuclear 
weapon as merely one of the elements of its arsenal implying as normal 
the inclusion of nuclear weapons in all-arms strategies, both might seem 
to have interests which stretch beyond merely deterring each other from 
ini tiating war. 
Over 40 years of peace between East and West appear to support de 
Gaulle's statement that, 
" •.. deterrence exists as soon as one can mortally wound the 
potential aggressor and is fully resolved to do so, and he is well 
convinced of it",94 
even if there is more to the strategies as envisaged. 
"One cannot believe in (nuclear) deterrence and at the same time 
not believe in it; found one's defences on nuclear weapons and 
prepare for a conventional war. The exercise has no interest 
except for that which might be called archaic war, a war which 
would have the adversary behaving as if nothing had happened since 
the epoch when H~tler's panzers broke through the breaches on the 
northern fronts Today we have the means ro render this war 
unthinkable".9 
This does not represent current thinking in the US and in NATO the 
emphasis is on conventional forces and balance. There is growing doubt 
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about nuclear escalation but the knowledge of the technology of weapon 
making, the stocks of nuclear weapons available, and the flexible 
response doctrine ensure that the threat of escalation cannot be avoided. 
Yet there is no certain identity of views by all the NATO allies 
regarding nuclear deterrence. It was argued that French nuclear planning 
was 
"more oriented towards the politic~l management of crisis than 
towards military effectivemess". 9 
The policy has persisted, however, and it accords with President Truman's 
belief that nuclear weapons are political and any decision to use them 
will be political. What may be indicated is a belief that even if war 
between the us and the USSR may be inevitable in an unchanged 
international system, nuclear war may be avoided because politicians will 
not authorize the use of nuclear weapons even if requested by their 
military conunanders. If this was more than mere conjecture it might be 
said that nuclear weapons in one sense supported international law, but 
for all the ambiguities it would be amazing if French nuclear targets 
were not aligned with particular reference to the potential enemy's 
control structure (as is done by the other nuclear powers) even if not 
co-ordinated within American or British single integrated operational 
plans. 
Restraints on Deterrent Measures. 
Deterrence is a matter for individual States (alone or in 
alliance). To be effective it must be planned in respect of 'worse case' 
scenarios and specific potential enemies. It follows that it presupposes 
breach of Art 2.4 of the UN Charter which enjoins States including 
non-member States (Art 2.6) to 
"refrain in their international relations from threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State .•• ", 
As Martin pointed out, states supporting the fundamentals of the 
Charter 
"are not concerned with winning wars as avoiding them, or, at 
least, containing them".97 
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As a minimum this demands a UN capability to prevent an aggressor from 
winning, but the deterrent measures of the UN reside only in the words of 
the Charter unsupported as yet by effective enforcement. It follows that 
the promise of Cap VII of the Charter is still elusive, and measures of 
self-help continue to be judicious. within the consensus of 
international law threat of collective action against aggression is 
intended as a form of deterrence but the means must also be afforded and 
experience has shown little will for that. 
Concentration on deterrent measures as opposed to build-up for 
aggression affects the place of war even if it does not markedly alter 
allocations to defence votes. But are legal restraints influential in 
the choice of one policy or the other. 
Protestations of observance of international law when policies are 
in dispute, especially when in clear opposition to the facts, are rarely 
taken seriously by the other party. Each knows that law may be appealed 
to when clearly in the right, but rarely by a State in the wrong: when in 
the national interest rather than when not. The value of a reputation in 
international relations for rigid adherence to international law is still 
to be proved where interests rather than morals are paramount. Would 
unilateral and invariable adherence to law by a state ensure that right 
triumphed: more relevant, would it deter? Rightness of cause in any case 
is subject to interpretation. If States freely accepted judicial 
adjudication would both parties with conflicting national interests be 
satisfied, and satisfied permanently? Yet, although there are many 
reasons for the failure of deterrent policies the cause lies in breach of 
international law by one side or the other. 
It is not yet prudential to rely on immediate and effective 
collective security measures through the UN but international law and 
opinion still imposes criticisms of means and methods adopted by States 
in their deterrence strategy. For instance, there is unease about the 
technology of weapons especially the arsenals of nuclear weapcns. The 
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threat of chemical warfare is increasingly debated. These are problems 
of law as well as of strategy and nuclear deterrence. Stability might be 
increased with equal access to technical information and knowledge, but 
denial of access to technology is a matter of municipal not international 
law, and is itself a deterrent policy.98 
Neutral states by definition should not need to be deterred from 
military action, but they have need to plan their own deterrence and 
defence policies. If they have no logical grounds for aggression their 
economic policies and practice could promote inter-State dispute - even 
if not fonming a casus belli. 99 
Pre-emption, reprisal and retaliation short of war are all elements 
of deterrence and examples have been noted since 1945. Such actions may 
be illegal on both the facts and the principle. Those who contravene the 
UN Charter (Art 2.4) by such means look for support from Art 51 on the 
grounds of their right of se1f-defence following attack or danger of 
impending attack. 
Deterrence is not merely a matter of the denial of territory. All 
states, especially the highly industrialized, seek to deter encroachm~nt 
on what they consider their vital interests wherever they may be. This 
is a permanent process and provides rationale for : 
(i) retention of anmed forces and readiness to adopt self-help 
policies resulting from 
(ii) doubts about the likelihood of timely UN intervention and 
early collective security measures by the UN as the 
alternative to (i). 
In its turn this produces a continuing concern about the intentions 
as well as the capabilities of a potential enemy. Thus, the classic 
incitements for arms races are implicit in deterrent postures making arms 
control measures an essential part of the strategy. 
Deterrent measures are limited usually to threat with an obvious 
capability for enforcement. Nuclear weapons in this role are not 
unequivocally condemned in spite of the obvious possibility of use at 
some later time. Deterrence whilst successful must also include what is 
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planned if it fails. Although nuclear weapons may be the basis of the 
deterrent threat it does not follow that they will be used immediately if 
aggression is limited to conventional attack. 
Nuclear States will not want to be forced to adopt a nuclear 
strategy against non-nuclear States 50 that they must be able to deter 
aggression by conventional as well as nuclear capability. EVen if 
non-nuclear States are unlikely to attack nuclear States there is no 
guarantee that they will refrain from aggression against other 
non-nuclear countries. Korea, Vietnam, Suez and the Falkland Islands 
disputes may point in one direction but the rationale for flexible 
response could lead to nuclear war against an otherwise overwhelming 
conventional attack by a non-nuclear State. such scenarios might include 
States with nuclear capability as yet unacknowledged. 
An ability to inflict unacceptable damage may be calculated in 
economic terms. Whereas the infliction of such damage by military means 
will be aimed incidentally at the non-combatant, the whole economic 
attack would be directed at the civilian population. It is pointless to 
consider a deterrent strategy divorced from economic means. 
Deterrent policies do not stop at threat for the will to use all 
means and available capabilities is implied. States whilst still at 
peace must conform to traditional preparation and readiness and, 
"must have everything so arranged that nothing remains to be done 
but to set the machinery in motion; it will be too late then to 
attempt to work out the plan of campaign, or to collect the 
necessary material". 1 0 0 
Whilst military deterrence may be regarded as passive in the ser.se 
of being limited to threat, economic measures can be continuous. In the 
military case it is not legal but political restraint which will dictate 
the use of nuclear weapons, but in the economic case such agreements as 
GATT will have to be taken into account. 
Means of Deterrence. 
The means of deterrence coincide with those of defence in many 
aspects, but there are also major differences. Defence supposes a degree 
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of readiness for war, but if deterrence may require such readiness to be 
obvious, its purpose is to preclude war. If deterrence fails it does not 
follow automatically that active measures of defence will be pursued. 
What follows unsuccessful attempts to deter a potential enemy from 
hostilities may be either defence or non-resistance. 
Deterrence supposes forces in being, but forces in being of 
themselves must not be taken to indicate the value a society places on 
war as a political instrument. If what is really desired is a projection 
of an "image of war winning capability" which "appears to deny to 
'adversaries' the prospect of successful resistance",lOl it may be a 
successful deterrent, but there need not have been a real intention to 
engage in war at all. 
The position is clearer when Soviet policy is considered. Of this 
it is said, 
"A serious capacity to wage war is viewed as an extremely credible 
deterrent posture. Such a posture would be desired by both sides 
in the event of war. So it is logical in Soviet thinking, and not 
contrary to deterrence rationales, to deploy such a posture in 
peacetime".l 0 2 
In that case requirements for war fighting and for d~terrence a~e 
identical. Indeed, the Soviet concept of the structure of armed forces 
is that it embraces requirements for deterrence, political influence, and 
waging war. It has no necessary relevance to the ideals of the Charter. 
Propositions have been advanced that a nuclear deterrence policy is 
weakened by a 'no first use' declaration unless both sides can be bound 
in such a measure. Further, 
"in the age of strategic parity and modern nuclear weapons the 
degree of social 'acceptability' of deterrence is inversely 
proportional to that of its operational credibility".lo3 
Operational credibility is a matter of means and intention. Means 
are tangible: intention is not only intangible but its deterrent '/alue is 
what an enemy perceives it to be at any time. 
Emphasis on particular means of deterrence change from time to time 
and not only in military terms. Economic pressures vary with the 
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emergence of new materials and technology and the supply of raw 
materials, uranium for example. 
Before 1914 the British Navy was Britain's deterrent as in practice 
it had been the prop of the US Monroe Doctrine. Now deterrence has a 
different look with Britain relying on the us for alliance and stategic 
protection in conjunction with NATO, although the problem of the 
protection of the sea lanes remains. Military means are fundamentally 
different from earlier weapons: different procedures and moral 
imperatives are necessary for fighting them especially as the effects of 
some are conjectural. There is a feeling, however, that the very 
existence of nuclear weapons, and the risks entailed by their use, 
deters; peace in Europe being ascribed mainly to the us strategic nuclear 
policy. 
The US and the USSR deploy a 'triad' of nuclear weapons and 
delivery means within their strategic policies. That triad is composed 
of bomber aircraft, ballistic missiles and submarines, and it is 
noteworthy that each of the vehicles, aircraft, missiles and submarines, 
have been subject to consideration as unlawful in use in the past. 
Further, by making use of the territories of allies and client States in 
the deployment of their triad of nuclear weapons the area to be covered 
by their respective extended deterrence is widened and the involvement of 
the states of deployment made certain. At the same time, some 
non-nuclear States have turned to chemical weapons as a deterrent, 
describing them as the 'poor State's nuclear bomb'. 
104 
Any emphasis by Third World States on what weapons are available 
may be influenced by the fact that attempts to forecast long-term trends 
in armaments and military equipment must contemplate a time scale of a 
"ten-year development cycle and in-service life of 15 to 20 years, 
as the norm for western equipment",105 
as well as exponential increase in cost. 
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In the competition between technological advance in weaponry and 
efforts to curb both the arms race and unbridled lethality and indiscrim-
ination of modern weapons, economics is an important factor. 
In the early stages of proposals for arms control agreements, or 
for the introduction of legislation to ameliorate a situation, law may 
offer only a theoretical solution to a problem without effecting a real 
solution. In domestic law this is a reason for consulting the 
experience of societies which have legislated on the matter, and 
comparative law is actively studied. It is not necessarily a formula 
for successful legislation but it is relevant to the initiation of inter-
national solutions where some regional measures affecting similar 
circumstances have already been successful. Similarly the full effects 
of technological advance in weaponry can only be seen in war so that much 
is made of 'proving grounds' such as those provided by the Middle East 
and other conflicts of the past 40 years. 
Fortunately in terms of nuclear deterrence there have been no such 
'proving grounds', so that lack of experience with, and consequential 
apprehensions about, the weapon and its effects may be a major reason for 
the success of nuclear deterrence so far. 
Treaties affecting nuclear weapons have also had to be negotiated 
with only what knowledge of the potentialities of the weapon was 
available at the time. Even if such treaties could be relied upon and 
had no escape clauses, and if further international nuclear agreements 
outlawing nuclear weapons were adopted, it seems unlikely at present that 
perpetual and universal renunciation would follow. The technology would 
not be lost, and advantage might be gained, or defeat avoided, by threat 
or use of such knowledge, even if none could be sure as to the similar 
possibilities on the other side. If safety could be assured by inter-
national agreement to renounce the weapon, it would be possible only on 
the basis of a foolproof verification system universally accepted as 
such. Even after the renunciation of the weapon and its elimination from 
national arsenals any question of the creation of a nuclear arsenal under 
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UN control would seem to offer too many hostages to fortune. Because of 
these factors and current moves toward improving verification procedures 
beween the US and the USSR nuclear deterrence may remain the basis of 
strategy between the nuclear states. 
The matter does not rest there: a deterrent force does not exist 
until it is capable of retaliation as well as surviving an enemy attack. 
This is not reversion purely to a strategy of mutual assured destruction 
as the foundation of deterrence for that strategy was never accepted by 
the USSR. Russia preferred a strategy not of 'deterrence by 
vulnerability' but one which included both active and passive defence 
measures and belief in survivability. This is a reason why international 
negotiations and legal initiatives must envisage what a 25-year future 
might hold. A look into such a future is necessitated by the basic 
definition of deterrence (and, suitably worded, of law and order): 
" ••• defensive capabilities that would make the choice of war 
clearly and deeply unattractive to (a potential enemy) and thus 
al&o make (such an enemy's) attempts at intimidation 
unrewarding".lo6 
It is only if the peoples perceive an enemy with hostile intentions that 
such capabilities by a State would offer reassurance in a way in which 
treaty obligations may not. But any notion that deterrence will put the 
danger of war at a level below that of 'a stand-off' defence is 
ill-founded. The necessity is for deterrence measures to convince a 
potential enemy of the costs to be paid for aggression. International 
collective action should be a part of the sanction which, to be 
effective, cannot be limited to purely defensive action. 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. 
The attitude of some Americans to the situation in Europe in the 
19305 was influenced by an American view that by the Treaty of versailles 
the 
"allies helped themselves to new colonies, carved the defeated 
empires into unrecognizable pieces and awarded themselves 
impossible reparation payments".107 
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There was American support for Germany in war and defeat and the American 
view did not take much account of European apprehensions. 
The American attitude affected in turn French and British 
governmental attitudes leading to inaction when Ge~ny re-armed and when 
the Rhineland was re-militarized. It lead to the continued American 
absence from the League of Nations and that organization's diplomatic 
failures. Those mistakes were recognized after 1945 but on a global 
rather than a purely European basis, including American membership and 
dominance of NATO. But the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not a 
unilateral guarantee of European security: self-help is increasingly 
required of the European partners and without it the alliance would be of 
less assistance to the US in its own security problem. 
American security must be planned, however, on a wider basis than 
that of the North Atlantic area. The Middle East, Africa, South East 
Asia and the Pacific have to be considered. For a different reason than 
global security the Russian position has similarities. 
Disregarding the part in defence policies which trade dictates, 
(which eventually may change American emphasis from the North Atlantic to 
the Pacific with some adjustments of the practical aspects of defence 
planning), it is reasonable to see strategic nuclear deterrence theory as 
related solely to super power superiority on a global scale. If so, the 
lengthening list of conventional wars since 1945 shows that the strategic 
deterrent's primary purpose is to prevent direct war between the super 
powers. In this the nuclear capabilities of France and Britain are 
masked by their disposition which is dictated by alliance considerations 
as well as home defence policies. The result may be that if the US 
108 f policy is in danger of being decoupled from Europe , (and the force 0 
the strategic nuclear 'guarantee' has never been accepted overtly by the 
French whatever the reality), the British and French nuclear deterrent 
policy might not prevent conventional war in Europe. That would remain 
affected by the continuing threat of US intervention even in the absence 
180 
of a North Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand, the WPO States can be 
reasonably assured of Russian strategic and tactical nuclear guarantee 
for that underpins the basic Russian security policy requirement of 
territorial buffer space. 
Thus, it may be said that nuclear deterrent strategy is founded on 
international agreements both in NATO and the WPO which are designed to 
safeguard the two super powers from the possibility of nuclear war in 
Europe leaving each free to develop (or to prevent development) 
elsewhere. 
The basis of this strategic nuclear deterrence is being 
increasingly challenged not only because of the holocaust which would 
result if it failed, but because of the nuclear weapon itself both in its 
threat and its use. This may as clearly be seen in current negotiations 
to reduce nuclear weapon numbers (because of the possibility of their use 
not because of their threat), and to ensure conventional balance as the 
developing strategic policy. 
Threat, Intention and Hostage-taking. 
The difference between the traditional policy si vis pacem, para 
bellum and a general concept of deterrence is that the latter if passive 
in action is offensive in the context of threat which is its basis, but 
the former policy is construed and organized as defensive. TWo issues 
are involved in the comparison: first, a separation of threat and 
intention: second, the hostage-taking which is implicit in the threat. 
Both must be considered in their relationships with modern missile 
technologies and the laws of war. 
Because states generally do not assume that others will observe the 
law there has developed a well established method by which a potential 
enemy's probable intentions can be paired with perceived capabilities. 
From this assessment can be made as to the likelihood of war. The 
capabilities, however, may be mere reaction to external pressures, and if 
intentions are then misperceived arms races are likely to escalate with a 
danger of pre-emptive operations. 
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The reactions of the potential enemy must be linked to one's own 
actions so that positive and negative factors affecting both capabilities 
and intentions can be taken into account. This is a continuing study for 
it is always the place of war at the moment of examination which is 
relevant, and for assessment purposes it is futile to take a 
retrospective view. If stability is to be maintained the means must 
never fall below assurance of effective retaliatory capability of 
sufficient stregth to cause unacceptable damage not withstanding the 
enemy's first strike. That capability must be made obvious to the 
potential enemy. 
The assessment of deterrent measures and capabilities will be the 
index of the probability of war but there is the difficulty that 
defensive reactions by one side may be regarded as offensive moves by the 
other. A potential enemy might not support a view that a force such as 
that deployed by the US in Grenada (1983) - a Force maintained in being 
at a high rate of readiness - is other than an offensive force despite 
the US commander's explanation that his Force's role was not intervention 
but deterrent. 109 The legality of intervention, whether deterrent or 
otherwise, makes such categorization much less than obvious. Antecedent 
circumstances are relevant, but in so far as a force in not under UN 
control it must indicate that a vital national interest is involved. 
Whatever deterrent measures are adopted there is always some danger 
of intentions being miscalculated either in an isolated incident or in a 
chain of events. It is not political policy about war, however, but the 
concept of war itself which ensures that even if the incidental causes of 
a war are the result of miscalculation the decision to fight is 
consciously determined at some level of a society. In this it is unlike 
contemporary philosophy which dictates that statute law in some States be 
interpreted not as placing the onus for negligence but indicating which 
party should effect insurance cover. In deterrence theory it is the 
state with no aggressive intentions that must deter the potential 
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aggressor. This is a function - now better understood - of arms control 
and confidence building measures. It is because there is always some 
danger that in changing action/reaction situations war may be 
precipitated through miscalculation that the direct communications link 
was established between the us and the USSR. 110 
Threat and Intention. 
Assessment of enemy capability may obscure a debate about a State's 
own intention to use a particular weapon about which moral or legal 
objections have been raised. 
In defence of the possession, if not the use, of nuclear weapons a 
philosophical argument is put forward which extends to nuclear deterrence 
strategy. The argument is based on a hypothesis of a moral distinction 
between threat and intention. That is, a threat to use a weapon can be 
made without there being any formed intention to use it. lll The 
essential legality of a weapon is also affected, for availability is the 
keynote to opportunity if circumstances arising demand that a decision be 
made as to actual use. 
This kind of moral approach may be misjudged or, at least, 
equivocal and reminiscent of the view that., 
"No use of nuclear weapons which would violate the principles of 
discrImination or proportionality may be intended in a strategy of 
deterrence".112 
But such a strategy to be credible necessarily implies deployment and 
targeting, and 
" ••• to have a nuclear arsenal deployed is to be committed already 
. .. t' . t " 113 to uS1ng 1t 1n cer a1n c1rcums ances . 
So that, "If it is the very use of nuclear weapons which is morally 
unacceptable, then a nuclear arsenal can be justified only if it 
is both intended and likely to prevent such use".114 
The view of the Church of England - at variance with that of NATO -
was that, 
"a nuclear component in deterrence is not sufficiently compelling 
to outweigh the hu~e moral imperative against using nuclear 
weapons at all" .11 
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That view related not only to "a reliable and morally acceptable approach 
to the future of the world" but also to crisis management as an "integral 
part of deterrence .•. which may mean in effect going to the 
brink .•• relying on fallible human judgment operating under tremendous 
strain".116 The horror of the weapon see~~ in this case to have blinded 
the reporters to the fact that deterrence is not a one-way street - each 
State deters the other - but if one fails so does the other even if 
unilateral surrender is considered preferable and intention and 
likelihood are conditional. 
It would strain the argument to hold that intention is absent from 
NATO and the WPO although both alliances would claim that the threat is 
conditional on the actings of the other. Given the conditions obtaining, 
a formed intention to use nuclear weapons seems obvious from the 
doctrines of both sides. But the doctrines are military, authority to 
use is political. As regards NATO, 
"We do not plan for the integrated use of conventional, nuclear and 
chemical weapons ••• We make a clear distinction between 
conventional and mass destruction weapons. Any use by the 
Alliance of either chemical or nuclear weapons would always be in 
accordance with release procedures approved by Alliance political 
authorities" • 117 
Leaving aside that distincticn between 'conventional' and 'mass 
destruction' , 
"we have no intention of suggesting that we do away with NATO's 
option to be the first to use nuclear weapons ••• The price of an 
attack on Western EUrope must remain the possibility of triggering 
an incalculable chain of nuclear escalation".118 
It is not to be supposed that a Russian view is markedly different, and 
on both sides a 
"Substantial portion of the world's most able scientists .•• (is) 
constantlr engaged in further extending and perfecting the 
weapons". 19 
Evaluation of the will of a State to utilize its nuclear capability 
is for the other side to make. Detente and glasnost can be promoted as 
tactical methods of weakening resolve not only to entertain the 
possibility of using nuclear weapons, but also of maintaining adequate 
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defences. On the other hand failure to observe international law should 
be counter-productive whether in obligations such as those under Basket 3 
of the Helsinki Final Act «1975) 14 ILM 1292), or interference in other 
states as in Afghanistan. 
There was no breakdown of inter-alliance deterrence as a r~sult of 
intervention in Grenada or Afghanistan, but, 
"Wars occur through miscalculation: but even in the cat's cradle of 
deterrent theory it would be stretching the doctrine of diminished 
responsibility much too far to argue that a breakdown of 
deterrence which had led to an aggressive act was less the 
responsibility of the aggressor than the aggressed".120 
Deterrence to be effective must point directly to the deteree: Nicaragua 
as a centre for disaffection in Central America might prove to provide a 
different experience. 
Enforcement of law is subject to legal limitation, but the state is 
the Judge of the limits in its domestic jurisdiction. Collective 
security has played little part in the sanctions of international law, 
and submission to the ICJ is voluntary and partial. Deterrence similarly 
is a matter for limitation by the state and until nuclear weapons are 
prohibited by universal consent - international law - the threat and 
intention will continue. 
Hostage-taking. 
The basis of deterrence is that the civil population of one side is 
held hostage by the other side, and to a degree unknown before the 
long-range missile, nuclear warheads, and biological weapons were 
available for military arsenals. If the threat holds consequences 
similar to those which follow conventional bombardment will ensue, but it 
is the scale and range of the weapons and their consequences that engage 
debate. 
International law has sought to protect civilian populations in war 
121 by prohibitions against hostage-taking or being killed as a hostage. 
Geneva Protocol I of 1977 sets out the legal position. 
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"Art 48. Basic Rule: In order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties •.• shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants ... and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives". 
Can nuclear weapons conform to that in practice? 
Between the taking and killing of hostages in armed conflicts and 
the making of hostages by nuc.lear deterrent policies there is the 
difference that one is actual whilst the other remains a threat outside 
the definition of war and armed conflict in the Conventions. If the 
threat is to be credible the intention to carry it out must be perceived, 
but, it is argued, so long as the threat is effective the civilian 
population is neither taken nor killed. The legality of the weapon in 
that case is immaterial. If the weapon is actually used questions of its 
lawfulness would arise too late. The conflict of opinion is illustrated 
by an exchange between two American strategic analysts: 
(a) Ickle condemed the "current smug complacency regarding the 
soundness and stability of mutual deterrence resting as it did 
on a form of warfare universally c~ndemed since the Dark Ages 
- the mass killing of hostages". 12 
(b) Panofsky, on the contrary, said that, "however it might be to 
rely on the threat of mutual destruction as a source of peace, 
it had seemed to work, and that in any case this state ?f 
affairs was a fact of life and almost beyond policy" ,12 
The argument was developed offering the justification of improving 
technology. By the early 19705, 
"the growing capacity of communications, conunand, control and 
surveillance systems, and, most of all, the ability to hit quite 
small and protected targets with astonishing accuracy all 
contributed to a sense that nuclear weapons were increasingly 
becoming instruments that could be used with precision and 
discrimination" .12 3 
Such a view of theatre nuclear weapons (TNW), and even of 
increasing accuracy of strategic nuclear weapons, could have little 
effect on the area of nuclear fallout especially if the use of TNW led to 
escalation to strategic nuclear warfare. Ickle's argument remains 
fundamentally based on the pre-targeting policies of the nuclear states 
in peacetime, and the necessary connection such planning has with an 
inability to distinguish between military targets and the civilian 
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population adjacent, as well as the area which will be affected by 
fallout. 
In a curious way the place of war, in Europe at least, has been 
affected for 40 years by the absence of an absolute prohibition of 
nuclear weapons. 
Deterrence and Arms Control. 
Where does nuclear deterrence lead? Adam Roberts124 answered that 
question by quoting Freedman, 
"An international order that rests upon a stability created by 
nuclear weapons will be the most terrible legacy with which each 
succeeding generation will endow the next. To believe that this 
can go on indefinitely without major disaster requires an optimism 
unjustified by any historical or political perspective".125 
Roberts makes the further points that the existence of 
"nuclear weapons (being large in their effects, but relatively easy 
to conceal) makes general and complete disarmament an even more 
unattainable goal than it was before", 1 2 6 but 
"nuclear weapons are already subject to several types of restraint 
and control •.• if we are going to go on l}ving with them, further 
limitations will have to be accepted" .12 
Art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is dismissed as indicating 
mere "obligation to pay lip-service to the possibility of a better 
world".128 
Proliferation has not been halted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
although it may have been made more difficult.129 There is a continuing 
worry that States which may want to have nuclear weapons may find others 
willing to help either to obtain them or to create tile production 
facilities essential for their manufacture. The legal position is clear 
but in this, as in other arms trading transactions, enforcement of 
international prohibitions is less than effective. In the long-term, 
debate can only underline the truism that knowledge of how to make 
nuclear weapons having been acquired it cannot be wished away, and if 
materials such as uranium are made difficult to obtain this will not make 
proliferation impossible. 
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Roberts had the view that, 
"The relationship between nuclear weapons and the Laws of War is an 
area of vast complexity ~d deep moral ambiguity in which the 
layman fears to tread". 1 0 
Is he wrong? In their Reservations to Geneva Protocol I of 1977 
the US and the British understood the rules were not intended to prohibit 
or regulate the use of nuclear weapons. That view was at variance with 
the wording of a Press Release by the us Delegation to the UN General 
Assembly on 10 December 1968 in which the 
"US recognized that the principles of law relative to the use of 
weapons in war 'apply as well to the use of nuclear and similar 
weapons,,,.131 
The Reservation seems also to negate the entire intention and the 
explicit wording of Art 35 of the Protocol, and Roberts was rightly 
emphasising "a degree of tension" between the underlying "ideas of the 
Laws of War •.• and of nuclear deterrence" which are to ' limit wars' and 
only alternatively to 'prevent wars' by making war so "frightful that 
States will fear to resort to it". It is a failure of commentators in 
referring to nuclear weapons in the context of the Law of War when they 
omit reference to the legal position under the UN Charter132 • Not only 
first strike, but any use of nuclear or other weapons, except under 
specified circumstances, is illicit ,under Caps VI and VII. 
Roberts attempted to justify NATO's diffidence in adopting a "no 
first nuclear use" policy by arguing that Soviet advantage in 
conventional weapons merely avoids discussion of NATO's ability, but 
reluctance, to counter that advantage. But in any case 'no first use' 
declarations have no force until translated into firm agreements 
acknowledging the position under the UN Charter. Unilateral declarations 
obscure the real issue of the legality of the nuclear weapon whether in 
deterrence or in use, or even as a bargaining counter in arms limitation 
negotiations. Nuclear weapons have not obviated the need for 
conventional forces, and budgetary shortfall rather than moral reasoning 
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may control expenditure on nuclear weapons (as is being suggested in 
Britain as regards Trident). 
If nuclear weapons are regarded as merely one kind of weapon of 
many available for use, (as is said to be the view of the USSR), there 
are strong reasons for believing that in the foreseeable future nuclear 
deterrence will continue to propound "ethical dilenunas of threatening the 
destruction of even ordinary people in retaliation for a similar att.ack". 
Without the threat nuclear deterrence would prove ineffective. Even a 
perceived diminution in the nuclear threat seems to indicate potential 
ineffectiveness. For instance, Roberts thought the ability of US nuclear 
force in deterring Soviet nuclear or conventional aggression in Europe or 
against Japan has correspondingly diminished as a result of the US-USSR 
nuclear balance on US extended deterrence policy. This remains unproved, 
but fears and ethical worries continue with regard to the nuclear weapon. 
This concern, which is not eased by a general reluctance by governments 
to discuss nuclear policy, leads to moralistic side-taking, and consensus 
on moral issues is difficult to obtain for the issue is not about the 
ends but the means. There is also a tendency to say, as Holst does, 
"Governments (therefore) cannot ignore the question of what to do 
if deterrence fails".l 3 
The separation of national (or regional) deterrent policy and 
capability from a global (UN) deterrence is usual, and the question is 
not (as ideally it should be) what should the UN do, or what collective 
action should ensue. The discussion, therefore, returns as it must in 
the present international system to the national State. Would a nuclear 
State which had refrained from using nuclear weapons in combat (as the 
USSR did in Afghanistan, the US in Vietnam, and Britain in the Falkland 
Islands) use the weapon as a first or other strike against a UN 
collective opposition? But the dilemma remains a national position: 
Holst, as moralist, attempts an answer in pointing out that, 
"There is a difference in accepting the possibility of large-scale 
destruction as a cons(;quence of war and accepting its deliberate 
creation as a legitimate purpose of policy in the event of 
" 133 war. 
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Large scale destruction immediately on the outbreak of war seems now to 
be always planned if only as incidental to land/air operations, and the 
difference is one of degree - that is, destruction by nuclear or by 
conventional weapons - rather than a moral difference. In any case, 
non-combatants are hostages in all wars whether nuclear weapons are used 
or not: Beirut is as pertinent as London or Coventry, Hamburg and 
Hiroshima. 
The policy cannot be limited to empty threat, 
"Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff. In order for deterrence 
to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be 
perceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary to use them 
effectively against the key elements •.. ".13~ 
In the context effective use would include 'first use' and its 
reciprocal, 'launch on warning'. Time difference between the two may be 
slight, but the deterrent factor may be impressive. Of course such 
policies (and their attendant theories) presuppose that interference in 
communications, malfunctions in equipment, and natural 'frictions' will 
not be so crass as to generate false alarms and consequential fatal 
action or war by accident. That risk will always playa part in decision 
taking and is now a continuing factor in peace as well as threat of war. 
In the international system there is clear differentiation between 
what is legal by way of preparation and planning for defence and the 
illegality of putting war plans into operation. In an international 
situation in which a state of 'cold war' remained continuous, 
preparations for war could not be separated from means and deployment for 
defence and deterrence. The nature of missile technology eliminating the 
necessity for, and time factor of, mobilization, together with the 
time-distance capability factor of nuclear missiles, make peace merely a 
state of non-war. Surveillance from space and improving means of 
verification slightly mitigate the likelihood of pre-emption but are 
themselves evidence of the uneasy nature of peace and some may be illegal 
in use in the absence of 'Open Sky' agreements. 
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In the circumstances, it would be re-assuring if it was realistic 
to take the deed, rather than the will, of General Assembly Res 1653 
(XVI) of 24 Nov 1961. But, in that connection, possession of, threat to 
use, and actual use are differently treated, and paragraph l(a) of the 
Declaration of the Resolution is limited to 'use' .135 
"The fact that the survival of human civilization is predicated on 
such a policy (ie, 'balance of terror'), may, in the long run 
result in the disintegration of the ethical basis of civilized 
society".136 
This demands definition of 'civilized society' and invites pessimistic 
comparisons of policies which have been advanced by various political 
theorists from Christian ethics to 'final' solutions. 
Civilized society ought to be an ethical society with aggressive 
war forbidden (as by the UN Charter and just war tradition), and a clear 
understanding that the use of nuclear weapons would render a war unjust. 
This would not eliminate war but would indicate the circumstances and 
means by which war might be ethical. By contemporary standards that has 
been done by Art S1 of the UN Charter which, however, leaves the threat 
of nuclear use even if it would be difficult to equate the size of 
nuclear stockpiles - far byond what is required solely for deterrence -
with the mere threat policy which, so far, has been accepted in some 
quarters as not entirely outraging an ethical base. 
Behind this is a military reality. If it is accepted that nuclear 
war is unlikely to attain a war's objectives and, therefore, has neither 
political nor military justification, conventioanl force remains. To 
that extent war will not have lost its place in the policies of society. 
Some of the problem of size of stockpile is numerical not ethical. The 
general tendency of militaLY analysts to overestimate the capabilities of 
a potential enemy and to underestimate their own has an 'ethical' basis 
of a kind. Analysts are obliged by prudence to make 'worse-case' 
calculations as counters to the occupational optimism of politicians 
secure in a belief in their policies,137 of diplomats with trust in their 
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negotiating skills, and to the parsimony of treasury subventions for 
military purposes as seen by the military analyst. 
Theories of deterrence can be convoluted and involved. The more 
involved the less credible. The more emphasis on defence the less 
credible as deterrence with consequential danger of pre-emption. Adam 
Roberts returned to the subject again in 1986, 
" .•• nuclear deterrence is not a stable state of affairs but a 
dynamic one, in regard to military technology, strategic 
doctrines, political perception, and the number of countries 
involved. The argument that nuclear deterrence has only to fail 
once to fail altogether ~s a strong if not totally 
incontrovertible one".l3 
He rejects moral fundamentalism (indiscriminate in moral as well as 
physical effects): "nuclear weapons seem to have the capacity to make 
sinners of us all".139 But he concluded that 
"To move away from existing conceptions of deterrence and defence 
to different and less offensive ones is urgently necessary, but it 
is doubtful whether the strategic Defence Initiative or the Labour 
Party's defence proposals as at present outlined are the way to 
achi eve the se obj ects" • 1 4 0 
The Labour Party's proposals have since been developed and arms control 
negotiations on nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe are 
proceeding, but the conceptions of deterrence and defence are as yet 
unchanged. That does not imply a general agreement between political 
parties on either conception or means. Indeed, there is a tendency for 
some political parties in the West to press for "idealistic aspirations 
for effective but non-provocative conventional defences".14l In West 
Germany the Social Democrat Party called for armed forces that are 
"structurally incapable of aggression"l42, but what that would entail 
even in a defensive war seems to offer only an indecisive performance. 
The Danish Social Democrats look for a purely "defensive defence" without 
specifying how the military operations might develop.143 
If there is an air of unreality about such proposals it is that 
whilst falling strictly within the spirit of the UN Charter they 
contribute nothing to the fundamentals of arms control and disarmament 
being unilateral in themselves, and are made - perhaps - with an eye to 
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burden-sharing arrangements within the NATO Alliance. As Father Gilbey 
pointed out, political decisioT"ls "are not wholly reducible to rules of 
morality, nor, for that matter, to any rules at all ... ".144 But the 
political nature of the evaluations made in international relations 
cannot be avoided for 
"the complex set of characteristics includes the ostensibly ethical 
assessment of the given war ... ie, its just or unjust 
character ... this is essentially a political evaluation, since the 
just or unjust character of war depends on the character of the 
social forces which wage war and on their aims, as well as on 
whether the war aims accord with the interest of socialism and 
national liberation. Thus just wars are at the same time 
progressive and the unjust are reactionary".145 
according to communist thinking. It is doubtful if the basic thinking in 
anti-communist politics - names apart - is markedly different. In any 
case moral relativism may be only a justification, as may be the case 
with the 'invitation to intervene' claimed by the USSR in Afghanistan. 
It seems, therefore, that if nuclear forces are the "ultimate 
deterrent against aggression,,146 , 
"armc; control and disarmament have a central role in the 
achievement of the goals in the united Nations Charter, including 
international security, and that means measures to enhance 
security at }he lowest possible level of armament are 
vi tal. •• " • 1 4 
Those measures include the strategic aspects of deterrence, and the 
specific deterrent apparently implicit in the stability to be expected of 
a nuclear balance between East and West. There are passive measures 
also, including law and morality, and arms control. 
Mrs Thatcher once observed that after 40 years since the UN Charter 
was launched, 
"we have not seen the emergence of an effective and enforceable 
body of public international law". 1 4 8 
She did not overlook the effect on public opinion which concepts of law 
and morality have had in relation to nuclear weapons. Neither was she 
unaware of the treaties of arms control which have been agreed even if 
some remain unratified. Rather she voiced a general concern about the 
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ideals which have yet to be attained but which would affect all 
indiscriminate weapons. She said that, 
"Deterrence and arms control are complementary and integral parts 
of the security policy of the Alliance. NATO therefore seeks a 
stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level to 
strengthen peace and international security through militarily 
significant prms control agreements which are both equitable and 
verifiable". 4 9 
It is because deterrence is not based solely on force that law and 
the legality of positions taken by governments are also conside~ations to 
be taken into account in assessing the place of war. On one hand are the 
implications of retaliation by nuclear or other missiles; on the other 
only threat of moral sanction. 
If collective action can be discounted in present circumstances, 
and if the threat of retaliation is not believed, deterrence is likely to 
fail. During this century neither moral obloquy nor fear of retaliation 
has deterred States from 'conventional' aggression - even against States 
the defence of whose neutrality had been guaranteed and to which 
guarantee the aggressor was party. The many wars since 1945 have been 
fought without the use of nuclear weapons available at least to one side, 
as in Korea, Vietnam, Suez, the Falkland Islands and Afghanistan. 
proponents of nuclear deterrence claim this as a result of a balance of 
terror and fear of unacceptable punishment in kind. Opponents of that 
hypothesis, seeing exaggeration of the influence of the armed forces in 
foreign policy planning and implementation, look for a change in the 
super powers relationship. 
If relations between the US and the USSR are now changing one 
reason is in the recognition by both sides that whatever may be effective 
about today's nuclear deterrence it is a policy which requires change. 
But general acceptance of the current policy has delayed alteration since 
the possibilities of anti-ballistic missile technology led to the 
curtailment policy of the ABM Treaty (1972) as a measure of promoting 
stability. Now the promise of a defensive system needs examination and 
development. The Hoffman Committee's view that, 
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"the President's goal of complete defence against strategic 
ballistic missiles (is) at best a long term aim ... in the long term 
such system might prove a ne~rly leak-proof defence against large 
ballistic missile attacks,,15 , 
has been sufficient to encourage expenditure on research into ideas 
which, at the most optimistic, would negate first strike as now 
developed. But the idea offers hostages to anti-satellite war and wars 
in the atmosphere as well as a continuing arms research and development 
race. 
Scientific investigation may have its own morality, but its 
products will be expected by some to conform to conventional morality 
(and law) and to provide the benefits forecast for them. Nuclear energy, 
however, has not provided the cheaper electicity forecast for it but it 
has produced relatively cheaper explosive power. If nuclear weapons on 
the whole have proved cheaper than conventional weapons in respect of 
fire power comparisons they have also proved more controversial and 
strategically demanding. The gloomy view that, 
"For the next thirty or forty years, the best that even a 
successful defence COUtd achieve would be to protect America's 
retaliatory capaci ty"l 1, 
only paints a 'last ditch' picture. Fear of overwhelming retaliation in 
kind is the major factor in nuclear deterrence theory, but reluctance or 
willingness to be the first to use a weapon (as with chemical weapons in 
the second World War), if logical, springs from military rather than 
moral reasoning. There has not been a reluctance to use the 'air' 
weapon, the submarine, or the missile since their introduction into 
warfare. Attempts at control (as for example by the Air Warfare Rules of 
1923152 ), have failed mainly because of the military utility of weapons. 
Increasing use of chemical weapons, and of missiles of varying range, has 
followed that pattern in recent combat. 
Evaluation of deterrent capability is related to the perception of 
threat which, if inaccurate, probably overstates in order to be on the 
safe side. It is in the will to carry-out the threat, rather than the 
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weight of the moral values involved in the threat, that miscalculation is 
1 0k 1 153 ROO f 0 ley. eVlslon 0 percelved threat is a normal method for 
justifying reductions or increases in military spending making 
calculations of relative nuclear and conventional costs more important 
than comparison of the morality of the weapons themselves. 
The argument, like the theory of deterrence, is related to means. 
These range from threat of punishment of an unacceptable kind to the 
security of alliances and balance of power arithmetic. But the 
introduction on the one hand of long-range bombardment by aircraft and 
ballistic missiles, and, on the other, opposition to war, has posed 
questions for moralists and strategists. The nuclear argument added to 
those problems. For the strategist questions of surprise and 
pre-emption: for the moralist questions of observance of the UN Charter, 
humanitarian law, proportion and discrimination and their relationship 
with military necessity. 
For nuclear powers and their consideration of justification of war 
or the alternative of abolition the compromise has been in a change in 
the use of military force from war-fighting to ability to deter. This is 
not true of non-nuclear states where emphasis remains on occupation of 
territory and towards annihilation in total war as in Iraq-Iran. So far 
nuclear weapons do not seem to have discouraged non-nuclear belligerents 
whether in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan for, in the circumstances, any 
potential threat of nuclear weapon engagement was, apparently, incredible 
whether from a military or moral or political point of view. 
Proliferation of nuclear weapon States might produce a different pattern 
of nuclear usage if any of the potential nuclear states has fears for 
survival. Openness in the nuclear deterrent threat has effected a peace 
in Europe: secrecy about nuclear possession will make for instability. 
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PART III 
THE MITIGATION OF WAR - THE MODERATION OF THE EFFECTS 
(A) By Humanitarian Law 
Law is founded in rationality although a degree of irrationality 
and variability is inevitable in its administration. War is founded in 
emotion which is often of greed and power on one side and fear for 
survival on the other. 
However logically they are planned military operations are executed 
and battle conducted in a highly-charged atmosphere which is the very 
abnegation of law and order as understood in terms of domestic law. 
Domestic law concedes a place for emotion in human conduct but only as 
regulated by the law and the exercise of lawful authority. Logically it 
follows that so long as wars persist international law should also seek 
to regulate human conduct (emotion) in the war. 
Regulation of conduct in war has been attempted in the provision of 
a code of conduct and humanitarian practice which has emphasised the 
effects of weapons rather than the fact of the weapons. This emphasis 
draws attention to the need for limitations in usage whilst somewhat 
neglecting to acknowledge that the availability of weapons is the reason 
for limitations and prohibition in their use. Indeed, it is the 
availability of weapons, flowing from prolific arms industries 
internationally uncontrolled and often nurtured by governmental ownership 
or encouragement, which makes modern wars possible. 
Despite legal impediments designed to prevent it, war remains a 
feature of international dispute resolution. The availability of weapons 
and the consequential need to maintain some readiness in defence has 
promoted theories of deterrence to prevent war by imposing a calculation 
of probable loss against possible gain as a result of war. 
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The calculation is military-economic, amoral and without 
consideration of legal concepts. The motives of a state for planning a 
deterrent posture rather than preparing for aggresion may, nevertheless, 
be based on moral and legal standards and just war theory. The 
provisions of the UN Charter may induce a government to support the 
limitation of arnament in peacetime and observance of the Laws of War if 
war eventuates. But observance of the Laws of War will not directly 
affect the place of war in the same way as will a policy of general and 
complete disarmament. The Laws of War deal with formal declaration of, 
and conduct in, war but the prohibitions of the UN Charter are modified 
by Art 51 and the variety of interpretations which States have placed on 
it. 
However, the humanitarian laws (jus in bello), by affecting the 
legality of weapons, could be argued to bring military strategy within 
legal boundaries. Thus in tl:e cases of nuclear, chemical and biological 
warfare recognition of illegality could be a factor in decisions on war 
policy, for there is a relationship with legal provisions governing 
agreements between states to control, limit or eliminate specific weapons 
and a State's war-making policies. The voluntary nature of war policy 
has to be contrasted with the universal nature of the essential 
illegality of a weapon proscribed by general agreement in a Convention. 
If modern weapons and their effects make it impossible now to fight 
wars and simultaneously comply with humanitarian law, the place of war in 
society will be affected to a degree by which bilateral agreements and 
arms control treaties have not succeeded in affecting it. 
The humanitarian law emphasises fundamental illegality whilst arms 
control treaties usually affect only the arms inventories in one way or 
another. 
Humanitarian Law: Scope. 
The humanitarian law of war has regard for working possibilities 
for civilized conduct rather than to actual conduct, for the gulf in war 
between civilized and barbarous actions is bridged by state policy as 
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well as perceived and believed courses of action dictated by militarj 
necessity. 
Whatever regulations were necessary in the past, standards of human 
conduct have not improved sufficiently, and the dangers of war have not 
decreased enough, to reduce the necessity for continuing concern with 
humanitarian law in peace and war. 
Surprise is a strategic principle of war, and pre-emptive 
operational planning is common to all armed forces in both strategic and 
tactical doctrine, nuclear and conventional. If one effect of 
international law has been to confine the legitimacy of war to only 
defensive war, as would appear from Art 51 of the UN Charter, the danger 
of war being initiated may have been reduced. 1 pre-emption in 
circumstances in which a State had genuine cause for fear of impending 
attack might be regarded as defensive, falling within the 'inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence'. In that case it would also 
fall outwith the UN definition of aggression. 2 Pre-emptive action, 
however, should follow and not precede what is prescribed under Art 11 of 
the UN Charter. 
The impossibility of correctly forecasting the future actions of 
other States, or the possibility of future aggression by them, 
necessitates that every State which maintains military forces for defence 
and survival must plan for the possibility of having to adopt a 
pre-emptive policy and strategy. In the event, such strategy might take 
such forces into enemy territory and impose duties upon them as occupying 
forces. Or that might follow from successful defensive operations. 
In present circumstances a continuation of defence - counter-attack 
- occupation-strategy is probable and with it a necessity for regulation 
to continue under existing international law. There must also be 
provision for the law to be kept abreast of technological and military 
developments and their potential effect upon populations and environment. 
states and individuals are bound by the existing law expressed in the 
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Conventions which are codifications of the customary law of war. EVen if 
the codifications lack universal ratification the customary law is 
extant. 
In the xxth Century the codification process has proceeded 
concurrently with conduct which would have been anathema in the past 
millennium. An increasing involvement of civilian populations in active 
military operations in the first World War led to renewed demands for the 
protection of civil populations by international agreements. The 
excesses of occupying forces and genocidal policies of some belligerent 
states in the second World War and since promoted increased interest in 
the situation of civilians in war. This was in tune with concern for the 
material position of peoples generally in peace as well as war. From 
this concern, expressed in Art I of the UN Charter, evolved the common 
definition of what should govern human relationships now set out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly Res 217/A 
(III)). 
It was obvious that war conditions would restrict the full 
operation of such a code, and its adoption is still a matter of concern. 
Agreement to place the onus on states to afford, in war conditions, at 
least minimum standards is contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
«1949) 78 UNTS 31: 135: and 287). 
The post war situation, whether in 'peace or war conditions', of 
Palestinians, Cambodians, Vietnamese, Kurds and others led to the 
amplification of regulations relating to the victims of international 
armed conflicts contained in the Geneva Protocol I of 1977 (UK Misc 19 
(1977) Cmnd 6927). Since then the continuing lot of Palestinians, South 
East Asians, Afghans, Kurds, Ethiopians and Sudanese, shows that 
standards of conduct still fall below what international law prescribes. 
The humanitarian law of war also deals with the conduct of 
combatants and the treatment to be afforded them when wounded and when 
prisoners of war. Treatment of wounded and prisoners is governed by the 
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1949 Conventions, and conduct in war, including conduct by combatants 
towards prisoners of war and wounded, may be the subject of prosecution 
for 'war crimes'. What constitutes 'war crimes', whether committed by 
civilian br soldier, is referred to in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
International Tribunal. 
In these operations and pre-occupations there is the unspoken 
acknowledgement that even if the killing of other humans as a judicial 
and criminal punishment is no longer inevitable - at least in some legal 
systems - war and its slaughter is likely to continue. This assumption 
stems in part from a long history, and a large literature extolling the 
virtues of war and forceful justice in systems of law and order. It 
stems also from a long experience of rationalization by interested 
parties. Yet since the second world War many governments have abolished 
capital punishment for crimes and, in the West, there is outspoken 
opposition to capital punishement still inflicted for 'crimes against the 
political state'. If this has a humanitarian basis it may go some way 
towards facilitating the enforcement of humanitarian laws of war 
especially if Rules of Engagement are drawn more tightly as to some 
practices to which governments have closed their eyes in the past. 
In summa~, the humanitarian law of war is concerned with three 
separate elements: 
(i) the justness of ~ar: 
(ii) conduct of war; 
(iii) the treatment of civilians, the wounded, and prisoners of 
war. 
(i) Justness of war imports a humanitarian character to a concept which 
would limit wars to those that are just by all the moralists' standards 
of cause, intention, and lawful authority. Right intention relates not 
only to cause but also to the means to be used and the ends to be fought 
for. Means necessarily involve questions of proportionality and of 
minimum force, both humanitarian characteristics, and involve 
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consideration for civilians exposed to military operations and to the 
effects arising from such actions. The requirements of justness and 
intention must lead to consideration of strategy and armament for each 
can have qualities inimical to justness of, and in, war. 
The justness of peace should not be disregarded. There are 
situations involving inter-State dispute and violence less than war as 
usually defined, and in legal terms the transition from peace to war 
should only be initiated after formal declaration, making surprise attack 
less likely. Justness of peace may be jeopardized by the retention of 
conquered territory. 
(ii) Conduct in war is not now solely in the hands of the actual 
combatant forces. Most weapons have intrinsic qualities liable to make 
any use disproportionate. Thus, there is implicit in the humanitarian 
law of war an examination of the weapons which may be used lawfully, and 
how they may be used. As regards the weapons themselves there are not 
only specific prohibitions, but legal implications also arise from their 
use. These implications and prohibitions cast doubt as to the possible 
legality of any war waged with certain modern weapons. But even in war 
which may be lawful by existing standards there are explicit rules as to 
the conduct of governments and their armed forces. 
(iii) Humanitarian law regulates the treatment to be afforded civilians, 
prisoners of war and the wounded. It provides not only for situations in 
which States are at war, but also for those circumstances in which 
conflict short of war is concerned. 
Practical Application of Humanitarian Law. 
The roots of the humanitarian law of war lie deep in history and 
the practices of many races. Chivalrous conduct has no territorial 
boundaries. Much groundwork for the present law was laid in the Middle 
Ages although real, formal development has taken place following the 1868 
St Petersburg Declaration ((1868) IAJIL Supp 95) and the 1907 Hague 
Conference ((1907) 205CTS 233).3 
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Historically there was a fundamental relationship of the spiritual 
and the temporal in t~be Muslim, Jewish and Christian nations and 
Churches, and their military proclivities were as often promoted by the 
spiritual as by the temporal leadership. It is likely that strict 
religious laws played a major part in the development of the laws of war, 
for this development, 
"has been determined by three principles: first, the principle that 
a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and force of any 
kind, to the extent necessary for the realization of the purpose 
of war, that is, the complete submission of the enemy at the 
earliest possible moment with the least possible expenditure of 
men, resources, and money: second, the principle of humanity, 
according to which kinds and degrees of violence which are not 
necessary for the purpose of war are not permitted to a 
belligerent; and, thirdly, the principles of chivalry, which 
demands a certain amount of fairness in offence and defence, and a 
certain mutual respect between the opposing forces".4 
The principles were held in respect to some extent prior to the 
second World War, but it is doubtful if all belligerents today are 
inspired by the principles, or reflect in their practices, (at least as a 
conscious law of behaviour), the following moral precepts, which are 
enjoined on the British Army: 
"The law of war is inspired by the desires of all civilized nations 
to reduce the evils of war by: 
(a) protecting both combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary 
suffering: 
(b) safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who 
fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of 
war, the wounded and sick, and civilians, and 
(c) facilitating the restoration of peace. ,,4 
But, whatever the views of individuals ~mether in authority or under 
orders, the laws represent the standard to be aspired to and enforced. 
In the words of the Martens Clause, they antedate the formal laws as 
representing what had been customarily followed: namely, 
"the principles of international law as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, 
and the requirements of the public conscience". 5 
Thus, the law of war is composed in part of customary international 
law, and in part of conventicnal rules by which parties to a convention 
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are bound. It follows that: 
(a) All laws of war are not subscribed to by all States or in the 
same way. 
(b) The relevant Conventions, even when agreed by States will 
remain unobserved in practice unless practical measures are 
taken in domestic law within national systems to guarantee 
their application. 6 
(c) The laws of war (jus in bello) do not refer solely to 
belligerents. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Geneva Protocols all deal with the victims of war. 
(d) Both belligerents and neutrals are bound to comply with the 
laws of war for these are bind}ng on States and their peoples, 
especially their armed forces. 
Whatever a State's position as to the adoption of the Conventions within 
domestic law, subject to reservations duly notified, both State and 
individuals are bound by the customary law of which the Conventions are 
codifications. 
Humanitarian Law and Jus in Bello. 
Humanitarian concepts in war take account of the legality of wars 
in both legal and moral terms: that is to say, in terms of the provisions 
of the UN Charter as well as the classical requirements for a war to be 
just. 
Assuming that there were genuinely just wars in the past it can be 
barely possible that any future war, even one limited in scope and 
objective, can be just in the light of modern weapons and fire power and 
the extravagant attitudes to these sometimes shown by modern military 
logistics. If, on the other hand, strict observance of the legal 
provisions were to prevail the use of certain weapons would be in breach 
of concepts of humanity as well as of law and custom. Nuclear, chemical 
and biological, and flamethrowing weapons are examples which, even if 
disputed on legal grounds, would be excluded by jus in bello principles 
of proportionality. 
Apart from doubts about the legality of war in which such weapons 
are used, justification for killing in war now generally rests on the 
sovereign right of States to order their affairs as they will or are 
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able. Even then killing is justified only within the proper conduct of 
military operations. In such operations military commanders and 
individual members of armed forces authorised by the political authority 
are faced with situations in which decisions have to be taken as to the 
methods to be used to gain the objectives ordered by the authority. It 
is then assumed as a matter of course that the reason for taking a 
particular decision is what is demanded by military necessity. Concepts 
of military necessity, however, need examination in the light of 
circumstances for they must not be excuses for unbridled conduct. This 
raises questions as to the military necessity for the conflict itself as 
well as to conduct during it. 
Without paying undue regard to the spirit in which the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols and the Judgments of the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal were discussed and drawn, it seems clear that if the rules and 
prohibitions were all strictly observed in war they would so affect the 
practice of modern warfare as to make it doubtful whether military 
decision would be feasible by such warfare. At the least, there would 
need to be such circumspection in utilizing all the possibilities of 
modern weapons that commanders would be inhibited in conducting the 
inter-service and all-arms operations which are fundamental to modern 
military practice. Further, a need to deal strictly with the provisions 
of the Conventions and Protocols regarding civilian populations would 
impose such restrictions on a commander's freedom of action, both 
geographically and operationally, that offensive operations, at least, 
would become more or less impossible in any built-up and industrial 
environment. 
Given the provisions of Art 51 of the UN Charter, war for defence 
and survival is still a lawful option for States. War, however, is not 
without restrictions imposed by morality as well as by custom and law. 
en the other hand, defensive war is just only if the concepts of military 
necessity and proportionality are still accepted whether in nuclear or 
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conventional war. Unless proportionality is to be dictated by the 
technological limits of weapons, the question which now needs to be 
resolved is not what legal limitations may be placed by a State on its 
forces as to the limits of necessity and proportionality, but how the 
concepts can be applied in practice. The principle of "applying 
compulsion and force of any kind, to the extent necessary for the 
realisaion of the purpose of war,,8 , will always appear to leave open 
whether the concept of military necessity is justification before or 
excuse after the event. Naturally, States will not tie themselves beyond 
Art 51 to voting for limitations on their ability to make war in present 
circumstances. Nor would they forego the right to stock their arsenals 
with the latest weaponry they can obtain no matter what detailed 
restrictions by way of arms control of existing weapons they might agree 
9 to. They are unlikely, therefore, to embrace the idea that the doctrine 
of military necessity may itself be morally inexcusable. 
Steady progress has been made, however, in the promulgation of 
codes of conduct. These codes and the precedent of the Nuremberg trials 
might inhibit some commanders seeking to justify strict proportionality 
and military necessity, and their political superiors in ordering any use 
of military forces and the weapons the State has provided for them. So 
long as victory is taken as justifying the operations undertaken, it is 
not likely that Humanitarian Laws of War will have such an effect in the 
foreseeable future despite civilian and political attitudes to nuclear 
weapons. Even the provisions of the Geneva Protocols which require 
action by States in peacetime are not universally observed. In the light 
of the analogous Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by many States, 
which is prayed in aid by many in condemning breaches of such rights, the 
subject matter of the Conventions and Protocols merits more consideration 
than is usually accorded to it. 
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Education. 
The humanitarian law of war is addressed firstly to those in 
authority, and secondly to the peoples at large. Codification of the law 
and its extension to all armed conflicts has been the result of a similar 
philosophy to that which underlies the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Both were influenced by the experience and effects of two world 
Wars. The sad fact, as Amnesty International has reported is that, 
"in at least half of the countries of the world, people are locked 
away for speaking their minds, often after trials that are no more 
than a sham. In at least a third of the world's nations, men, 
women and children are tortured. In scores of countries, 
governments kidnap and murder their own citizens".lo 
The states and peoples which the Report refers to are also given the 
responsibility for the obse~ance of the humanitarian law of war, but it 
can be expected that practices of peace will be carried into war. 
If the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and other treaties were the 
subjects of purposeful instruction as a norm~l part of national 
educational curricula in peacetime - even if alongside instruction in 
national defence measures - some of the realities of war would be 
assimilated by generations which had no direct experience of it. This 
would affect the place of war in society. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross, aware of the 
dilatoriness of States regarding action to be taken under the 1977 Geneva 
Protocols, has found it necessary in 1988 still to 
"make considerable efforts to develop humanitarian law and to 
ensure that it is accepted by the States".ll 
One difficulty is that in normal educational systems peace is taken 
for granted in peacetime and war is a matter of history for those not 
involved in it. Acceptance of the need for law may be merely by 
assumption untried by real consideration and not extending, even 
philosophically, to war. In Britain this could be justified when war was 
a matter for a specialised section of the population but it has less 
rationality today. UNESCO could draw on so much evidence of the conflict 
between peace and war and the necessity for regulation that it would be 
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unnecessary for States to formulate their own curriculum merely adapting 
to their language and cultural approach a universal doctrine. 
Unfortunately the standing of UNESCO which should be the natural fount of 
such doctrine as well as being its administrative progenitor and 
educational system has not yet recovered from excesses of the past few 
years. 
It is not the mere propagation of the codes which is desirable. 
Discussion of the international system and its apparent acceptance of war 
as an institution merits continuing questioning if the place of war is to 
vacated in favour of the place of peace. 
The Weapons. 
The place of war runs pari passu with demand for technological 
improvement in weapons and with an urge for moderation in the scope and 
conduct of military operations. As long ago as 1868 in the Declaration 
of St Petersburg it was said that, 
"The necessities of war ought to yield to the demands of Humanity", 
But in 1968, 
"Military considerations were still ~roving too strong for the 
humani tarian argument to prevail". 1 
In the face of elementary human rights it is otiose to classify 
some weapons as inhumane as though there are any others. Such taxonomy 
demonstrates the ease with which a classifier can relate the human to 
the animal species to which the use of the 'humane killer' was necessary 
to still fears of inhumane slaughter. Initially the term related only to 
the killing of domestic animals: less 'humane' killing reserved for sport 
is now increasingly being questioned. Either way the dietary habits of 
Christian, if not other, meat eaters were safeguarded. The use of the 
terms 'humanely killed' and 'inhumane weapon' signifies a penchant of our 
species for killing, or ordering killing, and in some way disguising its 
finality. 
However that may be, if war was a natural as well as a lawful 
activity, it was right to suppose that weapons could be classified as to 
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degrees of inhumanity and, if so, it was the duty of humane persons to 
seek to curb the more horrible (by contemporary standards) even if, by 
doing so, the use of the merely efficient might be excused on grounds of 
morale and economy. In retrospect it was recognized that the effects 
produced by the weapon and the ministrations of the medical, surgical and 
hygiene services available to the fighting man must be examined. This 
could not lead to numerical or qualitative control of weapons as in the 
SALT agreement, but to a humanitarian re-appraisal of the weapons of war. 
Such an examination must relate to the user as well as the victim and the 
moral nature of the weapon would suggest whether it should be prohibited 
totally in war. But, if the argument has always affected the use as well 
as the weapon in general terms the user in war is rarely in a position to 
decide on limitations on the use to which the weapon is to be put, or, 
indeed, how he is to be armed. 
The discussion was not new in 1868. Moral questions were raised 
regarding the permissibility in war among Christians of the crossbow. 13 
When the tools of war were provided by the soldier-user a standard of 
discretion relating to economy rather than humanity was self applied. 
When the state assumed responsibility for his arms and accoutrement (and, 
sometimes, pay) the era of indiscrimination coincided with a 
consequential lowered status for the soldier. As his relative status 
declined his indifference increased and colonial wars did nothing to 
prevent it. 
Similarly the civilian populations were increasingly bound by 
conscription, militia ballots, or by pressing, and campaigns eventuated 
for civilian and soldier in disease which inflicted more casualties than 
the medical services and the battles. 
As the area of operations and weapon effectiveness increased, the 
logistical support for armies became more reliant on civilian provision 
and the concept of the innocent civilian became more elusive. For war 
the industrial revolution was a technological success promoting the 
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supply of warlike equipment and weapons. The inventive capability of 
peaceful civilians (encouraged by warlike soldiers) effected the 
improvements in projectile and propellant which confused military targets 
and civilian property and person. Wars became more important than war 
aims in the inc.bility of politicians to clearly delineate those aims to 
generals who could understand and agree with them and carry them out. 
Communication failures resulted on one side or the other in the total 
wars of the Century as culmination of the savagery of the American and 
Spanish Civil Wars which were the proving grounds of modern European 
inhumani ty to man in weapons, war aims, and conduct. 
Emphasis on humanity in war has encouraged attempts at Geneva and 
elsewhere since 1945 to ban or restrict the use of certain weapons. 
Discussions from 1971 led to restrictions incorporated in the Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons ((1981) 19ILM1523) (which relates to conventional weapons which 
may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate 
effects).14 That Convention clarified vagueness in Art 35.2 of the 
Geneva Protocol I of 1977. Coincidentally but, perhaps, inevitably, the 
Iran-Iraq war1S and the Afghanistan conflict showed again that it is not 
enough to reach agreements on texts, Resolutions, or the self-enforcement 
by States of international obligations to ensure observance of even the 
basic principles of agreements which they believe in any specific matter 
are not in support of national interests. 
The humanitarian law in war is less concerned with weapons as such 
than their effects for arms limitation is mainly effected through arms 
control agreements. It is the conduct and treatment of individuals in 
war and conflict, and the actions of States in the enforcement of the 
humanitarian conditions prescribed by international law, that most 
concerns this aspect of the Laws of War. As a preliminary it should be 
noted that the Laws of War "are binding not only upon states as such but 
also upon individuals, and in particular, the individual members of armed 
forces".16 
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Individuals and Moderation in War. 
That states have duties towards their citizens has been recognized 
in legal systems and has been acknowledged by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which incorporated "all peoples and all nations" into the 
context. The extent of the duties, however, was (and is) not necessarily 
extended to aliens especially by States at war. Sixty years ago the 
Commissioners in their findings in the Noor Claim said, 
" ••• the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of 
international standards, and that the treatment of an alien, in 
order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to 
an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an 
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international 
standards that every reasonabl1 and impartial man would readily 
recognize its insufficiency".l 
That decision postulated the treatment to which aliens are entitled when 
interned in a foreign country at war. A similar standard is to be 
expected from an occupying military force and the deliberate ignoring of 
such standards during and after the second World War encouraged the 
formulation of the Geneva Protocols of 1977 as a code of treatment for 
civilian populations and military personnel in certain situations. 
The humanitarian laws of war prescribe for armed forces in war 
situations, but the place of war depends on the co-operation of s State's 
armed forces and how their treatment is affected by law. It is to that 
(domestic) law that a State's armed forces must look for rights and 
obligations. But members of armed forces as citizens as well as members 
of the state's forces should have reasonable treatment whilst at duty; 
they should not have to wait until hors de combat, or be taken prisoner 
of war, to become entitled to it. The soldier thus retains rights in 
peace, war and captivity, although rights are necessarily curtailed by 
domestic legislation and circumscribed by, for example, Art 29.2 of the 
universal Declaration of Human Rights. 18 To be placed under Game 
disability vis-a-vis other citizens is not exclusive to armed forces: 
police and many professions also have statutory rules governing their 
conduct and discipline. 
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The Milita£Y and Humanitarian Law. 
There is a tendency today - due in some degree to the plethora of 
law and regulation which impinges on almost every aspect of daily life -
to question some laws and to disregard some regulations as a matter of 
habit. Children daily observe their parents and others not only 
disregard traffic laws and regulations, but also listen to expressions 
regarding such legislation. An attitude is created and develops from 
then until the children, later, become aware of the question as to 
whether laws with which an individual has fundamental political, moral, 
or conscientious, objection should be obeyed. In this the individual's 
attitude will be influenced by opinion-formers of every kind. Most young 
people will find the question difficult, not less junior officers of the 
armed forces being instructed in their responsibility to the laws of war. 
"It is now accepted that in time of war members of the armed forces 
are in general bound to comply with the customary and conventional 
rules of international law or, if none exist, that such members 
must at least conform to a certain minimum standard of conduct 
dictated by the laws of humanity and the public conscience".19 
The latter part of that statement might have already offered 
difficulty, but 
"It cannot be asserted that the latter requirement would be 
contrary to the doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege,,19 
It is, of course, fully acceptable instruction where actions would, in 
any case, constitute crimes by established law, but it is an area of 
military discipline where greater instruction is needed for clarification 
of the position as regards the junior officer, and where reference to the 
Manual of Military Law20 and to the Judgment of the Nuremberg 
International Tribunal21 , are imperative. 
The military student will be aware that by Art 228 of the Treaty of 
Versailles the German government recognized a right of the Allied Powers 
"to try by military tribunals persons accused of violation of the laws 
and customs of war". In the 1930's, that might have been warning enough 
until the whole treaty was progressively rejected by the German 
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government between 1933 and 1939 unopposed by the former allied powers. 
Through a similar kind of disinterest the Nuremberg precedents have not 
served to prevent breaches of humanitarian law in wars since the 
Judgments were promulgated. 
In an age of increasing violence and armed opposition to authority 
the individual's attitude to humanitarian principles and laws in the heat 
of battle and the realities of planning for survival, and, it may be, 
within permissive orders and Rules of Engagement, is affected by his 
civilian and military environment as well as his education and training. 
The attitude of states to hurranitarian measures when planning the 
annament of their forces, in their own obedience to international law, in 
the Rules of Engagement they furnish their forces, as well as in the 
objectivity of their approach to the development of international law, is 
relevant. So also is the State's attitude to the observance of 
international law by its subjects. 
Those who enter into agreements on behalf of their States may have 
in mind, even if subconsciously, domestic legal rules to which there may 
be exceptions or exclusions. They will not find surprising exceptions 
such as Denmark's and No~ay's opposition to NATO nuclear deployment. 
Nor would they raise definitive objections to the frequent reservations 
expressed by Spain and Greece to othe~ise agreed NATO policies. This 
follows naturally from the practice of making reservations to treaties. 
Again, provisions of treaties which offer the possibility of exceptions 
to principle also offer scope for future disagreements. Art 51 of the UN 
Charter, for instance, offers exceptions to the rule against war. 
In their national interests States reserve their positions, but 
individuals can realistically only approach each problem in war as it 
presents itself. There, all violent behaviour is regulated by rules, 
custom and definition. Conduct regarded as falling outwith the 
humanitarian rules and now, more particularly, the definitions contained 
in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, (following the statement of the 
213 
4th Hague Convention of 1907 that "the right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited") is regarded as criminal 
and is subject to the penalties of law. 
In practice it has proved relatively easy only once to bring before 
international tribunals individuals of States defeated in a modern 
conflict and to apply the sanctions of law to those adjudged there to be 
guilty of war crimes. It is less easy to ensure that individuals accused 
of war crimes will be tried in the courts of their own States. War 
crimes, however, are not committed solely by one side only. It has not 
proved so relatively easy or desirable to arraign before tribunals 
persons of the victorious side who may be suspected of war crimes. 
After World War I, even if Holland was expected to hand over 
William II for trial, it did not do so. After World War II, Hirohito was 
exculpated, as some believe on somewhat specious grounds. Other leaders, 
however, bearing great, if not supreme, authority in the defeated States 
were tried for war crimes. Even if it is not possible to say that 
justice was even-handed between the belligerents the warnings were clear. 
This one-sided attitude continued after World War II - perhaps more 
spectacularly in civil rather than in inter-State war. Both Korea and 
Vietnam provide examples of unpunished war crimes, and the cases of Amin 
and Pol Pot again demonstrated that leaders may escape punishment. The 
selectivity of action against the perpetrators of war crimes strengthens 
a philosophy that some individuals will prove to be above the law. The 
situation of Russia and Katyn is in point, emphasising that national 
governments will not always admit excesses committed on their side 
whatever their attitude to the other side. 
The hope that television as an educational as well as an 
entertainment medium would provide a means of moral example has been 
diluted by what some might regard as a dedicated programme of the 
denigration of authority, police and public order embarked on in the 
imagined interests of entertainment and viewing statistics. There is 
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continued ridicule of earlier moral standards, at least as far as Britain 
and the US are concerned. Members of the armed forces have to adjust 
their attitudes between this exposure, the requirements of military law 
and discipline, and their organizational role in society which may 
include the preservation of: 
"the physical security of the society, with the promotion of the 
State's interests in the international arena, and with the 
preservation of the socia-economic and poli tical system". 2 2 
In this role both 'promotion' and 'preservation' in the context may 
indicate a use of military force. Such a use of force would acknowledge 
that in some circumstances, and as far as the armed services are 
concerned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may suffer setback 
on its way to the attainment of the universal ideal of Art 30. In this 
some divergence of practice between peace and war however obvious in 
principle has not had an effect on the place of war. 
The purposes for which armed forces are mustered can be secured 
only so long as the forces survive. Instinct for survival in combat with 
any enemy is inimical to humanitarian principles even if not always in 
breach of law or Declaration. But both principles and law are often 
displaced deliberately, as by the German Orders of 13 May, and the 
so-called 'Commissar Order' of 6 June 1941. 23 These German High Command 
Orders were in breach of Hague and Geneva Conventions to which Germany 
had adhered. If Japan ordered treatment of a similar kind to be meted 
out by its forces during the second world War, the fact that it had not 
adhered to the Conventions did not exculpate it for breaches of customary 
international law or the jus cogens. 
Obedience to orders, whether legal or otherwise, is a matter of 
training. In spite of the difficulties of strict compliance with the 
terms of international law during conflict, whether as a result of 
instilled unquestioning obedience to orders, or in the heat of battle and 
out of an underlying desire for survival, some attention to law is paid 
in some armed forces. A recognition of the need for ethical standards 
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ma~ be illustrated by the case of special 'intervention' forces, such as 
the SAS, the US Rapid Deployment Force, the Soviet Operational Manoeuvre 
Groups and the Spetnez troops, and France's Force d'Action Rapide, whose 
operations particularly bring them into contact with enemy civilians. A 
NATO commander, who had commanded Britain's out of Area Force, said, 
"We must also, of course, consider the special training necessary 
for the soldiers, sailors and airmen themselves. Besides having 
to handle evacuees with tact and sympathy, they must continually 
be aware of the Rules of Engagement which are unlikely to be 
straightforward on the ground, at sea or in the air. Hostages may 
have been taken, and the enemy probably will be difficult to 
distinguish from friendly civilians. Cunning, patience and 
diplomacy will be called for at all levels, which is unlike 
convention~l training where direct confrontation is more 
obvious".2 
Unfortunately, to such a view of hoped-for conduct the voice of 
experience may be opposed, 
"The enemy was bullets and shells, grenades, dugouts and 
bunkers ••• and the struggle against these was too all-consuming to 
allow for irrelevant 'flannel' about just wars or the good of 
humanity. These were irrelevancies in the fullest sense of the 
word, for they simply had no place on the battlefield".25 
Despite the importance of the individual, it is the attitude and 
actings of the States which really dictate how the humanitarian laws will 
be observed, and it is unlikely that States that do not themselves adhere 
to the Conventions will train their troops to do so. In the second World 
war, 
"the refusal of Germany to recognize Soviet Russia as entitled to 
the benefits of international law as accepted by the states of 
Western civilization - an attitude which manifested itself in 
particular in the treatment of Russian prisoners of war in utter 
disregard of the accepted laws and customs of war",26 
was not entirely unreciprocated. But even if a state is conscientious 
about Art 127 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III enjoining humanitarian 
training, if some enemies are to be treated differently from others there 
is always liable to be a lowest common denominator applied by the troops. 
As a result of education in the humanitarian provision of the 
Conventions breaches may become less atrocious and less frequent than 
might be the case if training is not forced on thp. armed forces. 
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Commanders faced with situations of survival or breach will decide that 
it is their troops who must be considered first and ideal humanitarian 
standards second, unless the interests of one can be fostered by the 
other. After all, the margins are wide, for actions in breach of 
international law are culpable only if without military excuse or 
justification. But the question of military excuse or justification in 
the use of indiscriminate weapons where civilian populations will be 
affected is not primarily a matter for the individual serviceman's 
attitude to humanitarian law but rather for arms controllers although 
other questions as to the lawfulness of superior orders may arise. 
Neverthless, the individual's attitude and conduct is what affects 
military conduct in war, and if international law is to affect the place 
of war the attitudes of military forces will be decisive. Whatever 
difficulties the us experienced through domestic civilian opposition to 
the Vietnam conflict military forces could have been maintained in the 
field. In any case, German post-World War I 'stab-in-the-back' type 
propaganda will be promoted usually to justify military surrender. 
It should be added, nevertheless, that usually there is respect 
between fighting forces. Excesses committed are often by support troops. 
Respect between frontline troops may not extend to civilians and it is 
here that discipline breaks down (or limited licence is extended by 
commanders and custom). All that is indicated is that international law 
standards have to be enforced to be fully observed and tradition and 
culture are usually deciding influences. 
Despite humanitarian expositions of human rights and legal 
enactments on the treatment of prisoners of war, and on the intervention 
of the "protecting power", it is the underlying moral and ideological 
tenets which dictate the treatment meted out in practice. This can be 
seen from the Korean War, and the IndoChina conflicts, which followed 
patterns discernable in German treatment of Russian prisoners and vice 
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versa, and of Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners, in the second World 
War. 
All too often, however, legislation and institutions to 'protect' 
human rights are in reality designed to create rights which formerly 
either did not exist or were unrecognized as rights. Furth~r, such 
rights are often sectional and selective and their creation diminishes 
existing rights of others. Examples can be found not only in race 
relations, equal opportunities and tenants' rights, but also in 'rights' 
for.merly exercised in war by mercenaries and in the ransoming of knights. 
That is not to denigrate such legislation, but to point to changing moral 
attitudes which, so far, have not in practice impinged on basic conduct 
in war. 
In drawing comparisons or parallels between national and 
international law, and in seeking to internationalize the law of all 
nations apart from the basic conduct which war tends to bring out, the 
differences between traditions and cultures are liable to prevent total 
integration. In that event, equality of individuals as between one 
nation and another in the treatment and regimentation of own troops as 
well as of prisoners of war is unlikely. For instance, the increasing 
Muslim population of Europe, especially of the United Kingdom, will raise 
questions there of the validity of Quranic law. In the United Kingdom 
the Union of Muslim Organizations argues that Muslims in Britain should 
be subject not to British Law in respect of marriage, divorce, death and 
inheritance, but to the Quranic law27 , (of which, of course, there are 
several Schools of interpretation). Such differentiation is not 
impossible: British India was administered under different systemb of 
private law based on religion (ie, Muslin, Hindu, Christian ((English) 
law in Indian adaptations). But, as in India, it does not encourage 
integration. 
In spite of the violent nature of contemporary human relationships 
there is a danger that the humanitarian law of war may be affected by 
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emotion on the part of liberal proponents, and cynicism by the military 
actually engaged in operations of war. The former seek wider safeguards 
in the face of advancing military technology: the latter may question 
motivation and how far restrictions are dictated by ideas regarding 
defence of property, both human and real, similar to those which Church 
and feudal superiority promoted in the Middle Ages, and which may place 
the fighting unit at a military disadvantage. 28 
Instances of chivalry today are influenced by conduct in any or all 
military ranks, and the plea of military necessity is not limited to 
higher commanders. Both in regard to what is considered military 
necessity and to obedience to superior orders the facts as often expose 
initiative from below as orders from above. Tactical requirements, now 
as always, dictate the preservation of vulnerable points for they may be 
needed later. Bridges were fODmerly located in centres of population and 
that was a reason for limiting damage to towns by advancing armies. It 
was in retreat that such limitations were removed. Troops in the field 
will often suspect intention and motive where limitations are imposed in 
actual operations, and commanders will consult what is vital to their 
planned operations. 
There is substance in the soldier's point of view for experience of 
the humanitarian law of war is that it is applied selectively in the 
punishment of breaches; it is, and has, no sanction for the States which 
fail to initiate in peacetime what the Conventions and Protocols obligate 
them to do. 29 Controversy regarding Hirohito of Japan and failure to 
indict Field Marshal von Weichs illustrate a problem which all 
prosecutors face. 3o If the Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo are 
to be precedents, who is brought to trial for breaches of humanitarian 
law will remain a matter for victorious states and how they may be 
influenced in their selections of the panels to be arraigned. 
What requires renewed consideration is the problem of safeguarding 
civilian populations. This becomes increasingly less feasible as weapons 
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become more powerful, of longer range, but remain subject to the vagaries 
which must be expected in war of electronic command, control and 
countermeasures, irrespective of whether weapons are aimed, as in the 
Iraq/Iran conflict, at civilian targets, or not. 31 
Different attitudes to the humanitarian codes will be adopted until 
and if the States police the law through the establishement of permanent 
UN central machinery to ensure prosecution for breaches. This goes 
beyond the provision for International Fact Finding Commissions in Art 89 
of Geneva Protocol I of 1977. The codes otherwise will be treated as 
effective only depending on the circumstances of each incident and the 
national views taken about them. But, unless fairness to all is 
apparent, military people will treat the law with some suspicion. 
Training for war necessarily concentrates on training for battle, not on 
how not to fight. Adjustment of basic military practice to take account 
of humanitarian aspects can be made only in actual operations. In 
peacetime, training time is allocated to instruction in the disciplinary 
codes of the forces and, for officers, some instruction in military law, 
with the refresher courses which experience of courts martial provides. 
For wartime intakes of recruits, time available is a matter of 
circumstances rather than of a planned curriculum, and instruction in 
military law could be an early casualty. The education of guards and 
prisoners in the provisions of the Geneva Conventions referring to 
prisoners of war is likely to be in a prisoner of war camp except for 
security injunctions designed to limit the effectiveness of interrogation 
procedures. 
Duties in occupation forces, or in aid of the civil power, make for 
greater problems for military units trained for instant retaliation. 
This is exacerbated if such forces are expected to produce political 
answers not military results. The situation in occupied territory of the 
Israeli Army in dealing the the Intifada has underlined the difficulties 
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no less than civil enforcement duties for British forces in Northern 
Ireland. 
Responsibilities of States and Individuals. 
Attention has been focussed in this thesis on the place of war of 
the state for any acceptable definition defines war as a matter for 
States. But the privileges and responsibilities of the individual 
citizen (now referred to as 'human rights'), increasingly affect the 
State's position in relation to its ability to wage war. Concentration 
on the position of States should not leave the individual out of 
consideration, for he, too, has a place of war. That place is now less 
muted than formerly even where conscription to armed forces is a common 
legal obligation as it is in many countries. 
In one sense, therefore, the Humanitarian Law of War is law for and 
about individuals. Whilst States by adherence to the law have undertaken 
certain action preparatory to, or in calling into being, a state of war, 
are held responsible for certain actings of their nationals, it is the 
conduct of individuals and treatment of their property which is, to a 
large extent, the subject of the Conventions and Protocols. But the 
Nuremberg Tribunal Charter shows that while the State may be accountable 
for individuals' actions, the individual is not thereby relieved of 
responsibility. 
The matter, however, is not simple, for despite the rights 
formulated in humanitarian law, and in the doctrine of Human Rights, 
individuals remain means and not ends in war. Their rights are curtailed 
to ensure this whether as a result of their participation in 
parliamentary elections and proceedings, or as a result of the will of 
arbitrary government. In NATO, 
n ••• the provision of money and people is not an end in itself. 
What counts is how these inputs are translated into defence 
capabilities ••• n32 
Violence and crime flourish today equally in 'wealthy' and less 
favoured States. Certain types of violent crime are met in a reciprocal 
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manner without recourse to formal legal process and they may be less 
evident than actual in less wealthy societies which may also have greater 
incidence of both civil unrest and terrorism. Violence in the heart of 
man is still an attribute of humanity, and is a considerable component of 
terrorism, although recruitment to terrorist organizations may to some 
extent be dictated by fear or fashion. Attention to humanitarian law is 
less likely where violence flourishes as a nonn of life. This is 
reflected also in mercenary service which still obtains although 
discouraged in some States, (for example, by the British Foreign 
Enlistments Act of 1870). 
Major progress towards harmonizing the attitude of people and State 
to war and to the State's anti-war measures needs to go further than a 
mere acquiescence in - or failure to oppose - defence budgets. It is 
easy to wear a pessimistic air about progress in arms control, 
disar.mament, and war prevention globally whilst expenditures on ar.maments 
continue relatively unabated (except in situations of increasing fiscal 
and trade weakness), and whilst threats of continuing violence pervade 
most societies. What may be less obvious is the attention and diplomatic 
effort given by governments to these issues. Diplomatic negotiation is 
not all overt, and the medium of the UN and its Committees is not the 
only channel used. 
Consensus is a slow process, and the problem of knowing the desired 
destination but not how to get there is not unusual in international 
relations. Convincing all the parties that the stated destination is the 
correct one and that it can be reached by the means proposed is often 
difficult. In the meantime, the place of war remains nationalistic and 
relatively unchanged. But a federated decision-making administration at 
a distance from the individual would not be improved in that respect by a 
world military authority. The right to bear arms is likely to become the 
duty to bear arms under such an authority in its major peacekeeping 
preoccupations. 
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A similar depersonalizing philosophy, fuelled by modern weapon 
power designed for distance killing rather than face-to-face combat, 
necessarily actuates some military planning. In such plans it is 
possible to see only 'the enemy' and not the individuals, military or 
civilian, at risk, and it is a continuation of the attitude which 
resulted in area bombing, naval bombardment by large units, and submarine 
warfare. It became a facfor in the realities of the Iraq-Iran missile 
exchanges, and extends to nuc~ ~ar pre-targeting (although planners will 
point out that plans are conditional and may never be put into 
operation) . 
It is possible in such circumstances to become blind to the many 
and separate effects of war. Refugee problems are not made by the armed 
forces although they are likely to be the immediate cause of them. The 
same will be said of the diseases and other evils which will result from 
any use of nuclear weapons. Much of humanitarian law of war relates 
cause and effect in a direct way which is not pursued by other interests 
in war, for States at war will justify their actions as being essential 
and in any case as being directed against other States. The consequences 
to individuals will be said to be unplanned and incidental to the 
military necessities. 
Punishment for Breach of Humanitarian Law. 
Principles are a source of law in the Scots, as in other, legal 
systems. principles as sources are assumed to be moral, although neither 
party politics nor the politico-economic ideology from which much 
legislation emanates is necessarily moral. When lawyers and social 
scientists contemplate long established constitutional and common law 
provisions they do not consciously and invariable relate them to the 
reasons and circumstances obtaining when the provisions were founded or 
imposed. Only when change is desired, whether for convenience. moral 
interpretation and adjustment, or evolving political or social attitudes, 
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is there consideration of the origins of the provisions, as may be 
observed as regards many British constitutional practices. Reports of 
the English and Scottish Law Commissions contain examples of such 
investigation. 
In the fonnulation of international law, national interest is 
brought to the debate just as party politics are brought into debate in 
domestic law-making. This becomes evident in post facto discussion about 
the meaning of many treaties which ought to be clear statements of 
objective and intentions. Humanitarian law is not different. 
In international relations, however, disputes about formulation or 
interpretation are not always genuine disagreements. Sometimes they 
cloak pre-meditated policies of aggression or intimidation. EVen 
whole-hearted and universal acceptance of adjudication by the ICJ would 
not purify this, for the idea of voluntary jurisdiction - risible in a 
domestic concept of law if not in voluntary codes - when taken up by 
leading powers such as the US and the USSR has militated against the 
effectiveness of such institutions as the ICJ. For this reason 
humanitarian law has been enforced rarely by domestic tribunals not under 
foreign military administration to some degree. The major exceptions 
were the Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo imposed by the victorious 
Allies after the second world War and reflecting Art 228 of the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
The Charter governing those Tribunals was based on selected 
principles regarded by the Allied Powers as moral for the purposes of the 
Tribunals, and the indictments dealt with a variety of offences in breach 
of the Laws of War. It may be assumed, nevertheless, that it was not an 
intention of the Allies to attribute guilt solely in respect of courses 
of conduct which only one side had adopted and to avoid issues of conduct 
in which both sides in the conflict had participated. That, however, was 
the effect of the selection made, and it detracted from a clear legal 
declaration of principles which should have become precedents. 33 
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Vagts, expressing the difficulty of accurately apportioning blame 
for a war, raised similar issues in respect of Art 231 of the versailles 
Treaty: 
"The future of the rights and considerations to be granted to 
enemies in war is at best obscure. Judging by experience, enemies 
are to be deemed criminals in advance, guilty of starting the war; 
the business of locating the aggressor is to begin before or 
shortly after the outbreak of war; the methods of the enemy in 
conducting the war are to be branded as criminal, the victory is 
not to be a triumph of honor and bravery over honor and bravery 
but the climax of a police hunt for bloodthirsty wretches who have 
violated law, order, and everything else esteemed good and holy. 
If civilians are extensively responsible for this new war code, 
the military have not been negligent in adopting and enforcing it. 
In any form, however applied, it does not make for the 
reconciliation of nations or for a firmer belief in the 
possibility of harmonising international interests, permanently or 
temporarily, before or after war". 3 4 
In the event, certainly as far as the Allies were concerned, 
occupation after the second World War was administered differently by 
each of the Allied Commissions. The circumstances of the Cold War 
affected the situation initially rather than any considerations arising 
from humanitarian law. it is clear, however, that the need for what 
eventuated as the 1949 Conventions was recognized, and in the immediate 
post-war period consensus was encouraged by the events not only fresh in 
memory but whose effects were still obvious rather than by such 
contemporary views as those expressed by Sir Robert Vansittart in his 
pamphlet 'Black Record,35 or by such views as that expressed by Vagts. 
The formulation and acceptance of international humanitarian law comes 
about not by pamphleteering but rather because of the intolerable 
situations, political and economic, which impinge eventually on the 
consciousness of determined people. 
If a clear picture of belligerent conduct in war is to be seen it 
is necessary to differentiate between war and the means by which it is 
waged. Apart from the causes of war, and the crimes of those who cause 
war to break out, it is necessary to examine the actions of those who for 
administrative convenience wear military uniform in order incidentally to 
take advantage of the Conventions although not really lnernbers of the 
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fighting forces. The occupation forces of Germany in the second World 
War included many such individuals whose war crimes followed inevitably 
frem the Nuremberg Decrees. 36 
Politically directed crimes by occupying forces may escape 
condemnation in the wider world as the later history of Pol Pot has 
shown. Worse, perhaps, are the many instances of states which fail to 
bring to justice their nationals known to have committed war crimes. 
Unlawful conduct in war is not limited to conduct during battle but 
is within the responsibility of the armed forces in a theatre of 
operations irrespective of any directions of government to other 
government forces. German armed forces co-operated with the 'special 
measures' in occupied Europe for the reason that the nature of such 
measures was not a military responsibility - a plea rightly rejected at 
the Nuremberg trials. Russian armed forces similarly co-operated with 
other government departments as regards the Stalin special measures, and 
looting, rape and murder were never far from the victorious troops as 
they advanced westward. Because of what had been suffered under the 
occupation by Germany and its allies there was sympathy with crude 
actions of immediate revenge. But there was also policy, and not merely 
individual savagery in the revenge taking. 37 
The Geneva Conventions and Protocols place the responsibility for 
all acts committed by those fonning part of the armed forces on the 
State. 38 The responsibility of states to compensate victims of war 
crimes does not exculpate offending individuals. But it is not clear how 
crimes committed by victorious annies are to be punished if offenders' 
own States take no action to do so. The responsibility of individuals 
for initiating war and for inhumane conduct in it, however, will not 
necessarily go unpunished for, unlike much formal international law which 
leaves procedures and enforcement to States, a precedent for sanctions 
directed at least against the defeated has been set by the Nuremberg 
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International Tribunal which itself had origins in Art 225 of the Treaty 
of Versailles. 
Today, it is the judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
which are principally discussed not the controversy as the whether the 
Tribunal and its Charter were in accordance with international law. Yet 
the controversy is not without importance for not all the subjects of the 
Allied Governments took the Charter and Tribunal as legal 39 , and, no 
doubt, such disagreement would recur but for the subsequent Resolution 
95(1) of the General Assembly.40 
Lord Hankey had many objections to the Tribunal and Charter: for 
example, he said 
"They (the Nuremberg Tribunal and its Charter) were not in 
accordance with international law, nor with the law of Great 
Britain, the USA, or Germany where the trials took place". The 
Charter "violated the Universal Resolution of Human Rights ••. for 
example, Article 10". 
Lord Hankey saw it as a 
"victor tribunal, consisting only of victor nations, with no 
neutral or unbiased outsider, with a Chrrter drawn up by the 
prosecutors to suit the prosecution". 4 
In addition, he referred to trials other than those at Nuremberg, but 
which were governed by the application of the Charter, and cited breaches 
of Geneva Conventions in respect of some of the accused, 
"they were deprived of their uniforms, decorations, badges of rank, 
and at court-martials they were not tried by their equals, eg, in 
the case of Field-Marshal von Manstein". 
In referring to Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration he said, 
"some of the acts with which the prisoners were to be accused were 
definitely not crimes at the times when they were committed. As 
to 'aggression', he said, "I was myself up to the neck in the 
Kellogg pact, right at the heart, and never on one single occasion 
in all the discussions about the Kellogg Pact did I hear one 
single word to suggest that it was a criminal act. And never in 
all the 26 years in which I was secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, did I hear any suggestion that planning and 
preparing a war of aggression was a crime. Planners do not know 
whether their plans will be put in operation as aggression or as 
counter measures". 
If after the first World War Germans were quick to condemn the 
Treaty of Versailles including the war guilt Articles (227-230), after 
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the second world War there has been less continuous opposition to the 
judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals' decisions on that 
subject. Such disassociation on the part of the Germans may be 
attributed to diversion of blame to the Nazi party instead of to tile 
Ge~n people as such, rather than to an unequivocal acceptance of the 
principles and terms of humanitarian law and the reinforcement of them by 
the General Assembly in the Resolution referred to above. 
particularly from the military point of view, but also the 
civilian, the precedent of the Tribunals as to obedience to superior 
orders and to the doctrine of military necessity has great importance. 
There is often a direct connection between pleas of military necessity 
and of superior orders, but Art 5 of the Charter of the Tribunal 
"expressly rejected the plea of superior orders as an absolute defence42 , 
and commanders have a responsibility for the acts of their 
subordinates43 • 
It may be that in practice there is as much danger for senior 
officers of defeated forces from a change in Government from the 
political party they obeyed to one which opposed the policies they 
supported. 44 
Crimes against peace and war crimes committed during the course of 
war are clearly defined in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgments. 45 Little 
effective effort has been made to apply the definitions in respect of 
war-making since 1945. The continuing activities of Idi Amin, Pol Pot, 
and others show that different standards are applied to different 
situations, and that decisions to enforce the Laws of War are likely to 
be political. 
It may be true, neverthless, that the Geneva Conventions, and the 
precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo do good by setting objective standards 
by which action can be judged, even if the precedents are rather for 
victors in bringing to trial persons who might not be tried if the matter 
were left to the processes of their domestic law. But if the UN Charter 
and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Judgments define what war crimes and crimes 
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against humanity may comprise, they do not offer precedents for 
investigation of the actions of the successful in war. 46 
The area of possible violation of the laws of war is continually 
widening. Wars have always been likely to affect neutrals and third 
party States if only in disruption of communications. Now the effects of 
radiation from the fallout of nuclear explosions not only in the theatre 
of operations but at great distances from it, together with the 
increasing lethality of conventional weapons has put civilian populations 
at greater risk than ever. If the timing of the 1949 Conventions soon 
after the Nagasaki and Hiroshima atomic attack was apposite it was also 
likely that there was more than a sub-conscious thought in the minds of 
the initiators of the Conventions that a more embracing regulation of 
conduct in war, especially as regards civilians and children, had become 
imperative. Perhaps also the thought lingered that, 
"The successful nation St~te ultimately perhaps by definition. is a 
war fighting organism". 4 
If so, the conduct of such a State could be restrained in its action only 
by the force of law universally agreed. To that end the Geneva Protocol 
I of 1977 included the Basic Rule at Art 48. 48 
That is one reason why States have sought to differentiate between 
the nuclear weapon as deterrent and the weapon in actual use. There is 
an analogy between the indiscriminating effects of the weapon (on 
combatant and civilian alike) and the 'hostage' component of nuclear 
deterrent theories. It might be said that there is a difference between 
the 'nuclear hostage' and the physical act of taking a person hostage, 
but the principles of the attempt to safeguard civilians, by the 
prohibition of taking and killing hostages in war and armed conflict49 , 
is rejected in nuclear deterrence planning. The Basic Rule above really 
says all that is necessary to indicate the potential unlawfulness of the 
weapon in use. 
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In any case, in the observance of the Conventions and Protocols it 
is duty not rights which is relevant. For the individual, there is also 
the dilemma of the weapons he is required by his lawful authority to 
handle and use. The dilemma is especially apparent in situations where 
conscientious objection to service in combatant units is not recognized. 
In the armed forces it will be thought generally that weapons provided by 
the State are legitimate weapons of war although the thought might not 
exculpate an individual using what he has been issued with if it was in 
breach of the law. Further, an individual would be unlikely to know if 
the missile to which he was assigned was in excess of the number 
pe~itted under an arms control agreement. 
War and the Civilian. 
The laws of war, arms control agreements between States, and 
confidence building measures, have direct or indirect humanitarian 
aspects or effects. This is also true of inst~ents of alliance for if 
such inst~ents lessen the probability of war or defeat if war does 
eventuate, they may mitigate some of war's ill effects but escalation in 
the areas of dispute implicit in military alliances is to be noted. 
In general, the humanitarian law of war relates to conduct between 
belligerents, and between belligerents and third party non-combatants, 
and what Hartigan called "The Forgotten Victim" - the civilian. 5 0 The 
law also itemises the duties which are imposed on States in relation to 
both combatants and non combatants under circumstances of capture, 
surrender, and occupation. 
Discussion of the position of the civilian in war is more than ever 
relevant today when the basis of conduct in war has often reverted to an 
earlier barbarism euphemistically, or pragmatically, called 'total war'. 
NOW, with Hartigan, the question needs tc be asked: 
"IS the idea of the civilian an anachronism? Have nuclear weapons 
and guerrilla warfare for ever obliterated the distinction between 
combatant and non comr.atant? 
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Hartigan answered for himself, 
"In what should be called the Age of Animosity the correct an~wer 
would seem to be a reluctant but none the less affinmative". 1 
That answer is debatable from both legal and operational 
viewpoints. This thesis is not the place for a sophisticated analysis of 
the part played by civilians in war, but that part has importance in 
every aspect of the promotion, maintenance, and the logistics of modern 
warfare. Discussion is necessary, therefore, as to whether humanitarian 
law specifically aimed at excluding civilians from war and its immediate 
operational effects, is desirable, necessary, or possible. 
In many senses the humanitarian law of war is retrogressive, for it 
observes the indiscriminatory effect of the products of modern 
technology, which are the products of the workers in industry, it seeks 
to provide for the safety of non-combatants engaged in prolonging - even 
making possible - war, and weighs the scales against the combatant, 
leaving him to fall back on his plea of military necessity. 
In any case, it cannot safely be asserted now that experience of 
non-nuclear war in the past is completely relevant to a nuclear future 
since modern weapons technologists have largely removed moral usage from 
the engines of war. As regards strategy, the advent of highly 
sophisticated technology which is sometimes an end in itself rather than 
a possible means whereby political decisions might be reached, has 
introduced a factor by which the consequences of the use, or non-use, 
remain unknown. 52 Non-use of technological, especially nuclear and 
chemical, weapons does not remove fears of possible contamination, or 
even accidents in storage. Human conduct, on the other hand, has been 
relatively uniform through the centuries mitigated only by the force of 
moral standards even if promise and performance were generally at 
variance. 
The safeguarding of the life of civilian non-combatants is 
nevertheless a foundation of humanitarian law. Hartigan, however, puts a 
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realistic, if jaundiced, view and Iraqi use of chemical weapons against 
civilians does not refute it: 
"The principle of non-combatant and civilian immunity is a theory 
made concrete in law and practice. It demonstratps how mankind, 
seemingly driven to lethal intra-species aggression, had come to 
control that aggression's worst impact, the unintentional 
slaughter of persons not directly involved in fighting. Now, 
after nearly eighteen hundred centuftes of forging, the societal 
tool seems shattered and abandoned. 
But, even if the weapons technology has got out of hand to the extent 
that it controls the strategy, has the principle really been abandoned? 
More and more States have excised the death penalty from the sanctions of 
their criminal law code. 54 Even where this has been done for diverse 
reasons not solely moral, including fear of the fallibility which 
sometimes arises in criminal judgments, the morality of the reasoning has 
been based broadly on dislike for the calculated taking of human life. 
Efforts at the prevention of war have a comparable ethos. The evolution 
of the Declaration of Human Rights was advanced by identical care for 
human life and well being. A reciprocal is that in some systems of law 
'self defence' is hedged around with conflicting definitions of 
justifiable force and a welcome reversion to the Augustinian view that 
"no pleasure should be taken in regard to killing even so as not to be 
killed".ss 
It is sensible, therefore, to observe a difference between 
execution by judicial sentence, which some States reject totally whilst 
at the same time anming their police who may, acting in the defence of 
the community, kill a suspected offender resisting apprehension. Such 
killing, if legal and unpremeditated in principle, is not the result of a 
judicial pronouncement. (St Thomas put it, 'as directed to the welfare 
of the whole community'). This merely says that shooting by properly 
authorised police, under certain conditions, is justified as in the 
'common good' and is similarly justification for the killing necessitated 
in war. Even if this begs the question of the justification of war 
itself, it is held to apply to killing innocent persons by 'mistake' in 
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the case of armed police shootings, and of civilians in war, and theories 
of military necessity and of double effect are involved. 
The attitude towards arming civilian police and the orders under 
which they operate reflect the State's attitude toward individual lives, 
and the State's attitude in turn reflects the normal societal behaviour 
of the citizens. It is outwith the purposes of this thesis to seek a 
correlation between such attitudes and actual battle conduct as, for 
example, at Oradour or My Lie. In both cases civilians were the victims. 
It is, however, the link between reservations regarding 
justifications for killing and killing necessary in war which ensures 
that humanitarian laws must have regard for some differences between 
combatant and non-combatant. In some circumstances the position is not 
straightforward for it is dependent not only on law, but also on: 
(a) the attitudes and actions of individual members of the armed 
forces, as well as their commanders both as individuals and 
commanders, in active operations of war, 
(b) the effects of being subject to their own and enemy propaganda, 
and 
(c) their own rights under human rights concepts to listen to 
broadcasting, and freedom to read a free press from whatever 
source that press may emanate. 
If it is apparent that civilians are entitled to freedom of 
information - a freedom which may be diluted by domestic law especially 
in war - it is also to be remembered that it is from the civilian 
population that the information medias' workers are drawn. Apart from 
service newspapers and broadcasts the armed forces, like members of the 
civilian population, are subject to what the civilian media propagates. 
If this has an objective of supporting the morale of soldier and civilian 
alike it can be a positive factor in military operations if only 
indirectly. The reverse is also true. 
Armed forces are employed to achieve political ends and purposes of 
war. Such purposes cannot be pursued today without the active 
co-operation of civilians, Paret had it that strategy, 
"is also based on, and may include, the development, intellectual 
mastery, th: utlization of all of the state'~ resources for the 
purpose of lmplementing its policy in war". 5 
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The legal differentiation between civilian and combatant set out in 
the Conventions and Protocols will be obscured very often through the 
effects of indiscriminate weapons and by the very nature of war and its 
incidents. 57 That is no reason to neglect agreed machinery for the 
investigation of violations as, for example, by the International 
Fact-Finding Commission under Art 90 of Geneva Protocol I of 1977. 
Neither does it mean that efforts by any military obliteration methods to 
break the morale of a civilian population and its will to continue a war 
can necessarily be justified as military necessity. 
The portrayal of modern war, and the motivations of those who 
portray it, should not be overlooked. The picture is drawn as 
ideological on the one hand, emotional on the other, by East and West. 
This portrayal forms part of the contemporary history, drama, theatre and 
television designed to index life in retrospect but also to encourage it 
for the future. 
Establishment religion plays some part, conjectural often even in 
fundamentalism. That is the religion as enunciated by its proponents 
does not always prevent war against co-religionists - Iraq-iran amongst 
the Muslims: Cambodia and Vietnam amongst the Buddhists; world Wars I and 
II amongst the Christians. Like judges, the ability to distinguish cases 
may be seen as in the dissident Afghans against the Afghan government 
forces, for the latter are thought by the former to be agents not for the 
Faith but for communist ideolOgy. 
For the Anglican Synod, war is a peripheral subject, for procedures 
and recruitment have primary importance there. Adjustment of doctrine to 
conform to contemporary mores, leading to support for violent political 
opposition, transposing theories of just war to acts of revolution, fail 
to recognize the real - and double - question of security and survival. 
Yet out of this has come a real concern for mitigating the 
inhumanities of war, and a continuing determination to promote 
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universally a humanitarian law of war. Much has been codified, and much 
of the concern has been with the victims of war, so that codes provide 
not only for the combatant forces and their conduct, but for the civilian 
populations who are the victims. Conditions for these two categories 
must necessarily differ, so that some definition is required. 
In very simple terms there are: 
(a) Members of the armed forces and certain authorised 
non-military persons accompanying the armed forces eg, war 
correspondents and all others falling under the definitions of 
Art 4 of Convention III. If captured, these are to be treated 
as prisoners of war and their treatment is prescribed in 
Convention 111. 58 
(b) The whole of the populations of the countries in conflict fall 
under the provisions of Convention IV, and the treatment to ~e 
accorded to them is contained in that Convention at Part II. 9 
It will be noted that the 1949 Geneva Conventions III and IV did 
not differentiate as regards "Persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities" (Art 3), as to whether they had been engaged in making 
annarnents and other essential war material, or in maintaining equipment 
of the armed forces, although this was being debated at the time. In 
part the ommission was due to the unrestricted bombing policies adopted 
by both sides during the second World War, when the morale of the 
civilian population was considered to be an important target. 
The position of armed forces and their subsequent treatment if 
taken as prisoners of war is fairly clear as regards States which are 
contracting parties to the Conventions. The personnel of an acceding 
State may, however, be at a disadvantage for that State remains bound by 
the Conventions whether or not the enemy "accepts and applies the 
provisions" (Art 2). 
The dangers and privations which affect the civilian population of 
the States in conflict are now to be feared as an inescapable part of 
modern war technology even if not accompanied by inhumane occupation 
practices. Thus, it is not the effect of war on armed forces as much as 
on the civilian population which may encourage change. Because of 
deliberate attacks on civilians, and the incidental effects of battle on 
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them even when military operations have endeavoured to confine dangers to 
the fighting forces, humanitarian law has emerged to mitigate the effects 
of military necessity and political decision in the conduct of war. Even 
in the most favourable circumstances, however, modern war will not avoid 
problems for refugees and war orphans. 
Civilians, Refugees and War-0rphans. 
In war as in peace humanitarian law does not flourish in the 
climate of the hunger and poverty that are the camp followers of both war 
and civil dissent. Liberal attitudes towards crime and punishment, even 
if based on ethical concepts, tend to facilitate crime and disobedience. 
This is seen in prisoner of war and refugee camps no less than in civil 
prisons. Nor can humanitarian law affect that aspect of war which 
results in the brutalizing of emotion and compassion arising not only 
from the war itself, but also as incidental to the doctrine of military 
necessity if loosely applied. Whether applied with due regard for moral 
standards or not the doctrine, like other incidents of war with the 
consequential uncertainties and dangers which attend them, makes wars the 
great begetters of orphans and refugee children and this is recognized by 
humanitarian law. 6o 
In the practical realities of war law's remedies can only be 
palliative, but the 1949 Conventions envisaged and sought to provide for 
those realities. Prior to the Conventions - especially Convention IV -
the earlier agreements provided for "relatively few positions - basic in 
character", but 
"The experience of the first World War showed the inadequacy of 
these provisions: the technological development of weapons, and 
the enlarged field of military action introduced thereby, 
demonstrated that civilians could no longer be regarded as being 
outside hostilities, and indee~f were exposed to the same (or 
worse) dangers as combatants". 
The very high casualty rates of civilians indicated need for the 
realistic regulations introduced by Convention IV, and the need for a 
detailed system for the treatment to be accorded to civilians, 
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particularly to orphans and refugee children. That such regulations were 
necessary reflects the unbridled nature of modern war and the depravities 
which become evident under its stresses. The Convention, therefore, not 
only sets out rights and treatment but also terms of operation and 
supervision. Unfortunately as it may seem from post-war history 
generally and in the Middle East and South East Asia in particular, the 
experience of those orphaned by war do not necessarily induce strong 
anti-war attitudes preventing repetition of their own experiences 
generation after generation. 
Prior to the second World War problems of re-settlement or return 
to former domicile tended to be 'solved' before the next similar problem 
arose. After the substantial evacuation of the post-1945 displaced 
persons camps the problem was still considered to be temporary arising 
from war to war. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitiation Agency 
(UNRRA) was established on that basis as an ad hoc arrangement by 
voluntary contributions. It was only in 1971, in the face of continuing 
problems, that the Agency was institutionalized as though acknowledging 
that no end of the problem could be foreseen. 
It now seems likely that it is impossible to obviate the 
inevitability of the coincidence of refugee problems and modern war. 
Fandne has been a cause of large-scale and enforced population movement 
and war another. The genesis of famine often lies in war, or is 
exacerbated by war, in a way in which the reverse situation is not common 
today. 
Refugee problems arising from conflict in Korea, Palestine, South 
East Asia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and the Sudan are examples which show 
that the post 1939-45 lessons are disregarded as being an unchanging 
element of war. Palestinian refugees alone total over two million and 
their displacement stemmed from institutional policies resulting in the 
recognition of the State of Israel and after failure to enforce UN 
Resolution 131 (II). Afghan refugee problems stemmed directly from 
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foreign intervention in a domestic political situation. For Pakistan 
which has received some three million people from Afghanistan the real 
problem has yet to be realized. 
In States unaffected by physical problems of incoming refugees 
consciences remain relatively undisturbed: such problems are accepted as 
incidentel to war. Even the delayed consequences of war which prolong 
refugee problems as in the case of the Vietnamese 'boat people' the 
problem attracts mixed attitudes. But refugees are no longer mere 
incidentals of war. They can be used as a political weapon, as in 
Vietnam, or as an economic factor as in compensatory payments in respect 
of the movement of individuals from East to West Germany. Dangers for 
the future may be seen in agitation for a Tamil State in Sri Lanka, for 
indigenous rule by Fijians, by Basque ambition in Spain and Sikh in 
India. Desires for the creation of sovereign States backed by violence 
inevitably lead to refugee problems and demands for political asylum with 
cross-border movement and counter-movement. Such activities influenced 
Israel in Lebanon and South Africa in Angola and Botswana. In times of 
relative peace such actions are deprecated, but they are the line of 
least resistance when peace is violated as Pakistan experienced during 
the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. 
It is a feature of modern war that it has become necessary to 
prescribe the treatment to be accorded to war orphans, but it is equally 
a criticism of public law that whereas it provides remedies for States, 
either through the ICJ or by way of reparations, individual anomalies 
must be adjusted by domestic law and procedure. There is no redress if 
States decline to pursue the individual's plea unless, as in the EEC, 
some appellate system is in force. The question would arise as to 
whether any system of law cocld cope with deprivation of rights on the 
scale of the refugee problem. 
There is on one hand the humanitarian concept for both peace and 
war which has been re-furbished since the second World War in the 
238 
universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Agreements. The 
Declaration and the Agreements should be considered together for the 
objective standards of the former are curtailed in war, whereas the 
treatment prescribed by the latter should become effective in war. On 
the other hand those who initiate wars are not inhibited by the 
inevitability of refugee problems stemming immediately from the 
abrogation of human rights, and the tactic of encumbering an enemy by 
driving the civilian population towards him, are equally in direct 
contradiction of the Declaration and Agreements. 
The continuous nature of the problem was acknowledged in the UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ((1951) 189UNTS150) (and 
the Protocol adopted on 16 December 1966). The problem's magnitude can 
be seen from statistics including: 62 
(a) 60 million people had been displaced in the second World War up 
to 1943. 
(b) 2 million Palestinians have been dispersed throughout the 
Eastern Mediterranean area since 1946. 
(c) 3 million Afghans are refugees in Pakistan and half-a-million 
in Iran. 63 
Numbers of refugess from South East Asian States, and from Tibet, 
are large but unknown, and this by no means exhausts the refugee flood, 
or describes the conditions under which they try to survive. Not all 
refugees from war zones are refugees from the war itself. Those from 
Vietnam who are referred to as 'the boat people' are more likely to be 
ethnic Chinese whose departure, sufficiently funded, is desired by the 
vietnamese. 64 
The necessity for regulation of State conduct with regard to 
refugees would seem more than obvious from the experiences of this 
century, but the economic situation of receiving States should be borne 
in mind in criticising standards actually afforded. What has transpired 
since 1949, despite the endeavours of UNRRA and various voluntary 
organizations, has failed to solve the post-war problems upon which have 
239 
been piled more problems as time has elapsed. Nor are war and national 
catastrophe the sale creators of refugee problems, but some such problems 
are disguised under categories of immigration and emigration as in the 
case of East African Muslims expelled by AnUn. They, too, require 
humanitarian treatment as prescribed by the Conventions, even if they are 
not the victims of inter-State war. 
As the Universal Declaration stands it is individuals not States 
who are affected by the conflicting ideas of Art 3 ('everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person'), and Art 29 ('in the 
exercise of his rights and freedom, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law'). This seems to imply that 
the Declaration deals only with rights in a State as peace, for Arts 3 
and 30 are plainly irrelevant in time of war. 65 Where it is convenient 
for a State to carry that argument further into times of crisis no doubt 
Art 29.2 might be cited in aid. 66 This is a reason for the coming into 
force of the Geneva Agreements and especially Protocol II of 1977. It 
seems clear that if there was any intention in the Declaration to affect 
the place of war such intention has been frustrated: but the words of the 
Preamble refer to both the foundation of peace and to recourse to 
rebellion. 
The Declaration would be a blueprint for all seasons only if it 
made war an infringewent of rights. As adopted by States the Declaration 
has not yet become universally accepted but the adoption of an even 
stricter instrument is more unlikely. 
In the long term it is the treatment which all categories of 
refugees, other civilian populations, (and immigrants for that matter), 
receive that determines their attitudes to war, revenge, or integration. 
Experience in Kamputchea is not encouraging. 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. 
Freedom of expression - a concept underpinned by the Helsinki 
Accords as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - is 
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differently regarded in different States, and particularly in how free 
expression may be followed by action. opposition to war, or to defence 
expenditure, or to certain weapons may promote political reaction. 
States usually rely on forms of conscription to raise armed forces 
for war although some favour voluntary recruitment in peace. There would 
seem to be little difference between the two in what a State allows its 
forces by way of the Universal Declaration's catalogue of rights, and the 
place of war seems to be unaffected by the method used to induct citizens 
into the State forces. It follows that interpretation of the justness of 
war may lead to a regulated procedure to establish conscientious 
objection in some States but will not obviate conscription in others. 
What seemed certain was that the political complexion of a nationaJ 
or federal State government in practice was a matter for the state or 
Federation. That seemed to fall within international legal concepts and 
custom and was unlikely to be altered by general consensus. Yet it 
remains doubtful if the Baltic states, and some East European States now 
under the tutelege of Russia are satisfied with their present position 
notwithstanding any national parliament they may be permitted. Thus 
concepts of empire remain despite much adverse international opinion. It 
is an open question whether Russia has yet modified 
"its world-wide political and ideological ambitions, and its 
often-demonstrated willingness to promote these ambitions without 
scruple when the opportunity offers and the risks are not too 
great".67 
Given also Russia's past experience of invasion it seems probable 
that the Western States and the USSR will retain some mutual antagonism 
however muted. This will not be dissolved completely by recognition and 
exchange of diplomatic missions if the distrust lingers and co-operation 
in the UN is only spasmodic. In that case, it is likely that neither the 
USSR nor the US and Western Europe can yet "see any alternative way of 
safeguarding its own security and minimum foreign objectives" short of 
devoting "huge slices of their national incomes to maintaining the means 
of obliterating each other". 6 7 
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In these circumstances differences of interpretation of human 
rights may well be carried into the training of the armed forces where 
the first and primary object will be to orientate the soldier to the 
difference between his right as citizen and as soldier. Interpretations 
of 'freedom' will similarly enter the training programme. Of course, as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
"derives (also) from the more enduring elements in the traditions 
both of natural law and natural ri~hts and of most of the world's 
great religions and philosophies", 8 
it is not surprising that some of its provisions were already in force in 
some military codes. For instance, the British Anmy Act and the Manual 
of Military Law prescribed punishment only after due process. Such 
attention, however, did not stem solely, if at all, from the motives 
which led to the promulgation of the Universal Declaration. The 
maintenance of discipline in organized forces, both on and off the 
battlefield, has been long established. The means for ensuring 
discipline may alter with time but the need for discipline does not. As 
well as the need for an additional legal code for armed forces, the 
relationship of those forces to the government must be scrutinized 
constantly. Whatever the standing of the Universal Declaration attitudes 
by the armed forces to politics and government do differ between one 
State and another, and from time to time with consequences for the place 
of war. 
War remains a brutal instrument of State policy no matter how the 
laws of war may be regarded and how people are recruited to armed forces. 
But the instrument is operated under a system of compulsion comparable to 
systems of taxation in that the citizen must pay taxes for the protection 
that the State affords him and must fight to defend the State at the will 
of lawful authority. That voluntary forces persist in some States shows 
that the theory is accepted more cheerfully by some than by others. That 
a war can be offensive in spirit, and expansionist in design; or may be 
unjust in concept and policy and may afford a citizen a moral right to 
call in aid theories of just war, will not alone allow him to escape 
't' 69 conscnp l.on. 
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The fact that weapons may be regarded as offensive, or 
morally indefensible in the citizen's judgment, will not allow him to 
contract out of taxation to be raised by the State with which to furnish 
its armed forces with such weapons. 70 These are national, not 
international, issues but they affect citizens of all States, and 
although treatment under national law affecting human rights varies from 
one State to another, all citizens of all States will be entitled to 
equal treatment under the humanitarian international laws of war. In 
practice, however, such equal treatment may depend on signature and 
ratification or adoption in domestic law of the relevant international 
conventions. It is necessary to note that in such matters of 
humanitarian law it is the "High Contracting Parties" which undertake to 
respect and ensure respect for the Conventions of 1949 and the Geneva 
Protocol I of 1977, but not all States are High Contracting Parties. 
That some States have not found if judicious to adopt the 
Conventions and Protocols may in part result from differences in societal 
factors and experience, and may reflect a disbelief in the efficacy - as 
whip or carrot - of injunctions about conduct in war. On the other hand, 
the Helsinki Accords, and the current negotiations in Vienna of the 
35-nation Conference on Confidenc~ and Security-Building Measures (CCBM) 
are aimed at a more stable relationship in Europe. They are very much 
concerned with promoting a common European acceptance of concepts of 
human rights and of the Universal Declaration. 
Humanitarian Considerations in Peace and War. 
In a wider view of humanitarian attitudes towards war the question 
of the justness of war has had considerable discussion. The justness of 
peace has been less canvassed. Yet it is a continuing fallacy that 
'peace' is the reciprocal of 'war', as though relationships in the 
international system are mathematical or necessarily reactive. It is 
also fallacious to assume that an objective of international law is the 
assurance of peace. As usually considered, peace is a state of 
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non-violence; international law seeks to perpetuate a system offering 
alternatives to violence between States in the settlement of disputes, 
and disputes are as endemic in 'peace' as in 'war'. Thomas Aquinas aptly 
described peace in a kingdom as comparable to what life is in a man. 
Peace in international relations is likely to be only an 
equiparation between dispute and resolution without war, and not an 
utopian ideal of the eli.mination of conflicts of interest. It introduces 
generally, but not essentially, non-violent methods of dispute resolution 
and control, but there are various situations involving violence between 
and within States which are not within the legal definition of war. 71 
The difference between international and municipal law in concern 
with disputes is that the latter imposes control, but the former requires 
consensus both as to substance and procedure. Because certain 
international institutions, the International Atomic Energy Agenr.y under 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty for exarople, exercise specific powers it is 
possible that expansion of such international control by an international 
institution may become the ultimate arbiter in disputes. The attitude of 
the generality of States toward the ICJ shows that this may be far off in 
practice. 
If much has been written generally and specifically about j'lst war, 
discussion of just peace has been promoted only by those concerned with 
specific cases. But there are differences of interpretation illustrated, 
(for example, by discussion of the Treaty of Versailles as it affected 
Germany in the inter-war years). For one school a just peace and 
peaceful co-existence could only be a peace in which communist policies 
could be realised worldwide, that is to say, a continuation of the 
struggle against capitalism by all means other than war. Even if there 
have been changes in practice as well as in attitudes, this supposed 
alternative to nuclear war, (the socialist objective of world 
domination), may not finally have been abandoned. In either case all or 
any form of interim co-operation with capitalist States may be utilized 
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or exploited. If capitalist States are unwilling to entertain 
unrestricted co-operation, especially in the fields of technology, ghosts 
of cold war will not have been exorcized. This is because peaceful 
co-existence and active co-operation require at least a public agreement 
with ideas of political freedom and religious tolerance, and human and 
property rights, enshrined in international social instruments including 
the UN Charter. 
The Chinese realistically call 'peace' "unarmed truce unable to 
prevent local war".72 But 'peace' has institutionalized camps of 
super-power influence. In multi-national, multi-racial, and multi-tribal 
States such as some ex-colonial countries, as well as currently in 
YUgoslavia, a peaceful co-existence requires co-existence within the 
country as well as between blocs of States. 
Peace and War, and the state of peace and war between one country 
and others, have to be viewed with causation in mind. Adherence to 
blocs, or to voluntary alliances, enlarge areas of causation and, in 
practice, even the so-called non-aligned States are not able always and 
in full to conform to the ideals of peaceful co-existence even within the 
State. 
Apart from factors arising solely out of associations of States 
there is a wide classification of causes, lawful or otherwise, from which 
situations of peace or war can develop. Lider itemizes: 
Deterministic causes, such as laws and regularities. 
Indetenninistic causes, such as free will. 
Teleot~gical causes, such as nature, history, or God's will or 
plan. 
Rapaport classified causes of peace and war as: 
Political - rational 
Eschatological, attempts to establish a wOfld without injustice. 
Cataclysmic - a catastrophe for humanists. 4 
There are other classifications of these causes, for example: 
Ethical, as in the exaltation of war for noble ends; scorn for 
stagnation by a peace which has bred moral decay and downfall of 
nations. 
Social, or religious, or ideological. 
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Most of such classifications are unscientific, and some overlook 
social factors and totalitarian instincts: they cannot all be valid. The 
nature of man and the nature of society, and the international system 
with its differences in economic standing and ideology affect attitudes 
to, and prescription for, the abolition of war or the maintenance of a 
state of peace. In the context of humanitarian law conduct in war may be 
affected by the causation of the war, but causation tends to be a 
retrospective study. 
The causation of peace - the sequence of war: peace terms imposed 
or accepted: the consequences of peace terms - immediate - are factors in 
just peace - continuing. If not better understood after the second than 
the first World War events rather than the legal instruments imposed 
their consequences for both Germany and Japan affecting their place of 
war over the past 40 years. 
Many factors account for varied ideas about the sustaining of peace 
by collective and legal enforcement. There have been movements towards 
the resolution of disputes by negotiation and diplomacy, and legal 
concepts have been among the actuating influences for enquiry into 
causation as a basis of legal investigation and judgment.'s However, 
decisions as to the causes of any particular war are rarely possible 
until after a considerable lapse of time. The official papers have to 
make public appearance and historians have to interpret them .. By 
contrast inquiLy into the causes for a State being at peace has seemed in 
the past to be a work of supererogation, and it is not clear what part 
desire for law and order rather than war weariness influences peace 
movements during war. 
The high costs of military technology, weapons systems and the 
electronic adjuncts of armed forces, and of their destruction rate even 
in peace time, as well as feor of nuclear war, contribute to public 
attitudes. But these may not be decisive in competition with immediate 
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or overt reasons particular to a specific situation. If war is a 
'multidimensional phenomenon', so is peace, and both have mainly 
political causation. But law may also be so described and also has a 
mainly political causation. 
Social welfare developments to improve human living standards 
demand the continuing attention of politicians, and comparisons of 
national standards are promoted as causes of domestic unrest. Whether 
social development can be separated from mere 'bread and circuses' has 
yet to be proved, but high standards of living have not prevented 
military adventures nor, necessarily, evoked any greater patriotism in 
defence of country. Even if there are ceilings to expenditures social 
development is generally evolutionary and may produce revolution in 
standards. Socialism is revolutionary and intended to change a system 
quickly. Between the two political realism has regard for survival. 
Justice in peace, therefore, may not be the desired objective, or the 
immediate object. It would be a mi~take nonetheless to consider that 
fixed and fairly immoveable foreign policy goals are no longer aimed for, 
even if variable economic factors dent and delay the fruition of such 
policies. 
How far different governmental systems influence different 
attitudes or how far governments reflect national views is not in point 
here, but political discussion in some states is generally non-violent, 
while violence arising from political disagreements is common in 
others. 76 In both it is taken for granted, however, that the country is 
at peace when not engaged in major war. Thus European states were at 
peace during their individual colonial wars in the late 19th and early 
20th Centuries. Similarly, the US was at peace when engaged in the 
Vietnam conflict; as was the United Kingdom during the Falkland Islands 
dispute; and Russia during the occupation of Afghanistan. The national 
place of war was not changed by these conflicts, perhaps illustrating the 
truth of the Chinese definition. 77 
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The humanitarian law of war effectively covers periods of 'war in 
peace' by legal definition (that is, periods of International Armed, and 
non-International Armed, Conflicts)78 as well as war. Whilst this is a 
necessary course of legal development it accepts that, by the nature of 
political thought and the utility of modern weapons, declaration of war 
is less likely in the future. 
Jessup had the idea of a State co-existing with a peace and war 
intermediacy which he called 'imperfect war'. 
" ••• if the mind is wedded to the idea that there is no alternative 
between war and peace and the actualities seem to deny that there 
is 'peace', the af~ent for war seems to command the support of 
a certain logic". 
But the vagueness of the interpretation and observation of 'the mind 
being wedded' could hardly lead to concrete and consistent law. If, 
however, there were support for a definition of war as being merely a 
situation in which the killing by individuals of one State of individuals 
of other States is sanctioned, encouraged, or ordered by a State, the 
consequences would be to discourage negotiations and make real war more 
likely. This is the situation where terrorism is planned and accoutred 
in one State and carried out in another. But there should be a scale of 
commdtment in a definition: large, organized groups engaged in more or 
less systematic killing at the behest of their political authority still 
might not qualify if incidents could be isolated, as localised conflicts 
on the River Amur between Russia and China were during the 1960s. There 
is a difference between such incidents and the consistent actings of the 
'terrorist' state, which seems to offer justification for reprisals. But 
reprisals are today in a disrepute which has stemmed from aerial and 
naval bombardment which is often indiscriminate. 
The real point, perhaps, is that no matter how far the humanitarian 
law of war is taken, or how wide arms control agreements may be drawn, 
the essential planning of peace cannot be left safely to what is 
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available after planning and providing for war and the continuing charges 
arising from previous wars. Security at a lower cost in agreement with 
like-minded States must still depend in the longer run on the policies of 
peace. 
In contemporary circumstances there is a need for the policies of 
peace to have regard for jus ad bellum and jus in bello in a continuing 
educational campaign regarding the laws of war. Greater awareness of the 
necessity for these laws may in the long-run lead to an increased 
repugnance (and healthy fear) for violent solutions with their inevitable 
indiscrimination in weaponry and tactics. 
Humanitarian principles and the positive law to give effect to 
them, if universally accepted, would make modern war impossible. 
Experience indicates that such an eventuality is unlikely at least in the 
short-run, but that the best instincts of some national leaders have been 
suffiCiently aroused to agree a code of conduct even for the business of 
war is a step forward. Unfortunately altruism and international efforts 
to control anmaments have not extended effectively to those means of 
war-making by which the code will be broken. In reality, the view of 
humanitarian law in the context of national survival is to be seen in tte 
equipping of a State's armed forces and in its military operational 
plans. Acquisition of indiscriminate weapons (nuclear, chemical, 
biological or conventional) and plans for their use show that policies 
are subordinated to the perceived realities of the international system. 
Similarly, the cultural background of individuals may be 
subordinated in battle to the necessities of the moment when survival 
tactics may override humanitarian instinct and habit. It follows that 
humanitarian practices and law may affect the conduct of war and the 
consequences that arise from it, but they are not yet primary factors in 
the place of war. 
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THE MITIGATION OF WAR - THE MODERATION OF THE EFFECTS 
(B) By Arms Control and Disarmament 
Arms Control: Definition. 
A belief that proliferation of armaments is a cause of war, and 
continuing hopes for the abolition of war have prompted discussion of 
disarmament, arms control and arms limitation. The terms are often 
applied indiscriminately but they may be more specifically defined. 
Disannament is a major issue discussed separately below1 , Arms limitation 
is loosely used to indicate any measure designed to effect a control of 
armaments short of a complete prohibition by way of General and Complete 
Disarmament (GCD). 
Arms control embraces: 
(i) Reduction or abolition of specific items agreed in formal 
international treaties. 
(ii) Demilitarization agreements between States regarding defined 
geographical areas or 'free zones', (eg, the Rush-Bagot 
Agreement between the US and Great Britain (1817) as to the 
Great Lakes and the US-Canada border). 
(iii) Mutual agreement to set qualitative standards or upper and 
lower limits in numbers in any kind of arms and materials 
including: 
(a) Zones of Peace (a concept not yet proved in practice). 
(b) Nuclear free zones (only one of which (in Latin 
America by the Treaty of Tlatalolco) is successful. 
The success was due to the nature of the territory 
which was nuclear free when the treaty was signed). 
(c) Confidence-building measures (more developed between 
NATO and the WPO than elsewhere). 
(iv) Regulation of the arms trade, including transfers between 
States by way of military aid and assistance and sales 
whether by governments or entrepreneurs. This area of 
control is relatively undeveloped. 
(v) Aid from one State to another in cash, kind or credit (which 
may make available funds for purchasing arms which otherwise 
might not have been possible). 
Arms control and disarmament have different objectives: the former 
to reduce the risk of war and the dangers of surprise attack; the latter 
to eliminate war and maintain peace. Arms control by the restricting of 
numbers may lead to lower levels of armaments, but may nevertheless leave 
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state arsenals sufficiently stocked, and replacement facilities 
sufficiently organized, to support the national policies, but arms 
control does not maintain peace. The abolition of war depends not only 
on the elimination of weapons of war but also research for 'new' weapons 
and control of weapons production capabilities. It is ability to 
effectively prevent replacement of weapons and material in war that most 
affects the place of war at any time. 
Military formations and units and their locations as well as 
aonaments may be referred to in arms control or confidence-building 
measures. Agreement on upper limits of weapons may result in increasing, 
not decreasing, a State's arsenal in order to effect balance between 
parties. What happens to the weapons which become surplus as a result of 
arms control agreements should be regulated in the agreement in order to 
avoid recreating imbalance elsewhere. In reviewing arms control 
agreements and their effect on balance between states the state of the 
weapons remaining should not escape scrutiny. 
It may be apposite here to refer to nuclear testing. A complete, 
universal and verifiable prohibition of nuclear testing would be a 
serious even if not definitive arms control measure. Attempted controls 
on nuclear testing are not otherwise referred to herein because they have 
neither been ratified by the us nor has an acceptable system of 
verification yet been finalised. In any case only the US, the USSR and 
the UK of the acknowledged powers have been involved in negotiations on 
all of the agreements reached such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, outer Space or Under water ((1963) 480 UNTS 43), 
and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests 
((1974) 13 ILM 906). But talks on a comprehensive test ban and 
verification procedures are proceeding. 
One further point of definition as regards arms control is 
necessary. The prohibition of the use of a weapon as was the case of 
chemical weapons by the Geneva Convention ((1925) UKTS 24 (1930) Crnd 
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3604) is not enough: manufacture must also be outlawed if the weapon is 
to be eliminated. 
Arms Control: Purpose. 
Arms control and confidence building measures are mainly of a 
restrictive nature promoted for political and economic motives rather 
than by military considerations. In so far as their ultimate purpose is 
to reduce the risk of war between the parties they have moral and 
humanitarian incentives of: 
(1) Increasing stabililty. 
(2) Reducing economic burdens of defence expenditure. 
(3) Lessening the risk of surprise attack. 
(4) Reducing damage in the event of war. 
Between states a balance of ar.maments and forces at agreed levels -
mainly mathematical but sometimes qualitative - makes for military 
stability. Arms control negotiators, however, do not all start from 
identical positions. This makes stability a concept difficult to rescue 
from the abstract when considering the conflicting factors presented by 
the array of modern armaments. The concept is necessarily bound by 
assymetrical tracts of time, technical knowledge, skills and 
manufacturing capabilities. 
Universal arms control measures are usually negotiated in a step by 
step process, each being complete in itself. This nonnally applies also 
to bi-lateral agreements for even between two States negotiations do not 
have in mind the ultimate goal of disarmament. Difficulties, such as are 
being experienced with the control of chemical weapons, can arise from 
this piecemeal process in negotiation where, 
"the forebearance of the United states over the past 19 years has 
only met with continued production, stockpiling and deployment by 
the Soviet Union", 
which has led to an attitude of not being in favour 
"of giving up or halting the maintenance of a minimum retaliatory 
capacity which is allowed by the Geneva Convention ... ,,2 
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Economic savings are not an invariable result of arms control 
measures for all too often sacrifice of one item is counter-balanced by 
the increasing costs of others. Neither is reduction of damage always to 
be expected from reduced numbers: improved performance is a fundamental 
reason for technical advance which may also affect the danger of surprise 
attack. 3 
The purpose of arms control might be explained in another way as a 
reduction in the combinations which make up military forces and their 
equipment with a view to: 
(a) lessening risks to security, 
(b) reducing the danger of escalation in the event of war, and 
perhaps 
(c) advancing in some manner, even if only 'climatically', towards 
complete disannament. 
Arms control on a global, regional or national basis is relatively 
unco-ordinated in its effect on the place of war in society. Control is 
muddled in practice falling between national initiative and universal 
reluctance; at any given time falling between a reduction in some items 
for some States and uncontrolled expansion for others. Generally it is 
without reference to the future introduction of improved and new weapons 
or to manufacturing capacity and trade potential. The term used by 
politicians and strategic analysts is often inaccurate in what they 
intend it to convey for it has become a euphemism (disguising its often 
barren nature) for transactions involving merely an adjustment of arms 
inventories. The control then lies only in verification procedures, but 
fear of loss of advantage will always be present in arms control 
negotiations so long as the international system remains one in which 
"the ultimate arbiter is the relative power of the competing states".4 
In their attitudes to arms control measures all States are not 
equal, and difficulties start from the two or three separate channels for 
the promotion of measures of control and the instruments which give legal 
interpretation of them (as, indeed, is common to much of international 
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law). In arms control this makes for unevenness. Balancing controls 
between NATO and the WPO for example may allow the place of war for 
either to be adjusted in another area and vis a vis a different potential 
enemy. That result might have been obviated had a universal control 
instead been possible. On the other hand, control of a weapon will 
affect the burden of defence budget more for some states than others in 
the replacement, by some other (and inevitably more expensive) weapon 
systems, of the effective military value relinguished if the place of war 
and stability is to be maintained. The place of war may as easily be 
aligned to offensive as to defensive policy and symmetrical balancing of 
weapons between States is not always what a State requires to support its 
foreign policies. Such policies will have regard not only to the forces 
and their equipment but also to the industrial base and raw materials. 
For this reason arms control measures rarely include restrictions on 
research toward the improvement of existing weapons (including those 
which are the instant subject of control); research toward new weapon 
systems; and the subsequent development, production and deployment or 
sale of the improved and new weapons. At the time of negotiating an arms 
control measure the stage which research and development of improved and 
new weapons may have reached already may be such that a weapon controlled 
by an agreement may be almost obsolescent already. 
As arms agreements can refer to a multiplicity of aspects including 
armaments generally, specific weapons, advisers, technicians and users, 
research and development, complete or partial controls, qualitative, 
quantitative or geographical limitations, agreement on what is material 
is necessary at every stage of negotiations. Whether self-application is 
dictated by morals, conscience or financial stringency it is not always 
subordinated to the military value of the proposals. 5 
Although the subject of disarmament is addressed elsewhere herein 
it is appropriate here to point out that GCD was a quid pro quO offered 
to non-nuclear States to eschew nuclear proliferation in the meantime by 
.... 
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adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (an arms control 
universal agreement). GCD might be the logical goal of arms control 
measures if they were co-ordinated to that end, but although there is a 
periodical review of the steps which have been taken by the nuclear 
states towards disa~ent, progress (and positive international law) is 
minimal despite Art 11.1 of the UN Charter. 
Arms control measures may be promoted by the UN (under Art 26 of 
the UN Charter), by individual States, or on a regional basis, but 
relative importance can depend more on which States adhere than on 
whether the convention is universal and open to all States. Apart from 
self-imposed unilateral controls some arms regulation may be determined 
exceptionally by a third party,6. A self-denying ordinance affecting the 
place of war is sometimes represented by a provision in the Constitution 
of a State. Although the UN Charter ought to constitute a major 
multi-national constraint on war States may go further. The Japanese for 
example are forbidden by their Constitution, 
"from resorting to war to solve international disputes, stationing 
SDF (Self-Defence Force) troops overseas, engaging in arms trading 
or possessing offensive weapons ••• Japan will not manufacture, 
possess or allow any nuclear weapons onto her territory_ She is 
also prohibited from taktng part in 'collective defence', that is, 
alliances such as NATO". 
If some of the provisions are vague the instrument may constitute "a 
barrier to the return of militaristic imperialism,,7, but the duty imposed 
under Art 43 of the UN Charter appears to be treated cavalierly. 
Self-denying ordinances, like Constitutions, can be abandoned, 
amended or re-interpreted. Japan is no exception, for 
"if the balance of power were to rapidly alter in the region- a US 
withdrawal from its Philippines and South Korean bases for example 
- Japan, unable to take part in collective defence, might choose 
to rely on her own increaring military power to protect her 
interests in the regicn". 
But such an ability to change should not be regarded as nullifying 
unilateral decision for most arms control agreements, whether bi- or 
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multi-lateral, have provision for terminating or amending their 
substance. 
The place of war is affected by national economics which provide 
for the availability of weapons and other means of making war. Few 
attempts have been made in international and domestic law to place 
restraints on arms manufacture, production and transfers, and purchases 
are restricted usually only by finance although they may be given by way 
of military aid as recompense for some political consideration. This is 
an area in which the effect of international law on the place of war is 
lightly felt although serious arms trading is of immediate international 
concern. 
The size of the 'open' arms transfers problem is illustrated in the 
following example, 
"Six developing countries - including Syria, Iraq and Libya - each 
have more tanks than the us Army has in its units in Europe. In 
all, a dozen or more developing countries have more than 1,000 
main battle tanks, and a similar number has access to ballistic or 
cruise missile technologies. When the prospect of chemical or 
nuclear proliferation is added, future conflict in the developing 
world may be complex and deadly". 8 
Several other areas in the distribution of armaments also affect 
the place of war not only through an absence of effective restriction but 
as the result of determined commercial effort on the part of the 
producing States. They include (a) The illegal export of small 
quantities of apparently harmless materials from multiple sources which 
can be built up to allow the establishment of nuclear and chemical 
manufacturing plant (such as at Kabuta in Pakistan, Tarapur in India and 
Rabta in Libya), (b) Large scale missile proliferation which is causing 
regional anxieties. 
Legislative weakness under which transfer of arms may be illegal if 
arranged in the supplying State but which is lawful if arranged in the 
receiving State is aggravated because the policing of laws affecting 
commercial anms transactions falls to be carried out by the individual 
States concerned. 
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Arms Control: Developments. 
Approaches to arms limitation, (inconceivable in earlier centuries 
to a laity under feudal obligations when philosophical as well a~ moral, 
legal, and military principles were based on the right of States to make 
9 
war ), emerged in the late 19th Century but were rejected at the Hague 
Peace Councils of 1899 and 1907. There military views prevailed and were 
accepted as the States' views, for as feudalism retreated the State 
appropriated the privileges of the sovereign as feudal lord and merely 
transferred to itself the personal obligations of the people. This it 
did by means of taxation and the obligation to attend for military 
service in the State's quarrels, in the Militia for training and for home 
defence, and the soldier could and did participate in the political 
debate. 
Thus if States carne to arms control still conditioned to believe in 
an unlimited right to use military power in their disputes with other 
States, they could contemplate arms limitation only when they could also 
contemplate limitation both of sovereignty and the use of military forces 
to obtain what they desired. Partial and unilateral disarming was common 
after the conclusion of hostilities. It was not regarded as disarmament 
but rather a rationalization of forces and expenditures to a peacetime 
level following an apparent lessening of the imminence of the next war. 
In reality there was probably a difference in time scale between the 
acceptance of limitation in the practical applications of sovereignty on 
one hand and attitudes favourable towards lessening the use of force in 
pursuit of national objectives on the other. Reluctance to vote funds to 
support active military operations was a continuing factor but one which 
did not affect the concept of sovereign right in war-making, which was 
the main reason for the development of legal restrictions such as the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
It is now recognized that political will to uphold them is the 
essential if legal instruments like the Kellogg-Briand Pact are to lead 
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to the elimination of war. That political will must be supported by 
effective reduction of armaments and in openness about national arsenals, 
and control of the arms trade, all of which the League failed to 
effect. 1o But the League's failure induced a less utopian attitude in 
the UN which initially limited such proposals to the formulation of a 
plan for the regulation of armaments whilst outlawing aggressive war. ii 
Even so, the danger of direct confrontation between them led the US 
and the USSR by about 1960 to place greater emphasis on bi-Iateral arms 
arrangements, especially as regards Europe, than on the likelihood of 
co-ordinated and universal arms control through the UN. Deterrence 
rather than war policies began to emerge. 1 " NON experience has shown 
that if the control of armaments is to have a material effect on the 
place of war disa~ent rather than limitation may be necessary for 
deterrent policies do not eliminate the possibility of war. Wars can be 
fought with what arms are available so that what is decisive is not the 
arms controlled but what are retained for use backed by an industrial 
base for replenishment. 
Generally limitations to national defence forces have not taken 
into account potential manufacturing capabilities or the repercussions of 
trading in arms. The arms trade is an element of national strategy and 
foreign policy. For a manufacturing State it is both a matter of 
sovereignty and security and is often fundamental to securing a 
favourable balance of trade. Thus the exporting of arms is a conscious 
political and economic policy which directly affects employment and 
social policies. Its contribution to the national exchequer through 
taxation or direct profits is important. On the other hand, disarmament 
would reduce defence expenditure and allow re-deployment of labour, 
materials and capital in the longer term, but unless universal, 
disanmament would not eliminate the arms trade. 
Control of arms and arms manufacture remains the subject of 
importance which the founders of the League of Nations appreciated as 
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directly related to any effort to relegate the place of war in society. 
Even in a world of disarmed and free societies entirely without violent 
entanglements, and subject to a world authority, there could be no 
guarantee of unbroken peace. The reality of this absence of guarantee in 
present circumstances in which a disarmed world is not yet contemplated, 
is acknowledged in Art 43.1 of the UN Charter. The circumstances are 
dictated by the realities of sovereignty, national interest, and the 
international system in which the effects of polarization of the Yalta 
spheres of influence are still apparent. This state of affairs is 
exacerbated by the schools of thought within a society which argue as to 
the means by which law and order should be enforced. 
Measures of voluntary cr enforced disarmament, arms limitation and 
control altogether separate from jus in bello, just war, or simple 
economics have proved to be of variable effectiveness although concepts 
of arms control are proposed as affecting inter-State stability and, 
thus, the probability of war. 
It may be thought that there is clearer evidence of the effect of 
international law on actions in war than on its effect on the place of 
war. This is so in relation to the Law of the Sea and its influence on 
strategy. O'Connell called the attitudes and postures adopted regarding 
the Second Law of the Sea Conference an, 
"intellectual morass where opinions and views are a substitute for 
law, the occasions for controversy; dispute and violence become 
ever more numerous and frequent. The law of the sfa has become 
the stimulus to sea power and not its restraint".l 
He pointed out that the changing law of the sea earlier represented 
the interests of the European States especially in relation to freedom as 
opposed to sovereignty related to neutrality, blockade and contraband. 
" ••• the pliable character (of the law) has meant that it has been 
made to serve the purposes of sea power, and ha& become a weapon 
in the naval armoury".14 
This attitude is reflected in 'linkage' theories applied to arms 
control negotiating and is an integral constituent affecting limitation 
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in any aspect of land and air as well as sea power. There is danger that 
refined and sophisticated arms limitation theories may have a similar 
effect, especially as they are pursued as individual topics without 
reference to humanitarian policies as such, and without the planned 
objective of general and complete disarmament prescribed by the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Humanitarian measures and arms control agreements, however, often 
have much in common; if their overt considerations differ their 
objectives are often similar. The Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty 
(INF) of 1988 seeks to eliminate a type of weapon just as the 1925 
protocol sought to eliminate chemical weapons. If effective both would 
reduce dangers to civilians as well as combatants. The vital difference 
is between a species of weapon (like the chemical) and a class (like the 
INF). If the object of any arms control measure is to reduce quantities 
from an overabundance to sufficiency, a balancing rather than 
elimination, it might be a step in the right direction even it it merits 
no fanfare of trumpets. Terminology if descriptive of means is not of 
itself necessarily descriptive of ends. 
As a development of the League of Nations it was hoped that the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 would effectively outlaw war. That 
assumption influenced the agenda for a Disarmament Conference in 193215 , 
but the agenda was principally a repetition of obligations under the 
Convenant which members had already diregarded. The discussion raised 
interesting points: France submitted detailed proposals one of which was 
that weapons exceeding a certain size should be internationalized, and 
the US proposed that tanks and heavy mobile guns should be abolished. It 
was also propcsed that a Disarmament Commission on verification and 
sanctions be established by the League. Indeed, the measure of success 
was such that with the inclusion of nuclear weapons the same agenda would 
stand today for the same issues remain unresolved, and, like the Anti-war 
Pact, they have not sufficiently influenced national policies. 
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The creation of the UN, and at least nominal adherence to the 
Charter, represented progress in attitudes if not in fact. Falk said, 
" ... the willingness of nations to subscribe, even in principle, to 
the renunciation of their rights to use (except in self defence) 
force, is a significant step, an expression of willingness to move 
in the one direction rather than another .•. ".16 
The willingness should still not be over-stated for (as Dr Kissinger said 
of detente), it 
"is an instrument of mitigation of conflict among adversaries, not 
the cultivation of friendships" .17 
Arms Control and strategy. 
A State may accept restriction on its right to make war but 
perpetual peace is not yet automatically a consistent and unvarying 
strategy of any State even if various 'paths to peace' have been 
identified by strategic and other analysts. 
"Strategy is not getting what one wants, but knowing what one 
wants, and what it takes to get it",lS 
and in the context the paths it takes include deterrence, non-violent 
resistance and arms control. But whereas arms control in itself is not 
obviously a path to peace in a world in which war remains possible, even 
if not inevitable, it may be a manageable concept of deterrence on a path 
designed to lead to peace. The potentially catastrophic effect of 
nuclear war ensures that arms control is all too often synonymous in the 
public mind with nuclear arms control and nuclear deterrence disregarding 
the lethal nature of modern explosives. 
At best, arms control is a limiting rather than a preventive 
factor: at worst it may be regarded as a policy which accepts the 
continuation of war as an arbitrator in international dispute. Even 
justificatory expenditure on armed forces in civil power establishments 
ostensibly for prevention of civil strife leads to a classification of 
weapons as defensive and thus sustains a tactical illusion as to the 
potentiality of weapons. 
If arms control is a derivative of deterrence theory (ie, security 
at a lower level of armament), it follows that if must have regard to a 
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State's ability to respond to aggression not only on its own behalf but 
also on behalf of the UN under Cap VII of the Charter. Whilst deterrent 
measures organized against hostile military threat remain potent elements 
of inter-State relations, arms control must also remain as an essential 
balancing factor. It is anomalous that, at the same time, arms 
manufacture and distribution as a form of inter-State trade and aid will 
remain and continue to effect an energetic cycle of threat, deterrence 
and a~ race. A~ control policies, therefore, must go beyond own 
defence planning for control policies ought to include destruction of 
proscribed weapons and forbid stockpiling and future sales of what 
becomes obsolescent as a result of arms agreements. 19 Much of third 
world armament consists of weapons which became surplus to the 
requirements of other States and in certain circumstances in war military 
forces will utilize all available annament not necessarily with real 
regard for discrimination or proportionality.2o UN concern with 
instances of the operational use of chemical weapons since 1945 
emphasises this attitude. 21 Further, any notion that if deterrence fails 
nuclear weapons will remain unused is unrealistic in the face of NATO's 
flexible response doctrine and the size of nuclear arsenals known and 
suspected. 
Under present conditions weapons will continue to be developed and 
manufactured without general restriction. Some will be sold as items of 
a State's export trade with more regard for political policy than real 
regard in any particular context to long term peaceful purpose. These 
trade-off effects of arms control measures are one aspect, but the 
measures themselves are not lightly undertaken for, 
"we (the US) do not rely on trust in international agreements just 
as we do not in domestic commercial agreements. For arms control 
this means that whenever the limitations involved would affect our 
military strength, we must be able to satisfy ourselves that other 
parties are living up to their reci~rocal commitments: we do not 
rely on trust but on verification". 2 
But, as Nitze pointed out, 
"It would be nice if we could attain perfect verification, that is, 
if we could be sure of detecting any violation of a treaty 
provision. But such standard in unreachable, even with the most 
intrusive verification regime we could devise".23 
An important aspect of an enlarged verification process included in 
the INF Treaty is that it is detailed in a formal legal instrument as 
opposed to the sometimes surreptitious surveillance methods which 
formerly had to be employed. There are political advantages too, 
"For Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection marked a fundamental 
change in their attitude towards the West".24 
The detail to be included will make agreements increasingly complex 
not only as to the inspections but also, where applicable, as to the 
destruction of weapons if the nuclear example is to be followed in 
agreements concerning conventional weapons. But because they deal with 
means rather than principles arms control agreements continue to be 
overtaken by technological progress and the 'economics of futility' 
implicit in the cancellation of research and contracts, after heavy 
expenditure but before fruition, due to the subject becoming a victim of 
'catching-up and leap-frogging' in weapon design and production. This 
futility is not only a drain on taxpayers but it shows how weak the 
connection between the present arms control balance concept is and the 
preservation of peace. The history of the American SOl (and the ABM 
Treaty) may later constitute a principal example. For example, if Carver 
is correct that the Soviet principle of 'correlation of forces' means 
'superior in quality and quantity'. 
"It bodes ill for those who place their hope on persuading them to 
accept measures of arms control that do not preserve their 
superiority, whether the approach preferred is that of , 
'negotiation from strength' or unilateral disarrnarnent".·s 
As between NATO (and the neutral Scandinavians) and the WPO, 
however, the probabilities fcr the use of force appear to be lessening 
with the improving atmosphere for agreement on arms control measures 
including conventional as well as nuclear weapons. 26 
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The changing influence of military power is related to the 
limitations placed on the use of military force by politicial decisions 
including arms control and confidence-building measures, and in attitudes 
about means to be adopted in the resolution of political disagreement. 
The potential to use military force, especially in Europe, reflects the 
limitations and the attitudes. Because of such politically imposed 
restriction on the use of force it is sometimes claimed that the purpose 
of armed forces' planning is defensive and designed on a view that, 
"Offensives produce war an?/or empire: defences support 
independence and peace". 2 
Such simple propositions might reflect military experience if they 
relate solely to the use of military force, but the reality is more 
complicated. Economics are the geneses of arms and armies. If some 
States pursue the propositions in terms of arms control they disregard 
them in their arms trade policies. By doing so they enhance the military 
power of the recipients and, perhaps, their own balance of trade. A 
hypothesis, therefore, might be that the use of force by a State or by 
its arms trade customers cannot be divorced from the political policies 
of the State. 28 Proxy forces, as CUbans in Angola, are examples and may 
also be a convenience for the export of obsolescent arms justified on 
econOIUc grounds. But to maintain the place of war the up-dating of arms 
and equipment is vital and may have to be paid for from arms trading. By 
the nature of arms supply it follows that the States which are parties to 
the greatest number of arms control agreements are also the largest 
exporters of arms. The mechanics of arms production forces such States 
into long-term plans not only for the maintenance of their own arsenals 
but for their trade in arms as well. Accordingly, those responsible for 
the security of a State, including politicans, military, technologists or 
strategists, have to look into the future to plan ahead for a period of 
perhaps 25 years. Policies of 'no war before ... ' must envisage the lead 
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times involved in research and development, production and deployment, 
and training not only for weapon systems but also for the related 
technology in command, control and communications systems. National 
treasurers will take a shorter term view, but if the utility of military 
power is to remain relatively constant the progressive long-term 
replacement term must be accepted, at least in the absence of progressive 
arms control measures. Thus, the means for ensuring security will always 
be liable to short-term changes through day to day financial situations. 
In arms acquisition and military technology there is a need for 
international law to be concerned with the political implications as well 
as with the weapons. The provisions of the law should be consulted not 
only regarding existing and potential weapons but on how desired 
objectives are to be met by them. For arms controllers a question is 
whether the legal provisions will be permitted to affect the scientific 
progress or the desired objectives. For politicians political desires 
ought not to dictate that an agreement and not its content is the vital 
factor. If agreement at any price is politically desirable future 
effects on ability and capability of the use of force will have been 
disregarded. 
From some points of view the total control of a weapon for its 
military utility may not be desirable. For instance, 
"Nuclear arms are not military instruments in the classical meaning 
of the term; their v~lue lies much more in the effect they have as 
a poli tical signal". 9 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to support that view, for while it 
remains true that war is an extension of diplomacy 
"by other means, in a nuclear age this is no longer a precept on 
which it is safe to base policy. Pcevention of the use of nuclear 
weapons has itself become a major aim of policy". 3 a 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty alone will nut ensure non-use of 
nuclear weapons even if their retention is justified on grounds of threat 
value and 'no use' philosophy. That would be ensured - if at all - by 
prohibition of retention, acquiSition, and use. 
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Missing in contemporary questioning is the legality of the weapon 
rather than only the control of it. On the other hand it may be argued 
that rendering the weapon less immediately effective - the purpose of sor 
- would alter the balance of argument as to its use. From a point of 
view of arms control and military power, not to use a weapon which is 
available represents a self-denial which most States could resist easily 
in most circumstances. Instances of such self-denial, however, have 
occurred which were not solely reactive to nuclear threat from opposing 
t " 31 par les. Nevertheless in a continuing relationship between arms 
control and military power the nuclear weapon cannot be excluded on 
'threat no use' grounds. 
Armament technology embraces many scientific, engineering and 
electronic elements including the consequential development of strategic 
and tactical doctrine to exploit the full possibilities of improving 
weapons systems. This continuing process dictates that arms control must 
also be a continuing and progressive effort. Progress is unlikely to be 
swift or certain: argument about nuclear policies and first use of 
tactical nuclear weapons today is reminiscent of earlier debate about the 
development of atomic strategy. Planning for massive retaliation may 
have given way to the doctrine of flexible response but arms control 
proposals are only now overtaking theatre nuclear weapons. The 
elimination of these short range weapons would delay escalation from 
conventional to nuclear war, but would bring longer range nuclear weapons 
into action earlier in a future war (if that war were conventional at its 
outset). 
Proposals for arms control usually avoid the elimination of a class 
of weapon, and if the INF agreement did cover such a class it left 
untouched other classes as well as the permissible ceilings allowed by 
the SALT agreements. But the vista is widening: arms control is moving 
toward a more embracing discussion to include naval forces and nuclear 
propulsion. A starting point for such discussion must be the doctrine 
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that in land warfare an attacker has traditionally sought a three to one 
advantage in men and material, whereas in naval warfare the defender 
requires the stronger force. This concept - even tactically - may be 
difficult to promote in view of NATO's insistence that WPO superiority in 
numbers and location indicates an offensive policy for the Warsaw Pact, 
but that NATO naval superiority indicates no such policy, being dictated 
solely by defensive intention, Nevertheless, limitation of naval forces 
would be another step forward in nuclear restriction. 
It would be wrong to be too optimistic about a system of continuous 
negotiations on arms control especially if effectively limited to the US 
and the USSR with the 40-Nation (UN) Conference playing only a hopeful 
role that any agreement reached in that forum will be accepted by member 
States. In any case if elimination is not feasible, a policy of 
retention of secure second strike ICBMs will merely promote nuclear war 
to an exclusively long range operation. 
The effect on deterrent policies of limitation and class 
elimination must be taken into account militarily, whilst the climate in 
which negotiations take place must be noted politically. The US in 
Vietnam and the USSR in Afghanistan suffered political defeat through 
limiting their military effort, but that may not prove military force in 
use is no longer the arbiter it formerly was. What is indicated is that 
if a great power hopes to impose political solutions by force it must 
calculate the military requirements and aims more carefully, and its 
domestic support more critically. 
At the same time inability to eliminate the nuclear weapon or 
unequivocally proscribe it by international law, whilst placing reliance 
on it for deterrence (especially in Europe but also as between Russia -
China - the US), affords an index of the reluctant place war is accorded 
in that specific situation. But a place for limited war (China and 
Vietnam - Russia and Afghanistan, for example) remains unchanged. 
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It might follow that arms control negotiations will become 
institutionalized within political policies whilst concurrently arms 
development to affect adjustment of military policy will contribute to 
reactive developments even if only to ensure a continuing deterrent 
capability and credibility. Security at lower levels of expenditure and 
armament does not alter political or relative military positions any more 
than GCD would. But the unequivocal outlawing of nuclear weapons would 
impose increased financial burdens for funding conventional military 
policies leaving the surprise factor unchanged by the substitution of 
conventional for nuclear warheads. 
In the arena of arms control international law has a part in 
specifying what is agreed, how it is to be carried out, and how verified. 
What has not been included in agreements so far negotiated is what 
sanctions shall be imposed for breaches of treaties other than a right to 
withdraw. There is need, too, for legal measures to fill the vacuum of 
relatively uncontrolled arms trading. 
In the long view it is the attitude of mind against war which is 
the effective arms controller. Measures of arms control as foreseen 
remain fundamentally, if relatively, ineffective while technical 
research, development and testing continue, and while the industrial base 
of States is geared to incorporate armament production facilities. The 
continuation of progressive arms technology and arms manufacture in one 
State will ensure that all states continue to feel a need for arms for 
security. The levels at which arms stocks are held or fighting services 
are enrolled and furnished may be subject to increasing inter-State 
agreement but such agreement can eliminate only the probability of war -
not its possibility. 
These are reasons why the differing concepts of arms control would 
benefit from the establishement of a permanent institution under Art 26 
of the UN Charter instead of the many ad hoc conferences and bi-lateral 
discussions which obtain outside the 40-Nation Conference at Geneva, and 
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which may have repercussions for many States. One example of the latter 
is that the ABM Treaty of 1972 (not ratified by the US) is between the US 
and the USSR with NATO indirectly involved as an extension of the US 
't l' 32 secun y po ley. But SDI is really a ballistic missile defence and it 
may prove to be a test for international law in the context of the 
b 'l tIt' t' 33 1 a era nego la lons. It will not advance the cause of peace if one 
of the parties repudiates the ABM Treaty, but States other than the two 
signatories have no overt influence in the discussions. Breach of 
international law or withdrawal from treaty obligations may be 
expressions of realism, but some international co-ordination (perhaps 
under Art 102 of the Charter) designed to obviate such definite steps 
which may have effects on third party States seems desirable. 
The value of international political and legal institutions may not 
always be obvious, but in a system with many dissensions always likely 
experience indicates that solutions are forthcoming eventually which 
would not materialize without debate in an institution open to all the 
States affected. So long as the institution functions for a community at 
peace improvement can reasonably be expected. Whether it would survive 
in a community at war is doubtful. 
Arms Control: Economic Control. 
The political objectives of arms control are not merely to ensure 
security at a lower level of armaments. The strategy has the control of 
defence expenditure also in mind. 
Cobden forecast something of the kind in 1849. 
"the progress of scientific knowledge will lead to a constant 
increase of expenditure. There is no limit but the limit of 
taxation".34 
Scientific knowledge and its related technology continued to progress and 
were matched by larger armed forces and more equipment. At times in many 
States a limit of acceptable taxation has been in sight or has been 
reached as a result of events and political reactions. The progress, 
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"As mass armies arose and were developed ... as the burdens of 
associated armament rivalries threatened the economies of the 
participating nations, a countermovement set in - a demand for the 
limitation or restriction of armaments by international 
agreement" . 3 5 
Despite the numbers of men and women in armed forces it has been 
the increasing proportionate cost of equipment since 1945 which has 
encouraged the countermovement rather than the cost of the personnel. If 
technological progress demanded increasing proportions of defence budgets 
it also presupposed greater military effect with fewer people. It was 
incidental and largely overlooked that this was a prescription for 
nuclear, or perhaps chemical or biological, warfare rather than 
conventional war in spite of increased efficiency of conventional 
weapons. 
When acknowledged, the presciption led to a further 
countermovement: to limit nuclear weapons and, at the same time, to seek 
a balance in conventional weapons hoping to be prepared for all 
contingencies. Renewed steps to eliminate chemical weapons were also 
pursued. The developing strategy can be seen in the NATO changes from 
the Lisbon Force Goals of 96 divisions, to all-out nuclear retaliation 
(MAD), and the the present policy of flexible response, all keeping the 
US extended deterrence and its high risk - low cost threat in mind. But 
the economic costs of being prepared for all contingencies are proving 
less acceptable and the NATO reactive nuclear threshold may actually be 
between peace and war and not between nuclear and conventional war 
although the costs of both systems of armament have to be accepted. 
The problem for political decision is whether arms control is to 
become control of all weapons or merely the balancing of individual items 
as currently is the practice in the US-USSR agreements. The decision is 
likely to be determined by economic factors as much as preferred military 
strategy so long as universal controls are resisted and bilateral 
limitations are without comparative advantage. The economic aspects, 
however, are not limited to defence costs for they include the industrial 
base, employment, and in some States a lucrative arms trade. If defence 
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is a costly business for the industrial State there are set-offs to be 
taken into account. 
In the promotion of arms in opposition to arms control the 
conflicts between the economist and the military are resolved by the 
politician by his decisions on the allocation of funds for defence votes 
and annament projects and his allotment of export licences for the arms 
trade. This is controlled by the purse, and this direct control is 
exacerbated by the effects of inflation. 36 
In any case allocations can be affected by outside influences, some 
directly as a result of international borrowing and the conditions 
attached to loans. In the case of newly independent States, political 
independence may not signify economic independence from former colonial 
powers. Such lack of independence may be seen in economic matters and in 
continued military associations with the ability and readiness of the 
former power to supply arms and aid. 
Departmental control of defence expenditure as a form of arms 
limitation may be countered by the proclivity of administrators to put 
the onus of disbursement elsewhere. 37 For example, border police may be 
furnished from civil votes although they may essentially consist of 
soldiers organized in military formations. Time scales, too, are 
difficult: long term planning especially in view of production lead time 
permits changes of mind as well as of alliance commitment. Both can have 
a limiting effect. 
Membership of international and regional institutions and 
organizations may define incidentally what funds are left for allocation 
by a State after satisfying the institutional demand. Similarly there 
may be some residual control as a result of a State's contribution to UN 
Peacekeeping forces and finance, for what is available to the UN in one 
place may not readily be available when required by the State in another. 
Arguments about burden-sharing in alliances reflect national allocations 
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to defence in personnel and equipment as well as in finance: they may 
result from unilateral arms limitation. Because of the disparities in 
the gross national product of states, however, there can be no balancing 
of defence expenditure on a purely percentage or per capita basis 
although such percentages can be the basis for balanced reductions. 
Arms control measures in any case are calculated around some form 
of balancing of one side against the other. Lowes Dickinson pointed out 
that 'balance' has two meanings: equality between things, eg, a balance 
of forces; and another equality, eg, a credit balance at bank. 38 Balance 
of power professes the first whilst seeking the second, and milita~ 
balance in arms control has similar attributes. 
Arms control is a tool used to promote the vital interest of a 
State in survival. To this end only it would seem States endeavour to 
ensure their security not only by expenditure on defence forces but also 
by arms control agreement. In spirit this is a diplomatic method of 
trying to regulate the competition, whilst law records what has been 
agreed. The record in a formal treaty, however, may include time scales 
and cancellation clauses making arms control measures impermanent and 
subject to review. 
Technological Development and War. 
The means of modern war are products of technology the implications 
of which can be seen in the relationship between military requirements 
and technological progress. Much of all research and development 
expenditure is directed towards military ends and is funded by 
governments directly or indirectly. The relationship is sufficiently 
intimate for impetus towards new and improved materials and products to 
stem from the technologist or the military or both. 
There is a military significance in improved social conditions 
leading to (al an increasing percentage of young men and women physically 
fit for armed service (timely today in the absence of colonial manpower), 
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and (b) general standards of education sufficient on which to base the 
use and maintenance of sophisticated weapons and equipment. 
These developments are relatively unaffected by public 
international law, but political implications have led to a changed 
strategy for nuclear weapon states from nuclear war fighting policies to 
nuclear war prevention. At the same time a conventional strategy of no 
restraint in weapon development, deployment and use has been maintained. 
The logistical implications of technological advance in weapons 
systems has forced adaptation to extravagant rates of ammunition 
expenditure for an increasingly wide range of guns, and missiles, as well 
as mines and engineer equipment. It has also led to a constant updating 
of weapons and equipment of shorter obsolescence time span, and high 
wastage rates. This constant updating has released continuing stocks for 
arms traders. 
Technological advance in military equipment is adapted to civilian 
applications, but no question is raised as to the pace of technological 
progress. It is not clear that technology is improving chances of 
survival in any case and circumstances, apart from the effects to be 
expected of all-out nuclear war. It is not clearly demonstrated either 
that scientists, technologists, engineers and politicians are now able to 
control all peaceful and warlike applications of their sciences. At the 
same time, if arms control follows rather than leading, the developing 
technologies may result in strategic imbalance, the costly maintenance of 
equivalents, or to retaliation in kind as a continuing m~ilitary policy. 
Mines in space, particle beam weapons and SDI are referred to in the 
context, and although the effects to be expected of them are not fully 
understood political thought and policies follow the technological 
possibilities. 
It is not clear that verification techniques can be expected to 
keep pace with advances in weapons technology. If not, a question is: 
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can nuclear war be managed? Earth surveillance and military command 
through satellites suffer from counter technology in any case. 
It is clear that the military aspects of technological development 
cannot be treated in isolation and this has been recognized at 'Summit' 
discussions, 
"The Reagan Administration insisted that the US-Soviet discussions 
not focus simply on arms control but rather cover a broad agenda 
including also human rights, regional conflicts and bilateral 
matters. This recognizes that relations between nations involves 
much more than the level of arms, which is, in fact, but one of a 
number of sources of tension and mistrust".39 
unrestricted advance in military technology could frustrate other 
agreements concurrently being negotiated, and emphasise the need for 
control of research, development, and manufacture as well as deployment. 
A realistic view would necessarily include the arms trade. 
Such a view would consider strategy and the military means to 
support it. The economics of the arms trade is likely to be considered 
on economic terms rather than from a counter-strategic point of view. In 
the economic considerations the provision of military aid tends to be a 
short-term pragmatic matter, and even if some rolling index of military 
aid requirements was possible the industrial demands might continue to 
prove decisive. 
Attitudes to Arms Control. 
The different approaches by States to their defence problems at 
different times ensures that the processes of arms limitation are not 
dovetailed into an effective whole designed to eliminate war. They are 
designed rather to make war less likely. A result is thriving global 
arms industries and a general availability of arms for war (as shown by 
Iraq and Iran) and civil strife (as in Afghanistan). 
The market, internal and external, allows a State to develop or 
obtain 'smart' weapons to maintain its military capabilities in the face 
of limitation of other arms. Longer-range and 'smart' weapons of greater 
accuracy and smaller expenditure per target allowing a wider choice of 
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target are not designed to render more effective humanitarian measures 
for the protection of civilians. 
One effect of long range weapons and missiles is psychological in 
both tactical terms and humanitarian practice for 
"when ... the enemy and their hapless associates are not 
visible ••• Detachme~t may not breed contempt •.• it can limit our 
abili ty to car-e". 4 
The indiscriminate nature of the weapon is likely to be matched by 
indiscriminate behaviour when the killing is of victims unseen and it may 
be that attitudes towards distance killing result from a particular kind 
of training. 
Changes in attitudes by States to measures of arms control are 
influenced by law only remotely for change is dictated more by the 
availability of arms and ability to obtain them. As they are developed 
arms control measures and technological possibilities affect strategic 
policy first and only thereafter a correlation of law and war. But arms 
control strategies are products of political attitude and may have a 
somewhat haphazard effect on strategic planning. 
For instance, 
" •.• for the first five years of the Reagan Administration, arms 
control was treated largely as a myth, and as a set of proposals 
the USSR would never accept. A combination of the events in 
Iceland, and the Reagan Administration's growing need for a major 
political achievement, then suddenly thrust all of these proposals 
to the fore. The resulting arms control negotiating process has 
been well managed •.• it has suddenly altered the entire US defence 
planning and programming equation in str-ategic and theatre nuclear 
forces, and conventional force for Europe, in rrYs for which the 
Department of Defense was largely unprepared". 
If what was being emphasised was the political nature of US 
initiative, the different and separate interests of arms control planning 
(as opposed to military defence, budgetary, and technological arms 
planning, and the research involved), was highlighted against a failure 
of consultation domestically. 
It has been suggested that the Russian reaction has been affected 
more by the domestic economic considerations than by the military 
situation. But if economics forced the situation there was also the, 
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"succession of arms reduction proposals from Reykjavik onwards all 
framed and timed with such subtlety as to gain maximum propaganda 
advantage and give more cause for concern than comfort to the NATO 
allies".42 
Influence of peace movements in the initiation of proposals is not 
apparent, and in the case of the USSR, 
"concern about unhealthy trends in youth behaviour, (and) ... the 
growing 'passivity' or apathy among youth" - passivnost - was 
mistranslated as 'pacifism' in the West". 4 3 
Peace movements like political observers of foreign States are often 
misled by preconceptions. In discussing plans being made during the 
second World War for the Britain of the post-war years, Correlli Barnett 
said, 
"Yet the wartime promoters of New Jerusalem had pursued their 
vision in the face of economic realities perfectly well known to 
them - on the best romantic principle that sense must bend to 
feeling and facts to faith". 4 
Facts and faith may express the different attitudes of those who believe 
war can be prevented but not abolished by arms control and humanitarian 
measures and those who see each measure as a step towards GCD. 
Unilateral disarmament is not a solution for lack of reciprocal restraint 
is destabilizing, although each arms control agreement, even if not in a 
co-ordinated step by step process, can make for security between the 
parties. But if nuclear limitation satisfies public attitudes it will 
effect no financial savings if it is offset by increased conventional 
forces. Conventional balance at lower levels is necessary for that. 
Lawrence Martin had a pessimistic approach in saying that among the 
practical priorities the strategic nuclear force should come first and 
should be fostered without unwarranted "expectation of what negotiated 
arms control can achieve". 45 Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, 
regarded arms control as linkage such as was pursued by the US prior to 
the invasion of Afghanistan and the civil disturbances of Poland. He 
said, 
"It has to follow a military build-up and proceed on a broad front. 
High level meetings were to feflect careful preparation and reward 
restrained Soviet conduct".4 
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He added, however, that 
"with highest level neg?pations continuing all these premises are 
being cast overboard", 
and warned that if areas of negotiation, such as arms control, can be 
insulated by a State their other activities can more easily be pursued. 
Linkage, therefore, following military build-up, is essential, for arms 
control is merely an aspect of policy although an essential one. 
In practice, the bogeyman may be a concept that 'negotiations' 
implies some equality between the parties and preparatory arms build-up 
may be intended to ensure this. But, so far, arms control negotiations 
have been a bargaining process aimed at limitation on a reciprocal basis. 
The elimination of a weapon system by both sides is another matter. The 
bargaining process embraced linkage not limited to direct arms control 
measures for national economics also played their part. President Nixon 
pointed out that when he was in office in the 19705 the Soviet leaders' 
eagerness for trade was 
"one of our most powerful levers in winning concessions on 
political issues". 
But he warned, 
"linkage was only as strong as the Soviet leaders' desire for 
whatever it was that was being linked to their behaviour. It was 
only as stron~ as the West's own toughness and skill in 
bargaining".4 
Such toughness has to be reflected in Alliance solidarity and, 
ultimately, in the military balance. 
Whatever subjects are linked with arms control negotiations, a 
disa~ed world is not yet envisaged for it is recognized that progress 
towards it must inevitably be on a step by step basis. This is dictated 
by the realities of the situations affecting international relations, 
arms races following technological 'advance', and is altogether separate 
from schools of thought within societies which argue as to intention and 
enforcement. 49 But disarmament and arms control have been regarded by 
some as being less effective than nuclear arsenals in keeping peace in 
Europe, always excepting the military incursions which have enforced 
Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. 50 
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Peace in Europe is one matter, but in other parts of the world a 
ready supply of arms from European industrial States, the us, and the 
USSR has often provided the means of conflict. Now, 
"It is incumbent on all governments who engage in arms expendituI:"e 
- not just the major military powers - to examine the 
possibilities of arrangements that would result in reduced 
acquiSition of arms, so allowing a greater proportion of their 
resources to be devoted to their own socia-economic 
development".51 
But this admirable statement does not include the other necessary 
injunction, namely, that transfers of arms from the industrial States 
forms substantial economic substance for manufacturer and exchequer. 
Cutting off the sources is the most effective form of arms control in 
these circumstances. 
Limitations on the Use of Weapons. 
Public concern has been expressed in many countries regarding the 
indiscriminate and unnecessarily injurious nature of certain weapons. 
popular movements have been initiated in some States to demand the 
control or elimination of nuclear weapons. This concern has been 
focussed mainly on 'new' weapons and there has been a failure to 
recognize that 'older' weapons have identical characteristics of 
indiscrimination and savagery. Indeed, most weapons have potentialities 
which bring them within a broad definition as indiscriminate for most can 
be used in an indiscriminate manner by bad aiming, bad timing, by 
deliberation or accident, irrespective of the quality and nature of their 
firepower and wounds they inflict. 
In the public debate it is nuclear, biological, chemical and 
bacteriological weapons which are the subjects, but informed debate also 
about mines, booby traps and weapons the primary effect of which is to 
injure by fragments undetectable in the human body by X-rays, have led to 
'll"tt' 52 conventlona lml a lon measures. 
Some weapons platforms which have encouraged indiscrimination in 
the past, especially against civilian targets, have also been discussed. 
They include aircraft, naval bombardment vessels and sQbmarines. Now 
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platforms in space must be included as well as the seabed, ocean floor 
and subsoil, the moon and other bodies in space, and Antarctica. Some of 
these are locations from which it has been agreed certain, or all, 
weapons should be barred permanently.53 
Moral and practical reservations about certain weapons are not new, 
and if the use of some weapons is politically controlled it is primarily 
a measure of doubt about the moral, not the practical, qualities of the 
weapon although in the case of the nuclear weapon the doubt extends to 
the practical and the potential. 
President Truman refused to use nuclear weapons in Korea in 1950 -
1953. In 1953 President Eisenhower, 
"had told the United States Chiefs of Staff that they could plan to 
use nuclear armaments of all shapes and sizes in the future, 
wherever this would work to the advantage of the united states".S4 
In 1954, however, he refused to use nuclear weapons in support of the 
French at Dien Bien Phu. Nuclear weapons were not used in the 
British-French operations against Egypt in 1956. 
No doubt the military plans of the nuclear powers include the 
identification of nuclear targets but considering that the us again 
refrained from using nuclear weapons in Vietnam (as did the British in 
the Falkland Islands conflict) the utility of nuclear force in use (and 
the possible advantage to the user) is being questioned. Thus, it is a 
paradox of arms control theory that nuclear deterrence is seen as 
something other than the threat of - and readiness to use - nuclear 
weapons: that by some emotional transference the most indiscriminate of 
weapons has become a symbol of peace in Europe. This somewhat Jesuitical 
situation may ensure the survival, and renewal from time to time, of the 
weapon even if its utility for actual armed combat there ceases to be 
seriously considered if or when conventional balance in Europe is 
secured. 
War prevention or postponement has always been an objective of 
military deterrence, but if nuclear deterrence is to be regarded as a 
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proved preventative of war between nuclear States 55 a situation will 
emerge that unless nuclear weapons can be eliminated by agreement nuclear 
deterrence may prove an acceptable alternative to disarmament. The fact 
that there has been no serious war between China and Russia since China 
became a nuclear power, or between China and India since India acquired 
nuclear capability may not only support such a view, but also endorse 
political control of nuclear weapons. Too much emphasis on nuclear 
deterrence as what prevents war, however, obscures other reasons for 
states being at peace. 
It is more relevant that domestic and international political 
concerns are affected by attitudes to legality as well as to 
desirability. But if the utility in use is problematic for whatever 
reasons, what is the utility of nuclear weapons in deterrence policy? 
The real argument for nuclear deterrence is that it prevents war (whether 
nuclear or conventional) between nuclear sates, whereas deterrent 
measures limited to conventional forces do not prevent conventional war 
between either conventionally armed states or between a nuclear and a 
non-nuclear State. China, Britain, the US, the USSR and India have 
fought conventional wars since becoming nuclear States, and the many acts 
of aggression by other States have not been deterred by fears of hostile 
conventional weapons. 
It is sometimes pointed out how close the US and the USSR came to 
nuclear war over CUba in 1962, but the point is that there was no war: 
nor was war likely. The nuclear threat (as opposed to nuclear blackmail) 
was always sufficient the ensure the withdrawal of the weapons which 
were, or were to have been, installed in Cuba. The question was whether 
the threat would be made. Further, only vital interests of the us were 
involved, and there was no vital interest basis for war on the part of 
the USSR. 
It seems likely that nuclear States may be reluctant to authorize 
initiation of nuclear exchanges by the tactical use of theatre nuclear 
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weapons despite the doctrine of flexible response. Fear of escalation, 
as well as the knowledge of inevitable effects of nuclear war, will 
inhibit politicians whatever the milita~ recommendation. In this there 
is recognition that, 
"The lessons of experience about the emotional experiences of men 
at war are much less comforting than the theory - the tactical 
theo~ which has led to the development of these (TW) weapons".56 
But flexible response as deterrent, like limited war, requires the 
co-operation of the opponent. Korea, Vietnam, Iran/Iraq, the Middle East 
and Afghanistan, seem to show that limited wars may fail to gain 
objectives or teach relevant lessons, but it is not clear that it is 
solely because they are limited and not total. 
Air Marshal Slessor wrote in 1954 that, 
" ••• it seems to me that the very fact that the final arbitrament of 
total war is one to which no one will again resort as an act of 
policy may very well mean that our enemies will seek increas~~qly 
to achieve their aims by a series of limited aggression ..• ", 
but this has not proved to be profitable or to accomplish what aggressers 
have intended. Perhaps world opinion and the forum available in the UN 
mitigate against limited success in war being allowed to lead to 
territorial aggrandizement unless, as in the case of Tibet, a conquered 
State is abandoned by world opinion. 
The greater danger today of the use of nuclear weapons by states 
that have not as yet acknowledged their nuclear capability if faced with 
imminent threat to survival cannot be excluded. 
'No first use' Declarations. 
Public disquiet and moral reservations about certain weapons have 
encouraged some States to declare that they will not be the first to use 
nuclear and chemical weapons although the debate does not always develop 
beyond the 'no first use' morality to question why second or third use 
should be moral or less immoral. 
'No first use' declarations, however, are unilateral and national 
having no particular international legal quality. They cannot bind 
successors in government either politically or militarily. The lack of 
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permanency in the declaration would remain even if a State became 
'nuclear free' because the knowledge necessary for production would 
remain, although time might not permit the knowledge to be transformed 
into tangible stocks of the weapon. What the declarations really do is 
to emphasise ambiguities in the roles for which nuclear weapons are cast 
and the conflicting moralities of their use in war-fighting or as 
instruments of deterrence. 
As unilateral declarations without any international legal content 
are unlikely to affect the place of war discussion would not be important 
but for the incompatibility of 'no first use' assertions and a 'flexible 
response' doctrine which includes escalation by means of nuclear weapons 
in their war-fighting role. A first principle of warfare, to make the 
enemy conform to one's own actions is especially important at the opening 
of hostilities. To this end the defence armouries of States will include 
a wide range of indiscriminate weapons with which, if necessary, to take 
and keep the initiative and leave the enemy only a reactive role. 
In such situations debate about 'first use' of nuclear and chemical 
weapons must be viewed from a possibility that the side which opened 
hostilities would expect the other to commit smaller tactical nuclear 
weapons - possibly nuclear artillery - or chemical weapons anticipating 
that there will be pre-planned defensive situations or locations where 
'first use' by the enemy was likely, justifying retaliation in kind. 
This seems to be implicit in the doctrine of 'flexible response'. At the 
same time the subject of SDr arouses fears and anxieties that it will 
lead to increasing weapons inventories and to arms races. 
Other aspects of US-NATO planning, such as follow-on forces attack 
air/land battle, and counter-retaliatory strategy with more powerful 
(possibly more indiscriminate) conventional weapons, do not cause 
comparable public apprehension. Greater numbers and improved quality of 
conventional weapons could prove more likely to endanger peace than 
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nuclear deterrence has so far. This is one reason why added impetus to 
talks about conventional weapons is currently offering possibilities for 
further arms control measures at Vienna. 
At first sight it is not clear whether declaration of 'no first 
use' of a weapon is intended as an arms control measure or as a 
humanitarian proposal, or whether such a declaration is made without 
regard to the role (defensive or offensive) which circumstances may 
impose on its use. Even if such declarations, (nuclear, chemical or 
biological), are credible as regards some situations it must be expected 
that blanket 'no first use' declarations covering any eventuality are not 
likely to be. Forceful pre-emption can never be ruled out entirely. 
There is an element of doubt about the legality in use of nuclear 
weapons. In 1961 General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) stated, inter 
alia, that the use would be a direct violation of the UN Charter. The 
Resolution was supported by 55, opposed by 20, member States and there 
were 26 abstentions. It is not clear either whether weapons are illegal 
in international law only when they have been declared specifically so to 
be (as in the case of some 'new weapons' if identified as falling under 
Art 36 of Geneva Protocol I of 1977). That Protocol, however, 
sidestepped the legality of nuclear weapons as the Reservations of the US 
and the UK seem to imply.58 
In referring to nuclear weapons, basic principles and customary 
law, Best says, 
"If by those criteria they were already unlawful before the 
seventies, they remain so after them. The essence of the argument 
that they were so rests chiefly on the indiscr~minateness 
apparently inseparable from their employment". 9 
Massive bombardment affecting civilian populations such as were 
carried out in the second World War are now shown by Geneva Protocol I of 
1977 to be illegal. Bombardment by nuclear we~pons is different only in 
degree of indiscrimination for the total outcome of fallout remains 
unpredictable. The future of the nuclear weapon, perhaps doubt about its 
legality, and more particularly the effect of reciprocal reaction to a 
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first strike has led to categorical declarations of 'no first use' 
policy. But there remains an uncertainty of motivation. Such 
declarations purport to be political but they stem from strategic and 
tactical concepts, and, if not entirely rhetorical, may be a battle 
strategem. As they stand they have no legal validity even though they 
are in general conformation with the provisions of the UN Charter 
regarding aggression. But the idea of a 'no first use' doctrine if it 
supports anti-aggression policies is worth further consideration not 
least because it cannot be reconciled with the juxtaposition of 
conventional and nuclear wear-ons implicit in the NATO 'flexible response' 
policy. It is the highly indiscriminate nuclear, chemical and 
bacteriological weapons that raise humanitarian and moral questions of 
use (as in Resolution 1653), non-use, and first use, which are not always 
specific as to whether deterrence or battle is referred to. Expression 
of moral repugnance regarding the use of the weapons is reminiscent of 
similar discussion during the second world War (and since) about area 
bombardment. 
Basic Rules 2 and 3 of Protocol 16o might have seemed clear but for 
the Reservations of the UK and the US, and the NATO policy that so long 
as the weapons are not specifically abandoned through arms control 
agreements they remain vital to that policy.61 
It is doubtful if 'no iirst-use' declarations have precluded the 
exhaustive pre-targeting for nuclear weapons as a deterrent action. 
pre-targeting by the US is organized under the Single Integrated 
Operational Plan (SlOP) stemming from what was thought to be Soviet 
strategic vulnerability to air attack. The concept was described by the 
then US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, in 1951: 
"In the event of war, there will be concurrent requirements for the 
destruction of Soviet atomic delivery capability; direct atomic 
attack on Soviet grollnd and tactical air forces; and destruction 
of the crit}cal components of the enemy's war sustaining 
resource" . 
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The realization of this policy would be impossible if demanded of second 
strike, following an enemy all-out nuclear first strike, or if 
pre-targeting is neglected. In the nature of the nuclear weapon and the 
likely circumstances destruction of targets must include civilian 
populations despite the greater accuracy and smaller circular error 
63 probable (CEP) now than when SIOP was first envisaged. Pre-emption, 
however, is of doubtful legality if and until the enemy can be proved to 
have been immediately determined on aggressive military measures and 
committed to war. There is a considerable risk in waiting to find out 
that may over-ride the legal doubts, but the considerations differ as to 
whether missiles are available for use by one or both parties, (and, in 
the event, whether nuclear warheads are involved). A mistaken 
identification of a nuclear instead of a high explosive warhead could 
affect the honouring of a 'no first-use' declaration. 
Such declarations have other weaknesses. Surprise remains a basic 
military objective but technology has brought additional problems for it. 
Surprise by high speed manoeuvre is made more difficult by electronic and 
other surveillance devices and early-warning systems. 64 Perennial 
problems of time and space have still to be solved for if distance has 
been annihilated by weapons platforms capable of fast movement, and by 
air, sea and land launched missiles, time is still an imponderable when 
related to an enemy's reactions. 
Such is the possible efficiency of technological 
information-gathering that it is unlikely new weapon species, or new 
generations of older weapons, wil] take an enemy by surprise, or that the 
size of forces and size of contents of a State's arsenal will not 
reasonably be known to other States. But Egypt used Russian 
ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles in 1973 to the surprise of 
the Israelis; Argentine's Exocet missile armament was not public 
knowledge; and the Mujaheddin's more sophisticated arms surprised the 
Russians in Afghanistan. The use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran 
war by Iraq was surprising in a State adhering to the 1925 convention. bS 
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Technology has made first use of indiscriminate weapons militarily 
attractive to an aggressor. Delivery of nuclear, high explosive, or 
chemical bombs or stand-off missiles at high speed over great distances 
to targets selected by the aggressor before hostilities have begun would 
outrage custom even if conforming to the principle of surprise. But 
whereas first use as an opening salvo in a war might be accompanied by 
attempted justification as a legitimate pre-emptive operation, 
pre-planned flexible response demanding escalation from conventional to 
nuclear warfare because of a stated conventional imbalance is another 
matter. Political decision will differentiate between first use and 
early use. 
Justification for the use of nuclear or chemical weapons would have 
regard for actual situations but is likely always to presuppose a 
situation of imminent defeat unless use is agreed. Early use, which will 
be first use in some situations, need not be postulated only in a 'backs 
to the wall' scenario. It may be a tactical operation at a given time 
and location as a basis for counter-operations, pre-planned and 
pre-targeted. 
The dilemma for NATO inherent in 'no first-use policy' is that, 
"During the past five years, US strategic policies have tended to 
shift their emphasis from embracing nuclear deterrence to 
eliminating nuclear weapons. For the Europeans, the Rekyjavik 
Summit proposals, the double zero agreement on INF weapons, and 
the population defence rationale for the Strategic Defence 
Initiative all contributed to the perception that Americans want 
to make nuclear weapons unusable. But since flexible response 
rests firmly on retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first 
if NATO is attacked, this perception has erod~d European 
confidence in America's extended deterrence". b 
There is also the obvious point that what is possible for NATO is also 
possible for the Warsaw Pact. A decision to put into operation a 
flexible response strategy, with its implications of escalation at a 
given point, may well be accepted by the USSR as according with the 
concept of 'nuclear sword and conventional shield' on their side. 67 
The matter may be complicated further by the idea of an agreement 
between the US and the USSR cf 'no first-use' of nuclear weapons. This 
-
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idea has been variously advanced, by Edgar Boekar for example. He 
debated several factors which he thought might lead to, 
"the adoption in Europe of a policy of no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons, perhaps codified in an agreement with the Soviet Union. 
This could result in reduction in the number of Soviet missiles 
targetted on Western Europe, and on the NATO side, it could 
eliminate costly first-use and nuclear warfighting options. It 
would also be acceptable to both super-powers since it would 
prevent the possibility of Western Europe developing as a major 
nuclear power in its own right ... the mere existence of a limited 
nuclear force at se~ would constitute a significant deterrent 
against first use". 8 
Such a policy would constitute a measure of arms control for instead of 
unilateral declarations69 , some in guarded terms, opposed States could 
develop a treaty agreeing on the policy. Verification would be 
impossible for the situation of use or non use fructifies only when 
hostilities commence, or as a conflict develops, when the treaty is 
either observed or disregarded. It would mean that short of denying 
itself the means with which to make a 'first use' policy - nuclear or 
chemical - a State's unilateral 'no first use' declaration is liable to 
be overtaken by circumstances. Formalizing an inter-State agreement 
would be a step forward, for it would underline the basic weakness of the 
double standards involved. 
The inclusion of certain weapons in a State's arsenal is sometimes 
held to be morally justified as being solely for deterrent purposes. But 
such weapons are available for any purpose and the moral justification is 
flawed by a 'no first use' declaration for that indicates intention to 
use under certain circumstances. In any case the declarations are 
limited if applicable to non-nuclear states. 
The conditional intention was explained by the then 
Secretary-General of NATO in 1984: 
"There is indeed no alternative to "Flexible Response", and to 
opponents of that he could say, "He who propagates a purely 
conventional deterrent in full knowledge of the de~ressing lessons 
of history, accepts a very heavy responsibility". 7 
But the dichotomy between 'flexible response' and 'no first use' (as 
opposed to commencing a war without immediate nuclear use) is patent, but 
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that raises questions as to the effect in use compared to deterrence. 
Credible deterrence demands perceived will and intention to use: lack of 
will destroys credibility. There is a dangerous instability between 
'having' and 'using' in the context for ultimately the decision to use 
might be out of the hands of the lawful authority. 
Seeking to relate 'no first use' to a purely defensive role may be 
only an exercise of moral philosophy. 'No first use' as meaning not 
initiating a war by the use of nuclear weapons is only one aspect for, 
"We can in a defensive war fight offensively: the defensive form in 
war is ~o mere shield but a shield formed of blows delivered with 
skill". 1 
In any case effect on morale of having 'not for use weapons' has to be 
considered. 
There are other factors. Nuclear weapons will be subject to 
political control at a distance from the battle. It is one thing to 
contemplate decision-making difficulties for Heads of Government in 
ordering strategic nuclear warfare. It is another to decide whether a 
commander is to have authority to use TNW when he considers it vital or 
whether he must, in any circumstances, wait for political permission. 
Again, it may be more difficult to despatch manned nuclear sorties than 
to unleash missiles and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), and there is 
always likely to be greater hesitation in sending manned aircraft. 
The NATO concept of battlefield extension calls for early 
disruption and delay of enemy follow-on echelons. This is a time and 
space problem which logically may entail ' first use' (including nuclear 
mine-laying). It may not be politically possible in practice, but 
striking at targets at their most vulnerable, which may be at 
concentration or approach march (if such manoeuvres are still 
applicable), without waiting for actual invasion, may be sound military 
tactics in the circumstances. As these will be military targets often 
located within civilian environments, any such action is liable to 
foreclose on last minute negotiations between the parties. 
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Political necessity may make it impossible to disrupt a first 
attack before actual invasion and, if so, military necessity will demand 
deep battlefield extension if it ~emains an option. Reaction ~ather than 
pre-emption puts defence at a disadvantage although within the spirit of 
Art 51 of the Charter (which in any case envisages collective response). 
This is why a 'no first use' concept might not be a political or moral 
concept, but is likely to be a battlefield strategem to be regulated only 
by the military circumstances. Abolition or elimination of the concept 
will entail abolition of the weapon. Thus, the clear implication is that 
if nuclear deterrence is to be regarded as an intermediate stage between 
arms control and disannament 'no first use' declarations must be avoided 
or be regarded as incredible, for the illegality of the weapon and its 
illegal potential indiscrimination make moral virtues in deterrence less 
likely than the virtues of guarding against the practical realties. 
Technology and the Place of War. 
Public opinion in matters of high technology may be influenced more 
by emotion than knowledge and that may be a reason why the actions of 
governments are sometimes shrouded in secrecy and public opinion is not 
consulted in decision-making. Not only is the place of war so decided 
but the developing means and capabilities involved may also be unattended 
by public discussion. The result is likely to be that public fears 
regarding the 'defence' situation may be disregarded as arising from 
ignorance of real facts and likely consequences or may be considered 
trivial or frivolous. 
The history of nuclear energy, and especially of nuclear weapon 
development is an example, but it is not only in the field of arms 
technology that developing trends are to be feared, or the propensities 
of the scientist/politician complex to be questioned. Developing 
experimentation in human as well as plant and animal genetics has led to 
the view that, 
"the entire creative process in higher forms of life including 
human life, is goin~,to be re-directed or controlled to satisfy 
purely human ends". • 
- - ---------... 
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That military/political ends can be excluded is not certain, but if the 
process has been entirely uninhibited by international law domestic 
regulation is beginning to be effected in some States: international 
consensus may slowly follow. If, however, it is to be a question of 
which would be worse, the elimination of the human species through the 
effects of nuclear war; the changing mutations which radio-activity 
carelessly or accidentally disseminated might induce; what will follow 
the ultiimate greenhouse effect of uncontrolled manmade atmospheric 
pollution; or what could be evolved as a result of human bio-technology 
and changed genetic characteristics in human beings, some people might 
choose war. 
In an environment occasioned by technological uncertainties the 
problems of stockpiling and storage of radio-active waste material 
(including nuclear submarines) may seem petty. But it was typical that 
the politico-technocrats did not allow for the capital and continuing 
costs involved which the problem now presents, for in the early euphoria 
such costs were as overlooked as a problem involved when financing 
nuclear emergy or the arms race which it generated. 
Not everyone agrees that scientists were most at fault in the 
decisions to develop nuclear weapons systems and the resulting nuclear 
and missile arms races. For example, 
"The civilian nuclear strategists ••• played a considerable and 
sometimes totally irresponsibel part in fuelling the arms race. 
They always knew more than their attentive audience - the 
politicians - and they always knew much more than the average 
citizen who had little access to the nuclear information being fed 
by the Pentagon into their 'consulting' firms. They were t~ a 
posi tion to manipulate the poli ticians and the public ... ". 
Nor need it be supposed that the situation was very different in other 
nuclear weapon developing States especially in the period before the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty introduced some international elements of 
control. 
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Three components as follows inform the technological debate, and 
they, like the place of war, involve not merely science and defence but 
many government departments: 
1 Provision of the scenarios and thereby the requirements in 
outline. 
2 Development of the technology to meet the outline requirements. 
3 Allocation of the necessary resources of men, money and 
materials. 
This is not all: the deployed material has to be maintained, and a 
continuous process of improvement and 'modernisation' involves the 
scientist in counter-balancing progress made by other States and in 
keeping ahead of potential enemies. Reduction of cost per item leading 
to increased quantity is also an important factor which has been 
successful in the miniaturization important to missile technology. All 
this gave rise to a paradox. 
Implicit in differing attitudes towards natural sciences and the 
economic aspects of 'social sciences' and fundamental to the opposed 
ideologies with which the post-war world has been inflicted and which has 
been a major factor in the a~ race is a question. If value-neutral 
attitudes are taken towards scientific progress, and if there is a free 
choice in technology whether to pursue 'peaceful' or 'warlike' usage for 
such discoveries and developments, why do those who advocate a market 
economy as fundamental to economic science often also advocate State 
control as an essential in the field of economics and finance, and a 
socially-directed existence? If this were only a matter of budgetary 
priorities, and a fear that defence expenditures would oveLWhelm welfare 
and social expenditures, that fear could be obviated without great 
economic direction. Rather it is to be feared that much of the 
motivation arises from a paternalistic attitude toward 'how we should 
live'. On this, Kant warned that the paternalistic State is the greatest 
despotism imaginable. 
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In the long LUn, however, it seems to be assumed that utopia is 
possible and the only question seems to be: to whose Utopia should we be 
directed? If a collective answer was possible it should settle the 
questions of 'how' and 'why' which the three components above pose. 'How 
and why' are vital: dissatisfaction with existing internatiDnal systems 
and relationships, and fear of the possible results which may eventuate 
from an increasingly technologically directed future are not enough to 
effect change. This may be universally recognized: but eliminating 
causes of dissatisfaction in the control of systems affecting peace and 
war such as arms races, arms transfers and diversion of resources to 
annaments, is difficult. The difficulty is not lessened by the mixture 
of individual sovereignties and an as yet only partially accepted 
international control with which the international community struggles, 
and which the super-powers tend to by-pass in favour of bi-lateral 
discussion regarding mutual arms control. 
Bi-lateral measures of arms control, or even global measures short 
of GCD, are unlikely to change the place of war permanently for a State, 
but such agreements are the most important measures currently being taken 
towards peace even if largely concentrating on the European situation. 
But there is a major - and planned - weakness. When a weapon in its 
present form is controlled by an agreement it may re-appear in another 
and uncontrolled but improved form as a result of technology available at 
the time to only one party. 
The Gap between Arms Control and Disanmament. 
Before leaving the subject of arms control to consider disarmament 
an intermediate position affecting the place of war may be noted. 
If the abolition or elimination of war is possible a wide 
conceptual gap is evident as to the means by which it may be 
accomplished. Is it likely that piecemeal arms control measures can 
result in abolishing war {no matter what effect they may have on 
....... 
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individual cases), or is ~ possible at all in ~~e 9cesen~ si:~ac~cn? 
Att~mpts to 9covide a 9rac:ical answe~ have not yet c~osec ~~e 
c:::nce9t'..lal ga9 beyond movement i:1 favour of GC:J 'NhiC!1 surfaced i:1 ':..'"'.e 
~on-:~olif2ration Treaty. The di ::icJ.l ':.ies co not 3012. adse au:::: 
st~ategi= and foreign p'licies, or even economic fac':ors, but =ecause ::.. .. e 
syst~m of i:1t2rnational law seems mere favcuraC~e (or easier :0 ex~~:i:) 
in ~~e negotiation of bi-lateral ::"~an universal treaties. A'~ c:r.':.:ol 
measures may take ei the:- f~r:n but G...--::l demands uni '/'!:-sal ag:,eeme~':... ~~e 
difference and scme of the effects ariSing :~=m i': ~y be seen i:1 
c:mpaci!1g t."'.e Geneva Protocol of 1925 en c!i.emical ·..,ea90ns · .... i:.~ :.';e :~F 
• H167' be.... ns d"l.. "S -':1 ,~ Treaty ot __ on nuc_ear ..... eap'ns t· .... een t .. e... an ,-~le u .:l ••• 
T~eaty 9rovided not only for ~~e e!.imi:1a~ian ef a t1"pe of nuclear ''''ea~ons 
but also for t."'.e destruction of t."'.e stocks and :.~e ..... ea9Qns ce?loyec. 
8o~ inst~ents were limited in application: ~"'e Treaty being bi-~ateral 
di rectly affected only the t·1'IQ parties '.mereas the ::ool;.oco1 being 
universal affected only t.~ose ·.mo adhered to i:. !n ~::ec~, t!1ere:ore, 
other nuclear States (acknowledged, unacknowledged and potent:al) remai:1 
f:ee to deploy ~,e specified nuclear weapons (but subjec~ t~ ~';e 
Non-?roli:e~ation Treaty if ~,ey ·Nere subscribers to it). ~~ose States 
not adhe:ing to ~,e Protocol remained free to use chemical weapons and 
~,ere was no ban at all on manufacture and s:ockpiling. 
It is true that chemical weapons are the subject of C" •• u::ent ar:ns 
1 . t' bu" Ioh . h . '- . . .... • .... c!c .. "'t<a_.4 ... mo:: a ~ contro_ negotla lons, ~ ~.e pOlnt .ere 1S ~~at aeS91:e 1.5~. ~ _ 
influence, ~,e system of international legal rest:i=tions on a~ is 
limit~d to a voluntary acceptance of ~,em, and of ~~e detailed te~ 
which will apply. !t is in these circumstances ~~t some unilateral ar~ 
unenforceable decisions on ~~e use of weapcn5 have been made / and 
theories of deterrence have been evolved especially to avoid the use 
of nuclear weapons. Proposals for limiting conventional weapons at 
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the same time as nuclear deterrence continues to attract support and 
whilst the incidence of nuclear proliferation is increasing (in intent 
if not yet in practice), it might seem that a third concept is to be 
interposed between the concepts of arms control and disannament. But 
it is by no means clear that the threat of nuclear '..reapons could resolve 
the conceptual incompatibility be~Neen arms control and disar.nament 'Nhic~ 
represents the probability of the continuance of war as an inst~ent in 
any circumstances. Law alone cannot resolve the incompatability for its 
enforcement might entail armed conflict bringing into questions ~,e means 
of enforcement in a multi-national or multi-reqional society. 
Further, the proliferation of nuclear States ''''ill al'....ays raise a 
spectre of nuclear blackmail and the use of sophisticated weaFons agai~st 
elementary weapons has never been inhibited by ideas of Queensberry Rules 
in warfare. In any case the nuclear weapon is an inf~exible weapon in 
use and requires a flexible ~ecurity system in deployment and 
stock-holding. 
Declaration of 'no first use' or of limited conditions and 
ci rcumstances under ''''hich the nuclear (or foc that matter, any) weapon 
would be ~sed is also an interpolation between arms control and 
disarmament but may have little meaning in practice. Yet if a coherent 
policy of war is possible and it is seen as ei~,er (a) essential in 
national interests without an alternative, or (b) a means not to some 
other end, but as an end in itself - a kind of 'superman' ~,esis - it may 
discourage steps toward disarmament even if it does not foreclose arms 
control measures, neutrality, or perhaps the ren~ciation of offensive 
war. 
Coherent or not the position accorded to war in the reality of the 
present system of international relations prompts the question, 
"Can and should international t.loteory be focused upon the abjuration 
of the right to go to war at all ... or should it rather be aimed at 
the elimination of crrtain evidently intolerable ends, styles, and 
methods of warfare". 5 
The question needs refinement for there seems no technical reason today 
for assuming that the elimination of some weapons or methods, even if 
possible, would lead some States to adjure total war as a modern heresy. 
It is weapon supply which allows States to contemplate war: how they are 
used in battle will not be circumscribed except by events. In any case 
the example of neutral States is not helpful for abjuration of war does 
not necessarily imply disarmament, and the defence budgets of neutral 
States are considerable. 
It is to be anticipated that the current focus - elimination or 
limitation of certain weapons rather than abjuration of war is likely to 
continue. This course is dictated because any form of renunciation 
accompanied by disarmament is possible only if accompanied by a 
whole-hearted belief in a collective security system. Cap VII of the UN 
Charter has yet to promote such a belief and the lack of real impetus 
towards implementation as regards collective security.is too obvious to 
need emphasis. 
In the result exercises stated to be of collective security as in 
Grenada, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Chad, and the Maldives, only leave the 
inviting States to wonder when their invitees and their influence will 
leave whatever they may have accomplished for the benefit of their hosts. 
In the balance of abjuration or control too much should not now be 
made of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and its history,76 or of the failures of 
post-1945 proposals by both sides during the period of the Cold War 
including the joint 1961 US-USSR proposals77 • Since then, some agreement 
as to the desired ends has emerged in Art VI of the NPT but only 
disappointment prevails as to the means to be adopted. 
There are two principal differences to be overcome as to means: 
(i) Whether the implementation of GCD is possible in the present 
system of international relations, or 
(ii) If it is possible, how it can be carried out and peacekeeping 
be assured. 
-
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As to (i), a control system and plan under which GCO could be effected is 
clearly unlikely as long as the Security Council is unable to function to 
the extent of its Charter powers and so long as member-States will not 
implement Art VI of the NPT. 
As to (ii), if an international institution to effect (i) did become 
universally possible the verification procedures included in the INF 
Treaty might solve the earlier problem of an acceptable method. There 
may be a wide gulf, however, between specific 'on site' site inspection 
and a general disarmament commission's necessary freedom. 
us Attorney-General Jackson pointed out in 1941 (when post-war 
reconstruction could be treated somewhat idealistically in North 
America) , 
"The principle that war is an instrument of national policy is 
outlawed must be the starting point in any plan of international 
reconstruction" .78 
In the event this did not take the argument into practical channels and 
the UN draftsmen left the door ajar by Art 51 of the Charter. Perhaps 
they might have agreed with Roling's view that, 
"Jurists have always been aware of the }~adequacy of positive law 
to achieve the aims it has set itself" , 
for the inclusion of Cap VII in the Charter was intended to provide the 
sanction: the draftsmen cannot be blamed for the politicians' inclusion 
of Art 27. 
Disarmament might be easier to envisage if there was a basic 
agreement with Genova that war is 
"a parasitic activity because it makes use of materials, results, 
techniques, and knowledge of any other activity in order to 
accomplish its purpose without making any rational contrjbution to 
the realisation of any other practically possible ends". 0 
But the statement might be thought untrue if only the example of Russian 
retention of conquered territory and Yalta agreements are considered. 
Such anomalies made laying a foundation for disarmament more difficult 
than a victorious alliance might have been entitled to expect. 
Situations have to be taken as they are and with two opposed super powers 
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unable to agree on any system of disarmament proposed by the other (or 
even jointly) little progress was possible. Indeed, instead of 
disarmament massive re-armament has been universal in spite of efforts 
which have been made to secure some international consensus on measures 
of arms control rather than on the more contentious concept of universal 
GCD. 
Theories of Disarmament. 
Four main concepts of disarmament have been suggested: 
(1) The reduction or penal destruction of the armament of a State 
defeated in war. Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and 
Italy by necessary implication of para 11 of the Terms of 
Armdstice (3 February 194r) and the subsequent Instrument of Surrender, are examples' 8 
(2) Unilateral disannament arrangements relating to specific 
geographical areas: the Rush-Bagot Agreement (1817) between 
Canada and the US is an example. 
(3) The complete abolition of all armaments - the 'utopia' theory. 
(4) The reduction and limitation of national armaments by 
international and general agreement. 
(1) and (2) need not be discussed here. 
(3) is multilateral and formal and generally referred to as General 
and Complete Disarmament. It has many defects among which are the 
unnatural separation of arms from the political causes of war and the 
lawyer's nightmare of defining 'arms'. It has been supported in Britain 
as elsewhere in the formulation of Art VI of the NPTS2, and its virtues 
are self evident. 
(4) describes the processes of arms control which are currently 
undertaken through the 40-Nation Disarmament Committee of the UN. 
In present conditions GCD would entail a complete change in the 
international system and that cannot be foreseen. What more aptly 
describes disarmament today is Tate's term 'illusion,83. This is 
reminiscent of Moltke's report to the Reichstag; for GCD would require an 
effective judiciary: 
"A tribunal of international law, if it should exist, would still 
be without executory power and its judgments would finally be 
submitted to decision on the battlefield. Small states can rely 
on neutrality and international guarantees: a large state exists 
only by itself and its own strength".84 
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Small states and neutrality are one matter, but a stockpile of nuclear 
weapons held centrally might be another. 
Arms control and disa~ent are rarely dealt with as one 
co-ordinated process8S • 8 fi In i:'=,ractice the two are separate concepts , so 
that in discussing arms control reference to disarmament is, perhaps, 
inevitable for disarmament ought to be a logical progression from 
individual measures to universal abolition rather than a cataclysmic 
awakening. Such progress is not possible yet and GCD is not really a 
serious topic in current arms control negotiations. Some arguments for 
arms control, however, are arguments directly in favour of disarmament in 
some contexts. In consequence repetitive discussion is sometimes 
unavoidable as between one concept and the other. What seems 
incontrovertible is that arms control practice is founded on pragmatism 
not logic, whilst GCD theory is based on a specific application of logic 
even if not yet generally accepted. Arms control measures as presently 
envisaged will not lead to ~:D by any logical process as the British 
position shows: 
"The Government support balanced and verifiable arms control 
agreements, which are consistent with maintaining our security. 
We must beware of proposals for wholesale disarmament, which see 
the reduction of weapons as an end in itself. That is not the 
end. The end tS greater security, and that is an important 
distinction" .8 
It may be important to observe that the reference to disarmament 
was not to GCD the object of which is complete security so far as that is 
attainable. 
Limitation by numbers or deployment is included in both concepts. 
In one sense Michael Howard's description of arms control, as follows, is 
a prescription for disarmament for the lowest feasible level of armaments 
is GCD: 
"Only the very naive would assume that the reduction of armaments 
is in itself a good thing; that the lower level of armaments the 
nearer one automatically comes to 'peace'. The object of arms 
control agreements is to ensure international stability at the 
lowest feasible levels of armaments, and reductions which do not 
maintain or enhance such stfbility do more harm than good, however 
much money they may save". 8 
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Serious disarmers do not think that military stability is an end, or that 
the elimination of war will come about without political concensus which 
is the real objective. The point of departure for disarmers in Howard's 
description is 'the lowest feasible levels', for that limits the 
definition in three ways. First, to a calculation as to the levels, or 
perhaps to a succession of levels but short of GCD. Second, that peace 
is only determinable by mili!:ary stability. Third, the definition seems 
to indicate a universal agreement affecting all States. Bi-lateral 
agreements (between two States or alliances), which are what is often 
being considered in such circumstances, take no account of the effect on 
the stability of third party States88 • In any case, a general table of 
levels is unlikely, for each State requires a different and changing 
level of armaments to ensure its security at any time. Any kind of 
universal comparative scale would appear to be doomed to failure as were 
the Treaty of London of 1936 and its predecessor the Treaty of washington 
of 1922;23, both of which foundered on comparative calculations. 
Disarmament on the other hand would be a universal prescription. 
It has been weakness of practical arms limitation that it has been 
regional or geographical (eg, between the US and the USSR) with some 
exceptions discussed at the UN and its Committees. Levels of armaments 
in the Middle and Far East, and the Pacific Ocean States, have had less 
attention. China especially has not featured in nuclear or conventional 
weapons agreements. 
That GCD will grow, if at all, from progressive but disconnected 
arms control agreements between individual, or groups of, States 
following the present pattern is doubtful. Even if the expressed hopes 
of President Reagan and Mr Gorbachov for the abolition of nuclear weapons 
come to some concrete and universal reality, and Conventional Stability 
Talks effect reductions and balance in Europe, capability for war will 
remain. Second World war conventional weapons were not without 
indiscrimination: they have I:een 'improved' since 1945. If 
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nuclear war implies holocaust, total conventional war will not be 
observably different for millions of victims. 
General and Complete Disarmament: Concept and Development. 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty which stemmed from a US-USSR draft to 
the Geneva Disarmament Conference includes the obligation that, 
"Each of the Parties ••. undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control". (ArtVII)89 
The Treaty was signed in July 1968 and just how much Art VII was merely a 
continuing quid pro guo offered to non-nuclear States to ratify the 
Treaty is problematic. As Frank Barnaby put it, 
"perhaps the greatest weakness of the Treaty is the imbalance 
between the obligations of, and benefits for, the non-nuclear 
weapon parties - the "have nots" - and those of, and for, the 
nuclear-weapon partieR - the "haves". Moreover, the 
nuclear-weapon parties have failed to fulfil the few obligations 
under the Treaty which they do have".9o 
The INF Treaty has been concluded since that statement was made, but it 
generally remains correct as regards disarmament for GCO is not 
universally regarded as practicable or even desirable today. Hedley 
Bull, for example, saw the sovereign States, even without a common 
government, as a society; albeit 
"an imperfect one: its justice is crude and uncertain, as each 
state is judge in its own cause; and gives rise to recurrent 
tragedy in the form of war; but it produces order, regularity, 
predictability and long periods of peace, without involving the 
tyranny of a universal state".91 
He pointed out that more thought had gone into preserving this society 
than abolishing it, and one of its institutions has been national 
armaments of which he said, 
"if armaments are an integral part of the whole system of 
international relations, and stand or fall with it, there are 
serious objections to the notions both of the possibility and the 
desirability of disarmarnent".92 
His objections really stern from his belief that world government, even if 
possible at all either by consensus or conquest, would result in a 
universal tyranny. At the same time, he has no belief in the probability 
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of a change in the nature of the disposition of the state to forego 
altogether aggression and expansion. If collective security is 
impossible without a change in the nature and system of international 
relations, therefore, States must continue to attend to their own 
. t 93 secun y . Both these pessimistic, if realistic, views seem to be 
reflected in the lack of progress to which Barnaby referred. 
It is not necessary here to labour the point that the two schools 
of thought - controllers and disarmers - exist, and that states, in their 
views of the future, are unlikely to adopt one by dismissing the other. 
If one school reads lessons from history whilst the other is concerned 
with a normative view, both may subscribe in some degree to the notion 
that, still today, 
"Peace is artificial: war is natural,,94, and "the power to destroy 
cannot be literally obliterr}ed as long as human beings and their 
productive capacity exist". 
Even if there are now few Hegelians who would suggest that the 
interdependence of states "reduces disputes between them to terms of 
mutual violence", or that "war is not only a practical necessity, it is 
also a theoretical necessity, an exigency of logic", Kolnai, who stood 
for "rational and civilised views of government", agreed that although 
"war in itself is an evil", it might become "under certain circumstances 
a neceaary evil "H. This merely leads to the view that the truth of 
Philip Noel Baker's, 
"comprehensive disarmament wo~+d produce a world in which states de 
not have a predatory nature" , 
has yet to be tested in practice. But if "peace is rationally the goal 
to which societies tend", as argued by Aron,9 8 and if "survival is the 
primary goal of all states", it may follow that, 
"in the most adverse situation force is ultimately necessary to 
guarantee survival, hence military force is always a component of 
national strategy". 9 9 
Where the argument seems to lead is that whilst all States appear 
to agree that war is undesirable, all will continue to reserve the right 
to engage in it. That is, when it is not possible to justify war in 
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terms of 'Just War' theory, the reality of a situation, however arrived 
at in the system of international relations as it is, may demand the use 
of force. An 'inherent right' to that is recognized by Art 51 of the UN 
Charter. The real question is, 
"whether international society can survive if states continue to 
pursue autarchic policies of security and defence".loo 
The question will remain until it is resolved whether, 
"armaments cause wars or are (they) the product of international 
tensions arising from other causes".lOl 
For the disarmers it seem clear that, 
"Rapid advance in military technology, the continued deployment of 
new weapon systems, and the worldwide dissemination of the most 
modern weapons brought about by governmental arms traders! ~re 
having the most serious consequences for world security". o~ 
They may feel that perhaps Madriaga was correct in his assessment that, 
"The problem of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It 
really is the problem of the organization of the world 
corranunity".103 
Availability of Arms in the Causes of War. 
It is unrealistic to divorce sources of supply from possession of 
armaments in a question of the causes of war. Such sources fuel tensions 
just as they may be thought to underpin the activation of a will to 
fight, especially where the arms trade is political and not solely 
commercial. Iraq, of course, was aware of Iran's military build-up 
during ~1e years of Mohd Raza's reign, but judged that the political 
situation favoured Iraq in a short and limited war. But the war was not 
quick, and its duration and outcome then depended on sources of supply of 
arms. What does seem possible is that the long-standing tensions gave 
rise to demand for armaments, and the resort to arms was less an 
appreciation of the arms situation than an effort to harness the 
circumstances obtaining in Iran: arms versus disruption, as it were. 
As an example, therefore, the Iraq-Iran war does not provide an 
answer to Buchan's question**. What does seem likely is that the 
conflicting hypotheses for and against disarmament seem to indicate some 
** (see fn 100) 
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general agreement on some of the terms, not least on the proposition 
that, 
"force is an ineluctable element in international relations, not 
because of any inherent tendency on the part of men to use it, but 
because the possibility of its use exists". "It thus has to be 
deterred and controlled"'rnd if all else fails, used with 
discretion and restraint". 04 
That seems to suggest that if people are in principle 'against 
war', they none the less expect to see it continue as an instrument in 
international relations because the alternative seen is unattainable. At 
the same time they may feel that the possibility of the initiation of war 
rests on availability of weapons with which to fight it, even if that 
consisted only of an exchange of missiles discharged from great distances 
with no face to face combat. 
If the situation is that, 
" ••• in today's world, policies and strategies are usually developed 
after new weapon systems have been acquired", for "in very few 
cases have weapons been developed to fulfil a national military 
requirement ~r even as an answer to a perceived threat to national 
securi ty" , 1 0 
belief in the availability hypothesis may be well grounded. This view of 
consequential development of policies and strategy has been supported in 
all regional theatres of opetations when sophisticated missile systems 
have been introduced into belligerents' arsenals, whether in Vietnam or 
in the Middle East conflicts. 
The need for arms control measures follows such a hypothesiS, as is 
well known to supplying States, for as regards their own national 
interests if not that of their customers they take note of the injunction 
that, 
"What we need to ensure now is that our arms control strategy is in 
line with our security and defence requirements ... the aim of arms 
control is to enhance[o~r at least maintain, our security at lower 
levels of armaments". 
In relation to this equation of security requirements, arms control 
and limitation, the objective of GCD is unrealistic at the moment, as is 
the attainment of perfect defence whether through SOl or a new system of 
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international relations. The situation is bedevilled by the momentum of 
technological weapon development which continues to energize a cycle of 
arms improvement - strategic policy catching up - arms control - arms 
development. The cycle will continue in the absence of effective arms 
development control. In reality this leaves little room for hypotheses 
short of planned progress toward the realisation of the presumed 
intentions of Art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Accepting that war is not primarily the fact of arms and armies, 
and whatever view of control or disa~ent is favoured, war remains a 
political instrument and cannot abolish itself except, perhaps, by the 
obliteration which all-out nuclear war would effect. In any case, human 
agency remains an essential and it must continue to be asked whether the 
use of force can be eliminated, or if not, how it can be controlled if 
the UN as currently organized and operated is not an effective answer. 
political Initiative. 
Irrespective of differences of views on means to be adopted, it is 
generally realised that arms control and disarmament on one hand, and 
defence on the other, are inter-related with both having the aim of 
promoting and enhancing national and, thus, international security. 
Both, however, demand universal and not merely unilateral agreements for 
implicit in the danger of war is the danger of involving other States as 
happened in 1914/1919. 
That there is recognition of the inseparability of arms control and 
defence policies is progress, and the recognition that they are "integral 
parts of foreign policy" is vital. 107 This recognition is obvious from 
the establishment of governmental bodies such as the British Arms Control 
and Disarmament Research Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
the Us Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A negative restraint on at 
least the export of technology is hoped for in the NATO States and Japan, 
and this has the blessing of the governments concerned. 108 
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Restrictions through direct trade channels might retard development 
of weapons giving the West some temporary advantage within a limited time 
scale. But restraint is increasingly being questioned as a result of the 
Gorbachov approaches. Attitudes may not so quickly change. The Tsar's 
Rescript regarding the Hague Conference of 1896 was for discussion on 
'maintenance of general peace and possible reductions of excessive 
armaments which weighed upon all nations'. Two schools of thought 
emerged, but 
"even within the Russian government, suspicion existed regarding 
the desirability of arms limitation discussion". 1 0 9 
The attitude persists with argument as to desirability against 
feasibility: could there be general peace without reduction of excessive 
aDmaments - and what constitutes excessive? 
The Special Session of the UN Conference on Disarmament of 1978 
adopted by consensus, 
"the most comprehensive statement on disarmament ever accepted by 
the world community,,110 , 
but later sessions were less unanimous. 
The 40-Nation Conference on Disarmament meets at Geneva for six 
months each year. Amongst other subjects it has been pursuing an 
agreement on chemical weapons since 1982. 
States enter negotiations with reservations and this is true of 
those of the Special Session kind, which, for technical reasons, cannot 
result in effective action. States with no direct - or likely interest 
in a subject approach the subject from different angles than those 
directly interested. Nuclear states differ from non-nuclear States as 
regards the Treaty on Outer Space of 1967 as well as the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Yet there is some possible argument 
for nuclear weapons in space in that the technology might hinder or 
prevent the outbreak of war. Whilst the argument would lapse with 
abolition of nuclear weapons, the Russian desire for technology has the 
argument in mind in viewing the US plans for 501. 
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The SOl question is only one aspect of an urge for technological 
advance, and States generally now recognize the part to be played in 
future prosperity by technology.lll Nevertheless in foreseeing SOl Bull 
warned that, 
" ••• if the deterrent situation is brought to an end by a 
technological breakthrough, for example the invention of an 
effective defence ..• " the function of nuclear armaments at the 
present time of limiting the incidence of war ... "may cease to be 
so even for nuclear armaments; the deliberate choice of nuclear 
war will become a rational alternative for the superior nuclear 
" 112 power. •• • 
on balance it is probable that Churchill was more perspicacious, 
"It is to the universality of potenti~l destruction that we may 
look with hope and even confidence". 13 
That was said in favour of nuclear deterrence, and so long as it proves 
successful arms control will be limited to numbers of warheads and 
missiles, or even of individual classes: disarmament will remain only a 
possibility for the future. 
In the drive for limiting numbers whilst maintaining a deterrent 
capability, it must be remembered that if arms races are de-stablizing so 
too would be 'disa~ent races', especially if the underlying individual 
foundation of capability is weakened at a disproportionate rate. But not 
all limitation is planned limitation. Some is, 
"What might be called passive disarmament, which is what Defence 
Ministers are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid under 
pressure on the the one hand from Finance Ministers and Cabinet 
colleagues and Star Chambers and on the other, from a seemingly 
inexorable rise in the real costs of defence equipment".114 
It may be too early to believe that disarmament is more likely to 
come about bacause of shrinking defence budgets than because of moral 
urging to limit or eliminate war. The concept of armaments at a lower 
level is as descriptive of cost factors as of numbers. It does not 
change the position of war for when a decision is taken to start a 
conflict forces must go to war equipped as they are - not as they might 
like to be. This has always been so. 
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The United Nations and GCD. 
Perhaps it is implicit in the terms of Art 11.1 of the UN Charter 
that the founders regarded 'disarmament and the regulation of armaments' 
as somewhat academic. This approach seems to have been followed, for in 
Art 26 where the Security Council was empowered to formulate plans '[or 
the establishment of a system for the regulation of arma~ents', only 
recommendations to the Member States was possible. However, as the 
entire enforcement basis of the UN was to rest upon Arts 43 and 44 there 
was a necessary recognition of the reality of the standing armed forces 
of the Member States, and general disarmament was not likely to be of 
immediate moment or priority. The situation may have changed somewhat 
with the years, but international law, as yet, has had little part to 
play in it despite any hopes which may have been founded on Art VI of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Disannarnent: The Future? 
Several factors prevent fulfilment of visions of GCD. First, the 
concept was rejected as fundamentally unrealistic by some analysts. 
Second, fears for survival in the existing international system ensure 
the maintenance of national arsenals. Third, the importance of the 
t . d t' i t' 1 . 115 armamen 1n us r1es n na lona econoffiles. Fourth, the technological 
aspects of weapons research and development and their effect on arms 
balance and stability.116 Fifth, a lack of faith in the ability of the 
Security Council effectively to carry out the duties imposed by the UN 
Charter (which may, alternately, be said to be a lack of faith in the 
willingness of the members to ensure the success of the Charter's 
regimen) . 
In reality it seems only possible to envisage the concept of GCD in 
circumstances in which -
(a) law, custom and contemporary views of morality support 
attitudes in favour of GCD, 
(b) the weight of conscientious objection to defence policies, as 
well as to service in armed forces, m~kes any form of 
conscripted military force unlikel/ 1 , and 
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(c) economic necessities, including environmental protection, 
leave insufficient funds for the provision of military 
equipment and advancing military technology. (In the meantime 
if this is a factor in support of the elimination of armaments 
it also supports defence at a lower cost). 
If law is to have an influence toward disarmament, political 
action, as always, must make progress in the elimination of areas of 
disagreement and apprehension. It is in the nature of human 
relationships and institutions that as one dispute is being settled 
others arise in a continuing process. This has been the case with 
approaches to arms control and disarmament. Now a major concern in the 
west is with agreed measures of nuclear arms control - perhaps nuclear 
disarmament - on one hand and SDI on another. If nuclear disarmament was 
effected it should obviate the need for SDI (and the as yet unforeseen 
problems which SDI might pose). The elimination of a weapon by the 
development of countervailing systems has not been unknown. Its 
likelihood in the case of SDI cannot be predicated merely on US-USSR 
negotiations, even if both subscribed to the hypothesis that, 
"When the security of a state is based only on mutual deterrence 
with the aid of powerful nuclear weapons missiles, it is directly 
dependent on the good will and designs of the other side, which is 
a highly subjective and indefinite factor .... The creation of an 
effective anti-missile system enables the state to make its 
defence dependent chiefly on its own possibilities and not only on 
mutual deterrence". n 8 
Yet the case for having national nuclear arsenals is weakened if 
deterrence would rest on those 'own possibilities' rather than on the 
nuclear weapons themselves. But, of course, effective SDI measurement is 
likely only to be credible in action and not merely theoretically if SDI 
is to influence nuclear disarmament. Thus the discussion remains highly 
political as yet, and 
"We know that unilateral security can no longer be achieved either 
by unilateral withdrawal from the world or by unilateral attempts 
to achieve impregnability,,119, 
according to the Head of the Delegation of the US in the nuclear 
negotiations with the USSR, casting doubt on the 'disarming' qualities to 
be expected of SDI and putting the argument back to 1972 and the ABM 
Treaty. Adding weapons to an arsenal is unlikely to lead to di5armament 
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and SDr in any case might lead to an arms race in space and to the 
abrogation of the outer Space Treaty of 1967. 
Throughout, the argument is an acceptance of belief that GCD is 
impossible without some kind of world government with power to shape its 
own institutions, enforcement methods and means. The deficiencies of the 
League of Nations and the UN illustrate the hurdles to be jumped. If 
disagreement was of detail the difficulty might be overcome. But it is 
disagreement in principle which is involved, and the time for systemic 
change apparently is not yet. Vagaries of interpretation and 
uncertainties of intention in the EEC, and burden-sharing calculation in 
NATO, illustrate difficulties always liable to arise in international 
organizations. Long-standing differences between Greece and Turkey 
remain unresolved despite common membership of NATO which in practice has 
not proved to divert or direct all their attention from perceived 
national to international interests. 
The periodical reviews of the Non-Proliferation Treaty already 
undertaken offer advocates of disanmament small encouragement, nor will 
they be encouraged by the proliferation of ballistic missile armed States 
for that exposes some regional instabilities as well as increasing 
sophisticated arms production capacity. 
Technological advance in nuclear weapons and missiles attracts 
little disfavour even though their end results may be unforeseen and 
unforeseeable. After 30 years of the 'peaceful' use of nuclear energy, 
problems attendant on closing down nuclear power stations are only now 
being examined and casted. Technological and engineering progress in 
weapons systems is to be feared as well as favoured for it is the 
creation and availability of weapons not their destruction that prevent 
disarmament. The seesaw effect cycle produced by the availability of 
obsolescent weapons following arms control agreements or modernisation 
and their re-distribution to other States is also to be feared. 
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Arms control is not disannament and measures effective in Europe do 
not solve universal problems: global conventional stability talks remain 
vital. Advice such as, 
"Forget spurious morality, foreign policy that is based on anything 
other than self-interest is as unlikely to survive as it is 
impossible to conceive".120 
is generated by contemporary realities but it is as applicable to the 
production, proliferation and global distribution of armaments and the 
means of making war as to defence because national self-interest is 
concerned with national economics as well as with national security. 
It would be wrong in this thesis, therefore, to leave the subject 
of arms control and disarmament without considering the national and 
international trade in arms. 
Arms Sales and Transfers. 
The 'regulation of armaments' has to comprehend the two separate 
connotations of defence and the arms trade, but the defence aspect tends 
to receive more attention as it is this which forms the basis for the 
bi-Iateral treaties which are seen as urgent steps towards the 
elimination of particular inter-State wars. 
The consequential but theoretical background of a strategy of arms 
control measures is clear from Arts II and 24 of the UN Charter. 
Reviewing the US-USSR bi-lateral agreements at one extreme and lack of 
progress towards the realization of Art VI of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty at the other, the practice discloses that enthusiasm for the 
subject is muted by industrial and commercial considerations. 
In the long run it may have been a mistake in Art II to limit the 
General Assembly to making recommendations to the Security Council for 
such recommendations could result only in a plan for submission to the 
member-States the most powerful of which have shown little desire to 
institute a universal regulatory system. But if the regulation of 
armaments ought properly to include decision on the legality of a weapon 
judicial opinion should have been provided for. However, if regulation 
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is not of inventories but of sources (ie, of arms sales and transfers) 
powers beyond mere recommendation are essential to a regulatory process. 
In the weak position of the UN, in the paradoxical situation that 
arms producing States will seek to finance some of their own defence 
spending from profits and taxation of an export arms trade, and in the 
motivating factors generating the giving of military aid and assistdnce, 
it would seem inevitable that movement toward universal regulation would 
be a frustrating business. That frustration is exacerbated in practice 
by the economics of the arms trade which is dictated by the politics of 
States both as suppliers and customers. Where amour propre is not the 
villain (as in the similar case of state airlines) a perceived need for 
tools to assist in self-help is. 
It is necessary to question the purpose for purchase and the 
relationship of arms purchases and defence commitment. Multi-lateral 
forms of arms control which set ceiling figures have little relative 
effect on the strengths of forces. What is important is the transfer of 
types of arms which would offer marked advantage for one State over 
another and missile technology has been a recent example repeated many 
times. Setting up facilities for domestic manufacture has vital 
implications for regional balance. Both Libya and Iraq have been 
assisted in their ambitions in the nuclear and chemical warfare fields by 
Western technology however acquired and despite any illegality of weapon 
or weapon proliferation. For the industrial States factorins 
construction, and providing the machinery and knowledge, forms part of 
their export trade whether legitimate or othet~ise. 
In all the circumstances the omission of any direct reference to 
the arms trade from NATO's Ccmprehensive Concept of Arms Control and 
Disarmament is not surprising121 • The Declaration of the Heads of State 
and Government which accompanied the Comprehensive Concept stated that, 
"31. We will seek to contain the newly emerging security threats 
and destabilising consequences resulting from the uncontr<?ped 
spread and application of modern rnilitdry technologies".l .. 
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In reality any question of direct limitation of the arms trade whether in 
NATO or the UN will remain for decision by the individual member States. 
States have different levels of military, economic and industrial 
capability and ambition. Concentrating almost exclusively on the US-USSR 
(NATO-WPO) negotiations, or on the eventual attainment of GCD, takes 
little account of the smaller States and their propensities for war. 
Equally, concentrating on bilateral nuclear agreements between the two 
super powers takes no cognizance of their client States, how they are 
armed, and by whom. 1 23 
Arms sales and transfers are not limited to providing for client 
States, nor are they exclusively between an industrial and a 
non-industrial state. The search for a main battle tank to replace the 
Challenger in the British anmy prompted competition between West Germany 
(Leopard 2), the us (Abrams Ml), and the British Challenger II. If a 
non-British vehicle had been chosen it would not have raised any 
principle, moral or othe~ise, about the arms trade by those who opposed 
the purchase, but only a debate on the merits of not buying home-produced 
124 products. This is a matter of the normal competitive nature of the 
arms trade. 
In arms trading there is some governmental interference which tends 
to be muted by the deep-seated theology of free trade on the part of 
h f 1 th d 12<, t ose power u States at share most of the international arms tra e. 
These States also decide what restraints they will apply to the trade as 
it directly affects themselves and how they will police their own 
legislation. 
Determination to use force if necessary to assure the national 
interests of a State can be ~aintained, and the determination sustained, 
only by capability for armed conflict. States which do not - or cannot -
equip their armed and police forces from indigenous manufacture must 
import from States that are willing to supply armaments. For obvious 
reasons of capital investment and because of differing technological 
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standards, specialisation skills, and economic abilities to spend 
lavishly on armament research and development, even some industrial 
States today have to rely on others such as the US, the USSR, France, 
Britain and, increasingly Japan. 126 The arms trade is a continuous 
process, It does not operate on any 'once only' basis for armed forces 
demand a constant up-dating of equipment to keep pace with the 
modernisation to be seen in the equipment of other forces. 
Justifying Arms Sales. 
When weapons of war were hand held and unsophisticated there was 
some balance of forces and technology. Each centre of population had its 
armourer, fletcher, smith and bowyer, and the engine of war - the horse -
was bred locally. War was then endemic but limited to the extent of the 
availability of weapon numbers and the weapon-making capacity and 
capability. The North-West frontier tribesmen of India (Pakistan) had 
long been examples of operators of limited war restrained by local 
weapon-making and stealing effort. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan 
has changed the situation and now underlines how vital external arms 
supply is for factions with no modern industrial infrastructure. It has 
also introduced modern warfare and weapon~ on a sophisticated scale 
which will bedevil Afghanistan in the future and make Pakistan's policy 
to deny Pakhtunistan more difficult to maintain. Terrorism is largely a 
matter of the availability of weapons supply supporting the dogmatism 
which collectivities, interest groups, and 'religious' organizations can 
command. The Mujahideen are 'freedom fighters' to Pakistan but 
terrorists (dushmani) to the Russians. 
The arms industries of the world, state-owned or encouraged, have 
equal ability to make possible armed conflict or to buttress deterrence. 
In the proliferation of arms manufacturing states there seems little 
chance that such cause for concern will be aroused as to lead to 
prohibition and dismantling. Instead, only 'terrorist' arms 'factories' 
are destroyed when discovered. This is an opportunistic policy of States 
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in the interest of the State as a manufacturer, as well as being in the 
public interest. A difficulty occurs when terrorist forces develop into 
armed opposition and civil war. 
The apparent concern of the 1925 Geneva Conference is now largely 
forgotten: instead encouragement of arms production is said to be 
essential on the grounds that it is not only sound domestic economic 
policy but also necessary for national autonomy in defence matters. 12J 
Western industrial States as well as Taiwan, South Korea, and 
increasingly North Korea, Israel and South Africa advance these views. 
Such a policy for South Africa necessarily followed UN imposition of an 
arms embargo. The Brazilian government encouraged domestic arms 
manufacture as a factor of national export and economic policy, but the 
development stenuned rather from "the armed forces organization culture" 
consequent on Brazil's successive military governments. 1 28 It is a story 
repeated in many States with military regimes composing, or sustaining, 
governments. Liberal domestic commercial policies lead to the 
development of arms industries, and subsequently to collaboration by the 
machinery manufacturing and transportation industries. In Brazil many 
Western automobile manufacturers had local subsidiary companies that also 
collaborated. 
As the range of sophisticated weapons arsenals grows a matter for 
concern is that 22 developing countries have active ballistic missile 
programmes; 17 Third World States have deployed such weapons; and they 
have been used in operations in Syria, Egypt, Libya and the Afghanistan 
army as well as by both sides in the Iraq-Iran war. More worrying is 
that these missiles are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. 1 29 
There is no international legal inhibition on the development by a 
State of its own arms industry. Instead, the total effect of indigenous 
arms production, and the consequential reduction in imports by Third 
World manufacturing states, may ensure that there will be less restraint 
or influence on importing States than was formerly exercised by the super 
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and medium exporting countries. But lack of the technical knowledge 
necessary for the production of more sophisticated systems is an initial 
restraint. Some local control is exercised especially in the case of 
weapons produced under licence, but, as in Brazil, support by 
multi-national companies is likely to be forthcoming as opportunities 
offer. What may be required is a Non-Proliferation of Technological 
Information and Equipment Treaty in respect of sophisticated and 'smart' 
conventional weapons to displace or supplement such organizations as 
COCOM (Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export controls).130 
Such a treaty, however, is unlikely to reach even a draft proposal. 
Development of indigenous arms manufacture does not result only 
from external pressures from exporters or even from economic 
considerations. UN embargoes result from the very conduct which 
necssitates access to sources of arms supply (as in the cases of south 
Africa and Iraq-Iran). External dangers are also potent factors even 
when, as in Israel, a 'sponsor' could be relied upon for arms and 
financial support. Experience shows that when indigenous arms industries 
are set up with the purpose of making States self-sufficient at least to 
some degree in arms supply, it is not long before export outlets are 
sought. But all is not plain sailing for such industries. Political and 
economic difficulties may lead to reduced military budgets with resulting 
difficulties in financing arms procurement. In the face of foreign 
competition a home producer must reduce unit costs, or seek longer 
production runs resulting in surpluses to domestic requirements. 
A substantial source of supply also arises from surpluses thrown up 
when forces are re-equipped and their e~uipment modernised with the 
latest weapons. The older weapons may still be desirable and regionally 
advantageous to another State. 
In an alliance such as NATO reduction in defence allocations affect 
the quantities of locally produced equipment which each member will 
purchase for its forces. Current 'zero growth' formulae adopted by NA'ro 
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States in place of the annual 3% growth policy which recently obtained 
resulted from the improved atmosphere for arms control in Europe about 
which Mr Gorbachov said that, 
"OUr principle is simple: all armaments should be limi ted and 
reduced ... if there is any imbalance, we must restore the balance 
not by letting the one short of some elements build trem up, but 
by having the one with more of them scale them down. 1 1 
Thus, both scaling down and budgetary limitations may increse the 
availability of arms for trade purposes. With competition between arms 
manufacturers and between a~.s manufacturing States, and an availability 
of surplus arms through controls mentioned, falling prices will result. 
This will allow purchases by States that could not previously have 
afforded such purchases, and is a reason for universal agreement on 
budget limitation as well as arms limitation, as was proposed at the 1899 
Hague Peace Conference. Compensatory transfer from manufacture of 
a~ents to manufacture of other goods to maintain economic equilibrium 
will be essential. 
State Support for Arms Manufacture. 
Trade in arms as in other commodities can be a weapon of foreign 
policy. Brazil provides an example of the priviledged position of arms 
manufacture in industrial States. It can often offer employment when 
other industry is in recession, help the balance of payment equation, and 
present electoral advantages - the American 'pork barrel' for some 
politicians. The slow progress of rationalization and standardization 
within NATO is indicative of the importance of their arms industries to 
the member States. Price per item comparisons favourable to 
American-produced arms do not always alter the preference by west 
European member States for their home productions. 
Government support for arms industries is not limited to defence 
purchases and finance. Even when defence requirements and commercial 
sales are predominantly concerned political influence or pressure may 
still be applied, especially in export trade licensing. Political 
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direction may be indicated to firms whether state-owned or private, or to 
local units of multi-national companies particularly when foreign 
investment in domestic enterprises is concerned. In Britain there have 
been anxieties regarding many arms manufacturing firms including GEe, 
English Electric, westland and Ferranti. 
It may be true, however, that a need for overall commercial 
viability in multi-national companies makes a national policy more 
difficult to apply without threat of interference from the State where 
the company is incorporated. How the firm of Krupp (a portion of which 
has been owned by Iran since 1974) has been affected in sales to Iraq and 
Iran may be less public, but any attempt by the Federal German government 
to nationalize or compulsorily purchase the Iranian holding could have 
been viewed in the context of oil embargo countermeasures. The position 
of COCOM is also relevant. 132 
Another aspect of governmental interest is demonstrated by the 
German and Russian arms industries which used the Spanish Civil War as a 
proving ground under battle conditions of equipment designed for their 
own forces. Such a valuable laboratory is not always available, but the 
US is said to have access to Israeli first hand experience of American 
equipment used in the Middle East: 
"A recent survey in the Washington Post showed that Israel now buys 
$500 million worth of parts a year from 15,000 different American 
companies ••• the Pentagon receives detailed information from Israel 
on the performance of American-made we~pons, some of which have 
never been used in cOlrbat by the US". 1 
There is a real danger of weapons looking for a war in which to be test~d 
under battle conditions, and such a war need not be between States. In 
civil war, weapon availability may make the difference between domestic 
protest and violent insurgency. 
Control of Arms Sales and Transfers. 
Major transactions in arms are not made in the open market, but are 
the results of political and commercial negotiations. Transfers by way 
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of military aid, or under the terms of an alliance agreement, are 
dictated primarily by political and economic policies. 
Arms control if extending to arms sales and transfers lies in 
embargo on physical transfer or in restrictions imposed by a supplying 
state on its exporting agencies. But such control is difficult to 
exercise for systems of supply are often either indirect or deliberately 
obscured. Restrictions on use may be imposed, for instance in limiting 
weapons to police or defensive purposes, but difficulty of verification 
and control is obvious. 
Transfers of arms from one State to another, if controlled, are 
generally regulated by domestic legislation,134 which may be in 
confo~ity with a UN Resolution or Recommendation135 , by inter-State 
agreement, or unilaterally by observance of contractual conditions of 
sale or transfer. There is also a possibility of total prohibition of a 
state from exporting arms such as is prescribed by the Japanese 
Constitution, but interpretation of 'arms' may prove contentious. 
On the other hand proliferation may be encouraged by 
extra-commercial considerations such as subsidies, interest-free loans 
and other inducements to purchase like payment by raw materials or other 
barter arrangements. Such considerations are not matters for 
international publIc law unless weapons prohibited by international 
convention are concerned: rather they fall within the law of contract. 
Political administration and efforts to improve standards of living 
may offer some priority to moral values, but commercial transactions in 
the arms industry have no regard for such values except in so far as they 
may be applied by legislatior. 136 The world is a commercial and 
industrial place and international relations are more and more concerned 
with 'oiling the wheels of commerce' .131 The economies of States, often 
geared to welfare-state subvention which demands an increasing industrial 
output to satisfy welfare ideals, tend to accept whatever is fiscally 
rewarding. Commodities which can be produced, marketed and exported 
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encourage a national commecial outlook especially in newly industrial 
states. Even bureaucrats and educationalists who may wish to avoid 
direct contact with mercantilism must nevertheless support an industrial 
basis of society whether as administrators and executives of the 
industrially conscious State, or in preparing the younger generations for 
entry into the industral society. It is little wonder, therefore, that 
the industrial society incorporates the armaments industry as a 
commercially orientated and necessary element. 
Recurrent balance of payments deficits in many States encourage 
government support for exporting. As adverse balances become serious or 
habitual a more relaxed view of the activities of their exporting 
manufacturers than rhetoric on arms control may imply may be taken by 
governments. This is serious enough when conventional weapons are 
concerned, but the arms trade has not refrained from selling chemical 
weapons and related materials as the recent case of the RABTA plant in 
Libya 'designed to produce chemical weapons' shows. Even if not on a 
government to government basis instances of assistance in setting-up 
nuclear plant and processes for military purposes has been suspected in 
contravention of the NPT for example in Iraq and Palestine. 
It has not been unusual for both the us and the USSR to place 
restrictions of some kind on some arms supplied although transfers by way 
of military aid may have been unconditional. Subsequent transfer to a 
third party has been restricted except in cases where it was the real 
intention of the transactions. France on the other hand made no secret 
of the fact that it was selling 'independence' by way of arms for Third 
World States. Since the law of 1987 (Loi Progarnmation Militaire) the 
necessity to co-operate with other States in arms development programmes 
may place some restriction on an unlimited policy of arms sales, as well 
as on a policy of offering such a means of independence. 
Co-ordinating Committee for Multi-lateral Export Controls (COCOM). 
It is not only international agreements and how they are observed 
that make for collective action. Reciprocity and fears of reprisal have 
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similar effect. This is a basis of the operation of COCOM which is an 
organization composed of the NATO members (except Iceland) and Japan, and 
is administered under an informal understanding arrived at in 1949. 
There is no treaty or inter-State agreement and the secretariat has no 
international status. 
The principle of COCOM is that commercial instincts and interests 
have to be subordinated to alliance solidarity in the matter of the sale 
or transfer of technology and some of its products from Western States to 
the Russian bloc. It has been described as follows: 
"Cocom's task is to restrict Western exports to the Communist 
World. The Germans, ever anxious to increase their own trade with 
the Eastern bloc, are increasingly critical of the whole system: 
the Greeks reportedly turn a blind eye to it: the British fear 
that US export laws may impinge on UK export rights, and the 
Americans are quick to accuse their partners of selling computer 
secrets to the East". 
Fisk described the Organization's method of dealing with offenders: 
"We don't put pressure on them (citing "such diverse organizations 
as the Irish Government's 'Export Control Delegation', the Swedish 
'Industrialists' Group', the Swiss Ministry of Defence, and south 
Korean business groups" which regularly attend meetings with 
Pentagon officials) "and they know we are not their enemy. But if 
they sell the wrong stuff to the RUssi~rs, they know they won't be 
getting any more technology from US".l 
Fisk did not report whether the members of COCOM received treatment 
identical to that received by the 'diverse organizations'. In any case 
it is doubtful if on basic issues COCOM is able to effect the controls 
for which it is intended. Aggressive industrial and technological 
espionage makes control difficult. The breach in April 1987 which 
resulted in the sale of machine tool equipment to the USSR allowing it to 
produce almost silent propellors for submarines in a case in point. 139 
Further, the importance attached by States to their arms sales trade is 
illustrated by the euphoric manner in which news of arms sales agreements 
ubl ' , d 140 are p lClse. 
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The UN and Constraints on Arms Transfers. 
The practical application of restrictions on arms transfers adopted 
by the UN is likely to vary from State to State. All forms of sanction 
against a State agreed in the UN are effective only to the extent that 
they are imposed and policed by individual States. 141 
Unevenness in application of controls follows from the economic 
importance of arms sales to manufacturing States which makes universal 
co-operation in embargoes under UN Resolutions unlikely. Weaknesses in 
enforcing sanctions were exposed in Rhodesia and South Africa, and no 
doubt would have continued in Iraq and Iran but for the ceasefire agreed 
between them. Embargoed States will naturally seek to circumvent 
restrictions and as arms transactions are viewed commercially there ar~ 
always interstices to be found in sanctions walls as the result of 
political pragmatism as well as commercial enterprise. 
Where terrorists in a State receive arms supplied by another State 
- as the IRA is reported to l~ave done from Libya - there may be appeal to 
the UN under Art 39 of the Charter as being likely to lead to breach of 
international peace. The offended State, however, must still apply its 
own remedies. 
Arms supply to 'independence fighters' raises many issues as sides 
are taken in the UN as US governments have found regarding both Nicaragua 
and Afghanistan. But support for a faction such as the Contras in 
Nicaragua shows which side in the conflict the supplying government 
favours. Commercial priorities rather than disinterest in the result of 
a conflict may induce a State even to supply arms to both sides (China in 
the Iraq-Iran war, for exarnple)142. 
Wars begin and are sustained by armaments and suggestions (by Alva 
Mydral for instance) have been made that the UN should collect and 
distribute information regarding national armaments by means of a UN 
international disarmament control agency. The proposal has not been 
promoted enthusiastically, and not only because commercial interests have 
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been lukewann. Arms sales and transfers are influential counters in 
international relations affecting voting in the UN. In any case, it is 
when demand for arms is lightest and weakest that agreement on 
restriction is more difficult to obtain from the manufacturing countries 
because of the competitive commercial pressures being applied. 
The purpose of arms embargoes by the UN, however, is not solely of 
arms limitation but to bring about cessation of hostilities as in 
relation to the Iraq/Iran conflict. Security Council Res 598 may yet 
prevail to transform cease fire to peace treaty, but both States are 
replenishing their arsenals. Generally, it is the circumstances seen by 
the belligerents rather than UN recommended sanctions, (that is, where 
the force of circumstances begin and the circumstances of force end), 
which will dictate, for if only arms supply is in point some State will 
be found willing to meet demand. 
It is unnecessary to look beyond casualty lists for the effects of 
the arms trade, and in this context it is not necessary to take account 
of the causation of war and the will to fight to underline the truism 
that, 
"The history of warfare is inseparable from the history of weapons 
and weapons designed f~r the fight have a central place in the 
military dimension", 14 
and now increasingly in the political and economic dimensions. Thus with 
the help of other governments, 
"Iraq has been able to keep Iran from winning decisive victories 
because it has dominated the race for new arms imports".l~~ 
In Afghanistan the supply of arms via Pakistan to the Mujahideen may well 
have been a deciding factor in a Russian decision to withdraw her troops. 
Experience shows that it is not enough for States to acknowledge 
the need for control and limitation of the arms trade; they must 
constitute the means to ensure these ends. International law as a means 
can perhaps be effective if it is backed by positive law but arms traffic 
in this Century has demonstrated how relatively easy it is to avoid 
unsupported legal prohibi tiOliS and registers. 
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Proposals for a register of arms transfers were made at the League 
of Nations,145 at the UN by various members including Malta (1965) and 
Denmark (1967): the idea was rejected at the 1970 Geneva Conference on 
Disa~ent. Obvious reasons for rejecting a register and other 
initiatives to restrict arms transfers are the conflicting interests of 
vendor and purchaser and traditional, innate secrecy on the part of seme 
states as to their defences and equipment. This applied to the aborted 
Conventional Arms Talks initiatied by President Carter (1974-1978) which 
envisaged a combination of legal/political and military/technical 
restraints. A compromise is included in the Final Document of the 1978 
UN Special Session on Disarmament, 
"consultation should be carried out among major arms supplier and 
recipient countries on the limitation of all types of conventional 
weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished 
security of the parties with a view to rromoting or enhancing 
stability at a lower military level". 14 
stability in the first instance is a regional problem in the present 
international system, but becomes a universal problem in the long term. 
Arms control and disarmament, however, require universal application and 
President D'Estaing's view at the 1978 Session, 
"that to seek universal principles would be inefficient and 
contrary to political realities,,147 
in the present world diversity would itself prove accurate as the arms 
trade would operate where it could. It is a weakness of regional as 
opposed to universal decision-seeking that States, especially Third World 
states, wish to see all being treated equally and Subject to identical 
restrictions. It is those States that need economic assistance which 
find restrictions most crippling as regards arms supply, but who feel 
most vulnerable to regional inequalities. In any case, how is a region 
to be defined and where does overlap and interdependence end? 
Investigation of the inventory of arms available at the beginning 
of the Iraq/Iran war would have disclosed build-up based on Arab-Israeli, 
as well as on the Gulf and oil, situations and, in respect of the latter, 
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the Saudi-Arabian build-up. Oil in itself might have become a cause for 
war: what regional limitation could then have applied? 
States have to police strictly to preserve domestic arms restraints 
in company with customs and treasury enforcement. There are difficulties 
to be envisaged in setting up and enforcing international legal 
restraints which would fall to be controlled by those same domestic 
148 
organs. Only changed political outlook will affect a rationalization 
and coertion of the arms trade, but whilst there are no universal curbs 
on arms manufacture there is little likelihood of a manufacturing State 
mounting a major campaign to restrict arms transfers universally. 
The reality today, therefore, is that international arms trading is 
not illegal per se and a blanket prohibition is unlikely to be placed on 
the trade for lack of consensus among industrial States. In any case 
enforcement and verification in present circumstances would prove 
impossible. 
It is fairly certain, however, that influential States will 
continue to have little real difficulty in buying even the latest 
weapons, aircraft, naval vessels and other armaments whether the interest 
and influence is oil (as Iran and Iraq); geographical situation (as 
Vietnam); regional leadership (as India)149; and some States may combine 
more than one source of influence (Saudi Arabia and India). 
In their legal manifestations arms control measures and 
unco-ordinated limitations on arms sales indicate a continuing place for 
war rather than for its abolition for, in practical terms, they protect 
the place of war. 
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PART rv 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the existing international system of interdependent States 
enforceable world policies are the results of consensus fonnulated in 
international law and adopted in municipal law by the exercise of 
national sovereignty. The enforcement of policies so acopted is also a 
duty of states as a matter of national sovereignty. 
War is regulated under international law bo~~ as to its legitimac! 
and its conduct in operations and termdnation. 
Where a State considers international law to be incomplete in any 
particular affecting itself and another State it may seek to fill the 
vacuum by means of inter-State treaties. Treaties such as these may 
include the mutual limitation of armaments and other steps to reduce the 
possibility of war between the parties. 
That these principles do not always command obedience in a system 
which depends upon a diversity of national choices is to be expected. 
For that reason the UN was embodied in 1945 as the international control 
organization over the customary sovereign right of States to make war. 
From the UN the law could be developed, disobedience called into 
question, and the danger of war mitigated or prevented through open 
debate and collective action by civil or military means. Ad hoc 
peacekeeping forces, and truce observer forces, could be established 
designed to alleviate situations which might lead to conflict. In its 
operation, however, the UN must always re).y on the individual member 
States for action and for finances. 
It will be clear that in principle the place of 'N.ar i~ society 
should now be subject to regulation by international law and its 
institutions especially in matters of: 
(a) National sovereignty and international law. 
(b) Arms control and disarmament. 
(c) Collective security. 
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(d) Conduct in war. 
The conclusions which follow attempt to summarize some effects 
which both the law and the practice have had on the place of 'Nar in 
society. 
International Law, National sovereignty and the Place of War. 
The place of war - the lowest common denominator of international 
society - is now the result of conflict be~~en the interests of ~~e 
international community andthe claims of sovereignty and nationalism of 
States (and Federations), that is, be~~en the observance or 
non-observance of international law. So far armed conflict has been 
mitigated when the exercise of sovereign power has been controlled by 
economic necessities because international conflict is also a conflict 
between economic powers and standards of living. The conflict of 
interests between the international and the State societies is evidenced 
by the frequent non-observance in practice of concessions reluctantly 
made to demands to limit State sovereignty. 
This conflict has remained continuous in its incidents 
no~~ithstanding that there is an international mechanism for the control 
of war and the place of war, the united Nations. The views of 
governments are presented in this international organisation by unelected 
representatives. In consequence, the UN organization is remote from the 
peoples of the international community, and the views expressed in it may 
well be unsupported by national vote as changes in national goverrunents 
have demonstrated. 
The UN organization is founded in international law and a cursory 
examination of post-war history shows that whilst the effect of 
international law in this Century has been to outlaw aggressive war, (as 
well as the use of certain weapons and means of war), the behaviour of 
States and international institutions has often been to deny such an 
effect. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the place of war in 
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inte~tional society has been circumscribed by international law and the 
influence of that law on public opinion. 
It is for each State to determine '~ether war is to continue as an 
inst~nt of international politics, and each State's view of ~~e place 
of war is affected by that adopted by other States. The reality is that 
although the illegality of aggressive war is explicit in the UN C~arter, 
and although certain methods and means of warfare have been prohibited by 
the Geneva Protocol! of 1977, observance of these limitations on 
sovereignty has been frustrated on many occasions by failure of foresight 
and of enforcement. That is only to say international society has mcved 
from the vague "desire to diminish the evils of war, so far as t.~e 
military requirements permit" (of Hague Convention IV of 1907) to the 
prohibitions of the UN Charter and the 1977 Protocol. But unlike the UN 
Charter which is generally binding on States as regards the settlement of 
disputes, the Convention and Protocol are subject to the procedural 
requirements of treaty making. These limit the binding nature of the 
Convention and Protocol to the States adhering to them and subject their 
content to the declarations, reservations and objections of the adhering 
States (notwithstanding the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
1969) • 
As Art 1 of the UN Charter makes clear by implication the effect 
on the place of war brought about by international law may be greater in 
the fields of economics, commerce and industry since military budgets and 
strategic policy are dictated by economic circumstances (of which spanish 
silver, African gold and Middle Eastern oil are historical examples). 
Economic declarations in the UN may often be of more relevance to the 
place of war than overtly military Resolutions. 
It may not be clear, however, if economic stability is now a 
pre-requisite for military stability or whether wars are still fought 
with an underlying purpose of attaining economic stability. What seems 
clear from contemporary events is that military stability on an imperial 
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scale may undermine economic stability, and if this is not to be 
redressed by expansionist military adventure it will have to be sought by 
peaceful means as the UN Charter prescribes. A continuously changing 
place for war affected chiefly by economic forces may stem from respect 
for and a calling in aid of international law when a State is weak, 
albeit disregarding it when the state is strong. 
Although the laws of war remain applicable whether a war is lawful 
or unlawful, and whether or not it is in breach of conventional 
agreements, the place of war as an expression of sovereignty has not as 
yet been directly affected by the possibility that other States will 
exercise the powers provided by the Charter. 
Involved in a state's place for war are standing forces and 
operational plans whether for aggression or defence, and a belief that 
self-help may still be required in international relations and in 
intractable disputes. For the state the major difference between peace 
and war may be that the violence of its sanctions is normally directed 
against the persons and property of its citizens when they fall into 
dispute with domestic law, but the concept of international ~~r directs 
the State's violence against the citizens of other States in defiance of 
the legal concept of sovereignty. But if one State's sovereign power 
includes the right to wage war it is potentially at the expense of 
another State's sovereignty and territory. Traditions of sovereignty may 
have supported the notion: international law forbids it. The precaution 
implicit in a place for defensive war is not illegal, and for offensive 
war illegality arises only when war become a fact. 
One purpose of international law and custom is intended to ensure 
that international relations are conducted within an internationally 
agreed framework. The civilized formalities are contained in the Vienna 
Conventions on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, on Consular Relations of 
1963, and on the Law of Treaties of 1969. 1 Other customs and ways of 
organizing international relations have also arisen in the past, basing 
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their detail on different premises. These can sometimes produce results 
contrary to those produced by other concepts. Religion, for example, can 
produce divergent views of proper conduct in the same circumstances. 
However, in this Century codes derived mainly from the customs of the 
European nations (which had sought to determine when war was just and how 
it should be justly conducted) have provided a common approach for all 
States. These codes expressed what can be regarded as eternal verities 
of human conduct translated from individual to State in jus ad bellum, 
and back to the individual in jus in bello. Thus the practice of 
genocide is condemned as adhorrent in war and peace just as the St. 
Bartholomew's Day slaughter of 1572 is now condemned. 2 
The eternal verities today are said increasingly to be subject to 
contemporary circumstances and interpretation. Similarly, in particular 
cases common law interpretation is said to be affected by modern thought 
and conditions, although no subsequent statutory provisions have been 
passed to affect earlier precedents. It is an easy transition from a 
doctrine of desuetude to repeal by statute as has happened in Scots Law . .1 
But there is no analogy between repeal in domestic and agreed 
parliamentary procedure and a concept such as rebus sic stantibus which 
may apply in inter-State treaties but not in actual law. 
It is reasonable to claim that the laws of war are immutable and 
affect equally warlike practice and means.· But eternal verities are not 
identical for all civilizations and religions, and evolutionary progress 
at variable rates of change affect attitudes to morals and to particular 
laws - a position made more difficult by variable responses by individual 
States to limitations on their sovereignty. 
Change in international relations usually implies more authority 
for central organizations, but elements of sovereignty are not given up 
lightly. When sovereignty is surrendered voluntarily it is in return for 
some quid pro quo: when the result of compulsion it is rarely finally 
accepted but remains a cause for future dispute (e.g. the Baltic states). 
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Since 1945 there has been an incidental movement to limit sovereignty 
through interdependence and internationalization (for instance in 
communications and in atomic development). But at the same time the 
expansionist counter-movement of decolonization and consequental 
proliferation of new States has created problems for any role the UN 
might have in Dickenson's hypothesis." Even if some of the new States 
have been created without bloodshed others were encouraged by foreign aid 
and arms to freedom through conflict (for example Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Aden, Angola, though decolonization might have resulted without the 
bloodshed in some cases). 
In consequence the international system has progressed from a more 
limited individual sovereignty to a greatly increased number of units 
exercising that sovereignty. As the evolutionary position of these 
sovereign powers varies from ex-Imperial to newly created, an 'adequate 
proc~dure' for consensus-making from such different points of view (and 
material national interests) has been made progressively more difficult. 
The UN, like newly created States, has needed the benefit of experience. 
Apart from those different starting points from which States 
argue, war is the more difficult to eliminate because of the recurrent 
threat implicit in the advance by one State in the technological means of 
combat. Technology could be harnessed to an 'adequate procedure' 
especially by more effective surveillance and redistribution of resources 
but this is not in evidence. Rather the utilization of technical 
resources and resourcefulness continues to encourage arms races. On the 
other hand efforts to deny the victorious in war the fruits 0f 
territorial conquest, even if a further limitation of national 
sovereignty, would eliminate one cause of war. In the absence of the 
'adequate procedure' it would be myopic to think that calculations of 
possible gains from war are no longer possible. The Middle East, 
Iraq/Iran, and the Falklands Islands conflicts all had some form of 
territorial gain as a war aim. 
• See page 339 
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The concept of sovereignty with its integral concomitant of armed 
acquisition as well as voluntary relinguishment also includes an ability 
to retain as well as to surrender territory. By custom the concept may 
include an ability to regain what had been surrendered voluntarily even 
if it has been written into a treaty. such retrogression may form 
incidentally a basis for the doctrine of the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus. s 
There is an exception specific to general and imposed instruments 
such as the UN Charter where even non-adherence will not form a ground 
for non-observance in some circumstances. 6 But provision is made in the 
Charter for amendment,7 and a similar procedure is available in normal 
treaty making so that possible grounds for invoking the clausula would be 
obviated. Territorial conquest has been frequently the reason for war, 
however, and if international law did not clearly endorse the fruits of 
war and conquest, reality did. But is territorial conquest still a 
rational war aim? Custom at least seems to be moving against it now that 
humanitarian demands, nationalism, and general opinion have virtually 
effected the demise of colonialism and the military support of trade 
adventurism, and Art 2.4 of the UN Charter forbids conquest. Even in 
Great Power policies the exercise of a concept of uti poSSidetis seems 
now to be inhibited by global opinion if the withdrawal of the USSR from 
Afghanistan is to be regarded as reflecting contemporary standards. But 
the possibility has not been eliminated: Israel, Iraq and Argentina have 
maintained it since 1945 and no doubt included it in calculations of 
their military capability. 
The transition in this Century from Great Power politics (which 
were inhibited, if at all, only by balance of power policie5) to the 
imperfect influence of majorities in the UN has been masked by 
fundamental disagreements among the most powerful members of the 
organization. 
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In its practical operation the system of international relations 
depends on political co-operation between states, but politics is founded 
on pragmatism and the exercise of national sovereignty is affected by the 
demands of party politics. Development of international law, which is 
usually a limitation on sovereignty even if voluntarily accepted, also 
requires political co-operation, but the pragmatic operation of 
international politics makes such development difficult. This need for 
international co-operation is not always satisfied thus making continuity 
in international matters uncertain. 
As it is now conducted, the international relations system in 
principle remains subject to voluntary acceptance and enforcement of 
international agreements. Enforcement of international law also requires 
political co-operation, but pragmatism militates against universal 
effectiveness. Even if legal principles and customary law are accepted 
in general the practice may not always live up to the model. Terrorism 
and environmental pollution reflect the practicalities and the 
uncertainties. This is a situation of reality, and it has to be accepted 
if equal status for states is to continue even if that equality is 
political and not economic or military. The alternative, conquest and 
occupation in a rule of might would be reversion and not progress. 
Just as condemnation of anti-Semitism and racism, although 
accepted in principle, has yet to become universally effective, so fears 
of national security and survival have delayed the acceptance in practice 
of dispute resolution solely by peaceful means. Fears for survival 
present psychological as well as factual and doctrinal barriers to the 
elimination of armaments and have also been the causes of delay in 
law-making. Statesmen need to acquire the ability to ensure that 
situations do not become so intractable that use of force is the only 
method open to one side or the other in inter-State dispute. It follows 
that if the purposes of the UN are to be effected the powers and 
procedures of the Security Council must be enforced as they could be 
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under Art 33(2) and Cap VII of the UN Charter. In present circumstances 
that depends on consensus, and it is wishful thinking to believe that it 
will soon become the invariable practice. It may be that if war is 
inevitable in any system of inter-State relations, some inhibiting factor 
like the threat of nuclear devastation to contain or limit conflict may 
be essential however dangerous and undesirable. This kind of dichotomy 
can be seen in attitudes to nuclear and chemical weapons. For example, 
the official attitude of Britain is that retention of nuclear weapons is 
an essential element of deterrance, and, in any case, the weapon cannot 
be disinvented. At the same time, Britain presses in arms control 
discussions for the elimination of chemical weapons - sometimes described 
as the 'small State's A-bomb' - but that weapon cannot be disinvented 
either. Even further, the danger of nuclear proliferation in the present 
reality of only mild discouragement may render it impossible for the 
USSR, the US, France and Britain to dispense with nuclear weapons 
although verification techniques may now be sufficiently advanced to 
police such a dispensation. Verification of any agreement on the 
elimination of chemical weapons poses greater difficulties. Such weapons 
can be hidd~n at production and deployment more easily than nuclear 
weapons in similar verification situations. 
Technology, however, produces tools which are the means towards 
solutions of problems, but only when in the right hands. What seems 
obvious in theory but difficult in practice is that there can be no 
absolute national security without international security. Yet it is 
often believed that international security in practice would be only the 
sum of individual national security. But national security is not merely 
a military matter. It is also a defence of the way of life of a society 
and of the expectations ruld welfare of the people. Some societies are 
prepared to adopt policies which accept military risks in order to retain 
or attain the economic and welfare goals they seek. Such policies depend 
on the nature of the threats against a society. If nuclear deterrence 
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has been instrumental in preserving peace in Europe nevertheless in the 
global economic interdependence of today's international system nuclear 
deterrence alone may be too simple a concept and insufficient to ensure 
survival of the national way of life, attainment of national goals, or 
even maintenance of the standard of living. Just as technology may help 
to effect economic changes, so dissent and opposition may effect 
political change. 
Now the possibility has to be considered that some change in 
relationships between the us and the USSR will affect seriously the 
distribution of world power reducing the bi-polar nature of international 
relations and increasing multi-polarity and the influence of the UN. s 
Such a development might arise from a combination of economic weakness of 
both super powers at a time when regional economic alliances (such as the 
EEC) and national economic strength (as of Japan) increasingly make 
themselves felt. 
Desire for change is endemic in 'have not' societies, whereas 
'have' societies want to maintain the status guo. Between the two 
superficial examination notes the changes in power relationships without 
seeing changes in the international system which have been eff~cted 
incidentally during this Century. Those who long for a changed but still 
ordered system of world government see an unchanged world system 
dominated by State sovereignty and the threat or use of force. Those who 
resist encroachment on national sovereignty see defence expenditure as a 
first priority and the use of force as final arbiter. The reality is 
that so long as either school exists the other must be prepared to deal 
with it. 
Attempts to write contemporary history are doomed to fail for the 
picture is never complete. Whatever lessons seem to be emerging they are 
liable to be falsified by events. Whatever objectives are delineated and 
sought they are overtaken and merged and weakened or fade before a 
continuous rising up of others now assuming greater importance and 
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urgency. Of itself the process induces change based on retrospective 
values. Comprehension of, and movement toward, ideal situations are 
always accompanied by contemporary difficulties which inhibit bold 
political dicisions (or inhibit Lhe carrying through of them). 
Change is nonetheless apparent. To acknowledge the State of 
Israel quick recognition by the US and the USSR pushed the UN to adopt it 
as accomplished fact: it will take longer to transform the PLO into the 
government of an Arab Palestine State. But the change which the UN 
effected of a general recognition of the State of israel (notwithstanding 
Arab dissent), instead of the previously nonmal state by state process of 
recognition, has also brought into recognition the PLO as an entity in 
the international system. The limits have to be seen also for the 
conflicting actions which arise from majority decisions in the UN and 
national sovereignty sew discord as can be seen in Lebanon. Recognition 
of an Arab Palestine State will further destabilize the Middle East. 
Change, therefore, must remain in the curtailment of national sovereignty 
and its actions inimical to the UN objective. How will the acceptance 
and furtherance of the UN objective be secured? The case of Israel 
offers scant precedent so far in its relations with the UN, or with UN 
peacekeeping forces. 
International law will be affected by change in the system, and 
international law retrospectively will effect it. Regional arrangements 
will have their treaty constitutions, and bi-lateral treaties will 
underpin economic understandings with the World Bank and IMF and with 
other States. Debtor States that have difficulty in increasing their 
national indebtedness because they cannot, or will not, conform to 
limiting conditions postulated by lenders will increasingly seek help on 
a state-to-state basis either by regional combinations or by joining the 
camps of greater powers. 
Economic weakness is relative: current Russian activity in the 
Middle East and Egypt is evidence that it does not entirely inhibit 
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search for global power. American policies have simila~ att~ibutes and 
purposes. This points to a direct connection between economic means to 
political influence and trade promotion, for in the long run one fuels 
the other. 
It might be premature, however, to take it for granted that the 
strategy of promoting both political influence and trade by display of 
military might has been abandoned finally. 
Disa~ent and Arms Control 
The effect of international law on the p13ce of war is diffused by 
the demands of national sovereignty. Assuming the potential 
effectiveness of the UN, in theory States have restricted their former 
customary right to make war except as directed by the Security Councilor 
in accordance with the limitations imposed by Art 51. of the UN Charter. 
But many States have engaged in warfare since 1945 apparently without 
regard for the procedures of the UN or of Art 51. Such actions might be 
taken to demonstrate a disregard for the UN Charter and its underlying 
philosophies. There are objections to that hypothesis: 
(a) The majority of member States have not felt their vital 
interests to be so endangered that they have had to consider 
the matter of the Charter in these terms, at least on their 
own behalf. 
(b) A series of failures of the Security Council to take 
effective action was coupled with doubts about collective 
security possibilities and (more urgent at the vital time) 
fears of the timing by which collective security measures 
could be mounted by the UN. This led to conflict without 
reference to the provisions of the Cha~ter beyond reliance on 
Art 51. 
There have been instances of aggressive war since 1945 but it 
would be foolish to believe that the UN has been entirely discredited 
even though its reputation has fluctuated. Contributing to the UN 
failures in some of the instances avoidance of a war has been due to 
action by one, or sometimes both, of the super powers whose efforts have 
been directed to avoiding direct confrontation as a result of other 
states' wars or their own disagreements (if, indeed, they had wanted war 
at all). 
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Where there have been armed conflicts between States they have not 
been because of interpretations of Art 51 or of international law however 
expressed. They have been expressions of national sovereignty. Whatever 
the legal situation if peDmanent peace between States as the basis of 
international relations is what is sought (as resolved in the UN Charter) 
the peoples of the United Nations and their leaders have to be convinced 
of it. 9 
What would the motivation for a shift to permanent peace be? It 
must be political rather than moral for, if the change could not be 
imposed but must be the result of a political consensus, moral values 
would be subordinated to an amalgam of national interest values, and 
survival is not a moral issue whatever moral duty a government owes for 
its peoples' survival. Realities rather than idealism would dictate and 
Morganthau's now dated and no longer universal statement still has 
relevance 
"It is one of the great paradoxes of the 20th Century that as the 
preservation of peace has become a matter of survival for western 
civilisation the traditional instLUments for preserving it have 
become less effective: and more effective ones have not yet been 
devised".10 
The change would involve consequential disarmament and relocation 
of labour and a substantial re-shaping of the economies of the industrial 
States. It would probably release substantial arsenals of surplus 
weapons for international trading. If only for these reasons it would be 
unlikely to be either a swift, or a universally welcomed development. 
Progress towards the peaceful resolution of disputes through the UN was 
unlikely while the opposed positions of the US and the USSR and their 
followings dominated that scene. What now seems to be incontrovertible 
is that a change in the priority which the threat or use of force has in 
the present system represents the minimum position from which to approach 
h . 11 t e lssue. 
lnis Claude viewed disarmament with some suspicion, 
It ••• the power to destroy cannot be literally obliterated so long as 
human beings and their productive capacity exist; deindustrialization 
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and perhaps even depopulation of the globe are the ultimate 
requirements for making war impossible".12 
His emphasis on the desirable qualities which the change could bring, 
"pacific settlement proposes to leave states with nothing to fight 
about, and collective security proposes to confront aggressors with 
too much to fight againstJ disarmament proposes to deprive nations of anything to fight with".l 
reflected his belief in the unlikely acceptance of them. That is not to 
say that any progress towards permanent peace is possible if disarmament 
measures are ignored. Causation remains a principal element in the 
practice of peace and is as much a matter of 'hearts and minds' in 
international relations as it was in low intensity situations in Malaysia 
(even if forgotten in Vietnam). But if causes of war cannot be 
eliminated, and if deterrent measures do not deter, is disarmament 
possible while acceptance of some form of peaceful arbitration, and the 
findings of the arbitrator, remain matters for voluntary agreement by 
states exercising their sovereign powers? 
Arms control measures seem desirable to a growing section of 
populations,14 but evidence that a consequence is that the resolve for 
war of those who see armed conflict as an acceptable method of dispute 
resolution is weakened is not pe~ently reliable if only for the reason 
that circumstances alter cases. It is improbable that 'peace movements' 
have, as yet, influenced Changes in a State's view of the place of war. 
Similarly, the success of NATO's deterrent policy over 40 years has 
probably influenced some calculation of the costs and means of the policy 
in relation to the likelihood of war. Such calculations will be made 
increasingly in the contemporary circumstances, but unless the material 
capability to make war is removed questions of the use of force remain 
hypothetical for people until their interests are directly involved. But 
if "international politics is of itself necessarily power politics"l!> 
people will continue to see solutions in terms of power as they do in 
domestic situations where the application of class or economic power is 
normal. 
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The factors which make up national interest are not without 
opposed elements, but the concept of national interest may disguise 
internal conflicts such as the, perhaps, inexorable animosities which 
arise from ethnic differences such as Slav, Croat, Serb and Albanian from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the artificial 'nation' of Yugo-Slavia. 
Tribal differences as in Zimbabwe and Nigeria; religious differences as 
in India, Lebanon and Ireland; and long-standing colour and economic 
differences as in the US have similar effects. Even in emergent and 
ex-colonial States the need to secure and maintain defined, agreed and 
safe boundaries both external and internal (as between India and China; 
Israel and the Arab States; or internal as in Cyprus), leads to use of 
power in spite of a long and respectable history of arbitral boundary 
awards. 
The opportunism which exists in international politics cannot be 
ignored. It may be 
"more conspicuous when nations go to war: it is still strong in peace. 
The most popular vision of peace is of nations living independently 
each respecting the rights and territories of others, and each 
belonging to a kind of brotherhood. The brotherhood of nations, 
however, tends to be hierarchical and opportuniGt. Peace still 
depends directly or indirectly on military power. While we observe 
the role of military power when it dramatically breaks the peace, we 
tend to ignore its role when it ends a war or preserves the peace".16 
It may be that such a philosophy or historical interpretation 
gives less credit to any change of peoples' attitudes, or change in the 
system of international relations, which the existence and experience of 
the UN may have effected and is effecting. Or it may be that the 
philosophy ignores or rejects any peacekeeping capability of the UN 
which, endeavouring to avoid any semblance of enforcement by means of 
military power, has operated on the sufferance of the belligerent 
parties. Philosophies seeking to delineate causes of war often pay 
insufficient attention to the antithetic question of the causes of peace, 
except to say that it is enforced and artificial. Yet both war and 
peace, like law, are expressions of the will of States with the 
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difference that whilst war may be imposed on a State as the alternative 
of surrender and occupation, peace cannot be so imposed - only occupation 
and cease fire which remains conflict not peace. The state of Israel in 
its early if partial recognition and subsequent history is an example and 
it may yet have to consider an alternative of joint sovereignty if 
conflict is to be ended and the place of war adjusted to economic 
reality. 
Given a general acceptance of the provisions of the UN Charter the 
UN may be capable of substantiating what Dickenson believed. He said 
that war 
"will be eliminated eventually not by the strategy of prevention, but 
by the development of an adequate procedure fOf controlling and 
digesting change in international relations".l 
Humanitarian Concepts and Arms Control. 
Humanitarian restrictions in war are designed in part to mitigate 
the technically possible effects which can arise from the nature and 
quantities of weapons available to the combatants. Arms control measures 
agreed and verified in peacetime will effect this also, but new weapons 
which have not been subject to arms control discussion will additionally 
be available. 
Too much humanitarian content should not be read into those 
arsenals that have escaped restraint since the established humanitarian 
principle of minimum force is wholly compromised by certain weapons of 
mass destLUction which, in any case, make minimum force a relative term. 
This has led to agitation for the control of such mass destruction 
weapons although until recently the demand has been focussed more on 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 
Opposition to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons does not 
spring primarily from any foundation of international law, or consciously 
perhaps from knowledgeable humanitarian feelings,18notwithstanding 
current discussions regarding chemical weapons and the 1972 Convention on 
Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons. The concern is rather 
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dictated by fears for the survival of our species. 
In differentiating be~Neen the morality of one weapon as compared 
with others opposition to war itself is neglected. In respect of a 
particular war the diffentiating is liable to be bet' .... een conventional '"rar 
taken as concerning combatant forces and nuclear and chemical war in 
·Nhich entire civilian populations will ce at risk. This is not only a 
matter of the weapons' effects but nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons are weapons of surprise as well as of indiscrimination and are 
likely to affect civilian and military alike without regard for minimum 
force in its customary meaning. 
Limitation of conventional weapons has been less hardly pressed 
universally as the Reviews regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty show. 
progress in the Vienna Conventional Stability Talks can be expected but 
unless surplus weapons resulting from any agreement are destroyed that 
surplus may find its way to other States outside Europe. It is 
inescapable that the combination of aircraft or missile and high 
explosive aimed at civilian targets and populations is as much in breach 
of international law as if the bombs and warheads were nuclear or 
chemical. 
It is understandable that attention should be directed to nucl~ar 
'Neapons even if that has the indirect effect of making conventional war 
seem more acceptable and general and complete disannament more difficult 
to envisage. Fear and abhorrence of nuclear weapons have grown not only 
from the weapon and the complex and still unresolved total nature of its 
effects but also from reiteration of the continuing effects of the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings of 1945. Such abhorrence and fear is 
greatly worsened by accidents to nuclear plants such as Three Mile Island 
and Checnobyl. In perspective but not justification, the actual casualty 
figures of the two Japanese cities are dwarfed by those of even the 
revolutionary and guerrilla conflicts of the Century some of which - the 
Karens in Bu~ and guerrillas in Central and South America, and the PLO 
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and others in the Middle East - still continue their fighting. 
it is the potential of nuclear power which frightens. 
However, 
The place of war is affected by the revulsion felt towards nuclear 
weapons, and the instantaneous capability of missiles with nuclear 
warheads plays a part because it induces a feeling of defencelessness 
against the inhumanity of the weapon and its means of delivery. 
In the past humanitarian conduct was not vital to the concept of 
war as a measure of State power either in the settlement of disputes or 
in colonial conquest. The introduction of new weapons did not affect 
humanitarian aspects decisively even if some aplications such as 'dumdum' 
bullets were deplored. Now there may be considerable differences in 
attitudes between States which can use force without fear of escalation 
to nuclear warfare and those whose resort to armed force may, or is 
likely to, initiate nuclear war. Neither the elimination nor 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a foregone conclusion, and the 
view that chemical weapons are the small States' equivalent of the 
nuclear weapon is being resisted, not merely in the nuclear States. 
No doubt each nuclear State has studied the attitudes to the role 
and the interpretation of humanitarian law within it of those upon whom 
nuclear weapon would depend. 
Collective Security. 
Such information is not available here. 
The concept of collective security formerly implied co-operation 
between a limited number of States bound by treaty relationships, and it 
was subject to change through circumstances including defeat in war. 
That system was theoretically altered by the Covenant of the League 
(Arts 8 to 12 and 16) and now by the extensive provisions of the UN 
Charter making the organization and administration of international 
collective action a matter for the UN. But since the Korean War States 
have not given up their sovereignty in the matter of intervention in the 
war of other States to the ad hoc arrangements which are implied by the 
UN Charter (except in the limited way of peacekeeping and observation 
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forces which have been mounted from time to time by the UN). 
In the circumstances little need be said here beyond; 
(a) There is no proof that the provisions of Cap VII of the UN Charter 
will operate so long as the a~d forces remain national in eve~1 
sense. 
(b) A collective security policy which relies en natiar~l forces, 
arsenals and state of readiness for war (even ~~ough a place for war 
does not necessarily indicate a readiness for war - or vice versa), 
postulates such a time lag between commencement of '".rar ar.d ~~e UN 
intervention as to be ineffective in preventing .....ar. 
Peace is an Objective not a policy (as President Reagan said), but 
without a peace policy the objective of peace will not be attained. A 
policy for peace is explicit in the UN Charter but its weapons of 
deterrence, a~ control and collective action in ~~e present situation of 
the UN are related directly only to the postponement of war not to its 
elimination. Collective security measures are not so much a test of the 
UN as of the member States. Experience of the 19i3 Middle East War, t,l1e 
Iraq-Iran war, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon shows that if reliance 
on UN diplomacy and public opinion proves unavailing the member States 
are unlikely to support an interventionary military role for the UN. 
To that extent it is doubtful if the collective security 
provisions of the UN Charter have affected the place of war in society. 
But it has not been possible (or thought desirable) to put Cap VIII 
provisions into effective collective military action. 
In many of the instances of a~d conflict since the Korean War, 
and despite UN Resolutlons calling for cease fires, the latent threat of 
collective action by the UN has failed to prevent the outbreak and 
continuation of inter-State hostilities. 
Individual ready forces are maintained for instance by the US, the 
USSR, France and NATO, but their immediate services are available for 
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national or alliance purposes. They are not permanently allocated to the 
UN under Art 43 of the Charter. 
It has no doubt been considered whether a more immediate threat 
from a standing (UN) force would inhibit the escalation to armed conflict 
of inter-State disputes, and whether States would make permanent 
allocations of anned units to the UN. This has to be weighed against the 
probability that the benefit of immediate availability would be lost in 
debate as to whether the force should be used in an~ particular incident. 
perhaps the calculation by aggressive States is really whether 
effective collective action is likely at all in the absence of a standing 
UN military force. 
Justice and Conduct in War. 
An enquiry into the application of international law germane to 
war wO\lld be incomplete without reference to common standards pertinent 
to justness of cause and conduct which international law either specifies 
or seeks to endorse in its efforts to offer assurance of law and order, 
for it is in concepts of justness that international law is brought to 
bear on the realities of war. Other matters illustrating the nature of 
international law in regulating the conduct of States is provided for in 
inter-State conventions. Justness is not only understandable to the 
citizen from his domestic experience, but in and as regards war it is 
something which affects him in a direct, immediate and personal way which 
the texts of treaties do not. It is by the concepts of justness that the 
international law of war places direct responsibilites on individuals as 
the Charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals made clear. 
In the matter of war prohibition by law can become effective only 
with the force of public opinion which would be strengthened if the 
responsibilities of the individual were more widely known. This is the 
case especially in the matter of obedience to orders where the position 
of subordinates in a disciplined service in active operations is 
difficult. That difficulty is only one example of the impossibility of 
equating even a just cause with justness to every individual in promoting 
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the cause. Justness of both means and ends diverge more in war than in 
other operations of states. 
Efforts by humanitarian codes to mitigate the worst possibilities 
of war obscure the essential unjustness of the operations of war. 
Experience has shown that whilst war is tolerated, limitations must be 
placed on its practices. How difficult this may be is shown by the fact 
that in the major spheres of political judgment nuclear weapons are 
proposed as the strategical and tactical foundations of future 
operations. Any war fought with such weapons must be unjust by 
traditional standards however laudable the cause. It may be true that if 
the place of war has remained little changed by international law in this 
Century, (though public opinion, as yet unorganized, may be in advance of 
lawlnaking), the means of war have retrogressed far behind the traditional 
ideas of justness and humanitarian law, and some indiscriminate weapons 
are without clear and unequivocal prohibition. Such an example 
underlines the difficulty in international relations of matching legal 
prohibition with moral injunction. 
War will rarely work justice for the people as individuals however 
just a state's cause may be and this is a reason why international law is 
promoted if possible to eliminate war, and otherwise to mitigate its 
effects. But history has generally demonstrated that 'might' is 'right' 
and is the stronger party in peace and victor in war,19affording a reason 
for the peSSimistic outlook of some analysts. Few wars could be 
categorized absolutely as 'just' wars for neither might nor victory can 
of themselves indicate justness or rightness. In practice justness 
follows judicial decision no matter how unjust that may be. 2 oMilitary 
decision is another matter and in international relations the 
absoluteness of justice and right give way to the expediency and 
practicality of reality. Just war, therefore, remains a relative 
concept, but even if the cause for which a war is fought is just - for 
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example, a war against a real aggressor - the actual operations of war 
will work injustices of one kind or another. The haphazard and selective 
drafting of individuals for armed service will ensure this. 
If as a justification for the abolition of capital punisr~nt a 
State declares that it has no right to take human life, it could only 
justify a contra~! view in war to defend itself from aggression 0: ~r.en 
acting under the lawful authority of the UN. In the latter case a State 
would have to accept the burden of deciding on the justness of t~e UN 
position. But there can be no virtue in a concept of ~~e sanctity of 
human life of the adjudged criminal whilst exposing conscripted forces to 
a State's war of aggression. 
In the absence of an absolute system of collective security by 
voluntary forces the effect of international law on the place of justice 
arising in and of war is likely to be restricted and retrospective. The 
objectives of international law promote the legality of resistance to 
aggressive war. Thus law creates a reason for war in ~~e same way that 
the medieval moralists' definition created "just cause" as a reason for 
war. Initiating collective help at the behest of the Security Council 
must be taken to be in pursuit of the justice of international law's 
attempt to substitute other methods of arbitration instead of war. It 
follows that 'just war' is not a legal concept even though the expression 
might be endorsed by the UN in any specific case. Just war fails to 
discourage wars for most could be justified by one side, or by both, by 
contemporary standards and the definitions applied. For international 
law war is a fact not a morality, and with an absolute system of 
collective security aggressive war 'NOuld be unprofitable as well as 
impractical. Collective security requires reliance on a majority of 
states adhering to a definition of aggression and opposition to those in 
breach of it. 
Prior to the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and 
the UN Charter, it was thought that war was a lawful exercise of 
sovereignty or, if not, then 
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"an institution recognized by international law as a condition or fact 
found and regulated by it". 1 
Now even the idea that a legal right of self-defence exists under the 
Charter is sometimes disputed. It is said that "it is flatly denied by 
the Charter itself", for 
"Art 51 comes at the very end of Chapter VII which is entirely devoted 
to the duties and functions of the United Nations Securi ty Council". 
Thus, "the Charter does not confer any right, but if an inherent 
right exists outside the Charter (and some international lawyers have 
questioned what 'inherent' means) then the inherent right is subject 
to the rules of the Security ~ouncil and only ... until the Security 
Council has taken measures. ,,2 
In any case, the history of the actions of the Security Council may 
continute to encourage the view of independent decision. 23 Beyond the 
argument lies method. President wilson'S ideal of collective security 
for the League of Nations was a projection of the balance of power policy 
which had kept Europe more or less from substantial war between the Great 
powers during this Century to 1914. Attainment of the ideal was not 
accomplished, not because it was intrinsically impossible but because it 
was never attempted, and half-hearted imposition of sanctions - as in the 
Italy-Abyssinia dispute - was no substitute. Similarly, what were 
intended to be the military or coercive provisions of the UN Charter were 
abandoned or rarely or substantially invoked (with the exception of Korea 
and the Congo conflicts). In the Iraq-Iran war, States, and not the UN, 
took some steps in the Gulf to protect neutral interests but mounting a 
UN peackeeeping and election overseeing force is delayed by disagreement. 
Failures in the security Council can reflect disagreement in the 
General Assembly where, given the situation of political disagreements 
since 1947, the provisions of international law have not been applied to 
encourage balance of power or to prevent stabilisation of it. 
In spite of fundamental weaknesses caused by super power 
'confrontation', the task of identifying bases of equilibrium and 
preventing the erosion of them still falls on the UN. In reality the 
organization can intervene only with active assistance from the super 
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powers. But between American concepts of global freedom for the Western 
political system, and Russian desire for the global domination of 
communism there does stand a kind of collective security. Without 
debating whether the USSR wants to continue to expand westward, or 
intends to do so, or whether the NATO States would ever fight except in 
self-defence, the fact is that direct war between them has been avoided 
so far by their actions and not by any idealistic views or deference to 
each other's beliefs. 24 That avoidance of war has been due to respect 
for international law would be to give undue weight to the institutions 
in which the States argue such issues and cases. To say that no respect 
at all is due to international law - and justice of cause - would be to 
misunderstand the progress which is being made. 
The situation is not free from anomalies. Arms races and arms 
research competition continue, and proxy wars have not been eliminated 
even if CUba is withdrawing troops from Africa. Whatever effect 
international law has had in the prevention of wars, its effect on the 
place of war is different. Defence expenditures by States make it 
obvious that most believe they must be prepared for war as though war 
will continue as the final arbiter in their policies for offence or 
defence, or that military strength will enable them to avoid war. War 
may cost too much, but even without a war policy, results may still 
depend on forces in being. But any theory that if ends are not 
attainable without war they would be attainable by war, has less 
acceptability today. 
It would be easy to draw conclusions from an assumption that arms 
planning and acquisition is re-active, and that mirror-image reactions 
are what fashions arms inventories. Discussion of military balance may 
reinforce such an assumption. If that is really the position it must 
dispose of the idea that weapons are procured with only defensive use in 
mind, for the intention is to match what is seen by one side as 
aggressive intenion by the other. But counter-measures are in themselves 
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forms of offensive tactics and require offensive weapons. Further, in 
the context of the US and the USSR, the defence of one ideology in the 
long tenn supposes the elimination of the other conflicting ideology 
where the basis of one is world domination. The weapons, however, may 
not be exclusively military. 
If military domination cannot be attained without economic 
sacrifice, as experience indicates, it is not clear whether economic 
domination must accompany military domination or is the result of it.l~ 
Japan is now an example of one situation having formerly been an example 
of the other. Now it is clear that war and military domination are 
subject to international legal prohibitions, restraints and limitations, 
but it is not clear that economic domination is also so constrained. 
Beyond matters of expropriation and compensation, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the actions of multi-national 
commercial activities are controlled, if at all, by domestic law. 26 
Questions of separate or interlocking military and economic 
domination will increasingly arise as the Russian economy prospers (if, 
with the help of Western technology, it does) as is happening in Japan. 
If private international law has application to inter-State trading 
economic conflict as opposed to economic co-operation between States will 
require an application of public law as in the EEC. 
It has been thought that war is the price to be paid for 
stability, but it becomes increasingly obvious that peace is the 
investment essential for economic stability. Just as uninhibited 
sovereignty is no longer possible in matters of peace and war, so 
untramrnelled economic sovereignty can be exercised no longer. A 
difficulty is that the real difference between war and pe3ce has been 
emasculated by 'cold war' the effects of which can be seen in comparing 
the economic circumstances of the US and USSR with that of Japan. Peace 
can only be a state in which war is not envisaged, planned or financially 
provided for. But the comparison is not simple for Japan's military 
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expenditure is considerable even if representing only H of GNP.;: 7 There 
is the implication that the percentage of GNP which is allocated for 
warlike purposes however described may be a State's own index of its 
situation of real peace or cold war. To eliminate cold war as well as 
armed conflict by promoting real peace is the fundamental purpose of the 
UN. 
To be prepared for war or defence requires one kind of analysis, 
but in any analysis of justness rather than expediency before war is 
initiated no aggressor's calculations are unbiased. This has always been 
so, but the UN Charter (Art 34) should afford a more unprejudiced ( 
examination if Art 33 has not already resolved the dispute. That is not 
to say just war theories are wholly discredited even if now largely 
theoretical. Although States may be committed by economic or political 
alignment to one side in a dispute there is increasing interest displayed 
by their peoples in the justness of causes as presented to viewers and 
readers. 
Except when circumscribed by strict censorship, independent 
reporting, however, is likely to concentrate on the evils rather than on 
offic~l justifications for war and its supposed necessities (and 
i"-, 
blessings), even if examples of heroism and chivalry will not be entirely 
unrernarked. If there is truth in such a propositon, what should be 
obvious to all (rather than as formerly only to those in the battle area) 
are the costs of war, for modern communications systems provide many 
opportunities for considering conflicts world wide. People, as well as 
States, can now consider the advantages, disadvantages and the costs of 
war. Today it is no longer the fact of war or its operations which 
ren~in unscrutinized, and administrations may no longer be able to take 
their people into war with acclaim or resignation and without reference 
to the costs. Vietnam rather than Suez or Korea may be the precedent. 
would nationalism and patriotism repeat the Falklands Islands scena::io 
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for Gibraltar? But any hypothesis might fail through the introduction 
of religious fervour into the dispute. 
Perhaps greater separation of the military from the social costs of 
government is apparent. Spiralling costs to maintain military 
credibility are matched by equally spiralling health, welfare and 
education costs. Any theory that expenditure on social services is 
pointless if the State does not maintain effective defences can have 
little account of time scale - other than some arbitrary guess - for wars 
are not usually scheduled in a State's short or long term outlooK 
(although 'no war before •.• ' may be). Whether a war is planned or is 
forced upon a State it is only during the course of the operations that 
the economics of defence become apparent in, 
(a) the ever increasing cost of the minimum technology believed to be 
required to mount an operation or present a credible defence 
tested against performance (including failed deterrence), 
(b) the costs involved in utilizing what has been provided through 
earlier defence budgets, the continuing costs for provision of 
more munitions, the other opportunity costs of war, and personal 
involvement affect the people more directly and obviously, and 
(c) the costs of rehabilitation to be seen in the progressive 
destruction and in what will be required to return a State to a 18 
peace footing including the war's addition to the national debt. 
Realisation that the most effective deterrent lies in collective 
security (and preferably in a regime of general and complete disarmament) 
may be awakened in time under necessities that demand greater control of 
expenditure, material and people than war affords. If such an awakening 
occurs it is likely to have been influenced more by international 
economic pressures than the exercise of national sovereignty in defending 
its customary embrace. Demography is also important if only in 
comparing India and China's fecundity with European and North American 
population projections. Even if war's military operations demand 
proportionately fewer hands its logistics may be starved for lack of 
production and maintenance effort. 
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Realisation of the improbability of obtaining advantage even from 
victory in war ought to lead to lack of support for it, at least whilst 
the international system offers hope for economic and physical survival. 
Experience points to the danger that if a collective economic and 
security system does not evolve to prevent war some limited and 
ncn-nuclear wars may continue. One possible belligerent might calculate 
a war would prove rewarding in the short term thus upsetting any 
hypothesis of the unrewarding nature of modern war. The fact that at the 
end of the Iraq-Iran war Iran was without any sizeable external debt and 
was earning £6 billions a year in oil revenue has to be put alongside the 
loss of life and treasure and the costs of reconstruction. 
The role of international law and international institutions to 
document and enforce measures for restricting the ability of States to 
make war is clear, but in practical terms national sovereignty still 
inhibits definitive universal steps to the relegation of the place of war 
in the priorities of society. Evidence for this is clear. In a violent 
age the ability of states to maintain law and order is continuously tmder 
pressure but it is a measure of the degree of international co-operation 
that the UN has had relatively few successes in actually preventing wars. 
Successes in negotiating cease-fire agreements, truces and armistices 
have not removed the underlying causes of disputes (for example, Kashmir, 
Cyprus and Lebanon). In any case, the peaceful settlement of some 
disputes, or the post-war settlement of others, should not be taken for 
the acceptance of a principle or as evidence of a lower priority for war 
as a consequence in the face of the contrary evidence of post-1945 
history of over 100 armed conflicts of varying degrees of intensity and 
carnage. 
Illegitimate conduct in war seems to be an inevitable corollary of 
war and may arise directly from the place given to the violent resolution 
of breaches of domestic law and order. The treatment of prisoners of war 
in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the genocidal policies of Pol Pot, 
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the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against both Iraqi Kurds and in the 
war againgst Iran, the use of long-range missiles against cities and 
merchant shipping by both Iraq and Iran, and the 'death squads' of 
Nicaragua are examples of the obstinate nature of the problem of matching 
performance to the ideals of the Geneva conventions. 
From the evidence it would seem that even if the thought of war is 
more difficult to entertain the practical possibilities for it are 
unchanged, and the consequential conduct continues to reflect the nature 
of war for which a place in society continues to be accorded. 
summary. 
The place of war in society is neither constant nor typical. It 
is not constant because at any time it depends on national resolve and 
ambition and on fluctutating attitudes within the UN. Resolve and 
ambition are also reflected in the capability and readiness of armed and 
economic forces. A belief in the use of force to attain foreign policy 
objectives, or in defence of sovereignty, is essential for war to have a 
high place in society. On the other hand the place of war is 
inconsistent depending as it does on the condition of stability in the 
international system which may offer no likelihood or necessity for the 
use of force in a foreseeable future. All these conditions are subject 
to frequent change and re-assessment. 
The place of war is not typical because the requirements for the 
use of force differ as between States. More particularly today the 
requirements differ as between nuclear States, between a nuclear as 
opposed to a non-nuclear State, or between non-nuclear States. 
Much of the formal international agreement on arms control since 
the second World War has related to nuclear weapons and nuclear testing. 
This has affected the place of nuclear war only slightly if at all, 
because the remaining nuclear arsenals only refer to deterrence at lower 
levels of armament not to the elimination of nuclear war. Nevertheless, 
both the WPO and NATO appear to hold the view that nuclear war would 
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result in some kind of stalemate without military decision. At the same 
time the Non-Proliferation Treaty is intended to make it more difficult 
for the non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons. But the 
Non-proliferation Treaty may be less than completely effective. 
Means of communication related to geophysical factors have widened 
the areas of interdependence for many States, and modern weapon systems 
have increased the danger of global war for States with global interests. 
Although events are stirring after years of unproductive effort 
in Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, little actual progress 
has yet been made in conventional arms control beyond some agreement 
relative in biological and certain inhumane weapons. Progress in arms 
technology has provided weapons of increasing killing-power and range. 
Expanding facilities for a~nt production on a worldwide scale has 
increased the availability of sophisticated weapons to all States that 
can pay for them in whatever manner is acceptable to suppliers, or that 
can form a relationship with a supplying State which facilitates military 
aid and assistance. That commercial and political situation has made it 
easier for States to contemplate the use of force either alone (eg. Iraq) 
or with the aid of proxy or mercenary forces provided by 'sponsor' States 
(eg. Angola and Ethiopia). 
Changes in the place of war which might have resulted from 
stricter adherence to the UN Charter have, therefore, been discouraged by 
the increased incidence of weapons producing industries and availability 
of weapons. 
In particular cases adherence to the Charter might have been 
regarded as limitation of sovereign right, whereas a general attitude 
evident since 1945 (or perhaps since the Korean War) that on occasion a 
limited war if desirable might also be possible has sometimes been seen 
as a demonstration of sovereign right (eg. the Falklands Islands, Chad 
and Afghanistan). 
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Thus if as seems probable the place of war is dictated by: 
(i) Intention, 
(ii) availability of means and favourability of time and circumstances, 
and 
(iii)national and global public opinion, 
international law has not been a direct inhibiting factor on it, 
although the climate of opinion affecting intention at any time may be 
influenced by provisions of international law or by their absence. The 
correlative place of peace is also dictated by such reasons, as well as 
by international law since a balance in favour of negotiated settlements 
may be influenced by these means as well as being strengthened or 
counterbalanced by the availability of arms. 
The ideals and influence of the UN and its international legal 
standing may direct leaders towards negotiation. At the same time, 
contemporary movement toward increased interference in the internal 
affairs of States - inevitable in the context of the UN - may prove 
counterproductive. General agreements such as the 1986 Stockholm 
Document are factors in international relations where the parties agree 
on the objectives of the agreement. Direct interference (as with South 
Africa), not necessarily military, is another factor especially dangerous 
where such interference is orchestr~ted outside the UN and with, perhaps, 
special reasons. 
Indirectly influenced by a climate of law and order and of 
economic necessity the strategic aims of military forces in Europe have 
been changed from war-making to deterrence. Although related 
specifically to ~~TO/wpo this change has a global effect not limited to 
the us and the USSR. 29 Except in an atmosphere of desire for law and 
order, and the effect of such desire on public opinion, international law 
itself cannot be said to have been the real and direct reason for the 
changed strategy; that resulted from fear of nuclear war. 
The future of international peace is now balanced between 
agreements as to how States should conduct their affairs and the direct 
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limits of national sovereignty in an international system with modern 
conditions and communications. There are lessons to be learned from 
current affairs in the USSR and East Europe. (I write in 1989). 
Problems of control emphasize both the interdependence and the 
mutual oppositions of States in an international system without central 
direction or enforcement efficiency. Universal history is one of the ebb 
and flow of State power. This is unlikely to abate in the present 
international system. It is important that a climate of law and order 
should not be utilized to enable States to build-up power for regional or 
global domination. 3 ° This can be prevented by building-up a contrary power 
such as the UN not only as a source of law but also as an instrument of 
assurance. To be effective the steps toward such a conclusion are 
matters for international consensus not military power, but questions 
remain as to whether national, religious and racial interests can be 
subjugated to international interests. 
International law will continue to have little regulatory effect 
on the place of war, however, until arms control embraces not only the 
elimination of weapon systems but also controls the research and 
development of weapons both existing and new, and the strict regulation 
of the trade in arms. Any wish to effect change by less draconian 
measures of nuclear and conventional arms control even were they 
formalized in international law and supervised by international 
institutions, is subject to objection that what is inferred is relative 
and not definitive, and, in consequence, will not fundrunentally affect 
the place of war. 
Just how General and Complete Disarmament is to come about is 
still problematic, but if a place for war in the international system is 
to be denied it seems likely that only the inability to wage war will 
prevent war. It is not certain that such an outcome is pussible. In the 
interim, greater efforts to promote measures of collective security are 
indicated. 
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The dominance of science and engineering on the means of war will 
increasingly affect the place of war in the future. To offset the 
dangers inherent in unregulated scientific development collective 
political action has become important. There is a general trend now for 
technology, relatively uninhibited by law, to take the place of territory 
in the adversarial aims of States. As the same time, whilst satellite 
technology continues to progress and space satellites serve growing 
military and other purposes, anti-satellite weapons will contine to 
develop. Despite international law such weapons are likely to be 
stationed in space sooner or later unless collective action can persuade 
the super powers to oppose such a possibility. The effect of 
international law on developing technology is weak and it is as yet 
unclear how it will relate to future operations in space. 
This thesis might be brought aptly to its conclusion by a 
quotation from a recent advertisement: 
"The law exists to protect you, but can you afford to use it?". 
The question is relevant: it expresses what is fundamental to the 
international system at present, where an ideal effect of international 
law would be the elimination of war. But States have consistently shown 
by their actions they they do not rely exclusively on the provisions of 
international law in issues of peace and war. It is not an absence of 
international legal aid which is the culprit: it is a congenital belief 
that other States believe they cannot afford to rely on law and order 
alone to survive. The UN is a 'legal protection group' in which States 
are already subscribers, but they are not willing or able to make the 
organization reliable and in consequence they do not rely on it. Whether 
to make it reliable is impossible, or whether non-reliance is a result of 
deliberate choice or a symbol of independence is not entirely clear. 
The upshot is that the social effort undermines the intended 
effect of international law on the place of war which continues to depend 
on the maintenance of a correct and worldwide balance between economic 
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and socio-political requirements. The task of nationalism and national 
sovereignty is to will the global means. The task of the member States 
of the UN in the absence of a political centre of power is to guide 
society to effect that worldwide balance. 
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22. Joyce, JA: (1983) pp 81,82. 
23. Of course, this is a continuing expression by member States of 
their sovereignty. 
24. A question is whether NATO is solely a defensive military 
coalition accepting co-existence with an opposed political 
situation and intention. Or whether, as well as a defensive 
militaLY effort an offensive political and propaganda effort should 
be expanded which might not contradict para.9 of the Hannel Report 
on the Future of the Alliance. Another question is whether the 
Alliance is concerned with a common enemy or with a common goal -
denial or protection of universal communism. (For the Harmel 
Report see NATO Facts and Figures (1988) pp 402 et seg. ) 
25. The situation as between the USSR and the Eastern Bloc States is 
relevant if not easy to disentangle. 
26. GA'IT is "An integrated set of bilateral trade agreements aimed at 
the abolition of quantitative trade restrictions and the reduction 
of tariff duties among the contracting parties". (Ene Brit (1971) 
21. P 700.) 
27. 1988 Expenditures were (in US dollars). 
US. 260,268 million. (6.4% of GNP). 
USSR. 320,800 million. (about 12 %of GNP). 
Japan. 15,298 million. (1% of GNP). 
(Military Balance 1989- 1990: pp 32, 208 and 210). 
28. There might also be demands to be met for reparations, or on the 
other hand Marshall aid type of assistance might be offered. 
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29. "The sense that 1988 was a year in which the nations of the world 
may have set a new course was fed by the extraordinary change 
during the year from a world dominated by long-running conflicts to 
one in which settlement through negotiations became the norm ... All 
around the globe belligerence gave way to compromise". (Strategic 
Survey 1988/1989: p 6). 
This should not be taken to mean all belligerence or that the 
norm is rigidly adhered to. Long-running disputes have their ebbs 
and flows and not only in India and Lebanon, and the 1988 
settlement of Namibia was not the result of Res.435(1976) but of US 
and USSR co-operation.) 
30. Global domination is costly and difficult in any case. As Paul 
Kennedy has pointed out, " ... the sheer variety of military 
contingencies that a global superpower like the United States has 
to plan for - all of which, in their way, place differing demands 
upon the anned forces and the weaponry they are likely to employ". 
(Kennedy, P (1989) P 523). 
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